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
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
A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS

BY

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PART II




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MORALS IN EVOLUTION

PART II

THE BASIS

CHAPTER I

THE EARLY PHASES OF THOUGHT

1. THE history of law and custom gives us one aspect of ethical evolution. It sets forth the standard of conduct, or rather the standards recognized by different societies at different times. But behind the question of the moral standard is that of the moral basis, the grounds on which morality rests, the spirit in which it is conceived. For besides the question what kind of action is expected from us by our neighbours, our rulers, our spiritual pastors and masters, moral philosophy has to recognize the further question how it is that these expectations arise. On what grounds do rules of action rest, what authority promulgates them and by what sanction are they enforced? If it happens to be the interest of any individual to disobey them, what reason, other than physical compulsion, can be assigned for adhering to them? What is the penalty of disobedience? What, if wrong is done, are the means of reconciliation? In other words, behind the question of the moral standard there is the philosophical question of the nature of moral obligation, of moral authority, of the moral sanction, or, to use one expression for them all, there is the question of the basis of the moral order.

To understand how men have conceived this question, and what sort of answers they attempted to propound for it, is the

task that remains for us. But to understand ethical evolution on this side we have first to turn to departments of thought that are not in their origin ethical. For men's views of what is right are necessarily steeped in influences derived from their whole outlook upon the world, the range of their mental capacity, their conception of the creating, sustaining, and governing causes of things, their theories of human life and society. We cannot therefore thoroughly understand the history of ethics without knowing something of the general development of thought. At the same time we cannot here deal with this development in all its fulness. We must refer to it only so far as it throws light upon our special question. We shall have, that is, to take account of what men think and of how they think upon certain fundamental questions that affect practice.

It follows that we shall have to examine however concisely some leading features of religious development. Indeed, according to one usage of terms we should have to concern ourselves with nothing else. For a man's religion is sometimes held to include the sum and substance of his vital thought, the final meaning for him of his total outlook upon the world, and if so it clearly includes ethics as a part. In a historical study, however, it is more convenient to consider religious belief as consisting in the conception of spiritual forces which control or affect affairs. In that sense religion and ethics, though intimately related, are not identical, nor is the religious view of the governance of the world, though vastly important, the only view with which we shall have to deal. We shall distinguish, though we shall not therefore separate, the religious, the ethical, the scientific and other lines of development, and follow each in turn so far as is necessary for our purpose.

2. Beginning our survey with the lower grades of thought, we shall first attempt to characterize primitive conceptions, religious or other, of the forces with which man has to deal. This will be the subject of the present chapter. The next chapter will deal with the bearing of these ideas upon Ethics.¹ To form a just

¹ The relation of religion so conceived to ethics is perhaps the central question both of religious and of ethical development, and few relations in sociology are harder to define in general terms. We cannot say that religion is the parent of morality, nor that morality begets religion.

conception of the lowest order of religious conceptions is, from the nature of the case, a matter of great difficulty. The beliefs held by primitive men are by no means uniform, nor have they always been clearly understood by those who report them. Without dogmatizing as to questions of origin we may begin our account with the undoubtedly rude and early conception to which the name of Animism has been given by anthropologists. Animism is in the broadest sense the theory of spirits, and the name and the definition are so far open to criticism that the theory of a single Creator might be said to be covered by the general term. But when we look a little further into the matter we find that the kind of spirits intended where the term Animism is used have certain distinguishing characteristics. To begin with, Animism sees spirits everywhere, not one spirit that underlies all things, but separate spirits underlying all manner of things as the efficient causes of their qualities and actions. This feature of Animism may be said to be a predominant form of belief throughout the savage world.¹ A stone,

Nor are they intrinsically independent factors which occasionally interact, for at times they fuse with one another and move forward in a single stream. At other times they part, yet they retain their influence upon one another and seem destined to reunion at a later stage.

¹ While the belief in the soul of man is probably universal, and the human soul is, as Professor Tylor says, the model on which the souls of animals and inanimate things are formed, the question how far the conception is extended by primitive races is one to which it would be hazardous to give any general answer. If the tendency to attribute all actions to a spirit were erected into an avowed principle, and consistently applied, everything capable of being conceived as a distinct object would become also the seat of a spirit. That this would involve much duplication, and, so to say, overlapping would present no difficulty to the animistic mode of thought, which does in fact frequently conceive a greater object as animated by one spirit, while the lesser objects which form its parts have each a spirit of its own. Thus among the Chinese "one of man's chief gods is the *Shen* pervading the Earth as a single entity: and those which dwell in its several parts, its mountains, hills, rivers, meres, rocks and stones, are likewise his divinities." (De Groot, vol. iv., p. 325.) The conception, if we try to think it out, raises questions of identity and of individuality which might puzzle us, but probably do not puzzle primitive man. Be this as it may, the tendency to people things with spirits with indiscriminate profusion is widespread if not universal in the primitive world. For numerous instances see Frazer, *Golden Bough*, vol. iii., p. 43 seq. *E. g.* "The Mantras, an aboriginal race of the Malay Peninsula, 'find or put a spirit everywhere, in the air they breathe, in the land they cultivate, in the forests they inhabit, in the trees they cut down, in the caves of the rocks. According to them the demon is the cause of everything that turns out ill. If they are sick, a demon is at

a tree, a blade of grass, the wind, an animal, a human being, a mountain, a river, the sea, the sky, the sun, the rain, an epidemic disease—any or all of these may be conceived by the savage mind as the dwelling-place or the manifestation, as the case may be, of a spiritual agency which controls their behaviour; and this spiritual agency may be the object of fear or worship, of prayer and supplication, possibly of cajolement or abuse, finally of actual physical violence. Naturally not all spirits move men alike. Harmless inanimate things are seldom at this stage the objects of much solicitude, unless by some accident of belief they are associated with a powerful spirit for some special reason. Thus, among the *Tshi* of the West African coast everything is supposed to be animated by indwelling spirits, but little attention is paid to the spirits of bushes, grasses, stones. More dangerous ones, as the spirits of the rivers and lagoons, the sea, the mountains, are the objects to which the *Tshi* cult devotes attention.¹ Nevertheless, spirits may inhabit the most unpromising exterior; thus an essential part of Australian belief is the indwelling of spirits in certain objects, generally oblong pebbles² called "churinga." But these fall within the explan-

the bottom of it; if an accident happens, it is still the spirit who is at work; thereupon the demon takes the name of the particular evil of which he is supposed to be the cause." (Frazer, iii. 48.)

¹ Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, p. 276.

² Stone-worship must be ranked among the most paradoxical developments of animism—a stone being to our minds the very type of the inanimate. Jevons (*History of Religion*, pp. 131-144) inclines to think that it is in most cases derivative, the stone having been originally an altar, but admits (p. 137) that the worship of remarkably shaped rocks would belong to primitive animism. Sir A. Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*, First Series, p. 12) ascribes the primitive worship of stones in India to "that simple awe of the unusual which belongs to no particular religion." We have here something simpler and more primitive than animism itself, to which further reference will be made later. The next stage is that the stone is the dwelling-place of a spirit. At a higher stage it is connected by a myth with some "saint, demi-god, or full-blown deity." Finally it may remain in a spiritual religion as a mere symbol. Sir A. Lyall "knew a Hindu officer of great shrewdness and very fair education, who devoted several hours daily to the elaborate worship of five round pebbles, which he had appointed to be his symbol of omnipotence. Although his general belief was in one all-pervading Divinity, he must have something symbolic to handle and address." (*Asiatic Studies*, First Series, p. 13.) For a discussion of the fetichistic and symbolic views of stone-worship, see also Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (ed. 1903), vol. ii., p. 160. Whatever its character stone-worship as an element in early religion is widespread. De la Sausseye (*Manual of the Science of Religion*, Eng. Tral. i., p. 85 ff.) finds it among

ation hinted above, for they were stones carried about by the men of the *Alcheringa*, the ancestors of the "great long-ago," who deposited their souls in them and left them by some tree or cave, from whence at times they pass into the children of the present generation. For the spirit—and that takes us to the second point in the theory of Animism—as in some sort it dwells in the material thing, so it is also almost invariably separable from it. The spirit of man goes out in dreams, and appears to other people. Sometimes it leaves him temporarily when he sneezes, and hence it is well to pray for a blessing on him in such a moment, as we do unto this day. It quits him in trances; it leaves him finally at death. Since the spirit is a mere attenuated double of the man himself, it appears also in his shadow,¹ and can be seen mocking him when he stands by the side of a pool.

These different appearances of the double, or spirit, have not escaped savage man, and have led him in many cases to an almost bewildering multiplication of souls.² With that multiplication we need not now concern ourselves, we attend only to the fact of the soul's transmigrations. This impalpable entity is itself, it may be, transferred from one dwelling-place to another, leaving the outer seeming unaltered. The souls of the dead may pass into tigers as among the Malays, and often also in India, and in that form they may take vengeance on those who harm them in this life. And sometimes, the tiger is not killed if possible, for fear of injuring a dead relative,³ but is greatly feared for his supernatural even more than his physical prowess. The soul may wander away voluntarily in

the South Sea Islanders, in Central Asia, among the Finns, Laps, Negroes, ancient Peruvians, Hindoos, ancient Hebrews, ancient Arabs, Greeks, Romans, in the Hebrides and in mediæval Europe, and while recognizing the blend, hard to distinguish, of the altar, the fetich and the symbol, is inclined to conclude that the safest explanation of the cult is the Tacitean "ratio in obscuro."

¹ For instances of the shadow or reflection as the soul, see Tylor, i., p. 430; *Golden Bough*, vol. i., p. 285. With this idea we may connect the use of a picture as a supplementary home or body for the soul of the deceased, which so often plays a prominent part in the cult of the dead, e. g. in ancient Egypt and in China. (De Groot, i., p. 113.) The distinction between regarding the picture (1) as a receptacle for the dead man's soul, and (2) as the dead man himself in a new form, is one which on animistic principles cannot be drawn with any clearness or consistency.

² For illustrations, see Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i. 434.

³ Waitz, v. i. 166.

a dream, and then sometimes may lose its way, or be prevented from returning. It may be extracted by sorcery or carried off by ghosts, whence come illnesses, madness, and death. It may be trapped while on its journeys, but it may also be recovered for a consideration by one who knows the proper charms to catch a soul. It may even be swallowed inadvertently by a doctor. If irretrievably lost it may be replaced—so loosely is it connected with the real personality of the man—by another soul purchasable at a price.¹ Finally at death it still hovers in the neighbourhood, and may perchance be recalled if the mourners raise their voices and entice it with good things.²

We are thus brought to a third point in the animistic theory, the material view of the spirit. Though the soul of things is as impalpable and subtle as we have seen, so subtle and impalpable that it can transfer itself without difficulty, or without betraying the change through any physical or outward modifications, it is nevertheless capable of being dealt with as we deal with visible and tangible objects. It may be tied with cords, or driven away with weapons, or, since after all it has a modicum of intelligence, frightened away with shouts and threats. When an Australian war party loses a man the spirit of the dead follows them back in the form of a bird, and is frightened off when they get home. A part of the ceremony of mourning is to beat the air—not as a symbol of the futility of human grief—but for the purposeful object of driving the ghost away, and the funeral is not complete till the spirit is frightened out of the camp and into the grave where it should lie.³ Half the world away we find the Guaycurus of Paraguay sallying forth with clubs to repel the storm spirit,⁴ and we know from Herodotus that the Caunians, being disgusted with their gods, took bows and spears and

¹ For a summary of the evidence, see *Golden Bough*, vol. i., pp. 251–285.

² That this is the meaning of ceremonial wailing for the dead in China is shown by De Groot (vol. i., pp. 244, etc.). De Groot compares the Roman conclamatio, and corresponding customs in Picardy, California, the Caribbean Islands etc. Religion has here, as so often, merely stereotyped and given inner meaning to a natural impulse.

³ Spencer and Gillen, i. 493–506.

⁴ Payne, i., p. 390. Among the Haytiens the gods would shamelessly quit the tribe in case of misfortune, and were therefore secured by cotton ropes. (*Ib.*, p. 319.)

drove them bodily out of the land with execrations and insults. As late as the conquest by the Spaniards, bad spirits were driven annually out of Cuzco, in Peru, by armed warriors.¹ Demons may be caught and imprisoned, as among the hill tribes of Bengal,² or they may be expelled by charms, as when the llama's blood is sprinkled to this day in Peru on a doorway to keep them out of the hut. The soul may be put away for safety into a tree,³ as in the famous case of the Golden Bough, or, as it leaves the dead man, it may be induced to come back and re-incarnate itself in some child of the family. When the West African negro wakes with a headache or sickness he sends, Miss Kingsley tells us, for a doctor, who, promptly diagnosing his case as a loss of soul, proceeds to institute a search. In process of time the soul is duly caught, by methods best known to the doctor, brought in a box to the sick man's bed, and duly blown into him, to his mental comfort, and thereby, through the power of faith-healing, possibly to his physical restoration.⁴

But the commonest evidence of the material character of the spirit is its power of eating and drinking like an ordinary man. The gods of the Babylonians came about the sacrifice like flies; the ghosts in Hades lapped the blood which Odysseus brought for them. The spirit of the place partakes of the drops of wine which are poured out from a cup. The dead man is a participant in the funeral feast. The only doubt here is whether the ghost eats the food or the ghost of the food.⁵ Since the food does not actually disappear the savage mind is put to some trouble on the point, and sometimes the difficulty seems to have been the cause of scepticism. The question

¹ Payne, i, p. 391.

² Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, 301-303.

³ De Groot (iv., p. 106) has a good story of a Chinese criminal who could not be put to death, because he had put his soul into a bottle. Three days after being decapitated his trunk and head had re-united themselves. But his mother, whom he had beaten, betrayed his secret, and on her advice the vase was broken, and after this the criminal was successfully flogged to death.

⁴ Miss Kingsley, *West African Studies*, p. 200.

⁵ Strictly speaking there is a third alternative—the corpse itself may eat the food. This appears to have been the primitive Chinese conception, which by the time of Confucius had yielded to the somewhat more refined view that the food placed on the grave was destined for the soul. Hence arose the custom of placing the offerings upon the tomb instead of within it. (De Groot, vol. ii., p. 384.)

was put by a young Zulu in this way: "When we ask, 'What do the other Amadhlozi do, for in the morning we see all the meat?' the old men say, 'The Amatongo lick it,' and we are unable to contradict them and are silent, for they are older than we are and tell us all things; we listen, for we are told all things, and assent without seeing clearly whether they are true or not."¹ Such difficulties could be resolved by the theory that it was the soul of the sacrifice that went to the gods, as the Fijians hold, and so at a cannibal feast among them there is a double advantage, for while the men eat the body the gods eat the soul, and both are benefited alike. The dead wife of Periander told her husband that she was cold because her clothes had not been burnt, and she was only warm when he had made a holocaust of the wardrobes of the Corinthian women. The dead man's horse is slain at his grave that the ghost of the one may ride the ghost of the other. The wife is sacrificed to a similar order of ideas, and sometimes, the principle being logically carried through, the weapons and implements of the deceased are broken before they are laid beside him.

The spirit being thus materialized appears to enjoy an independent existence of its own. Here we touch the central contradiction of Animism. What at first appears as merely the animating principle of a material body turns out to be itself quasi-substantial and capable of existence apart from that body. We must not press Animism for a logical solution of the question how this can be, for Animism remains Animism precisely because the difficulty has not been faced. The "soul" of Animism is clearly a conception formed to unify and in a manner explain the visible functions and processes of the body. It underlies the sensible and material, and sets out to explain them. But it turns out to be itself just such another visible and material thing—only thinner and less palpable—a mere "double" of the appearances which it should explain. For the primitive mind cannot grasp an object of thought without transforming it into an object of sense. It needs a principle, connecting things that it can see or hear, and by a confusion of categories it makes of it merely another thing that it can see and hear.

¹ Tylor, ii. 387.

The spirit being the double of the object, Animism wavers between the conception of the spirit as belonging to the object, and that of the object as possessed and inhabited by the spirit,¹ and in as far as the spirit has a measure of independence so that it can leave its ordinary house and betake itself for a while at least to another, the transition from the one view to the other is easy enough.² We may indeed regard the independent spirit as arising by gradations. In its first stages it is so closely united to the object which it occupies that it is a question whether any distinction of material and spiritual has arisen, and we ought perhaps to suppose a pre-animistic religion in which worship is addressed to the material object itself without any question of a spirit which inhabits it, in which sun and moon, earth and sky, fire and water, or stock and stone, are worshipped as such, without any conception of spirits that dwell in them being formed.³ But though we can readily conceive a cult arising without any explicit conception of a spirit to which it is addressed, it must be borne in mind that the very fact that prayers or incantations are addressed to a being, is proof that he is regarded as understanding them: that if sacrifices are offered him he is held capable of receiving them and enjoying them—in a word, that he is to that extent a living being and manlike. The essence of Animism is the "confusion of categories," wherein not only the grades of mind but the whole distinction of mind and matter disappear, and to prove that original Mazdaism sacrificed butter to Fire without conceiving it as anything but the material fire that its worshippers saw, would only be to show that the cult carried this confusion to its furthest possible point. This "implicit" animism would then be merely the lowest stage of the development, and would grow into animism proper as soon as its implications became realized, so that in sacrificing to Fire men began avowedly to treat Fire as a living thing.

¹ This tendency is pushed to the extreme point, when the soul, whose original function is to vitalize the body and explain its actions, becomes so "self-subsistent" that it actually frames for itself another body, the duplicate of the first, in form and substance. It may even appear to the original owner, much to his alarm, and probably by no means to his future weal. (De Groot, iv. 97 seq.)

² Cf. Tylor, ii. 153.

³ De la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*, i., p. 104, seems to lean to this view.

Granted that the object is animated by a spirit, we return to the question: What is the precise relation between them? Is the spirit bound to the object and dependent on it, or does the object rather belong to the spirit, which enters it from without and merely uses it for a convenient dwelling? It would be hopeless to expect a consistent answer to these questions from animism. Its conceptions fluctuate between the two ideas.¹ But this very elasticity helps animism to deal with many of the facts. Disease, for example, may be possession by a temporary demon.² The inspired soothsayer, the raving madman, are momentarily possessed by God or demon. The quick-witted plan, the impulsive crime, are stimulated by Pallas Athene, or by the Erinnyes,³ which is impelling a man to his own destruction. Animism, in short, has a ready explanation for all the cases in which we seem to suffer or to act not wholly by and with our own will. But what of our own spirits? Are they dependent upon the body or not? Clearly not altogether so, or they would not wander away in dreams, nor would the soul escape at death with the last breath, nor live on while the body manifestly decays. Yet animism is far from being satisfied that the soul can do without some bodily support. Sometimes the corpse itself is necessary to the soul's life, and is accordingly preserved with jealous care. The corpse remains quasi-animated. It can eat and drink. Its mutilation injures the spirit. If unburied it suffers from exposure and its spirit will cause a drought to protect it from the rain.⁴ It is as far as possible protected and preserved that the spirit may at the proper time rejoin it. But since in reality the corpse decays, what is the soul to do? Apparently it needs a body of one kind or another. The Australian ancestor of the Alcheringa deposited his soul in a pebble or oblong piece of wood. The Egyptian made like-

¹ See Tylor, *loc. cit.*

² With equal facility in connection with the opposite pole of animism, disease becomes a quasi-material object, magic stones or pointing sticks, driven into a man by spirits, which can be extracted by a doctor, and perhaps transferred to another person, or walled up in a tree. (*Golden Bough*, iii. 29, etc.; Tylor, ii. 148.)

³ The $\epsilon\rho\eta\eta$ which is responsible for an act of folly or crime, is implanted in the soul by the Fury which will avenge it. (See *e.g. Od.*, xv. 233.) Cf. Leist, pp. 320, 321; Tylor, ii. 126-131.

⁴ De Groot, i. 57, 342; iii. 918, etc.

nesses of the deceased, statues and bas-reliefs, which the soul could inhabit. The Chinese make a tablet specially fitted for the dead man's habitation by the accurate inscription of his name and all his titles. Among other peoples quite a different view is taken of the soul's needs. Dimly conceived as a thin aërial substance, it is thought to require that the body, together with its food and raiment, should be reduced to the same form. So the corpse is burnt, and with it all that is devoted to the service of the dead. In all these cases, whether with the aid of the corpse or without it, whether in the neighbourhood of the grave or in another world, or in both places at once, the soul is held to maintain a semi-independent existence, its happiness or misery being determined largely by the amount of attention paid to it by its descendants upon earth. There remains one other alternative frequently adopted and finally becoming the basis of a great religious system—that it should find itself a new home by passing into another being. It then belongs for life to the body which it inhabits, but it existed before the body and will survive it. There is a limited or partial interdependence. This limited interdependence we may take as the central idea around which animistic theories radiate. Soul and body are two things, not one. But without soul, body decays, and without some sort of body, real or fictitious, the soul appears to be, at best, enfeebled and miserable.

The spirit, though material, is also intelligent and capable of being influenced by prayers, exhortations, bribes, threats, cajoleries. This brings us to a further point of cardinal importance. To our minds worship can be paid only to a being higher than ourselves, and the "spiritual" expresses that higher sphere of being into which man enters by virtue of what is best in him and what is most removed from the material and the animal. Such conceptions as these underlie all the higher religions, but they are wholly foreign to animism. Essentially the cult of animism is not an adoration of a being higher than man, but a mode of influencing beings conceived as possessing powers which may be useful or harmful to the believer. And spirit, as animism conceives it, though certainly implying enough of intelligence to comprehend the meaning of a promise or threat, is far from implying a higher type of moral or mental power than

that of the human "worshipper." We are accustomed to think of the rudest religions as anthropomorphic, and to say that man first framed gods in his own image. But in truth the majority of the beings worshipped by primitive man are not human, but something less than human. The distinctly evil agencies are more prominent than the good, for why should savage man trouble himself to please great spirits who are naturally benevolent? It is the bad spirit who will otherwise make himself troublesome that the savage is anxious to conciliate with the best of his store.¹ And the intellectual level is as low as the moral. The savage is confident in his power to deceive the spirit whom he addresses by methods which could hardly take in the savage man himself. The Naga propitiates a malignant deity by setting out for him a small fowl in a large basket. The god is deceived by the size of the basket, and distributes favours accordingly.² The ghost of a mother who would carry off her child is deceived in the Banks Islands by a piece of banana trunk which is laid on her bosom in her grave.³ Disease demons may be diverted by similar methods. Thus in an epidemic the Dyaks set up wooden images at the doors of their dwellings, that the disease may carry them off instead of the living people.⁴ When the Kaffir is hunting an elephant, he begs the elephant not to tread on him—surely as curious a confusion of ideas as is to be found in primitive thought—for, on the one hand, the elephant's soul is held to have intelligence enough to understand the petition, and, on the other hand, it is supposed to be so stupid as to be taken in by the request when the petitioner is all the while seeking to take his life. The Samoyeds are more crafty, for they tell the bear that it was the Russians who killed him; and the North American Indians spare the rattlesnake, risking the physical evils which they know, in dread of the vengeance which the rattlesnake's spirit would take on them, and which they do not know and cannot

¹ For illustrations, see below, p 31.

² Godden, *J. A. I.*, xxvi. 187.

³ *Golden Bough*, vol. ii., p. 345, where numerous instances of the same kind are given. The widespread substitution of models for real food, implements, etc., in sacrifices to the dead is hardly to be regarded as a deception—or if so rather as a form of self-deception—the model, pardonably enough on animistic grounds, being held as good a vehicle for soul-food, soul-money, etc., as a real loaf or a gold piece.

⁴ *Ib.*, 348.

measure.¹ The crude conception of the spiritual which these cases vividly illustrate, goes far to determine both the objects and the methods of animistic cults. Animal-gods and man-gods belong to the animistic level of religion, because it is only at this level that animals or men can be the objects of a cult without being regarded as the representations or embodiments of something far higher than themselves. Animism does indeed regard them as embodiments of a spirit, but this spirit is not essentially superior, either morally or intellectually, to the animal or man in which it dwells. The Toda addresses a cow, chosen by descent or by consecration to be the head of the herd, as being herself a goddess, "How fair was thy mother! how much milk she gave! Be not less generous! Henceforth thou shalt be a divinity among us. . . . Bear a thousand calves!"² So sacred is this divinity that the chief milkman is himself a man-god. Yet the animal which is worshipped is also unhesitatingly turned to human uses. Often the god may, with due observance of the proper solemnities, be killed and eaten by his votaries. Thus among the Australians at the Intichiuma ceremonies a man not only may, but must, eat his totem, or the supply would fail.³ The Gilyaks of Eastern Siberia bring up a bear cub with divine honours. Fish, brandy and other things are offered to him in every house. People prostrate themselves before him, and his entrance into a house confers a blessing, but he is also teased and worried. After visiting every house in the village, he is shot dead with arrows and eaten.⁴ In such practices, illustrations of which might be indefinitely multiplied, the savage is in his way getting the best of both worlds. He

¹ Tylor, vol. i., p. 467; Schoolcraft-Drake, vol. i., p. 232. Similarly the Western Esquimaux before setting to upon the stranded whale, would receive him with divine honours, harangue and compliment him. (Reclus, p. 52.)

² Reclus, p. 218.

³ Spencer and Gillen, vol. i., p. 168. When the Australian does not eat the totem himself, it is by his permission that others do so. In fact he is held responsible for maintaining the supply of his totem for the benefit of other totem-groups. (Spencer and Gillen, vol. ii., p. 160.) Strictly the totem should not be spoken of as a god, the conception being magical rather than religious, but the point here is the ceremonial eating of that which is ordinarily sacred.

⁴ *Golden Bough*, vol. ii., p. 380. For many other instances of killing and eating the divine or sacred animal, see the same work, vol. ii., pp. 302, 366, 396, 435.

needs the animal's flesh and is afraid of his spirit. Not only may the particular bear which he has killed have its avenging ghost, but all the bears may stand together in the blood feud and take vengeance on the murderer of their kinsman. So he pays honour to the individual bear slain, and through him to his fellow-bears. He comforts himself, in short, with a conception of the bear spirit which is intelligent enough to understand the show of honours and the words of cajolery, and stupid enough to let these make up to it for the hard facts of being killed and eaten.¹

The worship of men might seem intrinsically higher than that of animals. But in point of fact no distinction of principle severs the cult of man-gods in many primitive religions from that of animals as just described. The man-god of this stage must not be confused with the anthropomorphic deity of polytheism and the cruder monotheism. This deity is a spirit conceived as clad with human attributes. The man-god is an ordinary human being conceived as the incarnation of a powerful spirit or as possessed of magical powers. In the lowest grade he is merely a sorcerer, whose power is due to his relations with ghosts and other spirits. At a further stage of development he has marvellous powers of his own whereby he controls rain and sunshine, the winds and the crops.² Owing to this occult influence emanating from him, this mighty being becomes so full of danger to his people that his movements and actions have to be closely restricted. To drink of his cup or eat the remnants of his food is fatal. His touch and his glance are deadly. His misbehaviour may involve his whole people in ruin. In consequence he is surrounded with all kinds of precautions, and he ends by being a mere puppet in the hands of priests. Thus the Egyptian Pharaoh, a typical man-god, is described by Diodorus³ as hedged round both in his public and private life by watchful sacerdotal control which minutely prescribed to him

¹ The slain animal if properly treated may even invite others to come and be killed. The Orinoco Indians having killed an animal, pour a little liquor into its mouth, "that the soul of the dead beast may inform its fellows of the welcome it has met with, and that they, too, cheered by the prospect of the same kind reception, may come with alacrity to be killed." (*Golden Bough*, vol. ii., p. 402.) Many similar instances are given by Mr. Frazer.

² For instances see *Golden Bough*, i. 139, etc.

³ Diodorus, i. 70, 71.

the order of his actions. Similarly at Babylon, though the king was not strictly a god, the whole country suffered for his faults and he had to observe taboos—*e.g.* avoiding meat on the seventh day—which apparently concerned no one else.¹

Lastly, the man-god may be the incarnation of a spirit which lives independently of him. Of such a type the most familiar instance to us is the everlasting Buddha of the Thibetans. In this idea of incarnation death and rebirth necessarily play an important part. The gods themselves die in the philosophy of Animism, for death is only the migration of a spirit. Sometimes it is its migration to better quarters, and when this flesh that is now the spirit's habitation becomes old and weak or is doing its work ill, the worshippers of the god facilitate his migration by the destruction of his temporary tabernacle. The man-god in fact may be killed and even eaten like any ordinary human being.²

This unceremonious treatment of the object of worship is partly due to the conception that the body in which the spirit is incarnate is not the spirit itself. But the condition under which alone it can arise is that the object of a religious cult is not yet an object of worship as we understand the term. The spirit of the sacred animal does not rise above the animal. The god in man has powers which ordinary men have not, but he is not spiritually (as we use that term) a higher being. The spirits of early religion may be abused or coerced if they do not do their duty. The Greek youths whipped the statue of Pan if he did not give them good hunting. The Chinese emperor is supreme over all spirits except that of heaven, and regularly promotes or degrades them in rank according to their performances.³ The Ainu abuse their household gods when a death

¹ Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 375-8. For many similar instances see *Golden Bough*, i. 313, 314.

² See *Golden Bough*, vol. ii., p. 6, etc. A special case is the selection of a prisoner, criminal or slave to act as the incarnation of a deity. He then becomes a temporary man-god, receives honours and sacrifices, and is finally slain and perhaps eaten. The idea is apparently to strengthen the spirit—who is here some nature-god—by sacrifices, perhaps to bind him more closely to his worshippers by the partaking of his flesh, and finally by slaying him to give him a new and more vigorous life. The subject is exhaustively treated by Mr. Frazer. See the places quoted, and in particular, vol. iii., p. 134, for the killing of the god in Mexico.

³ For examples see Douglas, *Society in China*, pp. 5-7. The honours paid to ancestors for the exploits of their descendants depend on the same

occurs, as is shown in a vivid description by Mr. Batchelor of the scene in a house on the death of a child.

“One old man was calling on the goddess of Fire to help, and threatening never to worship her again if she did not keep warmth in the child’s body. Another person was looking out of the east window and accusing the goddess of Fire to the Creator, of not attending to her duty. A third was in a towering rage, and, facing the south-east corner of the hut, was telling the guardian gods that they were an extremely bad lot, and deserved never to be worshipped again.”¹

It is not necessary to multiply instances. The quasi-material spirit of animistic worship, whether incarnate in stocks and stones, in trees, animals or men, or roaming disembodied as a ghost, demon, or genius, is not intrinsically a higher being before whom man must prostrate himself, but more often if anything a being of a lower order, and in any case one who is to be managed as occasion serves, by prayer, entreaty, deception, threats, or force applied as we apply them to actual men and animals, so that when one fails another is tried.

Such then is the character of the primitive conception of spirit. It is a double of the common objects of perception, conceived on the one hand as a material substance capable of exerting force and having force applied to it, and on the other hand as feeling and thinking like a rather stupid man, and open like him to supplication, exhortation, or intimidation—a standing contradiction in which the categories of mental and material are hopelessly intertwined, in which mere functions and qualities become substantial beings, and finally by a crude induction the same spiritual agency by which men explain their own behaviour and that of their fellows is imputed also to animals, plants, and inanimate nature—to the wind and waves—the stocks and stones.

3. But the appeal to spirits is not the only way of influencing events known to primitive man. He has a more direct method, resting on the interconnection of things as he conceives it, the primitive theory, if we may use the term, of cause and effect.

conception, since it is the business of an ancestral spirit to watch over his family and guard its fortunes.

¹ Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, p. 217.

The practices growing out of these conceptions are grouped together under the name of Magic, and by recent writers have been thrown into strong contrast with Religion—Religion being conceived as essentially an appeal to a spiritual agency, Magic as an attempt to control nature without resort to a spiritual agency. In the operations of magic three main conceptions appear to be traceable. The first of these is termed sympathetic magic in the narrower sense. Its principle may be roughly formulated, "What is done to my belongings is done to me"—or more precisely, if two things are closely connected (as *e. g.* by being parts of one object) they will even when dissevered remain so allied, so much in "sympathy" that to affect one of them is to affect the others.¹ The most familiar instance is the use of hair-clippings and nail-parings to work evil on the man to whom they belonged. Another is the practice of heating a weapon which has made a wound in order that the wound may remain inflamed, or conversely of keeping the weapon clean that the wound may not fester. A third is to operate on the food left by a man.² A fourth is to attack his shadow. It is impossible to say how primitive man actually conceives the connection in these cases, for it is of the essence of the matter that he has no clear conception at all. But if we analyze out the principle implied—that is to say, the principle which, if it were true, would justify the procedure, and which being in fact false makes the procedure void—it is this—that the continuous identity which once connected the two things still in some sort persists. The clipped hair was once part of the man and his identity persists in it. The sword and the wound were two aspects of the same fact and their union remains. If this were true, sympathetic magic would be a genuine art, and because it is not true, sympathetic magic is a spurious art. In this sense the doctrine of a persistent unreal identity is the implied principle of sympathetic magic.

A second form of magic rests on another distortion of the principle of identity. If you cannot get hold of any belongings of your enemy you can at least make a likeness of him. You may destroy him, for instance, by melting or sticking pins into

¹ See *Golden Bough*, i. 9, 49.

² Or an excrement. (Spencer and Gillen, i. 547.)

a wax image of him. With very different intent, though by essentially the same method, primitive people in many parts of the world seek to make rain by squirting water, or to produce sunshine by kindling fires, or fertility by a representation of the processes of growth.¹ Here the implied principle—understanding the term once again as above—is that like things or like processes are the same. In making rain on a small scale we are setting up a process which extends further and has to do with the production of rain generally, or at any rate on a greater scale. In slaying one bear, again, or in honouring one bear, we are slaying or honouring Bear—the bear that is in all bears; we are incurring or averting a feud with bears in general. It will help us to understand this sort of identification if we revert for a moment to the creed of Totemism, the idea at the base of which is, as we have seen, that there is an occult connection between an animal or plant and the human beings of a clan or tribe, such that what they act or perform ceremonially the Totem will do likewise in real earnest. The Totem is in some sense—in what sense they certainly could not tell, and if we try to define the conception we shall modify it by the very process of making it definite—but it is in some sense incarnate in them. The Bear is in all bears, all four-footed bears and all human bears. But what is the Bear itself? To the North American Indian it is often a Big Brother of the Bears; another individual in short, and something on its way to becoming a god. But in a lower stage the Totem has no need of so much individuality, for the savage has not got so far in the endeavour to think out the problem of Identity in Difference. Every individual bear, two-footed or four-footed, is alike the Bear, and what one does or suffers all do or suffer. Further the identity may be fortified, as it were, by introducing the other principle of connection. For since things that are once joined are always connected an exchange of blood makes two men brothers. Joining in the same meal has a similar effect, and therefore what one suffers the others too will feel, not through moral sympathy but through a purely physical causation. Applying this to the Totem, how

¹ Cf. the symbolic processes combined with invitations to the animal in the totemic ceremonies whereby the Australians secure a full supply of the Witchetty grub. (Spencer and Gillen, vol. i., pp. 172 seq. and 206.)

can we identify ourselves with him better than by killing him. We eat the flesh of the bear and the Bear is within us. Yet we have not injured the Totem, for the Bear still lives—in other bears and in us. The species survives, though one individual is sacrificed.

These two forms of magic, distinguished by the best authorities as Sympathetic and Imitative, are also quite rightly, if with some verbal confusion, grouped together as being both alike Sympathetic in the wider sense. That is, they both depend on an occult Sympathy—in other words, a very crudely conceived identity between things and processes that are really distinct. The third set of magical ideas are simpler, and turn on a primitive conception of the qualities of things. Powers and influences exist in things, and are the basis of their qualities and behaviour. Like spirits, they are separable from the things to which they belong. They can be withdrawn by charms; they can be transferred to other things. A barren fruit-tree must be a male. A woman's petticoat placed upon it transfers to it the feminine quality, and it becomes fruitful. Chinese people, when advancing in years, have their grave-clothes prepared by young girls, because part of their capacity to live long must pass into the clothes and so put off the moment when they will be required.¹ Conversely, when the coffin is being nailed down the hammer is bound up in red cloth to prevent bad influences passing into the hand.² Now conceptions of this sort seem in the first place to be merely generalizations, which are too extensive and therefore faulty, from an ordinary experience. Some qualities or characteristics of things are in a sense transmissible. Death as such is not infectious, but smallpox is. The touch of a pregnant woman will not impart her fertility, but her warm hand will impart warmth. But there is probably a little more in the matter than a too hasty generalization. There is the conception of a quality as something quasi-substantial, something in short bearing a family resemblance to the spirit from which we have to distinguish it. When sins are loaded upon a scapegoat and driven away into the wilderness, when a toothache is nailed into a tree, when a disease is extracted in the form of a magic stone, or passed into

¹ De Groot, i., p. 60.

² *Ib.*, p. 96.

a third person, when evil influences are brushed or whipped off a man—in all such cases the quality is treated as something that you can almost pick up and carry about. It is at least as substantial as vapour, and in some cases it really becomes a spirit. When the Melanesian regards a stone with little discs in it as “good to bring in money,” it is clearly because it has the character of money stamped upon it. But this character they ascribe themselves to an indwelling spirit which they conciliate—the magical quality passes into the spiritual.¹ The third basis of magic may in fact be regarded as a spirit that has become attenuated into an “influence,” or as an “influence” that has not developed into a spirit. It thus forms a connecting link between magic and animism.

4. The other two forms grouped under Sympathetic Magic in the wider sense are not so closely connected with animism. Yet they belong in the main to the same mental level. We find in the primitive mind when it begins to theorize two tendencies which may be regarded as in a measure complementary. On the one hand, it tends to take the characters and attributes of things, processes that go on in things, thoughts about things and the words in which thoughts are expressed, and to turn them into objects, substantial as the things themselves, having in fact a mode of existence very like the things. The categories of substance and attribute are not yet distinguished. Of this confusion personification is merely the extreme case, the living person being simply the most concrete and many-sided of objects. In this tendency then we have the basis of the spirits of Animism and the occult essences and powers of Magic. On the other side the primitive mind equally fails to keep different objects distinct. One conception melts readily into another, just as in primitive fancy a sorcerer turns into a dragon, a mouse, a stone, and a butterfly without the smallest difficulty. Hence similarity is treated as if it were physical identity. The physical individuality of things is not observed. The fact that a thing was *mine* makes it appear as though there were something of *me* in it, so that by burning it you make me smart. The borders and limits of things are not marked out, but their

¹ *Golden Bough*, i. 45.

influence and their capacity to be influenced extends, as it were, in a misty halo over everything connected with them in any fashion. If the attributes of things are made too solid and material in primitive thought, things themselves are too fluid and undefined, passing into each other by loose and easy identifications which prevent all clear and crisp distinctions of thought. In a word, primitive thought has not yet evolved those distinctions of substance and attribute, quality and relation, cause and effect, identity and difference, which are the common property of civilized thought. These categories which among us every child soon comes to distinguish in practice¹ are for primitive thought interwoven in wild confusion, and this confusion is the intellectual basis of animism and of magic.

As they thus spring from a common intellectual basis, so in their working animism and magic find, especially in primitive times, many points of contact. Totemism is one instance, for, as has been pointed out, the bond of union which makes the totem one with its human worshippers, or rather fellows and allies, is of magical character, while the totem itself is often a spirit or perhaps even a god. Again, the magic power may come from and be controlled by a man. A Melanesian wizard affects things at a distance, not by a projection of a spirit, but by his *mana* or power. A chief's supremacy is due to his *mana*, he may be elected because he has *mana* attributed to him. A man may pass on his *mana* by imposition of hands; he may throw it into a material object, which becomes then a source of danger. He may use it, and does habitually use it, to secure his property. By this simple means, for example, he solves the problem of closing a public right of way and annexing it to himself. If the taboo is broken the evil consequences are averted by a present to the man who put it on—the human spirit after all controlling the magic influences. A dangerous magical influence may emanate directly from a deity. Thus, when Uzzah touches the Ark he is immediately struck dead, not because he did anything wrong, for his intention was absolutely innocent, but

¹ I do not mean that the child or the average unthinking man is familiar with these conceptions in the abstract, but that his experience is so organized under the influence of tradition, especially in the form of language, as to fall with general, though not unvarying, correctness into the pigeon-holes to which these terms correspond.

because Yahveh "broke forth" upon him. The Ark, being the habitation of Yahveh, was intrinsically dangerous, just like a highly electrified body.¹ Animism creates spirits of the dead, but the operation of these spirits and of death in general is conceived in terms of magic. The mourner, who may be haunted by the dead, is infected by their danger and has to seclude himself, and this, rather than the desire of supplying the deceased with comforts, is on some occasions probably the true explanation of the destruction of the dead man's property and of the mourning imposed upon his widow. Again, a magic influence may become a spirit. The curse which the evil-doer brings upon himself may be conceived magically, or it may pass into a spirit which haunts the man; or finally, by a union of both ideas, it may be an evil which the spirit inflicts upon the man.²

Lastly, in the practice of witchcraft, which is everywhere prevalent in the savage world, the two conceptions, of a natural order in the super-sensible world, and of the existence of spirits capable of being influenced by human means, are interwoven. The idea of witchcraft is to control events by super-sensible means, and these means are, on the one hand, the use of those occult influences, some of which we have just described, and, on the other, the control of spirits by charms, incantations and prayers. The witch may make rain by actions in which the falling of rain is in some way imitated. This is, as he conceives, a direct process of cause and effect, no spirit intervening. He may injure an enemy by destroying his image or burning locks of his hair which he has secured. Or again, he may have ghosts at his command. He may trap and imprison souls. He knows the word or the form which binds a demon or even a god. He punishes the enemy by causing a spirit to haunt him.³

¹ This magical conception seems at least to underlie the anthropomorphic account in 2 Sam. vi. 7 seq.

² See some remarks by the present writer in *Sociological Papers*, vol. ii., p. 172.

³ Recent authorities (e. g. Sir A. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, vol. i., p. 106, etc.; Frazer, vol. i., pp. 63 and 64, etc.) contrast magic as resting on a belief, however crude, in uniform natural processes with animism, as depending on the caprice of a spirit. The one is, they say, the germ of science wherein man seeks to control the course of events, the other of religion wherein he seeks to propitiate the spirit who controls them. It must be remembered, however, as these writers freely admit, that in animistic belief spirits are often constrained and coerced, and generally speaking,

All this is possible as long as the spirit is of so low an order as to be subject to conjurations and coercion, and as long as the spirit remains thus unspiritual it is not radically distinguished from other "occult" influences, nor are magic and religion in their working fundamentally opposed. Conversely it is an important element in the next higher state of religion to produce an order of gods no longer open to these illicit influences, above exhortation and intimidation, and capable of protecting their worshippers against the machinations of the sorcerer.

We may conclude that in practice magic and religion are closely interwoven in the life of primitive man. They also rest alike on confusions which differ in detail but agree in general character. They differ in so far as magic is the endeavour of man to control events by his own operations, and religion the attempt to appease or manage spirits in whose power the control of events is held to reside. Bringing them together we may say that the primitive conception of the world and man's place in it consists in the belief that processes physical, vital, mental or whatever they may be, are governed by invisible powers and agencies, spiritual or otherwise, capable of being influenced by man and used for his own purposes. These are not objects of worship standing above the level of humanity. On the contrary, even the spirits that primitive man recognizes fall rather below the level of humanity and are easily rendered subservient to its worst passions.

5. The confusions on which magic and animism rest find their

early religion operates on the spirit world in accordance with conditions and prescriptions which tradition lays down accurately enough. The spiritual world, in fact, is not without "laws" of its own. Thus without denying the suggestiveness of the contrast brought out by Dr. Frazer and others, we may prefer to say that in the relations of magic and animism certain elements of the later conflict between science and religion appear in germ. But the essence of science is rather the conception of rigorous method in the ascertainment of truth than the practical desire to influence nature. Though this desire stimulated science, and its satisfaction is the result of science, it is not itself the essence of science.

As to witchcraft, the modern use of the term does not seem to be finally fixed. Some writers seem to identify it with magic. (See Lyall, *l.c.*) Others connect it specially with demons and discarded gods. (Cf. Jevons, p. 177 ff.) Considering the points of analogy between the employment of occult forces and the control (as opposed to the propitiation) of spirits, I think we may group them together and say that the employment of either of these means, particularly to affect the lives and fortunes of others, is witchcraft.

general explanation in the stage of psychological evolution attained by primitive man. The generic function of mind in life is to establish articulate connections between the scattered portions of experience, and so enable its possessors to learn from the past how to provide for the future. By its success in performing that function the stage of growth reached by the mind of any given being or group of beings is to be judged. The higher animals have apparently reached so far that they can perceive the objects that surround them in their temporal and spatial order, and use the result of this perception in guiding their own actions so as to produce or avert particular effects. If this is so they certainly in a sense apprehend many of the attributes, actions and relations of things. In some sense my dog, when he is thirsty, knows that there is water in a jug, that I can pour it out for him, and that he can get me to do so by attracting my attention and signifying his wants. That is to say, his behaviour is adapted to the presence around him of certain persons and things with given attributes, related in a particular way, acting in a particular way. He knows this after some fashion, but we do not take it to be precisely man's fashion. Where then do we suppose the difference to lie? The dog can in some way differentiate the "solid" jug from the "liquid" water, for we see that he treats them differently. But we suppose it to be peculiar to the man that he interests himself in the generic qualities in point of which these things differ, and invents for them the names "solid" and "liquid." To discover and define these qualities the human mind breaks up its experiences into their elements, and at the same time and in the same process brings widely separated experiences together. The "solid," for instance, is something common to the jug, the house, the road, and distinct from the air and the water, distinct also from the shape and other qualities of the jug. This joint movement of comparison and discrimination breaks the perceptual world up into its elements and builds up out of them an order of ideas. Every such idea is expressed in a general term or name, and as there is a name for each thing, so there is a way of expressing each of its functions, attributes, relations. Our everyday experience thus translated into ideas falls into certain familiar categories—

Things and their Attributes, Persons and their Actions, Functions, Relations, Substances, Causes and Effects. But these categories do not at once emerge into clear consciousness. The mind uses them long before it is clearly aware of them. Or, more strictly, it works by rules corresponding to these conceptions, sorting experiences in a manner which accords with them, though it knows them not. It recognizes actual substances (stones, hills, men, horses) and their attributes or actions (hardness, height, sagacity, swift movement) before it has ever heard of Substances or Attributes or Relations as general terms, and a clear-headed man who is innocent either of grammar or logic may yet move among the objects of experience without confounding any of these categories. Thus below the stage at which the mind is clearly aware of the elementary conceptions under which rational experience is ordered, there is a stage where it works according to the rules to which these conceptions when known are found to lead, though without consciousness of the rules or the conceptions. This is the stage of "common sense." But below "common sense," again, is a stage in which the rules themselves are not yet efficient in their operation, at which the mind is not only unconscious of the categories, but fails practically in sorting experiences so as to accord with them, in which objects of thought belonging to different categories are not held apart but pass into each other, what is now a substance becoming at another moment a relation, while a relation or an attribute becomes a substance, or one relation is confounded with another. At this stage, though "general" ideas are already formed, they are loose in meaning and wavering in application. And this is the natural result of the methods by which they are formed. Developed thought knows certain rigorous methods of induction from experience, as well as certain definite principles of the analysis and synthesis of ideas whereby it forms new conceptions or checks those that it has formed. Primitive thought knows nothing of such safeguards. In the lowest strata of thought-operations we form ideas by casual association, drifting where the current of mental tendency leads us. Instead of the rigorous analyses and constructions of the logical mind we have the unregulated movement—the resultant expression probably of the unsifted mass of experience—carrying

us whithersoever it will. As to the test of experience, if used at all, it is applied in the form in which any chance instance that appears to confirm the mental prepossession is taken for proof, and if an instance to the contrary is regarded at all it is merely as the starting-point for some hypothesis to explain it away. Indeed the bare conception of truth or falsity scarcely exists. The world of ideas is largely a world of make-believe. If the child's doll or the savage's ghost cannot really eat the food offered them, the human playmate or worshipper is quite content to eat them himself "for" the other. The ideas make their junction, as it were, in their own world, and out of this the child savage derives the mental comfort he requires. As to stern truth, she moves in a cold, hard world best left untrodden. In a word, confusion of categories, crude induction, uncritical reasoning, and childish make-believe go to determine the character of the general ideas formed in the lower stages of human thought, and these conditions account for animism and magic.

6. Following what upon the whole appears the best guidance, we have treated animism as the lowest form in which distinct religious conceptions present themselves, but whether it is universally the religion of the lowest races is of course another and even more difficult question. In dealing with several branches of ethics we have seen that the most debased ethical conceptions are not necessarily those which dominate the lowest strata of humanity, and we have therefore learnt to separate the question what is intrinsically lower or higher from the question what predominates at a lower or higher stage of general culture. We must therefore approach without prejudice the question whether the lowest form of religion is universally or generally the religion of the lowest grades. What answer then can be given to the question? Whatever it be, it can be couched in general terms only and not in universals. Primitive beliefs vary too greatly and the evidence as to their character is in some cases too uncertain to admit of sweeping assertions, particularly of sweeping negatives. On the positive side indeed it may be pretty confidently affirmed (1) that the beliefs in either animism, magic or witchcraft are in one form or another

known to be so general among ruder races that we may reasonably believe them to be universal—unless indeed there are tribes which fall even below this level; (2) the same beliefs underlie the higher religions, and intermingle with them, only losing their influence by slow degrees as the moral and intellectual level rises. These results concur to suggest that animism and magic are primitive beliefs upon which the higher religion and ethics are overlaid. But if we ask whether they make up the total belief of primitive man about the order of nature and its origin, the answer is not so easily given. The spirit of animism is a rudely formed conception the function of which is to account for the processes of life and death, growth and decay. It is hardly definite enough to possess a personality and a history of its own. It is less than anthropomorphic and in reality little more than a shadowy double of the facts to be explained. But from a very early stage the mind has another method of explaining facts of nature or customs of man, namely that of telling a story about them and how they were set going in the past, by some personage of the by-gone times. This myth-making is in full vigour among the rude tribes of Central Australia. Why has the Echidna spines upon its body? Because in the Alcheringa there lived an Echidna man who for an outrage on sacred ground was pierced with spears. This was the destruction of the man himself and of his totem kindred, who have never since been re-incarnated in man but only in Echidnas with spears sticking out of them.¹ It is characteristic of these tales that what happens once happens always. The feature which an animal acquires it hands on for ever to its whole species. In fact the "principle" of tale-telling as the explanation of natural processes seems to be once again that slippery identification of one and all which we found underlying imitative magic and totemism. If so the primitive myth, so far as it serves a purpose in primitive religion, still rests on confusions analogous to those already examined. It also implies that capacity for freely imaging persons, situations, and actions on the analogy of experience which all races and all levels of culture share alike. By virtue of his myth-making, the savage can people the world, not merely with spirits

¹ Spencer and Gillen, i. 398.

and powers, but with persons, heroes, or monsters with a definite character and a history, with wives and children, loves and hates, wars and schemes of policy, all in a world of their own upon the mountains, beneath the earth, or in the sky.

Where the mythical being comes into relation with the origin and life of nature or with the customs and destinies of man he may be said to belong to religion, and in quite the lowest levels we find in fact creation myths connecting the origin of the world with mythical beings of the "Great Long Ago." For example, the Central Australians held that in the Alcheringa two beings arose out of nothing in the western sky and carved men out of imperfectly shaped creatures, between animals and men.¹ According to the Kaitish tribe a spirit-being named Atnatu arose in the sky before the Alcheringa. He made himself and has another sky and sun which are not ours. The stars are his lubras. He had sons and daughters in the sky, but they gave him no Churinga, so he threw them down to earth. He is angry if the bull-roarer is not sounded at the initiation ceremonies, and once dragged a number of boys up into the sky and ate one—but the flesh was not good.²

These creation myths, running down as they do to the lower strata of culture, raise at once the question whether the Creators should not be regarded as Supreme Gods, and whether such a belief is an integral part of savage religions. Now the existence of Great and Good Spirits is certainly reported among many primitive peoples, but three questions have to be settled before we can determine their place in primitive religion, viz. (1) how far are these reports trustworthy, (2) how far, when the Good Spirit really exists, is it an importation from Christianity or some other civilized religion, (3) how far is the Good Spirit, when recognized, an object of worship, and therefore an integral part of religion.

The savage races among whom Great Spirits are principally found or supposed to be found are the Red Indians and the Australians. Especial stress has been laid by some writers on the case of the Australians on account of their extremely low grade of development. But recent research seems to have established definitely that at least among a large proportion of

¹ Spencer and Gillen, p. 388.

² *Ib.*, ii. 498.

the tribes there is nothing comparable to the worship of a Divine creator and sustainer of all things. With regard to the natives of Central and Northern Australia Messrs. Spencer and Gillen have now shown that while the Alcheringa ancestors had superhuman powers, there is no instance of any being regarded as a deity. There is no idea of appealing to them for protection nor of propitiating them, except in the case of a mythic creature called Wollunqua among the Warramunga tribe who is distinctly regarded, not as human, but as a snake. Further, the natives from Lake Eyre to the far north and east to the Gulf of Carpentaria "have no idea whatever of the existence of any supreme being who is pleased if they follow a certain line of what we call moral conduct, and displeased if they do not do so."¹ Among the tribes of South-Eastern Australia religious ideas as well as social customs are somewhat more advanced. But here again, what has sometimes been taken for a supreme god appears, when the evidence is put together, rather as a "venerable, kindly headman of a tribe, full of knowledge and tribal wisdom, and all-powerful in magic, of which he is the source, with virtues, failings, and passions such as the aborigines regard them."² Once a chief on earth, he or his spirit has now ascended with his people to the sky and rules them there, retaining some measure of interest in the doings of the tribe on earth. He is in fact a spirit like the other spirits of men, but greater and more powerful.³

The other chief group of primitive people who have been held to believe in a Divine Creator are the North American Indians. But in this case also investigation has rendered it probable that the Great Spirit is either (1) a misunderstanding, or (2) borrowed from the whites, or (3) an anthropomorphic nature-god. The Indian term for spirit, *manitu*, had a general application, and was partly misunderstood by missionaries and partly used by them as a stepping-stone to the idea of God.⁴

¹ Spencer and Gillen, vol. ii., p. 491.

² Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-Eastern Australia*, p. 500.

³ Mr. Howitt does not regard such a cult as equivalent to ancestor worship. The term "father" used in addressing such beings expresses properly a tribal, not an individual relation, and towards old men is used as a term of respect. (*Ib.*, p. 507.)

⁴ Tylor, *J. A. I.*, xxi., pp. 284-8. Good and bad spirits are often found among the South American Indians also, but accompanied with stories of

Creation myths, however, are frequent. The Sioux story of the creation of man may be taken as a sample.

"Before the creation of man, the Great Spirit" (whose birdlike tracks are yet to be seen) "used to slay the buffaloes and eat them on the ledge of the Red Rocks. . . . One day when a large snake had crawled into the nest of the bird to eat his eggs, one of the eggs hatched out in a clap of thunder, and the Great Spirit catching hold of a piece of the pipe-stone to throw at the snake moulded it into a man. This man's feet grew fast in the ground, where he stood for many ages like a great tree, and therefore he grew very old: he was older than a hundred men at the present day; and at last another tree grew up by the side of him, when a large snake ate them off both at the roots, and they wandered off together; from these have sprung all the people that now inhabit the earth."¹

Here the Great Spirit is conceived in bird form and the whole story is in the crudest style of myth-making. In other cases the Great Spirit is merely the Sun or spirit of the Sun—as the following hymn shows:—

"At the place of light,
At the end of the sky,
I (the Great Spirit),
Come and hang. Bright Sign.

.
I am the living body of the Great Spirit above,
(The Great Spirit, the Everlasting Spirit above).

.
I illumine earth,
I illumine heaven."²

Many of the expressions in the hymn taken singly would appear to describe a supreme spiritual being comparable to the God of civilized religion, but, as the context shows, they are in fact applied to the Sun. So easy is it for one form of religion to use for its purposes the terms and expressions familiar to another

the deluge, the creation of Eve, etc., which betray their origin. Professor Tylor's view is corroborated for the Californian Indians by Major Powers (S. Powers, *Tribes of California*, p. 413), who writes that, except for a few tribes in the north, "I am thoroughly convinced that the great majority of the California Indians had no conception whatever of a Supreme Being." Their real belief was in the coyote, while the Great Man or Old Man above was a mere modern graft acquired from the whites.

¹ Catlin, *North American Indians*, ii. 168.

² Schoolcraft, 1. 398.

of quite different rank. Probably the very vagueness of the term "Manitu" has lent itself to misinterpretation. The Indian spirits are so little individualized that they all seemed one to the inquirer. The marked individualities of Polytheism were not yet attained—still less were they overcome and merged in the unity of a single Divine nature.¹

Lastly, where great and good spirits are recognized in savage religion we constantly find that they are in practice neglected for the active, present, and possibly dangerous spirits of the immediate surroundings of man. The evidence on this point comes from all parts of the world. The good spirits, the Algonquin held, could only do good. It was the bad ones that needed propitiation.² The Dakotahs knew little about what the Great Spirit would do. All the fear they had was of the spirits of the departed.³ The Caribs recognized a higher spirit, but paid him no honours.⁴ Thus even when the belief in a greater god has, from whatever cause, arisen, it maintains no touch with the working religion of the savage. It is an exotic, and not the normal and native expression of savage modes of thought.

It appears then upon the whole that while animism and magic are the dominant forms of the savage's beliefs and determine his attitude to nature, he also, by the play of fancy acting upon his experience, by the modes of linking thought to thought of which he is capable, invents beings which are not

¹ Cf. De la Saussaye, *Manual of Religion*, vol. i., p. 273. A race may recognize one god because it has not imagination enough to differentiate distinct objects and functions, or because it has attained a measure of insight into the unity which runs through all differences and joins diverse parts into one framework. The results would agree on one point, but they would belong to wholly different mental grades. Some such misconception perhaps influences Australian travellers, the vague statement of the natives that some mystical being made "everything" being taken with the fullness of connotation which the word possesses for the civilized mind. The Australian means rather, "all the things you see about you"—things generally, without any precise limit. His "everything" is a mere vague generality, and the creator of it far below the distinctly individualized deity of Polytheism with a definite province marked out for him. (See Spencer and Gillen, vol. ii., p. 492.)

² Schoolcraft-Drake, i. 152.

³ Schoolcraft, ii. 195.

⁴ Waitz, vol. iii., p. 385; De la Saussaye, vol. i., p. 262 (Negroes); Powers, *op. cit.*, p. 413 (Californian Indians recognize an Old Man above, but the coyote is the most useful and practical deity); Waitz, vol. iii., p. 345 (Tribes of the Interior of Oregon); Godden, *J. A. I.*, xvii, p. 30 (Angami Nagas said to have vague beliefs in a Supreme Being, but look on him as too great and good to injure them).

mere spirits behind the objects that surround him, but are genuine mythical creations. These play a part in the theory of the world, explaining the origin of customs and sometimes accounting for the creation of man or even of the world itself. They are conceived at any rate in the lowest grade—we shall speak of a higher grade presently—as animals, men, or monsters in the forms familiar to the magical and animistic way of thought. Often they are ancestors, or men of the Long Ago. Though they perform some of the functions of a supreme God, that conception is apparently uncongenial to savagery. That it has ever arisen spontaneously within its limits is on the whole improbable, and when imported it does not readily effect a living union with the practical religion. This religion is animism working through magic and supplemented by magic.

7. Above the spirits of Animism rank the greater gods of Polytheism. It is easier to feel than to define the difference between a "spirit" and a "god," but we get the clue if we turn back in mind to the ambiguities which we find at a stratum of thought which is a little bit above the lowest, between the indwelling spirit and a spirit which directs or governs an object in which it dwells no longer. Often these are ambiguities which from the nature of the case it is not possible for the civilized investigator to resolve. The spirit which dwells in an object, but which can leave it and enter another, may clearly pass by easy transitions into a spirit which does not necessarily dwell in any object at all, but haunts it, or even, ceasing to haunt it, retains control over it. On the West Coast of Africa, Captain Ellis associates the transition with the rise of images. The Tshi, for the most part, recognize indwelling spirits, but when they make an image of the spirit, which must in the early stages be made of a fragment of the thing in which the spirit dwells, the tie between spirit and thing is weakened. In fact it is clear that, to dwell both in the image and in the thing, the spirit must be in both places at once. In reality he becomes most identified with his place of worship, and so becomes the tutelary deity of the village in which his shrine is placed, and this is, says Captain Ellis, the highest stage reached among the Tshi, where most of the gods worshipped

are simply the indwelling spirits of prominent natural objects in the neighbourhood. The ghost-gods, who were originally human spirits, have a separate origin but similar history. The skull is brought into the temple, and so imparts a guardian ghost. Many such ghosts, again, become tutelary deities and are often blended with nature deities.¹

But the neighbouring and more advanced Yoruba-speaking peoples have greater gods than these. They have replaced the local gods to a large extent by the gods of the whole people, and these are the gods who personify or direct the great natural forces. They are distinctly separate from the natural objects which they, or some of them, represent; and here we sometimes seem to see the transition going on before our eyes. Thus the great god, Olorun, is described as the Deified Firmament or Personal Sky. He is an old god, and he is too distant and lazy to interfere in the world's affairs, and for this reason he has dropped out of worship. It is to be observed that his sphere is strictly limited; he only controls the sky. "A man," runs one of their proverbs, "cannot cause rain to fall, and Olorun cannot give you a child." Olorun made Obatala, who is also the god of the sky and of the earth as well; but he is an anthropomorphic god; he made the first man and woman, he creates each new-born child; he causes deformities as a punishment for neglect, and he has an oracle by which the guilt of accused people is decided. Similarly, a minor god, Olokun, is not the Sea regarded as a living being, but an anthropomorphic deity who controls the sea.²

The greater gods, then, are conceived as human, and as being distinct from that which they control and out of which the conception of them is evolved. As Mr. Frazer points out, when the tree ceases to be the body of the tree-spirit, and becomes simply its abode, the tree becomes "merely a lifeless inert mass," while the spirit tends to assume the body of a man, and "ceasing to be a tree-soul, becomes a forest-god."³ And just as spirits dwelling in trees are replaced by a god on whom the life of trees depends, so the spirits who dwell in water give place to a lord of the sea, and the divine sky to a God who directs rain and snow, thunder

¹ A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, pp. 276-284.

² *Ib.*, 34-70.

³ Frazer, i. 188. Numerous illustrations are subjoined.

and lightning, a king who reigns over skyland. Thus in Greek religion the worship of Ouranos dies away and yields to that of Zeus.¹ A place is indeed found for the discarded Ouranos in the theogonies which now become a feature of religious life. For the anthropomorphism, of which the rudiments have already been noted in savage myth-making, now receives a great extension. The genealogies, the births and marriages of the gods, their loves and hates, their deeds of prowess, are drawn out with exuberant fancy. Often, as we know, the gods retain traces of their lowly origin; they are associated with the animals or spots or other natural objects from which they were originally derived. Hence the hawk-headed or ibis-headed gods of Egypt, hence the animals sacred to gods, the clean and the unclean; hence many a practice explained mythically, but in its origin simply a piece of magic or animism.² But though the gods retain traces, more or less marked as the case may be, of their not too honourable descent, they become, as the religious life advances, more and

¹ I am assuming the truth of the common view that Zeus himself was originally the sky, though from Mr. Farnell's account (*Cults of the Greek States*, vol. i., chap. iv.), this would seem not quite so clear. In Arcadia he was the thunder, i. e. the thunder itself was the god (p. 45). At Olympia *Zeús kataβάρης*, Zeus as descending in the thunder, is worshipped (p. 46). But in Æschylus *kataβάρης* is the epithet not of Zeus himself, but of the thunder (see e. g. Prometheus Vincetus), and the thunder is not Zeus, but his "sleepless dart." Observe the three stages here. In the first Zeus is the thunder. In the third he is a personal god who wields it. In the second he is in an ambiguous condition, descending in the thunder, yet seemingly more than the thunder itself—the descent is one of his epithets, or, as Oriental thought might conceive it, one of his incarnations. The thunder itself is also animated in Æschylus, "sleepless" and "breathing flame," but we are to take this as conscious poetry, not as simple animism. Whatever the truth as to the original nature of Zeus, this development may stand as typical of the transition from animism to Polytheism.

In Latin the use of Jupiter for the sky persists in literature of the classical period (*sub Jove frigido*). But in fact it seems very doubtful whether the native Roman religion ever rose above the conception of spirits presiding over places, persons, and especially functions. (Wisowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, especially pp. 20-28, and Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, vol. ii., p. 203, "Die römische Religion steckte noch tief in Animismus.") The anthropomorphic impulse came from the Greeks.

² Dr. Frazer even says (*Golden Bough*, vol. ii., p. 167) that "we may conjecture that whenever a god is described as the eater of a particular animal, the animal in question was originally nothing but the god himself." In any case the association till recently so unintelligible of an anthropomorphic god with animals, plants, stones, and generally with quasi-fetich objects and savage rites, is now explained as referable, with very high probability, to a form of religious conservatism—an old rite being maintained in association with the worship of a new god.

more distinctively human, and in becoming human they also become superhuman. They are endowed at least with larger powers, with longer life, or with immortality, and in many cases also with physical, mental, and moral attributes of which more will be said later.

This beginning of idealism must be regarded as the final condition which the spirit must fulfil in order to become a god. The gods of Polytheism are great gods, and often have troops of spirits in subservience to them. The typical relation indeed is, as Comte long ago pointed out, comparable to that between a species and an individual. The spirit of a tree strictly regarded is limited to that tree and functions only in this spot. A tree-god controls all trees. Similarly all the great gods control either large provinces of nature—sea, earth, sky (Zeus, Poseidon, Hades), or are protectors of the people, national gods (Yahveh, Ashur, Athene), or preside over one or more of the main human functions (Ares, Aphrodite). Thus in the conceptions underlying them there are beginnings of a higher unity, an approach to order in the religious basis of life, which is carried further as by the anthropomorphizing genealogies and hierarchies the many gods are brought into subjection to one father and ruler of all.¹

The gods then, as opposed to the spirits, are clearly distinct from the natural objects which they govern, or the functions which they direct. They are anthropomorphic, and so tend to be connected by family and political relationships. They control the great powers of nature and the main functions of life. And while human they are also superhuman, and at their best lend themselves to ideal forms of beauty and of ethical thought.

¹ Inasmuch as the gods have personalities which have hardened into concrete individuals sharply opposed to one another, it might seem rather that polytheism has carried us farther away than animism from the unity of nature, and that where (as in the indigenous Chinese religion) we have one supreme spirit of the sky and one of the earth, we are nearer to unity. But that is misleading. Such unity as we find in animism is the unity of a blur, the unity which precedes differentiation. The Chinese religion—an exceptional survival of animism in a high but very conservative civilization—no doubt arrives at a systematization in which something like the hierarchy of Polytheism is reproduced; but, if I understand it aright, in a much less articulate fashion. What, *e. g.*, is the relation between the earth spirit and the countless spirits of hills, groves, rivers, etc., upon the earth? To this Polytheism would have a definite answer. They would be subjects, or daughters, of the earth-mother.

8. If Animism is the typical religion of savagery, the cult of the greater gods has its central point in the earlier civilizations. Yet to describe the religion of these civilizations would not be to describe polytheism. We have defined polytheism by marking it out sharply from animism on the one side, and (by implication) from monotheism on the other. But in the concrete development of religious history these demarcations are precisely what we do not find. The religion of the early civilizations is a mass of conceptions in which, around the figures of the greater gods, a surge of primitive animistic and magic practices rises and falls, while here and there through the obscurity there dimly looms the outline of a higher principle.

Thus to confine ourselves to the two most ancient civilizations, we have in Babylonia and Egypt, amid much that is obscure, fairly typical examples of the stage of polytheism in which the animistic foundation is plainly visible, in which magic still plays an important part, in which the conception of godhead retains plentiful traces of its lowly origin, while on the other hand there are the beginnings evident of the stage of thought which was destined to supersede polytheism. These religions in fact have their centre of gravity in the polytheistic phase, while they put out ramifications into the phases below and above.

The greater gods of the Egyptian pantheon are as they stand in the historical period impersonations of the greater forces that surrounded the Egyptian and controlled his life—the sky, the earth, the stars, the sun, the Nile.”¹ In its early phases the religious development seems to have proceeded independently but on parallel lines in the partially independent nomes or districts into which Egypt was divided. Each of these originally had its chief god, who very often personified the same natural attributes under a different name. In particular, “wherever there is some important change in the river (Nile), there they (these incarnations of the river) are more especially installed and worshipped.”²

The result of this multiplicity, as the different cults came

¹ Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 85-86. Isis of Buto denoted the black vegetable mould of the valley. (*Ib.*, 99.)

² Maspero, 99.

into relation to each other, was a mythology of luxuriant confusions and inconsistencies, which led the Egyptian priesthood to attempt a remarkable solution. To this we shall have to refer a little later. But let us first notice that these greater gods are in all probability not the primary deities of the Egyptian religion, which has its roots rather in primitive animism. The association of many of the Egyptian gods with a special sacred animal has from the days of the Greek travellers down to the present generation been a puzzle of the greatest difficulty. Further research into the earliest Egyptian monuments coincides with the results drawn from comparative religion in making probable that the animal is not the secondary figure in the cult, but, at least in point of time, the primary. The Egyptians had an animistic religion before they worshipped the greater gods Osiris and Ptah. The hawk-headed figure of Horus represents pictorially a combination between the worship of the Sun-god and the earlier worship of the hawk itself. The worship of Sekhet in the form of a cat-headed or lion-headed woman, again, blends an anthropomorphic cult with the more primitive adoration of the cat tribe. Like other people in the animistic stage, in short, the early Egyptians worshipped animals and other natural objects, while the later Egyptians tended to conceive of the deities as anthropomorphic, super-human spirits, and the historical Egyptian religion or mythology was a compromise or blending of the lower and the higher. Even the greater gods retained many traces of their animistic origin. The Egyptian deities, though great spirits, are by no means necessarily emancipated from either the weaknesses or the wickednesses of man.¹ They have their wives—not only goddesses, but harems of mortal women, priestesses of the temples. Not only do they marry and are given in marriage, but they die like men and require burial. Like men they have a composite nature, consisting of soul and body. The soul might be an insect, a bird, a shadow, or a double—Ka—and this latter was not essentially different from the Ka of man. Gods in fact were virtually conceived as men in their essential nature, having bones, flesh and blood, and a mysterious fluid, Sa, the source of vigour, with which they could impregnate

¹ Maspero, p. 126.

man.¹ The dead god, like the dead man, required food and a house—his temple. Indeed he could do with many temples, dividing his double among them in accordance with the accommodating looseness of texture which that entity everywhere enjoys. He might be incorporated in a statue or in a sacred animal.² Some gods remained the same after death, as Osiris; others changed their names and perhaps their character. Maspero writes:

“Their doubles, like those of men, both dreaded and regretted the light. All sentiment was extinguished by the hunger from which they suffered, and gods who were noted for their compassionate kindness when alive, became pitiless and ferocious tyrants in the tomb. When once men were bidden to the presence of Sokaris, Khontamentit, or even of Osiris, ‘mortals come, terrifying their hearts with fear of the god, and none dareth to look him in the face either among gods or men; for him the great are as the small. He spareth not those who love him; he beareth away the child from its mother, and the old man who walketh on his way; full of fear, all creatures make supplication before him, but he turneth not his face towards them.’ Only by the unflinching payment of tribute, and by feeding him as though he were a simple human double, could living or dead escape the consequences of his furious temper.” . . .

All offerings to the dead were presented to him:—

“He was humbly prayed to transmit them to such or such a double, whose name and parentage were pointed out to him. He took possession of them, kept part for his own use, and of his bounty gave the remainder to its destined recipient.”³

In Egypt, as among other primitive peoples, “men did not die. They were assassinated.” The murderer might belong to their world and be recognized as another man, an animal, an inanimate object. Or he might be a spirit, a god, demon, or disembodied soul.⁴ At least in the earlier period some of the gods were cannibals. Sahû, *i. e.* Orion, is represented on the pyramid of Unas in the sixth dynasty as a hunter. He hunted the gods, killed and devoured them, and by so doing, in accordance with true cannibal theory, assimilated their

¹ Maspero, 108-110.

² *Ib.*, 117-18.

³ *Ib.*, 116-19.

⁴ *Ib.*, 111.

virtues.¹ But what is even more remarkable, a man might do the same thing, and, by so doing, obtain control over the divinity. King Unas, in his address to the deities of the dead, boasts that the gods have been lassoed for Unas by one power, brought towards him by another. "Shosmu has cut them up for Unas and had the pieces cooked in broiling cauldrons. It is Unas who devours their magical virtues and eats their souls, and the great ones among them are for Unas' feast in the morning, the middle ones among them, male and female, are for his roast meat, the small ones for his evening meal. The old ones, male and female, are for his furnace." Again, "the inhabitants of the sky are made his servants, and the limbs of their womenkind are thrown into the cauldrons. Unas has taken the hearts of the gods, has devoured the red crown, has eaten the white. His victuals are those whose magic virtues are nourished on hearts, he has eaten the wisdom of every god."² It is to us a little bizarre for a man to recommend himself to the heavenly host on the ground that he has eaten them, but the animistic view of nature, with its spirits, that are at once immaterial and material, that can live by perishing, that may nourish man yet exist apart from him, which are more powerful than he and yet controllable by him, solves all these contradictions. Unas controls the gods because he has possessed himself of their virtues by eating them. Isis obtained control over Ra in his decrepit old age by stealing his name, by the knowledge of which she had over him a magical control. In the same way men could control the gods by magical incantations, the use of wax effigies, etc.³ This is in line with the lowest ideas of witchcraft. Side by side with it we find the typical conceptions of anthropomorphic religion, e.g. sacrifice as a contract between deity and worshipper. The god himself prescribes the details, and of course undertakes to fulfil his side of the bargain. He abolishes human sacrifice, declaring that he will be satisfied with an animal. But he is still a stickler for form. Any error of detail would void the contract, and this is all to the good of the priestly order.

¹ Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 97, 98.

² Maspero, *Recueil de Travaux*, p. 59 ff.

³ Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 212, 214.

But if on its lower side the Egyptian religion is thus rooted in animism and magic, if the gods figure almost as demons who destroy men, and are responsible for such deaths as cannot be assigned to obvious physical causes, if they have human concubines and can be controlled by magic—on its other side the esoteric philosophy of the priests tends to transcend polytheism, and to conceive the ultimate unity of the Divine. The very multiplicity of gods—especially of gods with similar functions and differing only in name—was a stimulus to thought, and called for some theory to explain so bewildering a confusion. As the unity of Egyptian culture grew, the separate nome-gods were necessarily united in one pantheon. In each nome a local trinity or triad was found, the nome-god being associated sometimes with wife and son, sometimes with two goddesses, “who were at once his sisters and his wives according to the national custom.”¹ Whether deliberately introduced for the purpose or not, the system of triads had the effect of reconciling the supremacy of the old nome-gods in each locality with a recognition of gods originating in other parts. The god who was supreme in one nome would enter the triad of another nome in a subordinate position.

“Hâthor, supreme at Denderah, shrank into insignificance before her husband, Haroëris, at Edfû. . . . On the other hand, Haroëris, when at Denderah . . . was nothing more than the almost useless consort of the lady Hathor.”²

But what is principally to our purpose is that in this system of Triads, and of more complex Enneads of gods and goddesses, two processes of identification went forward. With the slippery use of identity in early thought, the personalities of father and son within the triad slid into one another. The son’s “being was but a feeble reflection of his father’s, and possessed neither life nor power except as derived from him. Two such contiguous personalities must needs have been confused, and, as a matter of fact, were so confused as to become at length nothing more than two aspects of the same god, who united in his own person degrees of relationship mutually exclusive of each other in a human family. Father, inasmuch as he was the first member of the triad; son, by virtue of being its third member;

¹ Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 104.

² *Ib.*, 106.

identical with himself in both capacities, he was at once his own father, his own son, and the husband of his mother.”¹

Such identifications are not the reflective product of a profound mysticism which has seen into the recesses of the problem of identity and difference, but rather the naïve creation of shapeless early thought for which that problem has not yet arisen because personality has not yet hardened itself into the clear crystal of an individual concept. But this blurring or merging of two persons was followed by a more thoroughgoing identification. Owing to the identity of their position in the triads, all the divine sons were step by step identified with one another as sons; all were, as it were, manifestations of divine sonship. But father and son being already identified, this could only lead to a doctrine that under many names, in many shapes, at divers places, one deity was the real object of worship. But we are not to suppose that this was to reach monotheism as we understand the term. The many gods may be forms of one God, yet each form may be as real as the substance. The one god of monotheism is a jealous God, who pulls down the temples of his rivals and either expels them from the domain of reality or reduces them to the rank of outcasts under the name of demons. But the One Being, reached by the method of slippery identification, is not distinct enough to be exclusive. He is as much a Pantheist as a Monotheist creation. His own personality is not cut clear enough to exclude that of others. His many forms, each in its own locality, are more living than his substance.

“This conception of deity towards which their ideas were converging has nothing in common with the conception of the God of our modern religions and philosophies. No god of the Egyptians was ever spoken of simply as ‘God.’ Tûmû was the ‘one and only god’—Nâtir Úâû Úâiti—at Heliopolis; Anhûri-Shû was also the ‘one and only god’ at Sebennytos and at Thinis. The unity of Atûmû did not interfere with that of Anhûri-Shû, but each of these gods, although the ‘sole’ deity in his own domain, ceased to be so in the domain of the other. The feudal spirit, always alert and jealous, prevented the higher dogma, which was dimly apprehended in the temples, from triumphing over local religions and extending

¹ *Loc. cit.*

over the whole land. Egypt had as many 'sole' deities as she had large cities, or even important temples. She never accepted the idea of the sole god, 'beside whom there is none other.'¹

Thus Egyptian religion is monotheistic in tendency rather than in achievement, since the thought which led in that direction rested rather on a reversion to primitive vagueness of identification than on the strengthening grasp of a clear-cut conception of the divine. But it must be borne in mind that on its higher side Egyptian religion is intimately associated with morality. It is here that we first find a judgment of the dead, a God before whom every soul must plead, and with whom the justified soul is made one. To the details of this judgment we must return later. To conclude our present account² of the monotheistic tendency in Egypt with its ethical leanings, some hymns to Amen Ra of the period of the new kingdom may suffice.

"Hearing the complaint of him who is oppressed,
 Kindly of heart when called upon,
 He delivereth the timid from him who is of a froward heart,
 He judgeth the cause of the weak and the oppressed. . . .
 One and only one, maker of all that are,
 From whose eyes mankind issued,
 By whose mouth the gods were created,
 Who maketh the herbage, and maketh to live the cattle, goats,
 swine and sheep, etc., etc. . . .
 Sole king is he even in the midst of the gods ;
 Many are his names, none knoweth their number,
 He riseth on the horizon of the east, he is laid to rest on the
 horizon of the west. . . .
 In the morning he is born each day ;
 Thoth raiseth his eyes,
 And propitiateth him with his benefits. . . .
 Thy crew rejoice
 When they see the overthrow of the wicked one,
 Whose members taste the knife ;
 The flame devoureth him ;
 His soul is more punished than his body ;

¹ Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 152.

² I do not speak here of the exceptional attempt of Amen Hotep IV. to introduce sun-worship, in substitution for all other culta. This, I imagine, was an abortive attempt at monolatry rather than monotheism.

That Nāk serpent, he is deprived of movement. . . .
 Mighty prince of the gods
 . . . Making mankind, creating all that is." ¹

This is not monotheism. It reminds us rather of the psalm that begins, "God sat among the congregation of gods," in which Jehovah appears as the chief figure of a Pantheon. It reminds us still more forcibly of the Vedic hymns in which each god in turn is extolled as the one and only god. But though it is not monotheism, it is a religious conception removed by a very wide chasm from that extraordinary mixture of magic, cannibalism, and moral and intellectual crudity, which gave its character to the popular cult.

9. In Babylon, as in Egypt, primitive animism and the magic which is correlative to it, underlie throughout the worship of the greater gods. In its progress to a higher stage the Babylonian religion, it would seem, worked by differentiation. The more important natural forces became gods, the inferior ones were, as a general rule, relegated to the secondary position of mere spirits.² But at Babylon these inferior gods became in large measure demons, often malevolent demons,³ and the Babylonian magic, which was so important a feature in the life of the people, had special reference to these demons. They could be dealt with in one of two different ways, for the bewitched man might either appeal to a sorcerer, who could control the spirit directly, by potions, tying knots which would strangle him, burning images, and so on, or to an exorcist, who would apply to the gods for their help against the demon, and if properly treated would deliver the victim out of their hand. Here is a description of the Storm Demons of Eridu :—

"Seven are they, they are seven,
 In the subterranean deep they are seven,
 Perched (f) in the sky they are seven,
 In a section of the subterranean deep they were reared,
 They are neither male nor are they female,

¹ Griffith, *World's Literature*, 5312, etc.

² Jastrow, *Religion of Babylon and Assyria*, p. 49.

³ As an illustration, Nun-gal was by origin, probably, a lower god of Sippar. He disappears as a god, and his name becomes a collective designation for a powerful group of demons. (*Ib.*, 168.)

They are destructive whirlwinds,
 They have no wife nor do they beget offspring.
 Compassion and mercy they do not know,
 Prayer and supplication they do not hear,
 Horses bred on the mountains are they.
 Hostile to Ea are they,
 Powerful ones among the gods are they.
 To work mischief in the street they settle themselves in the
 highway,
 Evil are they, they are evil,
 Seven are they, they are seven, seven, and again seven are they.”¹

Next hear how the demons took possession of a man and how they were driven out:—

“They have used all kinds of charms,
 to entwine me as with ropes, etc. . . .
 But I, by command of Marduk, the lord of charms,
 by Marduk, the master of bewitchment,
 both the male and female witch,
 as with ropes I will entwine,
 as in a cage I will catch,
 as with cords I will tie,
 as in a net I will overpower,
 as in a sling I will twist,
 as a fabric I will tear,
 with dirty water as from a well I will fill,
 as a wall throw them down.”

This is declaimed by the exorciser and accompanied by symbolic actions.²

Often the gods are described in terms of the crudest animism. When Parnapishtim sacrifices after the flood, “The gods inhaled the odour, the gods inhaled the sweet odour, the gods gathered like flies around the sacrificer.”³ The finest hymns and prayers are associated with incantation rituals. The efficacy of prayer depends on its being uttered by the right person and in the right manner, for the approved form of words is of magical efficacy.⁴ The gods are of limited power. They are taken captive, and released by Marduk, “who showed mercy towards the captured gods, removed the yoke from the gods who were hostile to him.”⁵

¹ Jastrow, 264.

² *Ib.*, 272.

³ *Ib.*, 503.

⁴ *Ib.*, 353.

⁵ *Ib.*, 438.

They sanction the Flood and then bitterly regret, but cannot undo what they have done. The gods wept with Ishtar, "the gods in their depression sat down to weep."¹ Bel alone was ruthless. He bitterly resented the preservation of Parnapishtim—"What person has escaped (?)? No one was to survive the destruction." The good Ea expostulates with him.

"Punish the sinner for his sins,
Punish the evil-doer for his evil deeds.
But be merciful so as not to root out completely,
Be considerate not to destroy everything.
Instead of bringing in a deluge,
Let lions come and diminish mankind. . . .
Let tigers, famine, pestilence, come and waste the land."²

Thus adjured Bel came to his senses, took Parnapishtim by the hand and was reconciled.

Thus, as is natural on anthropomorphic principle, there are among gods, as among men, good and bad, kindly rulers and headstrong tyrants. We have seen Ea interceding for mankind. He is the water-god, the giver of fertility; he teaches the arts of civilization, and his cult is favourable to human feeling. He tends to be the god of mankind generally, as dissociated from any particular spot. Marduk, again, is a magnified king, the protector of the weak, he releases the imprisoned, and punishes the evil-doer. But Shamash in the Assyrian cult is the centre of a higher conception than any other deity.³ While Ashur and Ishtar are partial to Assyria, the favours of Shamash are bestowed on the kings for righteousness, and it is in the presence of Shamash that Tiglath Pileser I. sets his captives free. The following hymn to Shamash will illustrate his character:—

"The law of mankind dost thou direct,
Eternally just in the heavens art thou,
Of faithful judgment towards all the world art thou."⁴

Yet in this hymn, which is a prayer for the king's life, the later lines are a distinct echo of the incantation formulæ:—

¹ Jastrow, 502.

² *Ib.*, 504.

³ With the exception, perhaps, of Sin. See the hymn to Sin quoted in Jastrow, p. 303.

⁴ Jastrow, 300.

“Cleanse him like a vessel . . .
 Illumine him like a vessel of . . .
 Like the copper of a polished tablet let him be bright.
 Release him from the ban.”

With this may be compared Nebuchadnezzar's hymn to Marduk on his accession :—

“O, Eternal ruler! Lord of the Universe! . . .
 It is thou who hast created me,
 And thou hast entrusted to me sovereignty over mankind.
 According to thy mercy, O Lord, which thou bestowest upon all,
 Cause me to love thy supreme rule.
 Implant the fear of thy divinity in my heart.”¹

In such a conception of prayer there was surely the potentiality of a high development of ethical religion. Yet worship fails to differentiate itself wholly from magical incantation,² and though there are good gods who love justice, they are not fused into the unity of one real creator of things. In spite of some occasional expressions³ the better opinion appears to be that there was no real monotheistic tendency among the Babylonians.

10. In the religion, or rather the religions, of the Greeks again, as in the light of modern research and the comparative method we are coming gradually to understand the subject anew, we see three distinct stages of thought intertwined. At the base we have the demons of animism and the magical rites of “riddance.” We have the Keres, not awful mysterious fates as they already appear at times to be in Homer, but flitting mischievous demons bringing all manner of ills, driven away with sticks or purged with strong scents and holy plants like rue and buckthorn.⁴ We have the conception of a quasi-physical pollution arising now from breach of ceremonial, now from an outrage on the most sacred human relations, and extending to physical objects⁵ as well as to man. We have the living, self-avenging curse, the thin ghost squealing like a bat, and crowding to “drink the life-blood in the trench Ulysses made,” the animal god, the boggy, the monster brood. Above these fearsome shapes

¹ Jastrow, 296.

² *Ib.*, 296 seq., 314.

³ See, e.g., the hymn to Sin, referred to above, and cf. Jastrow, 319.

⁴ Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 168.

⁵ E.g. the pollution of the earth by blood.

we have the more gracious, strong, beautiful, and finally ideal human forms of the Olympian gods—essentially mere men and women in the first instance, as every reader of Homer knows, but built on a greater scale; turbulent, laughter-loving, now tender and friendly, now unreasonably resentful; joining in the fights of mortal men, and capable of being wounded by them, prosecuting the blood feud as Poseidon against Odysseus with no more regard to the inherent justice of the case than the human avenger would show; placated by sacrifice and trusted to perform their part in the implied sacrificial compact; united, finally, in intricate theogonies, and so affording a crude basis for the framework of things and the process of creation. But the Olympian gods, though human in their essence, were superhuman in the types of their might, majesty, and beauty. They have incarnated for all subsequent time the ideal types of finite humanity, the satisfaction of a mind reposing on the work that it has done and knowing that it is good, not troubled as yet with the infinite beyond and the poverty of man's power to cope with it. They are "the happy ones," glorified children of a time—not as an older generation supposed when the world was young, for the world in Homer's day was already old, but when for a while it seemed to be renewing its youth under fortunate conditions, beneath a sunny sky. But the Greek mind outgrew anthropomorphism and the higher development took two directions. On the more purely religious side in connection with the Orphic mysteries it followed a line not unlike and greatly influenced by the esoteric doctrine of the Egyptian priests. The movement was in part an advance, in part a reversion to older methods. The initiated felt dimly for a higher religious conception by the method of mystical identifications, first between the gods in their various forms:—

"One Zeus, one Hades, one Helios, one Dionysos,
Yea in all things One God, his name why speak I asunder?"¹

Secondly between the god and the worshipper:—

"I also avow me that I am of your blessed race."

says the initiated, and the reply is

"Happy and Blessed one; thou shalt be god instead of mortal."²

¹ Harrison, p. 656.

² From an Orphic hymn, translated, *ib.*, 586.

Similarly in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, the soul which passes the tests becomes itself Osiris. But as the *Book of the Dead* is essentially a provision of magical formulas, whereby admittance to the realms of bliss is to be enforced, so it would seem that the Orphic ritual is at bottom a ritual of magic.¹ It is the performance of ceremonial acts of occult efficacy upon which the soul is to rely. Here, as so often in mysticism, the spiritual consciousness overleaps itself and falls back intellectually on primitive confusions, morally on the purges and quasi-physical disinfectants of savage religion. It is much if purity of thought is insisted on as a condition and the worshipper is told that "he who enters the incense-laden shrine must be pure, and purity is to be of holy heart."²

A truer spirituality is to be found in the reasoned theism of the philosophers and the philosophic poets of Greece, whom the mob of educated and uneducated alike took for atheists, who were aware that the gods of the popular religion were beings made by man in his own image, that ethical purity must be attained by ethical and not by magic methods, and who first taught the world, what it has too often forgotten, that goodness and God are identical. These are the essential doctrines of a spiritual religion; they carry us outside the region of Polytheism, and their consideration must be deferred to a later place. For polytheism proper is outgrown when the stage of philosophic reflection is reached. Its anthropomorphic deities belong to the phase of thought which intervenes between the primitive confusion of categories and the philosophic movement which establishes the leading conceptions found in experience as clear-cut, independent objects of thought. It is the stage of the plastic imagination in which the mind is fully capable of forming for itself a concrete imagery of things unseen with all the articulateness and vividness of so many objects of perception. Its fictitious personalities are no longer mere pallid doubles of this or that function. They are many-sided beings with distinctly conceived attributes and a regular life history. If their origin is traceable to animistic confusions, if their birth is

¹ See Harrison, pp. 587-9.

² See Harrison, 479. "Osiris, rendered as holy, means the righteousness which the gods ordain, and is not confined to matters of ceremonial.

in some primitive personification of a function or an attribute, their adult life is passed on a higher plane. Their world is articulate in the sense that its parts are not only distinct but interconnected. The gods are related by ties of blood and political subordination, and in so far as each is responsible for some great department of nature or human life, the theogonies which form an integral part of polytheism may be said to form a first attempt, not perhaps at a theory of the universe, but at an imaginative picture of the agencies by which its framework is maintained. The thought of the polytheistic stage is wider in its reach, just as it is more distinct in its representation than that of animism. Its departmental gods represent a wider grouping of phenomena in proportion as a god of vegetation has a wider scope than the spirit of this particular plant. The endeavour to connect the several gods represents an attempt at a still wider interconnection of the parts of human experience. But all these endeavours go on in the form of concrete imagery and without any critical test of truth or any reflective examination of the conceptions used. The world of ideas is now a picture with many clearly-drawn figures in which the several categories are no longer hopelessly interchanged and confused, but the thoughts imbedded in this picture are not yet separated out and held before the mind as objects of critical examination. It is a world whose parts exhibit some order and interconnection, wherein a wider grouping of the phenomena of the perceptual world is mirrored, but this order is built up by imagination with the aid of fanciful analogies and ill-understood myths, adding little to the rational insight into the actual scheme of things.

CHAPTER II

ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS IN EARLY THOUGHT

1. IN the world of thought dominated by Magic, by Animism, or by Polytheism, what account do men render to themselves of the basis of conduct? What reasons do they give for the rules which they acknowledge, and what do they suppose to be their meaning and end? How does the violation of rule affect them, and how do they act when such violation has occurred? To these questions no single and simple answer can be given.

No doubt, as was said at the outset, custom is binding upon primitive man, and binding upon him in truth because it is custom. But while this is the real moral force which the onlooker recognizes as the essential point, primitive races have often a definite conception of their own as to the reasons of their obeying custom. Not infrequently its breach will bring misfortune upon the wrong-doer, on some one connected with him, or on the community. Thus the Aleuts hold that the whale avoids dissolute tribes, on which account whalers must avoid women during the fishing-season. But the whalers may have to suffer for the sins of others as well as their own, for the whale would punish them if their wives were unfaithful during their absence, or if their sisters were unchaste before marriage.¹ Similarly the Australians hold that certain breaches of custom cause the Erkincha disease and other penalties.² Among the Eastern Esquimaux, though abortion and infanticide are common, an opinion is growing against them on the ground that they

¹ Reclus, p. 52; *ib.*, p. 67. Among the Konyaga loose behaviour is considered to be punished by difficult confinements.

² Spencer and Gillen, vol. i., pp. 168, 411, 471. Cf. Howitt, *Organisation of the Australian Tribes*, p. 104, and *Tribes of S.E. Australia*, p. 296.

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bring misfortune in the village where the child's wailing is heard.¹

The process whereby breach of custom thus brings about its own penalty is not always easy to trace. The cases in which we have full information, however, fall into two principal classes. In the first, the connection is "direct," *i. e.* an evil influence is set up by the misdeed, which like any physical cause produces disease or whatever the bad result may be: these cases are in line with primitive magic, and in them the sanction may be regarded as magical. In other instances the trespass is held to offend a certain spirit, or possibly to put the evil-doer or his friends into the power of the evil spirit. This conception belongs to the department of animism, and here the sanction may be called religious. Finally, the two conceptions can be blended, magical and religious elements being entangled together.

To begin with magic influences. When the Dakota violates a female captive or breaks the rule of continence upon the war-path, he not only displeases the spirits of the deceased, but also the "war-medicine," and on both grounds brings down misfortunes on his party.² Taboos on intercourse have been frequently mentioned as forming a large portion of primitive life, and as influencing the marriage laws all over the world, and the taboo acts like a magical quality. For instance, the Australian native must not eat food killed by certain relations, nor generally food into which such persons "project their smell." Here the taboo is a quality which affects the food, and would directly injure the eater.³ We have seen that over a considerable part of the savage world taboo is the method of protecting property, *e. g.* in Rotuma the natives are honest, but their honesty arises from the fear that if one touches

¹ Reclus, p. 34. According to Westermarck (p. 61) unchastity on the part of a girl is considered to bring ruin on a country by the natives of Loango, and some of the Dyaks think that a pregnant unmarried woman is offensive to the superior powers (*ib.*, 63).

² Schoolcraft, vol. iv., p. 63. According to Schoolcraft-Drake, vol. i., p. 188, the Winnebagos attribute their respect for women in war to the direct command of the Great Spirit. Here the sanction is purely religious, but we have seen that the conception of the Great Spirit among the Red Indians is the centre of manifold confusion.

³ Spencer and Gillen, vol. i., p. 469.

the food of another the owner might kill him by its means.¹ In the Melanesian practice² the owner of the property controls the taboo. We are expressly told that it has no authority from a spirit.³ The infectiousness of the taboo is, as we have seen, an important element in early criminal law, the offender who has broken the taboo transferring its dangerous character to himself, and so not only incurring a curse, but also involving himself in the penalty of exclusion from the community.⁴ Thus the breaking of taboo carries its own punishment. The process works automatically and without need of the intervention of a spirit. In a quite similar way we have seen that some forms of oath and ordeal provide automatic punishments of perjury. A fetish object is laid on the stomach in Great Bassam, a stone is powdered and drunk in water in Ashanti. The operation in both cases is magical.⁵ Often in early society the laws are protected by a curse pronounced by the people as a whole or by a priest as their representative on any one who shall break them. Thus we have the well-known list of curses in the Book of Deuteronomy, and a quite analogous set of inscriptions recording the curses pronounced against offenders in the early Greek states.⁶ In the same way, paternal authority is fortified by the power of the parental curse and blessing. This action is automatic, and though we may say that it incorporates an ethical idea it fails to work in strict accordance with ethical conditions. The operation of the magical agency is, if the term may be coined, paramoral—working by the side of the ethical

¹ Gardiner, *J. A. I.*, vol. xxvii, p. 409. We have referred above to the imprecations pronounced over the boundary-stones by the Babylonians. The imprecations would make the stone itself avenge any disturbance of it. (Maspero, p. 762.) Similarly the stones set up by Laban and Jacob are witnesses to the division of the land. (Gen. xxxi. 45-52.) At a later stage the stone has become inanimate, but a curse on any one who shall move it is pronounced by the whole people. (Deut. xxvii.) The curse is still the punishment, though its operation is perhaps theological rather than magical.

² Referred to above Part I., chap. viii.; Part II., chap. i.

³ Codrington, *J. A. I.*, vol. x., p. 279. Compare the use of stones by Esquimaux. (Reclus, p. 110, and cf. Tylor on the mending of hedges by a cotton thread among the Kunama, *Contemp. Review*, 1873, p. 704.)

⁴ See Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 70-87.

⁵ Post, *A. J.*, ii., pp. 107, 108.

⁶ Deut. xxvii. 15, et seq. Cf. Harrison, p. 142, for selections from the 'Dirae of Teoa.' "Whosoever maketh baneful drugs against the Teana, . . . may he perish, both he and his offspring," etc.

principle, but not always on the same lines. The point is well illustrated in the story of the sons of Isaac. Jacob secures by fraud the blessing intended for Esau, and once given, the blessing cannot be withdrawn. It is quite comparable to a piece of goods made over once for all and not to be resumed. The most Esau can hope is that the store may not be exhausted—"Hast thou not reserved a blessing for me?" "Hast thou but one blessing, my father?"¹ Yet if the blessing were the true expression of the father's loving gratitude won by good service, Jacob should rather have had a curse for his deceit.

2. Grotesque as the magical doctrine of punishment appears when stated in set terms or illustrated in concrete practice, puerile as the whole machinery of magic stones, avenging beans, and death-dealing gibberish looks when viewed from behind the scenes, yet the conception of an inherent retribution following as an automatic consequence of the wrong act lies close to the permanent moral consciousness of mankind, closer than the alternative theory of punishment *ab extra* inflicted by a vengeful spirit or a just God. For here as elsewhere, the magical doctrine merely crystallizes a diffused psychological state into a material object or a physical occurrence. We can all put ourselves without the slightest difficulty into the mental attitude of the savage who breaks a taboo. We have many things that are taboo to us and we know what it is to handle them. Whatever we believe or disbelieve in religion or in morals, there remain for all of us certain things to do which affects us with a greater or less degree of mental discomfort, varying from uneasiness to acute remorse or the extreme of cold self-horror. These are in strictness feelings attendant or consequent upon the action. Externalize them, turn what we feel about the act into some physical attribute of the thing or person with which the act is concerned, some noxious emanation, some death-dealing "smell," and the feeling becomes a taboo. Once again, take away the taboo and at first sight the basis of the feeling seems to be removed, and moral obligation to disappear. But then comes a rational consideration of the whole circumstances of the case—the deliberate view of the total effect of the bad act on our own character, on the lives and happiness

¹ Gen. xxvii. 36-8.

of others, on the social order, on everything that we hold in affection and esteem. On this view we can see that our horror has its legitimate function, that it has grown up as an integral part of the conditions which constitute us fit members of a human society, so that before we can reason out all that a bad act implies we have a feeling about it in which those consequences are in a manner represented. Now this feeling is the great permanent fact of the moral consciousness persisting through all stages of development. The conceptions to which it gives rise vary greatly, and their variations affect and are affected by the whole scope and character of practical morality, so that their history is the history of moral development. The simplest of all ways of conceiving the facts is that of attributing malefic quality to the bad act itself—the act, or some person or thing affected by it, taking on itself by the primitive mental process of assimilation the quality of the mental feeling which arises in us when the act is contemplated in our minds. So near indeed is this to the permanent tendencies of the moral consciousness that language to this day speaks of the act as noble, base, or horrible, as if these were qualities attaching to a physical event, and not expressions for feelings which the physical event excites and psychological and social consequences that follow from it.

We may even go a step further, and say that in considerable measure wrong-doing is still conceived rather magically than ethically. Take, for example, the case of sexual intercourse. It is hardly too much to say that for the average moral consciousness this is still held to be sanctified by marriage as by the removal of a taboo, so that neither the production of children without means to maintain them, nor the indulgence of physical passion without psychical love, is strongly condemned when covered by the ceremony. On the other hand, the woman who breaks the taboo uncovered by the ceremony is stamped once for all with the scarlet letter, without regard to the question whether she was the experienced temptress or one whose fault was merely to have loved and trusted too much. She is marked, tabooed. Though condemned most loudly by the self-styled "moralist," the condemnation of her, in nine cases out of ten, is not really moral, that is to say, based on a rational view of her character and its potentialities for good and evil, but magical, based on a supposed

bad quality, acquired once for all by the breach of a taboo, in view of which she is a piece of damaged goods in the social market. And like all magical qualities the taboo is eminently infectious, and all respectable women are seen gathering their skirts about them to avoid that contact with the offender which would communicate the stain to themselves.

On the other hand, a man may be said to incur a magical rather than an ethical condemnation in cases of cowardice and perhaps of certain kinds of dishonesty. The "prison-taint" hangs in a measure about one who has ever been convicted and degrades him below much greater criminals who have kept within the law. In all these matters the function of the ethical thinker is to plead for that rational consideration of character and conduct, that *συγγνώμη*, which is the truest safeguard against Pharisaism, and which, making us aware of the extreme fallibility of our judgments upon other people, bids us confine such judgments to the minimum point requisite for regulating our dealings with prudence and justice. We must so far "judge" a convicted cheat as to beware of trusting him for the future, but as to the intrinsic worth of his character when all is summed up, and how it compares with that of many who need no repentance—of this, omniscience alone can judge. "Judge not" is a standing protest against magical condemnations.

3. Close as the magical judgment stands to the permanent conditions of the moral consciousness it is not the only form in which the primitive mind conceives the sanction of conduct.

As the belief in spirits generally accompanies that in the efficacy of magic, so the magical conception of punishment very readily yields to or blends with the conception of spiritual intervention. Thus the oath often takes the form of invoking the vengeance of a spirit.¹ In the case of the North American Indians we have seen that the spirit and the "war-medicine" worked together to secure self-restraint. The Dakotas attribute bad luck in hunting to an offence committed by some of the hunter's family against the spirits of the dead. The taboo on an offender may be due to the fact that the spirits are wroth with him. Thus a murderer may be avoided because he is pursued

¹ Post, *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz*, ii., 127.

by the ghost of his victim, and again the avenger of blood who fails to do his duty may himself be pursued by the indignant spirit of his slain relative. We are not indeed to suppose that the ordinary spirit of animism has a detached or impartial interest in human conduct; on the contrary, animism is for the most part non-moral, and a good deal of it is immoral. There is no reason why the spirit of a river should be any more concerned with morality than the river itself, while, on the contrary, there is some reason why the spirit of a disease should be more immoral than the disease itself, for, abstracted from the spirit which guides or animates it, smallpox is not a being which bears ill-will to men, but the spirit of smallpox is a monster going about seeking whom it may devour, and perhaps demanding sacrifices to appease it. Hence, savage animism tends often to what, from our point of view, are cruelties and immoralities which would otherwise not occur. The spirits of men, however, may be naturally expected to look upon conduct just as men themselves do, and consequently will applaud the good and reprobate the evil in the same way. Here is a possible means of connecting religion with morality, which is not left altogether unused in the savage world. Thus the Manes become the natural guardians of morality in the family: the son who kills his father is naturally punished by the ghost just as he would be by the living man had his blow not been fatal.¹ It is but a slight extension of this idea that the spirit of the father should avenge other crimes, or that the spirits of remoter ancestors should participate in the vengeance, so that the boy who strikes his father or mother "is devoted" to the *Divi parentum*,² or that a similar fate should punish other crimes in a family such as incest or cruelty to a mother.³ Again, when customs have been first instituted by an ancestor or a predecessor of a heroic age his spirit continues to take an interest in their observance, and he is angry with and perhaps punishes those who disregard them. As far down in the scale as the natives of South-Eastern Australia, we find spirits of this kind. The tribes north of the

¹ See Leist, p. 314, who quotes *Iliad*, xxi. 412; *Odyssey*, xi. 280. The only doubt in such passages is whether it is the curse or the ghost of the parent which operates.

² Law of Servius Tullius. (Bruns, p. 14.)

³ Leist, p. 320, quoting *Iliad*, ix. 454, and *Odyssey*, ii. 134.

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Herbert River recognize a being called Kohin, who once came down to earth, but now has his home in the Milky Way, though he roams about by night on earth, killing those whom he meets. He is offended by breaches of the marriage taboos, by the eating of forbidden food, or by neglect to wear mourning for the prescribed period, and sooner or later the offending native dies.¹

4. The spirit of animism, however, is not as such a moral being whom wickedness offends: he is concerned only with the conduct which affects himself, and so animistic religion often presents itself in the mass as wholly non-moral.² The savage prays in the simplest and most direct manner for the fulfilment of his desires, without the smallest regard to what we should consider moral obligations. The warrior does not even stop to explain the justice of his cause to the deity as more civilized men are wont to do. "Great Quahootze," prays a Nootka Indian in preparing for war, "let me live, not be sick; find the enemy, not fear him; find him asleep and kill a great many of him."³

The spirit is moved by the same considerations which move the savage himself. An offering pleases him and he will pay for

¹ Generally speaking in South-East Australia "a belief exists in an anthropomorphic supernatural being who lives in the sky, and who is supposed to have some kind of influence on the morals of the natives." (Howitt, p. 500.)

Mr. Howitt adds that "no such belief seems to obtain in the remainder of Australia"; and Messrs. Spencer and Gillen declare still more definitely that the Central Australian natives "have no idea whatever of the existence of any Supreme Being who is pleased if they follow a certain line of what we call moral conduct, and displeased if they do not do so. They have not the vaguest idea of a personal individual other than an actual living member of the tribe who approves or disapproves of their conduct, so far as anything like what we call morality is concerned." (Spencer and Gillen, vol. ii., p. 491.)

The only possible exception is in the case of the Kaitish tribe, who recognize a superior being called Atnatu, who is displeased if the bull-roarer is not sounded in the initiation ceremony.

² Thus Captain Ellis denies broadly that there is any connection between religion and morals in any of the three peoples of whom he writes (the Tahi, the Ewe, and the Yoruba), because, he says, the savage only revenges what affects himself. (*Yoruba*, p. 293.) Compare Tylor (*Contemporary Review*, April, 1873, p. 710) on the Papuans and Caribs. Speaking generally, Professor Tylor considers that savage animism is almost devoid of the ethical element. (*Primitive Culture*, vol. ii., p. 360.)

³ Tylor, vol. ii., p. 360, where a number of similar prayers for direct material advantages are given.

it. He may be expected to stand by his friends like a primitive man, and hate his enemies, according to the same model. For the rest, his character is drawn from the object which he animates, or the process which he personifies, or the function over which he presides. Thus if he is a disease spirit he is evil, and the very living worship of evil spirits together with the comparative neglect of those which enjoy a good character is in itself a strong mark of the low ethical standard of animism. As an ancestor who cares for the family welfare, as protector of a special place or a class of people, or as the avenger who may be called upon in the formula of an oath, a spirit may resent injuries or insults affecting his authority. It is only in this indirect manner that the lower animism provides a sanction of conduct.

A step forward is taken when spirits arise which are themselves personifications of the moral order, or of some portions thereof. We can conceive such impersonations arising either on the basis of animistic or of magical conceptions. What is essential is that they should embody a certain disinterestedness which transforms their action from the sphere of mere resentment to that of justice. Thus as long as the father's spirit is merely acting in revenge of a personal injury, it is not really a moral agency, but if it is held to supervise the family laws without reference to its own interests, it begins to be a disinterested judge. Similarly there is nothing moral in the action of a curse as such, but if the curse, having materialized into a quasi-spirit, is set in motion by certain specified breaches of morality, and by those only, it has acquired a more judicial character. We seem to see a transition of this kind going on in the case of the Erinyes. At first probably a "dark-flitting" curse which can be set in motion, for example, by the angry parent, or the despised suppliant, it is already in Homer a spirit dwelling in Hades, and a hard-smiting goddess who avenges wrongs. At times it seems to come without regard to any other considerations at the bidding of those who have the right to call on it. Thus for his unwitting sin against his mother, Œdipus suffers "all that the Erinyes of a mother accomplish."¹ The father of Phœnix, though he certainly had little right on his side, called

¹ *Od.*, xi. 280.

on the hateful Erinyes, and his curse was accomplished.¹ Iris reminds Poseidon that the Erinyes always wait upon an elder.² At times, too, the Erinyes seem to be carrying out a vicarious punishment with a certain blind and mechanical fatality, as when the Harpies carry off the daughters of Pandareos, notwithstanding all the goddesses had done for them, and give them to the hateful Erinyes to haunt them on account, apparently, of their father's crime.³ At other times the Erinyes are rather the avengers of certain wrongs, of the despised beggar,⁴ and of the broken oath—for which "beneath the earth they punish men." Here they are really protectors of certain branches of the moral law. Thus what is at one point merely a curse embodying the resentment of an injured party, becomes at another a spirit dwelling in Hades, flitting in the dark and smiting hard when set in motion by those who have the power to do so, and in yet others a spirit watching over certain branches of morality. In the first case, where the curse is a mere instrument of revengeful feeling, there is nothing specifically moral. In the last, where the curse falls impartially on any breaker of given laws, the moral element is clear. Between the two the curse that can be set in motion by definite authorities under definite conditions seems, at least in the case of the Erinyes, to be the link.⁵

The Erinyes is still the avenger of wrongs done to individuals and of special cases of wrong-doing,⁶ but in the goddess Themis, the Greeks of the Homeric age had a more generalized conception of a patron of justice. Themis is distinctly a goddess, she receives the gods at their gathering for the banquet on Olympus,⁷ but she has a double relation to human justice—in the first place, a general oversight; and in the second place, a special regard for the divine traditions which are ever growing up through the decisions of oracles, the *ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια*, and to her sphere belong those customary rights which, in early society,

¹ *Iliad*, ix. 454.

² *Ib.* xv. 204.

³ *Od.*, xx. 60-78.

⁴ *Od.*, xvii. 475.

⁵ I am indebted to Mr. A. Sidgwick for a valuable note in which the above passages, with others, are collated.

⁶ In later thought, as in the well-known fragment of Heraclitus, the Erinyes appear as guardians of "law in the Universe." They "preserve the stars from wrong." On the whole subject, see Miss Harrison's work, pp. 213-230, and Leist, pp. 320, 321.

⁷ Leist, p. 207; *Iliad*, xv. 87.

men who are unprotected by belonging to a family have no human means of enforcing, and thus in particular the stranger and the beggar and the suppliant are under her care.¹

While the Erinyes and Themis are strictly independent beings, their functions become closely associated with the gods,² and especially with Zeus, the chief god of Olympus. Zeus acts in accordance with Themis. In the *Iliad* he already punishes unjust decisions with storms,³ and in his capacity of Zeus Xenios is the special protector of the stranger and suppliant. In each several capacity he appears under the appropriate name—

as Zeus Timoros,	he is the god of retribution;
as Zeus Hikesios,	the god to whom the suppliant flies;
as Zeus Apotropaicos,	he is the averter of ill;
as Zeus Horkios,	the god of the oath, who pun- ishes perjury, and by whom the Athenian judges swear. ⁴

The different epithets are themselves half personifications, and

¹ Leist, p. 211.

² In the case of Phoenix, mentioned above, though the prayer is addressed to the Erinyes, the curse is carried out by Zeus of the underworld and Persephone. Both Erinyes and Gods attend on the beggar. (*Od.*, xvii. 475.)

³ *Iliad*, xvi. 385, quoted by Leist, p. 209.

⁴ On the moral functions of Zeus, see Farnell, vol. i., p. 64 ff. We get a similar development in the Roman religion. Here the tendency to deify functions makes a large portion of religion from the first. For example, we have at an early stage Messor and Conditor, gods, or rather spirits, presiding over different operations of the harvest. These have no moral interest, but we also have Spes, Concordia, Pudicitia, Pietas, etc., who foster the appropriate qualities. These are mere spiritualized abstractions, and bear the same relation to Hope, Concord, Modesty, and Piety that the spirit of an object does to the object itself. But we also find that the function-spirit is associated with one of the greater gods as his epithet: for instance, we have Fides associated closely with Jupiter. Fides is the spirit who protects the oath; Jupiter as Deus Fidius is the god who protects the oath. Public acts of the nation are sworn by Jupiter Lapis, in which there is probably the blending of a god with a fetish. While Faith is an attribute of Jupiter, Faith has also her own cult and temple close to the Temple of Jupiter. In the same way Victoria is worshipped as well as Jupiter Victor, and Libertas along with Jupiter Liber. As the tendency to personify abstractions persisted at Rome, some of these epithet-gods may even be later in time than the gods themselves, but be that as it may, they illustrate the same ambiguity between the god and the function which we find in the Greek religion. See Wissowa, *Religion der Römer*, especially pp. 22, 47, 48, 103 ff.

Zeus is in a sense a different being in each capacity, just as in the mediæval world Our Lady of Embrun was and was not the same being as Our Lady of Paris. The function wavers between being a god itself and being only the attribute of a god. But in the most logical anthropomorphism, Zeus is one god who supervises the moral order generally, and whose punishments are carried out by the Erinyes. The spirit of animism serves the gods of the higher stage.

5. In the conception of a Supreme God, the protector of the whole or of the most essential part of the moral order, we have come to the threshold of a spiritual religion, but we have not yet arrived at the conception of a moral order of the universe, nor at the principle that God is good of necessity because he is God. The immoralities attributed to the gods of polytheism are notorious, and though it is fair to urge that they belong to the world of primitive conceptions wherein the gods had their birth, still the very fact that they are retained militates, as the Greek philosophers knew, against a spiritual religion. The gods themselves suffered punishment for their wrong-doing. Apollo was compelled to become the slave of a mortal, and a regular penalty of eight years passed without Nectar or Ambrosia lay upon the Olympians who swore falsely by the Styx. If the gods are interested in sin, they are appeasable by sacrifice, and for occult reasons which the polytheist never made clear to himself, but which were associated with his conception of vicarious responsibility, the gods themselves put the impulse to sin into men's minds. The Ate, which compels a man to folly or crime, is a curse implanted in his mind by that same Erinys who will avenge the deed, and punish him for following the impulse implanted by herself.¹

¹ *Odyssey*, xv. 233, cited by Leist, p. 321. Compare *Iliad*, xix. 87, where Agamemnon excuses his folly (*τῆς δ' οὐκ αἰεὶς εἰμι*) because "Zeus and Fate and dark-flitting Erinys" put a wild infatuation into his mind. The infatuation (*ἄτη*) three lines lower is herself a goddess and daughter of Zeus, "who moves through the heads of men injuring them"—a capital instance of the interchange between magically conceived quality and spirit. At a later date, especially in Æschylus, there is an attempt to elaborate the theory of Ate upon the principle of vicarious justice. A father brings down a curse which besets the children and the children's children, all of whom add to the guilt until the accumulated iniquity is washed out by a tremendous catastrophe. In Herodotus we have a similar

6. Meanwhile, the connection of religion with morals develops on another line; the misfortunes which follow wrong-doing may not be manifested in this life, but whether conceived as the automatic consequences of the act, or as due to the wrath of the spirits, they may fall upon the soul in its life beyond the grave. In an elementary form the conception of retribution in a future life appears within the savage world, and though in many cases it is probably imported from civilized religions, there is no reason to doubt that there are uncivilized peoples among whom it has grown up spontaneously. The normal theory of animism, however, conceives the soul as continuing to live a life comparable to that which it enjoyed upon this earth, and dependent upon similar conditions. Its well-being depends, not upon its own actions in this life, but upon its receiving proper care from relations and descendants after death. It must be suitably buried, properly housed, and duly fed. And this remains the dominant conception upon which notions of duty to the dead depend, even when other elements enter in. These elements appear in different forms which are by no means wholly ethical in character. Sometimes the future life is itself a privilege of caste as among the Tongans.¹ Sometimes the fate of the dead depends on the manner of death.² Among the Nairs the childless woman will suffer in the future, a conception which perhaps connects itself rather with the necessity of the support of the dead soul by children than with retribution proper.³ Among the Western Esquimaux the soul has choice of two abodes, one above and one at the bottom of the sea, which is preferred as less inclement. Here dwell heroic whalers, men who have committed suicide rather than burden their families, and well-tattooed women who have died in child-birth; others get there only by crossing a narrow bridge, or by other dangerous and hurtful paths.⁴ Often the two conceptions are

order of ideas, but with a special stress on the overweening presumption of the individual which awakens the jealousy of God and brings down punishment.

¹ Tylor, vol. ii., p. 22. Sometimes the dead retain in a future life the social position they held in this: e. g. among the Yoruba. (Ellis, p. 127.)

² Thus among the Micronesians those who die in peace reach Paradise while others fall into hell. (Waitz, vol. v., ii. p. 142.)

³ Reclus, p. 159.

⁴ Reclus, p. 103.

intertwined. The Todas, after enumerating all the possible sins of the deceased and transferring them to a calf, promise the soul that it shall never lack milk to drink, and in fulfilment of the pledge kill cows near the burning calf, and afterwards burn the bones together with implements useful for the dead, and models of flutes and bows and arrows.¹ The Salish of Western America are said to believe in reward and punishment after death, but the origin of the doctrine is not known.² The Ainu hold that while all spirits go to Hades, the good pass on to the place of God, and the wicked to the wet underground world, a message from the Creator being sent through the fire-goddess to direct where the soul is to go.³ Among the Californian Indians, the Wintuns believe that the dead go to the happy western world, but wicked men's ghosts pass into the Grizzly Bear.⁴ Yet the possessions of the deceased are thrown into the grave, which implies a very different theory. The Yorak hold that the spirits of the dead have to cross a greasy pole. The good achieve this more easily, and therefore do not require the fire to be burnt for so many nights after their death to light them, as is necessary in the case of the wicked.⁵ But it may be doubted whether the Californian belief is not an importation from the white man. Often the warriors retain their supremacy in the world to come: the primitive Norseman continued to fight and to feast in Walhalla, and similarly the Tupinambas of Brazil think that those who have lived well—*i. e.* those who have well avenged themselves and eaten many enemies—will live in beautiful gardens, while cowards will be tormented.⁶ Generally speaking, the savage view of the future life, in proportion as it deserts the strict theory of the continuance of the present mode of life, is ill defined and extremely confused. The soul haunts the grave, and requires supplies, and yet it goes to another world, or is reincarnated in another human being or an animal. How far it is really the merits of the deceased that determine his fate and how he is judged, or by what method his sins are weighed against his virtues, it is generally very difficult to

¹ Reclus, p. 211, etc.

² Waitz, vol. iii., p. 345.

³ Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, p. 236.

⁴ Powers, p. 240.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 58.

⁶ Tylor, vol. ii., p. 86. Other instances of savage belief in retribution are quoted by Tylor, p. 93.

determine. In the higher stages of polytheism, on the other hand, the theory of the future life is often, though not always, more precise. Among the Greeks, one view was that the heroes passed to the Elysian fields, while at any rate the worst criminals were cast into Tartarus. The Egyptian soul underwent a regular trial before Osiris, and the Mexicans had a Book of the Dead, similar to that of the Egyptians, giving a full account of the dangers through which the soul must pass, and in particular of its trial before the Judgment-seat of Tezcatlipoca.¹ Thus the highest polytheism shows a tendency to the development and systematization of the vague ideas of retribution floating here and there through early religious beliefs, into an elaborate doctrine of future judgment. The development, however, is very irregular. We find nothing of it, for example, in the Babylonish religion, nor, till Monotheism was well established, in that of the Hebrews; its place in the regular Greek cults is secondary, particularly in the earlier period, and it is only in connection with the Orphic mysteries that it comes to occupy a central position. In India, as we shall see, the rival doctrine of transmigration tends to take its place, though the two theories are also combined.

7. But the imperfect morality of the doctrine of future retribution is most apparent when we turn to the methods by which sin is purged away and future happiness is secured. This introduces us to a group of ethical problems which at every stage are treated in close connection with the prevailing conception of the ethical basis. These problems centre upon the relation of the imperfect human being to the moral law. By what internal merit or external grace preventing him does a man come to reject evil and choose good? How does he grow in grace? When he has done wrong what means of reconciliation are open to him? These are questions of what might be called moral dynamics, of the forces which the prevalent ideal of conduct can bring to bear on the individual. As such their character must clearly be determined primarily by the nature

¹ Payne, vol. ii., p. 406. In Yucatan also there was a distinction between the Happy Land, where the good men and virgins went, and the evil lot which befell the wicked after death. (Waitz, vol. iv., p. 311.)

of the grounds on which morality is conceived to rest. At a later stage these questions are clearly recognized as questions of moral psychology. We have now to see how they are treated in the lower strata of ethical thought.

In the early stages of moral development men have, broadly speaking, two methods of dealing with their sins, one affiliating itself to the magical, the other to the religious conception of wrong-doing, while as before the two are not infrequently blended into one. Under the magical conception sins, if we may so call them, are like other evils, things that can by appropriate methods be purged out of a man or a place or a community. They may be transferred to a scapegoat, taken from those who have committed them, put into the animal or man who is to bear them, and driven away into the wilderness or destroyed. They may be got rid of by a solemn formula in which the wrong-doer repudiates them, swears them off, while magical ceremonies are at the same time performed to complete their destruction. On the other hand, where the wrong-doer is held to offend some spirit, the curative process would naturally consist in either quelling, subduing, driving away that spirit, or in appeasing and reconciling it. The former process will closely connect itself with magical arts, the latter leads on to the sacrifices which form the central feature of the cult of the gods.

The expulsion of evils by transferring them to a man or an animal is frequently performed on behalf of the whole community; it is familiar to us from the scapegoat to whom the sins of the Children of Israel were transferred on the Day of Atonement. Laden with these sins, the beast was driven away into the wilderness and the people were free. Among the aborigines of China the ills and disasters of the people during the past year are represented by stones and bits of iron which are placed in a jar and blown up.¹ It is not necessarily sin or wrong-doing that is thus destroyed. Some Chinese tribes protect themselves from pestilences by selecting a man to attract all the evil influences into him by certain rites, after which he is driven away from the village.² Ghosts may be driven off

¹ Frazer, vol. iii., p. 106.

² *Ib.*, p. 104.

like other evil influences.¹ Thus the homicide, even the successful warrior, must be washed to rid himself of the ghost of the slain, and the same process may be applied to the weapons used to commit the deed. The purification by which the ghost or evil influence is expelled lends itself in our minds to an ethical interpretation, but we see from the fact of its application to actions which the savage regards as not only innocent but laudable, that it is rather the supposed physical influence, whether ghostly or magical, that is dreaded and that the purifying rites have to remove.² The slayer of his own kindred who has committed a moral offence will also undoubtedly have to undergo purification. But in this respect he is merely on the level with the lauded slayer of an enemy. Both alike may be haunted; that the one is haunted for an act held immoral is an accident; he is not haunted because the act is immoral, nor is the act immoral because he is haunted. He is haunted because he has angered a spirit, a thing which another man may do in the course of his duty to his friends or his community.³ All that we can say at this stage is that immoral actions are among those which incur the wrath of spirits or the breaking of a taboo, but so little is the moral conception differentiated from the general vague mass of doubt and fear with which the primitive man views the effect of his conduct upon the influences that surround him, that the righteous and the unrighteous, the good and the bad, in so far as they bring those influences into play are all lumped together under the one designation of that which is tabooed or set apart from ordinary use and from contact with humanity. To us the holy and the unclean stand at opposite poles of thought, but in the primitive world they are not yet distinct. The Polynesian "taboo," the Latin "sacer," the Greek "hagios," are simply the things set apart for the gods or the spirits, or separated from the use of man, because filled with dangerous influences. If we translate

¹ Frazer, vol. i., p. 334 ff., quotes the practice of the Basutos, etc., and refers to the driving away of the ghost by the Arunta alluded to above, and to the taboos placed in various parts of the world upon those who have slain a man.

² After visiting a grave among the Ainu, Mr. Batchelor was beaten and brushed down with magic wands to drive away evil influences and diseases. (*Op. cit.*, p. 221.) Similar ideas underlie primitive mourning generally.

³ Compare Frazer, vol. i., p. 340 and following.

“sacer” by our word “sacred,” we must say the parricide is sacred. Of course he was not sacred, but he was set apart for the vengeance of the family god. Similarly the city of the idolaters devoted to destruction by the Hebrew invaders is not sacred in our sense, nor were their possessions too holy to touch as we conceive holiness. Rather were they unclean and accursed. They were like the holy things only in this, that they were set apart for Jehovah to do what he would with them.¹

The purification of the community from all ills, physical and moral, is often an annual affair, and since it is necessary that all transgressions which involve the possibility of calamity must be known in order to be got rid of, it is sometimes preceded by an annual confession of sins.² The Creek Indians, for example, held a ceremony called the “Busk” every summer, in the course of which “all the men who were not known to have violated the law of the first-fruit offerings and that of marriage during the year” were summoned to hold a solemn fast. All impure people were kept apart, also fasting, and after other ceremonies a new fire was kindled which was held to atone for all great crimes except murder.³

8. But the simplest method for ridding oneself of sins is merely to deny or repudiate them in the proper form which the tradition of the priest assures the sufferer to be efficient in ridding him of the load of guilt. This method of purification was highly developed in Babylonia, and also plays an important part in the Egyptian conceptions of the future judgment. In Babylon there seems to have been no question of reward or

¹ Compare Frazer, vol. i., p. 343, etc.

² The tribes of Guatemala are said to have made confessions of sins (Waitz, vol. iv., p. 265) in time of calamity. In Yucatan there was a private confession followed by a kind of baptism, the purpose of which was to remove evil spirits. (*Ib.*, pp. 306, 307.) The Iroquois practised a public confession at their religious festivals, but Morgan considers that they had perhaps learnt this from the Jesuits. (*The League of the Iroquois*, p. 170.) The conception was further developed in Mexico, where confession was demanded once in a lifetime, and penances were imposed including blood-letting and fasting, the sacrifice of a slave, and benevolence to the sick and needy; from our point of view a curious confusion of barbarous and moral methods of winning divine favour. These penances might avert punishment. (Waitz, vol. iv., p. 129.)

³ Frazer, vol. ii., p. 330, etc. A somewhat similar festival is held among the Seminole Indians of Florida.

punishment in a future life, but there was a very strong conviction that a god or demon might be given an opening for attack upon a man by any of his sins of commission or omission. Hence the so-called penitential psalms of the Babylonians and the incantation texts which throw so strong a light upon their ethical ideas. It has been rightly pointed out that the penitential psalms have many of the characteristics of magical formulæ. "The lapse" in them "from the ethical strain to the incantation refrain is as sudden as it is common." There is no question in them of retribution proper nor of genuine contrition. The psalm is an enumeration of possible causes of suffering. The mere mention of the right cause goes a long way to relieve it, especially if the priest calls upon the right spirit. Hence the length of the list of sins, which is due to the desire to make it exhaustive. "Speaking the right words, and pronouncing the right name constituted, together with the correct ceremony and the bringing of the right sacrifice, the conditions upon which depends the success of the priest in the incantation ritual."¹ Here is an illustration :—

"O that the wrath of my lord's heart return to its former condition,
 O that the god who is unknown be pacified,
 O that the goddess unknown be pacified.
 O that the god known or unknown be pacified,
 O that the goddess known or unknown be pacified. . . .
 The sin I have committed, I know not. . . .
 The sin I have committed, change to mercy,
 The wrong I have done, may the wind carry off,
 Tear asunder my many transgressions as a garment,
 My god, my sins are seven times seven, forgive me my sins."²

It is in keeping with the same line of thought that the incantation texts appear as a list of all possible sins, by which the patient who is suffering from misfortune, from fever or from the headache demon, who seems to have been particularly active in the Babylonian swamps, might have been placed under the ban. The reciter of the incantation calls on the great gods, "lords of redemption, on behalf of so and so, who is sick, wretched, or in trouble, has offended his gods, spoken evil,

¹ Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 292.

² *Ib.*, 320.

despised father or mother," and so forth,¹ and he demands on the chair, by the bellows, by the writing table, by the halidom of his lord and lady, that the ban be taken off. He calls on the gods of the master of the house, the god of the sinner, or the great gods "as many as are present," the "pan of coals—thou child of Ea," to come and extinguish the sins, transgressions and bonds of so and so, and banish his curse. The oddly placed invocation to the coal-scuttle is a reference to the ritual where the sin or curse was burnt up.² In another process the table of sins is thrown into the water.³

These incantation tablets of the Babylonians help us to understand the famous 125th chapter of the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, by far the oldest representation of a Day of Judgment. If we look at this account carefully we shall see that here again it is not really a confession of sins, nor a plea for forgiveness, nor even in reality a self-justification that is in question. The dead man enumerates all possible sins that occur to the Egyptian mind as likely to anger the gods, and he rejects them in the appropriate language. Whether he was really and truly guilty of them seems to have been a secondary matter. The point is that he rids himself of them by repudiating them in the proper formulæ. In fact the introduction to the confession explains that this "shall be said" when the deceased "cometh forth into the hall of Double Maati, so that he may be separated from every sin which he hath done." The first thing that the deceased says to Osiris is, "I know thee, and I know thy name, and I know the names of the two-and-forty gods . . . who live as wardens of sinners and who feed upon their blood." Knowing the names of these cannibal spirits he has magic power over them, and he addresses each one in turn, repudiating the sins which put him in the power of each spirit. "Hail thou, whose strides are long, who comest forth from Annu, I have not done iniquity. Hail thou, who art embraced by flames, who comest forth from Kher-âha, I have not robbed with violence,"⁴ and so on through a list of forty-two gods and forty-two sins. The

¹ For the list of offences, see below.

² From the Incantation Table Surpu (burning). (Zimmern, *Beiträge*, pp. 3-9.)

³ *Ib.*, Table IV., p. 23.

⁴ For the full list of sins, see below.

confession concluded, he again protests that he knows the names of the gods, he has "heard that mighty word which the spiritual bodies (*v. l.* the Ass) spake unto the cat," he has purified his breast, his hinder parts and his inner parts, and he opens the doors by telling their names.¹ At every turn magical lore holds the master-key, and the repudiation of sins is itself a magical formula for destroying them.²

Where the religious element predominates wrong-doing is held to be an offence against a spirit. We have seen that it is still possible that the means of expiation should closely resemble those of magic. The spirit may be merely driven away, or frightened off, or got rid of by deception. But the commoner case, particularly as the spirit develops into a god, is to appease him by sacrifice. Just as the sacrifice may be offered to secure a boon, so it may be used to avert wrath, and as primitive sacrifice is held by many modern authorities to be primarily a means of communication between the worshipper and the deity, the piacular form would tend to grow as magical beliefs gave way to the divine governance of the world, and calamities were held to be the direct expression of Divine wrath. At this point the value of the sacrifice became the essential feature, and men gave to the gods what they held most dear to themselves; hence costly hecatombs and human sacrifice.³ The eminently unspiritual conception of atoning for sin by these means is one

¹ Budge, *Book of the Dead*, vol. ii., pp. 355-377.

² This interpretation of the Negative Confession is supported by the authority of Mr. Griffith. (*Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, p. 46.) It was impossible, as Mr. Griffith points out, for a man to be innocent of all the sins, so exhaustively enumerated, but "by denial of sin in correct terms, and by magic adjuration of the heart not to betray him in the scales, the deceased outwitted the gods," and so the worst culprit could escape punishment. Thus, on the one hand, the idea of punishment developed until it seemed that no salvation was possible for any one; on the other, "purely mechanical means were provided, which, as it would seem, the greatest sinner could embrace with full assurance of bliss."

In a description of the Last Judgment found in the *Tale of Khammas*, dating from the first century after Christ, the evil deeds of a man are weighed against his good deeds. Here the magical element has receded in favour of the moral.

³ See Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 394, etc. Of course this is not the sole origin of human sacrifice, which is common enough from barbaric times in association with the cult of the dead, but in earlier civilizations it had a special tendency to crop out anew in connection with national calamities; *e. g.* among the Jews and occasionally at Rome. "A most unroman practice," says Livy.

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of the points seized upon by the advance guard of spiritual religion. The Jahveh of the Prophets desired mercy and not sacrifice, and the cultivated Roman saw the folly and the moral levity of the belief that the guilt of blood could be washed away by water.¹

Upon the whole, then, in the earlier stages of moral development the mode of dealing with guilt consists either in putting it away or repudiating it by a magical process, or in appeasing or conciliating the gods whom it has offended. Neither of these methods can be regarded as ethical in themselves. They may incidentally involve elements of retributive justice, as where a penance is imposed as part of the means of purification, or a costly sacrifice is enjoined as necessary to buy off punishment. They may also, where confession is exacted, have recuperative moral effect. It is permissible to think that these ethical elements have not been without their influence in determining the form which expiation takes, and particularly in a religion like that of Mexico, where civilized elements rub shoulders with the most unspeakable barbarities, we seem to find the moral element coming into prominence. But speaking generally and looking at the principle of the thing, we find the ethical element but little developed on this side. The removal of sin belongs either to the region of magical mechanism or of spiritual commerce.

9 In the variety of customs and beliefs at which we have glanced we seem to recognize two fairly distinct stages of ethical development. In the lower, the force behind custom—apart, of course, from the physical restraints imposed by society itself—is the fear of magical influences or of revengeful spirits. Neither of these is of essentially ethical character. The vengeance of a ghost is very different from the judgment of a god. It does not consider the rights and wrongs of the case, but acts like the

¹ Prof. Tylor, vol. ii., p. 439, quotes Ovid :—

“ Ah, nimum faciles qui tristia crimina caedis
Fluminea tolli posse putetis aqua.”

In somewhat similar strain Horace :—

“ Immunis aram si tetigit manus
Non sumptuosa blandior hostia
Mollivit avaros Penates
Farre pio et saliente mica.”

vengeance of the savage himself on the principle of retaliation. The magical taboo may be held to embody what we call moral feelings, but it implies no clear recognition of the distinctive nature of morality. To many breaches of the social order it does not apply,¹ while it does apply to many acts of no moral significance, and in all cases its action as conceived by the savage is what we should call mechanical rather than ethical. Thus the conceptions which serve as a basis for ethical conduct are themselves devoid of ethical character, and the means taken for averting the consequences of guilt, as purifications, incantations, and the appeasement of offended spirits, are of the same nature. A step in advance is taken when spiritual agencies arise who take interest in certain moral acts as such, protecting the helpless and suppliant because they are helpless or suppliant, and punishing the murderer because he is a murderer. In this way, certain departments of action are marked out in which a distinctly religious sanction is found for certain rules of conduct, and this idea is generalized in proportion as the avenging deities become the ministers or possibly the attributes of some, or, it may be, of one of the greater gods, who thus comes to be an upholder of the moral order as a whole. Such a God will be a judge of men who rewards or punishes in accordance with an impartial law. Such a God differs materially from a vengeful spirit. Unfortunately the conception of judgment is too often associated with means of appeasing the divine wrath in which very primitive and non-moral conceptions are wont to survive. If the belief in a future Judgment represents the ethical conception of retribution, means of securing a favourable judgment will very probably be supplied by a special application of primitive magic. Bearing these limitations in mind, we may, nevertheless, recognize at this second stage a distinctly ethical element in the divinely

¹ *E. g.* Theft, homicide, adultery. Of course any of these may involve a taboo, but if so, it is either a taboo imposed in self-interest, *e. g.* on property by its owner, or one involving nothing worse than uncleanness, *e. g.* homicide has no worse penalty than mere contact with death.

While the moral consciousness would allow contact with the dead to pollute only so far as guilt is marked, the genuine magical or animistic point of view is that the guilt (of homicide) pollutes only so far as dangerous contact with the dead is involved. The failure to differentiate the holy and unclean which has been noted above may be taken as typical of magical and animistic thought.

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appointed sanctions on which the social order rests. Morality is based on a partially moralized religion.

We may fruitfully compare this advance with the development which we found in studying primitive justice. In the lowest stages we saw that the bulk of the acts which infringe the rights of other men are not, strictly speaking, regarded as inherently wrong, but rather as legitimate occasions for vengeance to be inflicted by the sufferer and his kinsfolk if strong enough to do so. It is not my right to my property which is sacred at this stage, but rather my right to the protection of my kindred. The personal rights and duties which constitute the elements of social order are not yet regarded as valuable in themselves and deserving of the general support of impartial persons. The main categorical imperative is "Stand by thy kin." Doubtless the organization of the blood feud tends on the whole to the maintenance of a certain order, and thus indirectly the elements of social order are protected by this same "imperative." But this does not amount to a direct recognition of the primary rights of person and property. Putting these facts together and taking them in connection with what we now see of the basis of morality, we may infer that moral feeling is not at this stage disengaged from a prudential dread of human vengeance or of mysterious forces in which there is nothing peculiarly moral. Nor conversely do the mass of feelings which surround and sanctify custom directly support those rights and duties in which to our thinking the elements of the moral order consist, but rather that mutual aid among kinsfolk by which, as chance directs, the moral order may be supported or may be overridden. Above the stage of the blood feud we saw the rise of public justice and the growing predominance of the view that breaches of the social order are wrongs to be punished rather than personal injuries to be avenged. We saw how society became directly interested in maintaining the elements of social peace, and safeguarding the primary rights of person and property for members of its body, so that as far as the social tie extends the simple social obligations are recognized as binding. We seem to see here the emergence of a more distinctly ethical consciousness which corresponds with, and in fact often finds embodiment in, the

higher and clearer conceptions of distinct superhuman personalities who judge impartially between good and evil. In this conception, however crudely and indistinctly worked out, the "ethical basis" is no longer wholly "unethical." Not indeed in the form of a coherent ideal, or a reasoned truth, but as a working rule ordained by a just God the ethical begins to make itself felt as a distinct element of the human consciousness. This emergence constitutes the first step onwards in ethical evolution.

The same development may be described from a converse point of view by altering the question, and instead of inquiring into the basis of early morality, asking what is the ethical character of early religion. The reply will be that in the first stage we find that spirits, as such, are not concerned with morality, though some spirits by their position may be affected by certain kinds of conduct which they may resent. In the second stage we find spirits¹ whose essential function is to preside over certain branches of the law, and as development proceeds they become servants of gods, who supervise morals generally. Yet even at this stage, gods are not always, or necessarily, perfect beings; if there are some who represent physical and moral ideals, there are others who exhibit not only the evil passions of contemporary men, but sometimes also the darkest practices of primitive humanity which their own worshippers have outgrown. Some gods are good, but goodness is not yet the essential attribute of God.

10. In these early stages the ethical consciousness is still struggling for distinct recognition. It is far as yet from the position in which it can dominate the customary code or infuse its own ideal into the mass of social tradition. The morals of early society are therefore still governed by the conditions under which social life has arisen—that is to say, in particular by the principles of group-morality, in which the elements of hatred and revenge, of self-assertion and domination, in a word,

¹ In themselves these spirits, whether idealized ghosts or personified functions like Fides, are rather a special development of animism than members of the circle of the gods. But though not at first identical with the gods, they are a collateral product of growing religious thought, and in fact tend, as we have seen, to fuse with them.

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of all the qualities that make for success in strife, are at least as prominent as the principles of love, sympathy, forgiveness, harmonious co-operation, which make directly for the peaceable life of an ordered society. Early society, we might say, is founded on the two complementary principles of attraction and repulsion, and both are represented in its codes. True, early societies differ greatly in character, and we have noted instances in which, whether owing to fortunate surroundings or to a happy strain of moral inheritance, a simple, primitive life is lived in almost idyllic peace and harmony. But these are rare, and such a character is hardly at this stage to be found among the peoples which make the deepest mark upon the world. The condition of a low general culture favours rather the tribes which allow a large sphere of operation to the military instincts. Especially in the races which are starting on a great career of influence in the civilized world the blend of militant and domestic virtues is conspicuous, and the type that results, familiar to us from the annals of early Greece and Rome, from Hebrew history, and the accounts of primitive German life, is in many respects admirable. The closely-knit patriarchal family, the loyalty to the chief, the mutual help of the kinsfolk, the respect for woman qualifying the inferiority of her legal status, the sanctity of the oath, the open-handed hospitality, the regard for the suppliant and the stranger—these are among the virtues of primitive society to which its descendants sometimes look back with regret for their relative decline under the softening influences of culture. The other side of the account is the comparative moral isolation of each society, the ferocity often shown to enemies, the disregard of human rights where not protected by equal membership of the social group, the permission of piracy and slave-dealing, the frequent appearance of barbarous religious rites.

11. In the early Oriental civilizations there is a certain blunting of the edges of the barbarian ideas. Though war and conquest, slave-dealing and the imposition of tribute, play a large part in national life and political history, private ethics are more concerned with quiet industrial life and the arts of peace. Political freedom is gone: the personal power of the

chief or the great warrior counts for less; the family pride of powerful groups of kinsfolk is lowered. The ethical codes reflect a softening of manners along with a certain loss of the elements of chivalrous idealism which mark the best of the barbarian world, and which is not yet replaced by the idealism of religion or of humanity. It happens that both from ancient Babylonia and Egypt we have remarkably full statements of what were doubtless recognized as the principal moral obligations in the documents already mentioned—the Babylonian Incantation tablets and the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*.

In the second of the Shurpu Incantation Tablets,¹ already referred to, the exorcist asks on behalf of his victim—

“Has he offended his god . . . offended his goddess ?
 Has he uttered calamitous things ?
 Has he said evil things ?
 Has he said impure things ?
 Has he allowed unjust things to be said ?
 Has he made a judge take a bribe ?
 Has he oppressed weakness ?
 Has he divided father and son ?
 Has he divided son and father ?
 Has he divided mother and daughter ?
 Has he divided daughter and mother ?”

And so for several pairs of relations.

“Has he not set the captive free ? . . . loosed the bonds of the fettered ?
 Denied a prisoner the light of day ?
 Said of a captive ‘Seize him’ . . . of one who is bound, ‘Bind him’ ?
 Is there any sin against a god . . . any trespass against a goddess ?
 Any violence towards his forbears . . . any hatred towards his elder brother ?
 Has he scorned father and mother . . . affronted his elder sister ?

¹ Zimmern (Delitzsch u. Haupt, Bibliothek.), *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Babylonischen Religion*, 1901, p. 3, Tables II., III., VIII. Owing to their magical character, as explained above, the tablets are full of repetitions, sometimes with slight differences of phraseology, but the list given in the text covers, I believe, all the distinct causes of offence enumerated. I have let a few repetitions stand by way of illustration.

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- Has he given in small things . . . denied in great things ?
Has he said 'yes' for 'no' ?
'No' for 'yes' ?
Has he used false weights ?
Has he taken bad money . . . not taken good money ?
Disinherited a legitimate son . . . put in an illegitimate son ?
Made false boundaries . . . not allowed true boundaries.
Displaced boundary, landmark, limit ?
Has he set foot in his neighbour's house ?
Approached his neighbour's wife,
Shed his neighbour's blood,
Stolen his neighbour's dress ?
Has he not let a man go out of his power ?
Driven a respectable man out of his family,
Divided a united kindred,
Raised himself against his superior ?
Was he sincere with his lips . . . false in his heart,
Saying 'yes' with his lips . . . 'no' with his heart ?
Is it for all unrighteousness that he meditated,
To persecute the righteous, to repudiate,
To annihilate, to drive away, to destroy,
To raise up—to stir up violence,
To outrage, to rob, to procure robbery,
To engage in evil ?
Is his mouth loose and obscene,
(Are) his lips deceitful and refractory ?
Has he committed an impurity . . . taught indecent things ?
Has he engaged in magic and witchcraft ?
Has he made a promise with heart and lips, but not kept it,
Through a present dishonoured the name of his god,
Consecrated and vowed something, but kept it back,
Presented something . . . but eaten it ?
Has he angered his god and goddess against him ?”
“Whether he has pointed to a figure with his finger ?
Whether through the figure of his father and mother . . . he is
cursed,
Through the figure of his elder brother or elder sister . . . he is
cursed, etc.”
“Whether he has wrought wickedness to his town,
Spread a report about his town,
Maligned the fair fame of his town ?

Whether he has approached an accursed one,
 Whether an accursed one has approached him,
 Whether he has slept in an accursed one's bed,
 Sat on the accursed one's chair . . .
 He demands, he demands"—

The list may be completed from the remaining tables. Thus Table III. mentions:—

“ A curse through pointing with the finger at fire,
 Through taking fire and swearing by god,
 Through demanding due instead of giving it,
 Through sitting facing the sun,
 Through tearing up plants from the field,
 Through bow, brazen dagger, or spear,
 Through slaying young game,
 Through stealing up to a companion and slaying him,
 Through being besought for a day about a gutter and refusing,
 Through being besought for a day about a cistern and refusing,
 Through taking a bucket and swearing by god,
 Through asking any one about hunting, in the stable,
 Through swearing by god with unwashed hands upheld,
 Through stopping a neighbour's canal,
 Instead of being compliant to an opponent, remaining inimical to
 him,
 Through producing a weapon in an assembly,
 Through interceding for a sinner.”

Further in Table IV. we find a curse through

“ Abandoning instead of protecting manservant, maidservant, master
 or mistress,
 Abandoning instead of protecting woman, wife or son.”

The list of possible offences would doubtless tend to grow as fresh possibilities of offences occurred, while people were afraid of leaving out anything for fear of losing the magical effect. As to the contents of the Code, it will be seen that the simple ethical duties, respect for life, property, and sex, all figure; that great stress is laid upon the family tie and upon disturbances of the peace among relations and friends, that violence is deprecated, and that at least in one place, if not forgiveness of enemies, at any rate reconciliation with enemies seems to be recommended. Finally, the duties to prisoners and captives,

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the obligation to protect the slave and the dependant are freely recognized. In mentioning these points, however, we have indicated the highest limit which the Code touches.

With the Babylonian tablets we may compare the well-known chap. 125 of the *Book of the Dead*.¹ There are two Confessions. The first runs as follows :—

“I have not done injury to men.

I have not oppressed those beneath me (members of my family).

I have not acted perversely [prevaricated ?] instead of straightforwardly (wrought evil in the place of right and truth).

I have not known vanity (worthless men).

I have not been a doer of mischief.

(I have not made to be the first consideration of each day that excessive labour should be performed for me.)

(I have not brought forward my name for (exaltation) to honours).

(I have not ill-treated servants.)

(I have not thought scorn of god.)

(I have not defrauded the oppressed one of his property.

or, ‘I have not caused misery, I have not caused affliction.’)

I have not done what the gods abominate.

I have not turned the servant against his master (caused harm to be done to the servant by his chief).

I have not caused hunger.

I have not caused weeping.

I have not murdered.

I have not commanded murder.

I have not caused suffering to men.

I have not cut short the rations of the temple (defrauded the temples of their oblations).

I have not diminished the offerings of the gods.

I have not taken the provisions of the blessed dead.

I have not committed fornication, nor impurity in what was sacred to the god of my city. (I have not polluted myself in the holy places of the god of my city.)

I have not added to, nor diminished the measures of grain.

I have not diminished the palm measure.

I have not falsified the cubit of land (added to nor filched away).

¹ Translations of this chapter vary greatly. In the text I have followed that of Mr. Ll. Griffith, *World's Literature*, p. 5320. The variants in brackets are from Mr. Budge's *Book of the Dead*. The concluding address to the gods is from Mr. Budge's translation.

I have not added to the weights of the balance.
 I have not nullified the plummet of the scales.
 I have not taken milk from the mouth of babes.
 I have not driven cattle from their herbage.
 I have not trapped birds, the bones of the gods (of the preserves of the gods).
 I have not caught fish in their pools (?) (with a bait made of fish of their kind).
 I have not stopped water in its season.
 I have not dammed running water (cut a cutting in a canal).
 I have not quenched fire when burning.
 I have not disturbed the cycle of gods, when at their choice meats (violated the times of the meat-offerings).
 I have not driven off the cattle of the sacred estate.
 I have not stopped a god in his comings forth.
 (I am pure. I am pure. I am pure.)”¹

After an adjuration to the gods, the second confession follows:—

“I have not done injustice.
 I have not robbed.
 I have not coveted (?) (done violence to any man).
 I have not stolen.
 I have not slain men (man or woman).
 I have not diminished the corn measure.
 I have not acted crookedly.
 I have not stolen the property of the gods.
 I have not spoken falsehood.
 I have not taken food away.
 I have not been lazy (?) (I have not uttered evil words).
 I have not trespassed (attacked a man).
 I have not slain a sacred animal.
 I have not been niggardly in grain (acted deceitfully).
 I have not stolen (laid waste the lands which have been ploughed).
 I have not been a pilferer (I have never pried into matters to make mischief).
 My mouth hath not run on (have not set my mouth in motion against any man).
 I have not been a tale-bearer in business not mine own (given way to wrath concerning myself without cause).
 I have not committed adultery with another man’s wife.

¹ Griffith, *World's Literature*, 5320.

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I have not been impure.
I have not made disturbance (struck fear).
I have not transgressed (encroached upon sacred times and seasons)
My mouth has not been hot (been a man of anger).
I have not been deaf to the words of truth.
I have not made confusion (stirred up strife).
I have not caused weeping.
I am not given to unnatural lust.
I have not borne a grudge (eaten my heart).
I have not quarrelled (abused no man).
I am not of aggressive hand (acted with violence).
I am not of inconstant mind (have not judged hastily).
I have not spoiled the colour of him who washes his god (?) (taken vengeance upon the god).
My voice has not been too voluble in my speech
I have not deceived nor done ill.
I have not cursed the king.
(I have not fouled (?) water.)
My voice is not loud (haughty).
I have not cursed God.
I have not made bubbles (?) (behaved with insolence).
I have not made (unjust) preferences (sought for distinctions).
I have not acted the rich man except in my own things (increased my wealth except with such things as are mine own).
I have not offended the god of my city (thought scorn of)."¹

Then follows a further adjuration.²

"Homage to you, O ye gods who dwell in your Hall of double Maati, I, even I, know you, and I know your names . . . I have not cursed God, and let not evil hap come upon me through the king who dwelleth in my day . . . I have performed the commandments of men (as well as) the things whereat are gratified the gods . . . I have given bread to the hungry man, and water to the thirsty man, and apparel to the naked man, and a boat to the (shipwrecked) mariner. I have made holy offerings to the gods, and sepulchral meals to the *khws*. Be ye then my deliverers."

Not only are homicide, violence, many forms of dishonesty and sexual impurity³ here repudiated, but what is perhaps most

¹ Griffith, *World's Literature*, 5321.

² Budge, *Book of the Dead*, ii., p. 371.

³ The references to impurity are not free from ambiguity. Professor Flinders Petrie (*Religion and Conscience*, p. 134) regards the repudiation in

remarkable, there appears a strong implied condemnation of any conduct causing suffering to others,¹ a recognition of duty to dependents (though here unfortunately the translation is not above doubt), and a claim to the merit of positive beneficence. There is also a noteworthy repudiation of undue self-seeking.

The skeleton of this Negative Confession is filled in for us by such moralistic writings as the Precepts of Ptah Hotep, dating from the Middle Kingdom, and the Maxims of Ani belonging to the New Kingdom. Full of platitudes as these seem to the modern reader wherever their meaning is not obscure, they appear to have had a long popularity in ancient Egypt, and they are of historic interest as perhaps the earliest examples of secular ethics, the morals of worldly wisdom with little or no reference to religious sanctions; indeed occasionally with a certain suggestion in them that this life is all we have and we had best make the most of it. The tendency of both Ptah Hotep and Ani is to recommend a certain mildness and moderation of temper, restraint in language and in social intercourse, prudence and energy in the conduct of one's own affairs, a strenuous minding of one's own business, and avoidance of gossip, a prudent bending to superiors, and an equally wise moderation in dealing with those of lower estate, a generally diffused good-nature and reasonableness—all as means whereby man prospers in this world, and, as Ani adds, in the Valley of the Dead as well. "It is the modest (?) that obtain wealth; never did the greedy (?) arrive at their aim," says the optimistic Ptah Hotep. "Make not terror among men."² God punisheth

the First Confession (which he considers to be the older) as dealing only with a violation of the sacred precinct, while in the Second Confession he distinguishes three repudiations of adultery (19), of impurity (20), and unnatural lust (27). Max Müller, however (*Liebespoesie*, p. 17), understands the reference to impurity as a repudiation of the use of love philters. On the whole it seems doubtful whether fornication as such is one of the forty-two sins.

¹ The references to animals are obscure and can hardly be pressed. They seem to have magical or religious rather than a humanitarian purport.

² This is taken by Mr. Griffith, *World's Literature*, 5332, as referring to the occupations of brigandage and pillage. It is rather a faint condemnation. Ani is stricter, "Ne remplis pas ton cœur du bien d'autrui : garde t'en : agissant dans ton intérêt, n'approche pas les choses d'un autre." (Sec. 24, tr. Amélineau.) Ani specially protests against carrying off another man's slave. (Sec. 22.) So Amélineau. Others understand it as a counsel against associating with the slave of another.

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the like . . . Never did violence among men succeed."¹ Again, "Beware of any covetous aim. That is as the painful disease of colic. He who entereth on it is not successful. It embroileth fathers and mothers with the mother's brothers, it separateth wife and husband . . . A man liveth long whose rule is justice."² In the same spirit the pupil is to keep from relations with the woman in the house which he enters,³ but be kind to a woman if he has made her ashamed. He should avoid scandal and gossip.⁴ He should prefer gentle to violent methods. "Greater is the prayer to a kindly person than force."⁵ He should avoid presumption, "Raise not thy heart lest it be cast down."⁶ If successful he should avoid niggardliness. If a chief or great officer, he should do justice, and be considerate and attentive to suitors. If an inferior, "Bend thy back to thy chief, thy superior of the king's house, on whose property thy house dependeth . . . it is ill to be at variance with the chief. One liveth only while he is gracious."⁷ But to friends, "Let thy face be shining the time that thou hast . . . The remembrance of a man is of his kindness in the years after the staff (of power?)"⁸ Or as Ani puts it, "Eat not bread while another standeth by . . . The one is rich and the other poor, and bread remaineth to him who is open-handed. He who was prosperous last year even in this may be a vagrant."⁹ By attending to Ani's maxims you will reach an honoured old age, and be ready for death however suddenly it comes.¹⁰

There is much of kindness, much of social good-nature, much of prudent moderation, something of self-reliance and dignity, but "there is hardly a single splendid feeling; there is not one burst of magnanimous sacrifice; there is not one

¹ Ptah Hotep, sec. 6. Trsl. Griffith, *World's Literature*, 5332.

² *Ib.*, sec. 19.

³ So Ani warns his reader against the strange woman. (Ani sec. viii. Amélineau, *La Morale Egyptienne*, p. 25.

⁴ Flinders Petrie, *Religion and Conscience*, 117 = Ani, sec. 16; Amélineau, p. 116, Ani, 31.

⁵ Flinders Petrie, 155 = Ptah Hotep, sec. 20.

⁶ Flinders Petrie, 143 = Ptah Hotep, sec. 25.

⁷ *Ib.*, 150, 154 = Ptah Hotep, 30, 31.

⁸ *Ib.*, 141, 143 = Ptah Hotep, 34.

⁹ *Ib.*, 154 = Ani, 41; Griffith, *World's Literature*, 5341; Amélineau, 157.

¹⁰ Flinders Petrie, 129 = Ani, 15. Cf. Amélineau, 157.

heart-felt self-depreciation in any point of all that worldly wisdom." ¹ The chivalry of barbarism is gone, and the idealisms of religion and of humanity have not yet come. To the rise of such idealism we must now turn.

¹ Flinders Petrie, 162.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLD AND THE SPIRIT

1. THE growth of reflection has in many races and under divers conditions of culture carried mankind beyond the stage of Polytheism. The awakening reason demands a theory of the universe and ceases to be satisfied with the patchwork schemes of mythology. The moral self coming to partial consciousness of its nature and scope demands a higher rule of life and a deeper understanding of its relation to cosmic forces. Instead of inventing stories about the beginning of things and the origin of laws, the mind begins to search for the general truths underlying or permeating experience and giving unity and meaning to human purposes. The forward step achieved by thought in this movement may be described by saying that the imagery of its earlier stage is replaced by defined and reasoned conceptions formed by the analysis and reconstruction of primitive ideas. Though first applied with positive success in the special sciences, and particularly in the science of number and quantity, the ambition of conceptual thought is always to frame a theory of the universe and an ideal of life and character. And fail as it may in its attempts at final truth, a deeper religion and a higher ethics are the outcome of each new effort.

The lines on which these efforts proceed are very various. We have already seen the beginnings of a tendency to trace the scheme of things to a single principle, or at any rate to a first cause, in the attempts of polytheism to treat the many god as different incarnations or emanations of one and the same Being. But this tendency does not always lead to monotheisms. On the contrary, great religious systems have arisen in which,

as in Brahmanism, the movement is rather towards pantheism than to monotheism, and the unity of God is an uncertain conception waveringly held and admitting of compromise with the polytheistic traditions. There are religions like Buddhism, again, in which the whole theological aspect of religion is secondary, and the central conception is that of a necessary law of cosmic life by which human life in particular is determined and to which human beings must adjust themselves. Or finally, as in Taoism, the supreme principle of things may be left undefined as something that we experience in ourselves if we throw ourselves upon it, but which we know rather by following or living in it than by any process of ratiocination. This mystical interpretation is not confined to Taoism, but in one form or another lies near at hand to all spiritual religions, and expresses one mode of religious consciousness, its aspiration to reach the heart of things and its confidence that it has done so and found rest there.

Widely as these forms of religion differ from monotheism, they may for certain purposes be grouped along with it. All are or are on the way to become spiritual religions, resting on and involving a certain ethical idealism, and that power of handling conceptions which we take to imply a distinct stage onward in the growth of thought. For in the spiritual religions there is an endeavour to render an articulate account of the universe, of the world process as a whole, of man's place therein and the duties which it imposes on him. But this attempt cannot even be entered upon seriously until certain fundamental conceptions are formed with tolerable distinctness. The contrasts of the permanent and the changing, of substance and attributes, of cause and accident, of reality and appearance, of the eternal and the transitory, of the universal and the individual, of divine and human personality—such antitheses present themselves with greater or less articulateness in all attempts to think out the problem of the universe. What is common to all products of this stage of thought and what differentiates them from the work of lower stages is that in these the fundamental conceptions involved in any attempt to render the whole scheme of things in systematic fashion have definitely been brought into consciousness. The religions of

this stage are all conceptual religions rising above mere imagery, and handling as distinct objects of thought, categories which at a lower stage are still wrapped up in the experiences in which they are given to the senses.¹

They are also spiritual religions, having at their best certain ethical conceptions in common. We have seen that the characteristic of the lowest religions is that their "spirits" are "unspiritual." They are not even differentiated from matter. They blur and confound the distinction of good and evil, holy and unclean, intelligent purpose and mechanical action. In the stage now reached these confusions are in large measure overcome. The spiritual draws itself together and is presented in antithesis to the sensual and the earthly as the source of all light within man and without. The spiritual is opposed to the sensible world, the spirit in man to his grosser elements, as the underlying spring of what is good and wise and beautiful, and as the bond that connects him with the sources of all that he finds of goodness and wisdom and beauty in the order of things. Finally, with this conception of spirituality a distinct set of ethical conceptions is connected. The individual must enter into relations with the universal spirit, and to do so he must put off his individuality. He must subdue the senses, and not only the senses, but all things that make for his own self-

¹ The emergence of these fundamental conceptions into clear consciousness is to be regarded as the result of a long process of development. In Chapter I. we traced the growth of the mind to the point at which concrete images or picture ideas could be distinctly formed and held apart. But such ideas are not yet fitted for systematic thinking. They have to be further broken up and re-combined, so as in the first place to become exact, and applied always with the same meaning (as "universal" instead of "general"). Next, the elements that lie within an idea or go to constitute its character must be distinguishable, so that the differences which constitute a specific development of a general rule, or the blended identities and differences which constitute co-ordinate genera can be assigned. When this is done the idea is transformed into the concept, and the loose thought-transitions by which images suggest one another are superseded by systematic meditation, reasoning and discussion, whereby concepts are analyzed or combined and consequences logically inferred from premises. Fallacious and genuine methods are distinguished, and thus the old confusion of idea and fact which made the world of make-believe is in principle overcome. On the other hand, in the early stages, the methods of testing the original value of the conceptions employed by a scientific analysis of experience is little understood, and there is accordingly a tendency to construct thought-fabrics which nowhere touch solid earth.

assertion and hinder his perfect communion with the spiritual world. Pride must give place to humility, resentment to forgiveness, the narrow love of kinship to universal benevolence, family life to the selfless impersonal brotherhood of monasticism. For the spirit is not yet of this world. The first step towards realizing it is to conceive it by contrast to common workaday experiences. To understand how it may transform experience, to bring it back to earth without losing its warmth and glow upon the downward journey, is the unfulfilled task of a higher mode of thought.

2. The spiritual religions have their home in the East. Probably the earliest in point of time—though dates are very uncertain—is the imperfectly spiritualized system of the Brahmans. It is impossible, however, even to touch upon Brahmanism without saying one word upon the preceding stages of Hindu thought. The earliest phase of Hindu culture known to us, that of the Vedas, resembles in essentials the culture of the Homeric age, and, generally speaking, it has all the characteristics of a barbaric society, which is destined to develop into something higher. Family life is in the patriarchal stage; the father is master of wife, children and slaves. There is no caste as yet,¹ but there is a strong distinction between the fair-skinned conquering Aryans and the subject dark-skinned Dasyus. The gods of the Vedas are great gods, controlling the forces of nature, who may rank with any of the leading deities of Polytheism. Indra is a man of war like Jahveh or Ashur. He is the special protector of the Arya—“wielding the thunderbolt, and confident in his prowess he strode onwards, shattering the cities of the Dasyus . . . chastising the lawless he subjected the black skin to Manu” (the white Aryan).² Neither the power nor the moral attributes of the deity are conceived with more consistency or clearness than in other polytheistic schemes. Indra is said to have created or lighted up Ushas. But in other hymns he crushes her chariot with his thunderbolt, and this smiting of “a woman who was bent on evil”—elsewhere the recipient of prayer—is extolled as a “deed of might and

¹ See above, Vol. I., Chap. VII. ² Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. v., p. 113.

manliness."¹ Even in the Mahabharata and the Puranas, "Indra, Varuna and other gods" are represented "as leading a sensual and immoral life," and "the Apsarases or celestial nymphs are expressly declared to be courtesans . . . and are represented as being sent by the gods from time to time to seduce austere sages into unchastity."² S'rī is described as issuing forth from Prajāpati. "Beholding her thus standing resplendent and trembling, the gods were covetous of her and proposed to Prajāpati that they should be allowed to kill her and appropriate her gifts"—a genuine magical conception of the transference of powers. "He replied that she was a female and that males did not generally kill females. They should, therefore, take from her her gifts without depriving her of life."³ The chivalry of the gods did not go beyond respect for life, it appears. The gods, it is true, release from sin, but sin appears to be conceived as a quasi-magical bond, and the sin of the father is regularly visited on the children.⁴ Virtues, however, recommend men to the gods, and especially liberality conduces to prosperity. "He is the bountiful man who gives to the lean beggar who comes to him craving food. Success attends that man in the sacrifice and he secures for himself a friend in the future."⁵ The conception of the divine power fluctuates no

¹ Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. v., p. 192.

² *Ib.*, pp. 323, 4; cf. also p. 115.

³ *Ib.*, p. 349.

⁴ See Max Müller, *Rig Veda* i., pp. 244, 245, etc.: "Absolve us from the sins of our fathers and from those which we have committed with our own bodies. Release Vasishtha, O king, like a thief who has feasted on stolen cattle; release him like a calf from the rope." Cf. also *Rig Veda*, vii., p. 86, quoted in Muir, p. 66, where the poet naively explains, "It was not our will, Varuna, but some seduction which led us astray—wine, anger, dice, or thoughtlessness. The stronger perverts the weaker. Even sleep occasions sin."

⁵ *Rig Veda*, x. 117, quoted in Muir, pp. 431, 432. The notion of future reward appears in the Veda alongside of a more primitive view. He who cooks the vishtarīn oblation "goes to the gods, and lives in blessedness with the Gandharvas, the quaffers of soma. Yama does not steal away the generative power of those who cook the vishtarīn oblation." (*Ib.*, p. 306.) Here the question of oblations is most prominent. Elsewhere we read of heroic deeds, austerities and sage meditations, as contributing to bliss.

"Let him (the deceased) depart to those for whom the honied beverage flows. Let him depart to those who, through rigorous abstraction, are invincible, who, through *tapas*, have gone to heaven; to those who have performed great *tapas*. Let him depart to the combatants in battles, to the heroes who have there sacrificed their lives, or to those who have

less than in other polytheistic religions. On the one side, it tends towards monotheism in the form of attributing supreme position to whichever deity is the immediate object of worship—Indra, Varuna, or another. At times with less of *naïveté* and more of deliberate pantheistic feeling we find it laid down that one god is or includes all the rest. “Aditi is the sky, Aditi is the air, Aditi is the mother and father and son, Aditi is all the gods and the five classes of men. Aditi is whatever has been born, Aditi is whatever shall be born.”¹ We even get a distinct attempt at a true speculative account of the beginning of things.

“There was then neither nonentity nor entity; there was no atmosphere, nor sky above. What enveloped (all)? Where, in the receptacle of what (was it contained)? Was it water, the profound abyss? Death was not then, nor immortality; there was no distinction of day or night. That One breathed calmly, self-supported; there was nothing different from, or above, it. In the beginning, darkness existed, enveloped in darkness. All this was undistinguishable water. . . . From what this creation arose, and whether (any one) made it or not,—he who in the highest heaven is its ruler, he verily knows, (or even) he does not know. . . . That One which lay void, and wrapped in nothingness, was developed by the power of fervour.”²

On the other side, the divine power is animistically or magically conceived. The gods are held to be nourished by food, to be produced from other beings, to sacrifice and be sacrificed. In one hymn *Vīsvakarman* is said to sacrifice himself or to himself, and he offers up heaven and earth. In another, it appears, that the gods sacrificed to the supreme god or that they offered him up.³ Sacrifice is still a magic process from which the gods derive strength. Its materials and implements themselves become deities and so too do prayers and hymns, the Vedas

bestowed thousands of largesses. Let him depart, Yama, to those austere ancient Fathers who have practised and promoted sacred rites.” (Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. v., p. 310.)

Lastly, in *Rig Veda*, iv., 5. 5, there is a reference to some sort of punishment. “This deep abyss has been produced (for those who), being sinners, false, untrue, go about like women without brothers, like wicked females hostile to their husbands.” (Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, v. 312.)

¹ Muir, v., pp. 351, 354.

² *Rig Veda*, x. 129, in Muir, vol. v., pp. 356, 357.

³ Muir, vol. v., p. 372.

themselves, and the priests who control these powers.¹ The Brahmanic sage ranks with the gods.²

3. Before tracing the outcome of the Vedic religion in India we must glance at the parallel development in ancient Iran. Springing from the same stock as the Aryan invaders of India and worshipping the same gods, the ancient Persians developed a form of religion which is in one respect unique. The dualism of gods and demons, a frequent incidental feature of polytheism, became the central fact of their creed. Originally, it would seem, one of the great gods of the common ancestor of the Persian and Indian peoples, Ahuramazda gradually assumed a position of predominance over the rest. He is already in the time of Darius the greatest of all gods, "who made this earth, who made that heaven, who made man, who made Darius king."³ But this supremacy was not unquestioned. The demons did not disappear or become subordinate as in other religions, but maintained a perpetual conflict with Ahuramazda and his host, and obtained for themselves a leader, the evil spirit Angra Mainyu, or, to give him the name better known to us, Ahriman. The world of spirits is divided into two hostile hosts, who balance one another. Ahriman is the precise counterpart of Ahura, the Daêvas or demons are opposed to the Amesha Spentas,⁴ or good spirits, who assist Ahura. Human life is in a sense the arena of the conflict, since it is the forces that are held to work for man's good that are conceived as being ranged under Ahuramazda, and the contrary that fight under the banner of Ahriman. Yet the battle is not essentially a moral conflict between good and evil. It rages throughout physical nature, and is fought in large

¹ Muir, v. 411, 412. It seems out of place to regard the deification of the power of prayer under the name of the Brahmanaspati as imparting a new and more ethical element into religion. Such personifications belong rather to the lower magico-animistic stratum in polytheism. (See Muir, v. 272.)

² Manu, xiii. 49. Cf. ix. 317, and xi. 35, etc.

³ *Zend Avesta*, i., Introduction, p. 61, by Darmesteter, in *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. iv. On the relation of primitive Mazdaism to Vedism, the precise nature of which is uncertain, see *ib.* lii.

⁴ These, however, appear to belong to later developments of the religion and are probably importations, perhaps Platonic in origin. (*Ib.*, p. lvi. and lxi.) The original religion had a group of nature gods surrounding Ahura Mazda (p. lxi.)

measure by magical weapons. Animals play a large part in the fight—dogs, otters, and hedgehogs on the side of Ahura; snakes, tortoises, frogs, and ants on that of the demons. The distinction apparently depended on nothing so rational as the utility of the animals, but rather, we may conjecture, on the nature and rank of the god whom they incarnated in an earlier stage of the creed. To injure one of Ahura's animal supporters was as deadly a crime¹ as to kill one of Ahriman's animals was meritorious. Man also plays his part. His prayers and sacrifices assist the gods in their struggle.² Conversely, any deviation from the rules of ceremonial functions brings evil upon the land. In particular, any behaviour which spreads the death infection, *e. g.* carrying a corpse by oneself, which renders a man peculiarly liable to be seized by the death spirit, or polluting the sacred element of fire by burning a corpse, are unpardonable sins.³ They involve the community in danger, they

¹ This has nothing to do with humanity towards animals, but is concerned purely with the mischievous effects supposed to ensue. Thus "He who kills a water-dog (otter) brings about a drought that dries up pastures." Sweetness and fatness will not come back to the land till he is smitten to death, and "the holy soul of the dog has been offered up a sacrifice." The murderer receives twice ten thousand stripes, and offers a great number of gifts to priests; among them, "he shall godly and piously give in marriage to a godly man, a virgin maid whom no man has known to redeem his own soul," a sister or daughter of his. (*Zend Avesta*, i., *Sacred Books*, vol. iv., p. 168 ff.)

The penalty of killing a shepherd's dog was, at least, nominally, eight hundred stripes. The murder of a "water-dog" was avenged by ten thousand stripes. (*Ib.*, Introduction, p. 84.) Darmesteter thinks that these penalties must have had a money compensation. (*Ib.*, pp. 85, 86.)

² The gods also sacrifice to one another. Not only as an act of worship and recognition, as *e. g.* Ahura sacrifices to the ancient gods (Duncker, *Hist. Antiq.*, vol. v., p. 136), but also to one another to add to their strength. Thus Tistrya, worsted by Apaosha, cries to Ahura:—Oh, Ahura Mazda! . . . men do not worship me with a sacrifice . . . If men had worshipped me with sacrifice . . . I should have taken to me the strength of ten horses, ten bulls, ten mountains, ten rivers. Ahura offers him a sacrifice; he brings him thereby the strength of ten horses, ten camels, ten bulls, ten mountains, ten rivers; Tistrya runs back to the battle-field, and Apaosha flies before him. (*Zend Avesta*, ii., *Sacred Books*, xxiii., p. 99 ff.)

³ Some specimens are worth giving. "Two hundred stripes are awarded if one tills land in which a corpse has been buried within the year, if a woman just delivered of child drinks water. . . . Four hundred stripes if one, being in a state of uncleanness, touches water or trees. . . . Five hundred stripes for killing a whelp, six hundred for killing a stray dog, seven hundred for a house dog, eight hundred for a shepherd's dog, one thousand for killing a Vanghâpara dog, ten thousand stripes for killing a

hamper the gods in their conflict with the demons, and they afflict the offender himself with a taboo of deadly import.

But Aburamazda is the lord of the moral as well as the physical world, and there are breaches of morality which incur divine wrath no less than magical impurities. Prominent among these are falsehood and breach of faith. "The ruffian who lies unto Mithra brings death to the whole country."¹ To ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth were, as Herodotus tells us, the three lessons learnt by every Persian youth. This is borne out by the emphasis laid on truthfulness and the honourable observance of obligations. The principle holds equally, whether the other party to the bargain be believers or unbelievers, fellow-countrymen or foreigners. "Break not the contract, O Spitama, neither the one that thou hast entered into with one of the unfaithful, nor the one that thou hast entered into with one of the faithful. . . . For Mithra stands for both the faithful and the unfaithful."²

Scarcely less prominent is the duty of succouring the faithful with alms. Zarathustra's ideal, according to Mr. Mills, was to establish a kingdom under God, "whose first care was to relieve suffering and shelter the honest and industrious poor."³ However this may be, the duty of almsgiving is prominent. To refuse alms when entreated by the faithful is one of the offences which added to the progeny of the Drug demon.⁴ Hospitality is rewarded in the next life, and niggardliness

water-dog. Capital punishment is expressly pronounced only against the false cleanser, and the carrier-alone." Repentance and confession with the recital of an appropriate formula might save the offender in the next world but not in this. (*Zend Avesta*, Introd., p. 84.)

¹ *Ib.*, ii., p. 120.

² *Ib.*, l. c. Lower down the comparative sacredness of different contracts is expressed numerically in the form "Mithra is 20-fold between two friends," etc., & c. (apparently) 20 times more binding than between two persons not connected by any special tie. A list of ten cases is given, the sequence of which is curious enough. "Mithra," it appears, is 50-fold between wife and husband, but 90-fold between two brothers. He is, however, 1,000-fold between two nations, and finally 10,000-fold when connected with the law of Mazda. (*Ib.*, vol. ii., pp. 149, 150.) According to Mr. L. H. Mills (*Ib.*, vol. iii., Introduction, p. xxi.), mere raids for rapine (as opposed to desolation inflicted in regular warfare) were regarded as a terrible thing.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. xxii. Darmesteter (see vol. iv., p. lxxvii) also places the "ethics of labour" among the original features of Mazdaism.

⁴ *Zend Avesta*, i., p. 201.

punished. There is a reward for him who wields the power Ahura gave him to relieve the poor.¹ The moral code as a whole may be fairly represented by two passages. The first gives injunctions to the faithful.

“So be ye discreet from your obedience, most correctly faithful in your speech, most saintly from your sanctity, best ordered in your exercise of power, least straitened by oppressions, heart-easy with rejoicings, most merciful of givers, most helpful to the poor, fulfilling most the ritual.”² . . .

The second withholds a blessing and pronounces a curse on the wicked.

“Let not our waters be for the man of ill-intent, of evil speech, or deeds, or conscience; let them not be for the offender of a friend, not for an insulter of a Magian, nor for one who harms the workmen, nor for one who hates his kindred. And let not our good waters (which are not only good), but best, and Mazda-made, help on the man who strives to mar our settlements, which are not to be corrupted, nor him who would mar our bodies, (our) uncorrupted (selves), nor the thief, or bludgeon-bearing ruffian who would slaughter the disciples, nor a sorcerer, nor a burier of dead bodies, nor the jealous, nor the niggard, nor the godless heretic who slays disciples, nor the evil tyrant among men. Against these may our waters come as torments.”³

In sexual matters the magical and the ethical appear to be blended. The courtesan is banned as one whose look dries up more than one-third of the mighty floods—“Such creatures ought to be killed more than gliding snakes, than howling wolves.”⁴ The Sodomite is a Daêva, a worshipper of Daêvas, and in his whole being a Daêva. The first comer might kill him

¹ *Zend Avesta*, vol. ii., p. 23.

² *Ib.*, iii., p. 368.

³ *Ib.*, 318. The principle of group morality—here represented by the religious bond—comes out quaintly in the provision that a would-be doctor is to practise first on Daêva worshippers. If three of them die under his knife, he is never to operate on Mazdaists, under the same penalty as for wilful murder. If three recover, he can practise on Mazdaists. (*Ib.*, i., p. 85.) Sometimes the blessings of the creed are jealously reserved, as in the following:—“Mazda! Shall the thieving nomad share the good creed . . .” (*Ib.*, iii., 46.) But elsewhere there is evidence of a more catholic spirit and even of the conversion of a neighbouring tribe.

⁴ *Ib.*, i., p. 206.

without trial, and to do so was a means of redeeming an ordinary capital crime.¹ To touch a woman during the menses is an offence punishable with stripes.² Abortion practised by an unmarried girl brings the guilt of wilful murder both on her and her lover.³ Probably the fear of bringing a curse of barrenness on the land is the dominating motive in these ordinances. The "first wailing" of the goddess Ashi is over the courtesan who destroys her fruit; the second is over the courtesan who passes off a strange child as her husband's; the third over "the worst deed that men and tyrants do, namely, when they deprive maids that have been barren for a long time of marrying and bringing forth children."⁴ The procreation of legitimate children is the common point of interest in the three cases, and it is quite in accordance with the general tendency of the teaching of the Avesta that this should be a primary consideration, and that everything hostile, or, on magical grounds, conceived to be hostile to it, should be a deadly offence. The intermixture of magical and ethical ideas is well seen in the list of evils created by Angra Mainyu in all the lands which Ahuramazda made. They comprise:—

The serpent in the river, winter, the locust, plunder and sin, the corn-carrying ants, the sin of unbelief, the stained mosquito, the Pairika Knāthaiti (idolatry), the sin of pride, the unnatural sin, the burying of the dead, the evil work of witchcraft, the sin of utter unbelief, the cooking of corpses, abnormal issues in women, and barbarian oppression.⁵

The tendency of the moral element to predominate, however, appears in the account of the circumstances giving value to prayer. Recitations of the praise of Holiness is of different value on different occasions. For instance, if uttered when eating the gifts of Havratat and Ameretat, it is worth ten others. If when drinking Haoma (the Indian Soma), it is worth a hundred. The conception here is primarily magical—the quality of the Haoma intensifying the value of the praise, and the fact of eating or drinking increasing its effect on the

¹ *Zend Avesta*, i., p. 104.

³ *Ib.*, p. 178.

² *Ib.*, p. 188.

⁴ *Ib.*, vol. ii., p. 281 ff.

⁵ *Ib.*, i., p. 4 ff.

worshipper. But when finally the question is asked: "What . . . is worth all that is between the earth, and the heavens, and this earth, and that luminous space, and all the good things made by Mazda, that are the offspring of the good principle in greatness, goodness, and fairness?" "Ahura Mazda answered:—" "It is that one, O Holy Zarathustra, that a man delivers to renounce evil thoughts, evil works, and evil deeds."¹ Thus in the end the ethical conception of worship is made to predominate.

Ethical also in essence is the vivid picture of future retribution.²

"At the end of the third night, when the dawn appears, it seems to the soul of the faithful one as if it were brought amidst plants and scents; it seems as if a wind were blowing from the region of the south, from the regions of the south, a sweet-scented wind, sweeter-scented than any other wind in the world."

"And it seems to the soul of the faithful one as if he were inhaling that wind with the nostrils, and he thinks: 'Whence does that wind blow, the sweetest-scented wind I ever inhaled with my nostrils?'

"And it seems to him as if his own conscience were advancing to him in that wind, in the shape of a maiden fair, bright, white-armed, strong, tall-formed, high-standing, thick-breasted, beautiful of body, noble, of a glorious seed, of the size of a maid in her fifteenth year, as fair as the fairest things in the world.

"And the soul of the faithful one addresses her, asking: 'What maid art thou, who art the fairest maid I have ever seen?'

"And she, being his own conscience, answers him: 'O thou youth of good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, of good religion, I am thine own conscience!

"'Everybody did love thee for that greatness, goodness, fairness, sweet-scentedness, victorious strength and freedom from sorrow, in which thou dost appear to me;

"'And so thou, O youth of good thoughts,' etc., 'didst love me for that greatness,' etc., 'in which I appear to thee.

"'When thou wouldst see a man making derision and deeds of idolatry, or rejecting (the poor) and shutting his door, then thou wouldst sit singing the Gâthas and worshipping the good waters and Atar, the son of Ahura Mazda, and rejoicing the faithful that would come from near or from afar.

¹ *Zend Avesta*, ii., p. 313.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 315.

“ ‘I was lovely, and thou madest me still lovelier ; I was fair, and thou madest me still fairer ; I was desirable, and thou madest me still more desirable ; I was sitting in a forward place, and thou madest me sit in the foremost place, through this good thought, through this good speech, through this good deed of thine ; and so henceforth men worship me for my having long sacrificed unto and conversed with Ahura Mazda.’ ”

In the same third night the conscience of the wicked appears to him in the form of a “profligate woman, naked, decayed, gaping, bandy-legged, lean-lipped, and unlimitedly spotted, so that spot was joined to spot, like the most hideous noxious creature, most filthy, and most stinking.”¹

The creed of Zoroaster is not monotheism, though it had monotheistic tendencies, which developed in proportion as stress was laid on the final victory of Ahuramazda and the destruction of Angra Mainyu. But neither was it ordinary polytheism. It was a unique expression of the dualism of nature which few other creeds, if any, have ever attempted to face. As such it left a legacy in the conception of the devil to later religions. It is deeply immersed in magical ideas, which makes its code with its grotesque offerings and horrible punishments perhaps the most extraordinary document in the whole history of Ethics. Yet amid this it had also firmly seized certain moral truths—hardly yet the deeper truths of the spiritual religions, but the truths consonant to the character of an early civilization—the purity of the home life, truthfulness, good faith, neighbourly help and hospitality. It conceived that man’s duty is to master the earth, to tend the kine, to be fruitful and multiply, and that this was to lend power to the good spirit and aid its ultimate triumph over the demonic forces of Death and the desert. For those who forwarded the work there was a rich reward laid up hereafter—and for the evil that appalling meeting with their own conscience which was the opening of hell.

4. A far greater advance on the primitive Indo-Persian religion was made in India itself. Here, long before the age of Buddha, at a date quite unknown to us, the Vedic religion was developed into a metaphysical system, probably the first metaphysical religion of history. Not only had the gods

¹ *Op. cit.*, ii., p. 319, note.

been traced to emanations from a single principle—this would not in itself, perhaps, have brought the Brahman further than the esoteric wisdom of Egypt—but, what is for ethical purposes more important, this supreme principle was identified with the true self or personality of man, an identification which makes the spirituality of the Divine for the first time its essential feature.

“The intelligent, whose body is spirit, . . . He is myself, within the heart; smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley, smaller than a mustard-seed, smaller than a canary-seed or the kernel of a canary-seed. He also is myself within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds. He from whom all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes proceed, who embraces all this, who never speaks, and who is never surprised, he, myself within the heart, is that Brahman. . . . When I shall have departed from hence, I shall obtain him (that Self). He who has this faith has no doubt.”¹

We have here the first principle of all mysticism, that God and the self are one. But we have also something greater than mysticism, the discovery that the true self is something distinct from and opposed to the material body and the life of the senses, something that can be smaller than a grain of mustard-seed because not an object in space at all, yet greater than the universe because embracing all things. Matter is not spirit, nor do images and conceptions drawn from matter serve to define the Spirit, which is known rather by its opposition to them, as the self which we find when we get beneath the bodily shell and think away the objects of sensuous knowledge. Indeed, the only doubt is whether the self as that which knows can also be known.

“How should he (the Self) know Him by whom he knows all this? That self is to be described by No, No! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended; he is imperishable, for he cannot perish; he is unattached, for he does not attach himself; unfettered, he does not suffer, he does not fail. How, O beloved, should he know the Knower?”²

¹ *Upanishads*, i., p. 48.

² *Upanishads*, ii., p. 185. Cf. *Upanishads*, p. 112, where the duality (of subject and object) involved in knowledge is insisted on, and the difficulty is raised how the self which is the knower can also be the known.

But this sceptical movement does not prevent the triumphant identification of the self with the universal Spirit. The self is the true totality of things, and he who has achieved this wisdom, attaining to self-knowledge and self-mastery, attains also to a lordship of all things.

“Now follows the explanation of the Infinite as the ‘I.’ ‘I am below; I am above, I am behind, before, right and left—I am all this.’ Next follows the explanation of the Infinite as the Self. ‘Self is below, above, behind, before, right and left—Self is all this.’ ‘He who sees, perceives, and understands this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self—he becomes a Svarâg (an autocrat or self-ruler); he is lord and master in all the worlds. But those who think differently from this, live in perishable worlds, and have other beings for their rulers.”¹

Inner knowledge is the centre of mysticism; through this knowledge man achieves self-mastery, and self-mastery is world-mastery; for the true self, illusions thrown off, is the reality of all that is. How then do men attain knowledge? Neither work, nor prayer, nor much learning, nor penance, are sufficient. But these, it would appear, form a ladder whereby men escape from the impurity of sensual existence, and reach the clearer air of self-mastery. “By truthfulness in deed, by penance, right knowledge and abstinence must that self be gained.”² The rules of morality and religious ceremonial are presupposed.

“There are three branches of the law—sacrifice, study and charity are the first; austerity the second; and to dwell as a Brahmakârin in the house of a tutor, always mortifying the body . . . is the third.”³

The Brahmanic Code⁴ is naturally more explicit on this point

¹ *Upanishads*, i. 123, 124.

² *Upanishads*, ii., p. 39. Sometimes the Brahmanist thinker seems to be stumbling on the brink of the theory of Election, as:—“That self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained.” (*Ib.*, ii., p. 11.) For abstinence as a condition, cf. i., p. 130.

³ *Upanishads*, i., p. 35.

⁴ In citing Manu as evidence for Brahmanic teaching, we must bear in mind that the code as we have it is a growth of many centuries incorporating elements of various origin. To attempt to disentangle the sources of different sections, or to determine their chronological sequence, would, however, lead to a special inquiry far beyond the scope of this work. For

than the mystical books. And not only does it make conduct the foundation of the spiritual life, but we find it advancing to the ethical view that good conduct is truly good only when preferred for its own sake, independently of the conception of reward or punishment. "The sages who saw that the sacred law is thus grounded on the rule of conduct, have taken good conduct to be the most excellent root of all austerity,"¹ and "to act solely from a desire for rewards is not laudable, yet an exemption from that desire is not (to be found) in this (world), for on (that) desire is grounded the study of the Veda and the performance of the actions prescribed by the Veda."² This is perhaps a little halting, but in the concluding book of the Code we find a more emphatic sentence. "Acts which secure (the fulfilment of) wishes in this world or in the next are called pravritta (such as cause a continuation of mundane existence); but acts performed without any desire (for a reward) preceded by (the acquisition) of (true) knowledge, are declared to be nivritta (such as cause the cessation of mundane existence)."³ Abandonment of all earthly affections is the final condition of supreme felicity. "If a man, though well enlightened, is still pierced by passion and darkness and attached to his children, wife and house, then perfect Yoga is never accomplished."⁴ On the other hand, perfect knowledge raises man above the capacity for sin. Indra said . . . "he who knows me thus, by no deed of his is his life harmed, not by the murder of his mother, not by the murder of his father, not by theft, not by the killing of a Brahman. If he is going to commit a sin, the bloom does not depart from his face."⁵

Two notes are sounded here that echo through the whole history of mystical religion. All ordinary human ties are broken by a spiritual principle which puts everything belonging to this world into a secondary place. And in close conjunction with this feature we have the elevation of an inward state of mind as the highest goal, supreme above all conduct—the one

our purposes we must be content to take the code with all its inconsistencies at its face value, as representing the ideas at work in the Brahmanic world over a long period.

¹ Manu, i. 110.

² Manu, xii. 89.

³ *Upanishads*, i., p. 293.

⁴ Manu, ii. 2.

⁵ *Upanishads*, ii., p. 326.

element in conduct of vital importance being in fact merely the self-repression required in order that this inward state may come into being. Both these features belong to the first clear apprehension of the spiritual element in man, and its sharp opposition to the sensual. In this early stage it cannot be apprehended that the truly spiritual is something that forms and inspires the world of perception, that fashions lowly efforts to great ends and transfigures humble daily life with the light and glow of self-sacrifice and love. Become for the first time conscious of itself, the spirit wants a dramatic display of its independence. It must show its utter contempt for the material world, and in this unfortunately it includes those very human relations which are the true sphere of its activity. It knows self-control to be the foundation of its existence, and it makes the practice of self-control the one supreme and all-embracing end of conduct. These are common, and on the whole distinctive, features of the first stage of spiritual religion. True, the ascetic tendency and the cult of pain are deeply rooted in human nature, and play an important part even in savage life. Painful initiations as tests of virility are one of the commonest of savage institutions. Down to the lowest grades men honour those who can endure. But it is with the rise of spiritual religion that asceticism takes rank as the supreme law of salvation.

Asceticism links itself naturally to the conception of penance, and here again we come in Brahmanism upon the beginnings of a spiritual theory of man's regeneration. We have seen that the Babylonian who sought to avoid the consequences of his sins had no better method than to resort to an incantation, which was in the first place a form of repudiation, and in the second place a ceremonial purification, in which the sins were washed or scoured or thrown away or burnt out of him by one of the processes of sympathetic magic. We have also seen reasons for thinking that in the Egyptian Judgment of the Dead, at least in its old form, the negative confession had a similar significance. In the Brahman's Code we find a distinct advance towards an ethical conception of repentance.

“By confession, by repentance, by austerity and by reciting (the Veda) a sinner is freed from guilt, and in case no other course is possible, by liberality. In proportion as a man who has done

wrong, himself confesses it, even so far he is freed from guilt, as a snake from its slough. In proportion as his heart loathes his evil deed, even so far is his body freed from that guilt." ¹

Higher and lower elements contend in this passage. At times we seem near to the ethical view of purification through the acknowledgment of guilt and the ready acceptance of inevitable suffering, as the way and means towards a true change of heart. At other times we relapse into the magical conception of the potency of a formula, and learn that "even he who has stolen gold instantly becomes free from guilt if he once mutters" a certain hymn.² The old magic crops up by the side of the higher spiritualism, and the veil of mystical imagination drawn over all forbids that clear, remorseless scrutiny by which alone the doctrine of the spirit can be kept pure. Apart from the medicinal effect of repentance, confession, and forgiveness, the Brahmanistic religion took a stringent view of the consequences of guilt. If a man did not suffer for guilt in this life, it came upon him in the next. After passing through hell, he was reincarnated in some loathsome animal form. If the punishment did not fall upon the sinner, it might, by the principle of vicarious justice, fall upon his sons or his descendants or his ancestors. Manu says, "If (the punishment falls) not on (the offender) himself, (it falls) on his sons; if not on the sons, (at least) on his grandsons"; but there is a saving clause which shows that vicarious justice no longer wholly satisfies. "But an iniquity (once) committed never fails to produce fruit to him who wrought it."³

The doctrine of transmigration is interwoven with the most serious aberration in the Brahmanic ethics, since it offered, as we have seen,⁴ a theoretical justification for the deepening divisions of caste.⁵ We also saw, it is true, that these divisions were the subject of much questioning among thinkers. But it

¹ Manu, xi. 228, 229, 230.

² Manu, xi. 251; cf. 249, 250, 252.

³ Manu, iv. 173.

⁴ Part I., Ch. VII.

⁵ The Sudra, and still more the outcast Kandala, was justly despised and kept apart from the Brahman because he was the incarnation of a soul suffering for its misdeeds in some prior existence. Far from bringing relief to the despised and oppressed, Brahmanism stamped caste divisions with the seal of religion, and if it did not invent them, at least gave them the iron fixity which holds Indian society bound and fettered to this day.

was not the function of Brahmanism to ameliorate social life. Life in human society was a life of error in which the true Brahman remained only to fulfil his duty to his ancestors by begetting a son to continue their cult. His true life was in the forest, conquering the senses and coming to the knowledge of his spiritual self. Yet with this contempt for worldly values Brahmanism is able to make some advance towards those ethical positions which characterize the higher spiritual religions.

The Brahman is to avoid causing pain even within his rights. "Let him not be uselessly active with his hands and feet, or with his eyes, nor crooked (in his ways), nor talk idly, nor injure others by deeds or even think of it."¹ Consideration for all life, animal as well as human, is in more than one place urged, though the rule is not consistently carried through. "For that twice-born man, by whom not the smallest danger even is caused to created beings, there will be no danger from any (quarter) after he is freed from his body."² Malice is condemned, "neither a man who (lives) unrighteously, nor he who (acquires) wealth (by telling) falsehoods, nor he who always delights in doing injury, ever attain happiness in this world."³ If the eating of meat except in sacrifice⁴ is forbidden, this is perhaps an outcome of primitive ideas which at times verge upon zoolatry. But a more rational conception of the general sanctity of life is implied in the rule, "Let him never seek to destroy an animal without a (lawful) reason"; and in some places a true consideration for animals is blended with rules traceable to principles of magic. "Let him not travel with untrained beasts of burden, nor with (animals) that are tormented by hunger or disease, or whose horns, eyes, and hoofs have been injured, or whose tails have been disfigured. Let him always travel with beasts which are well broken in, swift, endowed with lucky marks, and perfect in form and colour, without urging them too much with the goad."⁵ As to enemies, the Brahmanistic Code does not go so far as Lao Tsze in bidding us to recompense evil with good,⁶ but it preaches rather the ignoring of an

¹ Manu, iv. 177.

² Manu, vi. 40.

³ Manu, iv. 170.

⁴ Manu, v. 31.

⁵ Manu, iv. 67, 68.

⁶ Yet in the Mahabharata we read the Buddhist verse, "Let a man overcome anger by kindness, evil by good; let him conquer the stingy by a gift, the liar by truth." (Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 130, note.)

enemy: "Let him not show particular attention to an enemy the friend of an enemy, to a wicked man, to a thief, or to the wife of another man."¹ If these words hardly suggest that it is forgiveness that is in question, but rather the avoidance of strife, on the other hand we read further on that forgiveness and liberality are means to purification. "The learned are purified by a forgiving disposition; those who have committed forbidden actions by liberality."² Yet the following clause seems to be the Mosaic law at a little higher remove. "Making over (the merit of his own) good actions to his friends, and (the guilt of) his evil deeds to his enemies, he attains the eternal Brahman by the practice of meditation."³ Lastly, forgiveness is a maxim of kingcraft. "A king who desires his own welfare must always forgive litigants, infants, aged and sick men, who inveigh against him. He who being abused by men in pain pardons (them), will in reward of that (act) be exalted in heaven; but he who, (proud) of his kingly state, forgives them not, will for that (reason) sink into hell."⁴

For the rest, the Brahmanic teaching, as we have seen, adheres to the Oriental view of women.⁵ It lays down certain rules of humanity and chivalry in warfare.⁶ In private intercourse it teaches the duty of truthfulness combined with courtesy. It insists much upon the avoidance of low occupations and mean methods of gain,⁷ and even preaches holding aloof from a king who is not of a true kingly caste.⁸

¹ Manu, iv. 133.

² Manu, v. 107.

³ Manu, vi. 79.

⁴ Manu, viii. 312, 313.

⁵ See above. Part I., Ch. V.

⁶ Part I., Ch. VI.

⁷ Betting and gambling are declared equivalent to "open theft." (Manu, ix. 222.)

⁸ "Let him not accept presents from a king who is not descended from the Kshatriya race, nor from butchers, oil-manufacturers, and publicans, nor from those who subsist by the gain of prostitutes. One oil-press is as (bad) as ten slaughter-houses, one tavern as (bad) as ten oil-presses, one brothel as (bad as) ten taverns, one king as (bad as) ten brothels. A king is declared to be equal (in wickedness) to a butcher who keeps a hundred thousand slaughter-houses; to accept presents from him is a terrible (crime). He who accepts presents from an avaricious king, who acts contrary to the Institutes (of the sacred law), will go in succession to the following twenty one hells." (Manu, iv. 84, etc.) Some conception of the spirit of the Brahmanic Code, and of the very diverse elements entering into it, may be obtained by comparing the lists of principal and minor offences. The following are mortal sins:—"Killing a Brahmana, drinking (the spirituous liquor called) Sura, stealing (the gold of a Brahmana), adultery with a

The Brahmanic Code is not the work of reformers or of men inspired with a social or humane ideal. It is the code of a society in which barbaric elements survive, but which has made great advances in civilization, and of a priesthood which has grasped certain sides of spiritual truth, but has neither disencumbered itself of primitive ways of thought, nor advanced to the point at which the ethical and spiritual unite. Its spiritual interpretation of the divine unity was such as readily to make terms with polytheism. For though all the gods and all human beings too were emanations from the one spirit, it does not follow that the many gods lose their reality. On the contrary, the way is prepared for the series of emanations—Vishnu, an emanation from Brahma ; Krishna, an emanation of Vishnu ; and Krishna himself impersonated in many successive incarnations, a system which retains many of the essentials of polytheism, under the shell of metaphysical theory. What was worse was that its mysticism could make terms with magic, it could find spiritual efficacy in a formula, and conceive austerity as conferring, not an ethical self-conquest, but miraculous powers. Finally, at its best, the Brahmanic view of life is pessimistic and its highest ideal is the sage who, having performed his duties, has emancipated himself from human relations and entered into the spiritual kingdom of the god within his breast. It contains no message of comfort for the sufferer, of love, of forgiveness, of humility. Still less does it proclaim an ideal of social justice. It leaves us with the picture of the emaciated hermit dreaming, in the trance of semi-starvation, of himself as one with the centre of things, a God self-created by his own afflicted brain.

5. The relation of Buddhism to Brahmanism has sometimes been compared to that of Protestantism to the Catholic Church.

Guru's wife, and associating with such (offenders) . . . Slaying a friend . . . stealing men . . . carnal intercourse with sisters by the same mother, with (unmarried) maidens, with females of the lowest castes, with the wives of a friend, or of a son." . . . On the other hand :—"Adultery, selling oneself, allowing one's younger brother to marry first, . . . giving a daughter to . . . (either brother) . . . defiling a damsel, usury, . . . selling a tank, a garden, one's wife, or child, . . . living as a Vratya, casting off a relative, . . . superintending mines, . . . subsisting on (the earnings of) one's wife . . . cutting down green trees for firewood, doing acts for one's own advantage only, . . . slaying women, Sudras, Vaisyas, or Kshatriyas, and atheism" are all minor offences causing loss of caste.

It is at any rate only by appreciating the central doctrines of Brahmanism that we can begin to understand Buddha's attitude. The Brahman held life to be on the whole an evil, from which it was the object of the higher knowledge to deliver its possessor. Every Brahmanic system had its own theory of the method of escape from the chain of existences. Buddha had a new theory, and one which, with the same element of pessimism at its root, was in closer touch alike with average human nature and with the higher ethical consciousness of mankind. Buddha's great discovery was the want of permanence in the whole world of phenomena, the whole world of change. Whatever has a beginning must also have an end. And so there appeared the possibility of an ultimate cessation from the wheel of suffering, an ultimate disentanglement from the chain of earthly existences. Transmigration is, in a modified form, a central doctrine still, but it is not strictly a transmigration of the soul, for the soul according to the strict Buddhist is a figment. The constitutive elements of the human being come together at birth, and are dissolved at death. If the good and evil he does live after him, it must be very strictly maintained that it is the good and evil only that live and not he himself. In other words, every cause has its effect. Whatever good I do has a permanent, so to say, spiritual efficacy, and equally whatever evil I do. But the effect is shown in a peculiar way. My personality does not survive, but my good and my evil works survive, and they determine the fate of another being, which comes into existence, as it were, to carry on my moral destiny. This is the difficult and much misunderstood doctrine of Karma, a doctrine which a modern metaphysician might phrase somewhat after this fashion: that it destroys the substantiality of the soul while leaving its causality; the stream of moral consequences becomes a stream of mere causation from which the personality of the moral subject is removed. But, further, Karma has, as it were, one central cause—Desire, the will to live, self-assertion. It is on account of this desire that I maintain my individuality, that I keep shut up within my selfish interests, that I maintain myself as a distinct being from the universe at large; and because this desire is, Karma is, and the results of my personal character are per-

petuated. If I would seek emancipation from the chain of earthly existences I must put an end to Karma, and to put an end to Karma I must put an end to desire; and to put an end to desire, I must train myself in the doctrines of the Buddha which teach me the unreality and the valuelessness of all earthly things, and raise me to that emancipation from self, from worldly interests, from all care for the things of this transitory being, which is for the Buddhist the dream of bliss. I must, in short, attain to the extinction of individuality—that is, to use a technical and deeply misunderstood term, to Nirvana, for Nirvana is not, as is often thought, utter extinction; on the contrary, it is a real state of real people in this earthly existence, it is the state of the Arahats, a state reached by those who have trodden the path marked out for them to the end and gained the summit of the ascent. Nirvana means extinction, but it does not mean extinction of life, but extinction of those desires and lusts, which war, not as in Christianity against the soul, but rather for the perpetuation of individuality, which form a barrier between the world and me, which make me, in short, an individual, and prevent me from reaching that state of blissful contemplation, of perfect benevolence, and total selflessness which alone can prevent the law of Karma from bringing another being into existence in my place, when my earthly career is ended. We now have before us the “four noble truths” in which the doctrine of Buddha is summed up. The first is the truth about suffering. All transient existence involves suffering; birth and death, growth and decay, the frustration of desire, the longing that cannot be satisfied, all that belongs to our existence as individuals—all are full of suffering. There may be joy too, but pain cometh at the end, and the word is written large over the final balancement of accounts. The second truth is the truth about the cause of suffering, which is the craving for the satisfaction of desire, the craving that maintains life and causes its renewal. The third truth is that suffering is brought to an end by the conquest of this craving. And the fourth truth is that the path leading to the cessation of suffering is the “noble eight-fold path,” by which the craving of desire is laid to rest.¹ The eight-fold path

¹ *Buddhist Suttas, Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xi., pp. 148, 149.

therefore contains in little both the ethics and the practical religion of Buddhism, which is on the one hand opposed to the sensuality of this life, and on the other to the ascetic extremes of Brahmanism.

“What is that middle path, O Bhikkus, avoiding these two extremes discovered by the Tathagata? Verily! it is this noble eight-fold path; that is to say—

“Right views;
 Right aspirations;
 Right speech;
 Right conduct;
 Right livelihood;
 Right effort;
 Right mindfulness; and
 Right contemplation.”¹

The pursuit of the eight-fold noble path liberated the follower of Buddha from the ten following fetters in succession, namely: 1. Delusion of self. 2. Doubt. 3. Dependence on works. 4. Sensuality. 5. Hatred. 6. Love of life on earth. 7. Desire for life in Heaven. 8. Pride. 9. Self-righteousness. 10. Ignorance. It is not till the first five fetters are destroyed that the Buddhist becomes an Arahant, and it is not until the remaining five are abolished that he has finally put an end to delusion and sorrow.² It was not impossible for a layman, living the ordinary life of a householder, to enter upon the path and even to attain to Nirvana, but though not impossible, it was extremely difficult.

“Full of hindrances is household life, a path defiled by passion; free as the air is the life of him who has renounced all worldly things. How difficult is it for the man who dwells at home to live the higher life in all its fulness, in all its purity, in all its bright perfection! Let me then cut off my hair and beard, let me clothe myself in the orange-coloured robes, and let me go forth from a household life into the homeless state.”³

Hence the order of mendicants, or Bhikkhus, an order of celibates who were to attain to Nirvana, or to tread the path to

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 146, 147.

² See Rhys Davids, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 109, 110, &c.

³ *Suttas*, pp. 187, 188.

Nirvana, as each individual's capacity would allow him, and to reach it, not by exaggerated abstinence, or extreme mortification of the flesh, but by simple adhesion to rules of life based on the conception of virtue as resting in selflessness, the avoidance of desire, the avoidance of injury to others, the cultivation of love, and the destruction of hatred. These were the simple elements constituting the rules of the Bhikkhu's life and simply formulated in the eight precepts.

"One should not destroy life.

One should not take that which is not given.

One should not tell lies.

One should not become a drinker of intoxicating liquors.

One should refrain from unlawful sexual intercourse—an ignoble thing.

One should not eat unseasonable food at nights.

One should not wear garlands or use perfumes.

One should sleep on a mat spread on the ground."¹

These eight precepts apply to all Buddhists, including householders.² Two more are binding on mendicants, namely, to abstain from dancing, music, and stage plays, and from the use of gold and silver. These form with the first eight the ten moral rules of the order. With these may be compared the division into ten sins—

"Three of the body—

Taking life,

Theft (taking what has not been given),

Unlawful sexual intercourse.

Four of speech—

Lying,

Slander (includes 'saying here what one hears there'),

Abuse (swearing),

Vain conversation.

Three of the mind—

Covetousness,

Malice,

Scepticism."³

Further, the Buddhist Manual of Ethics classify moral duties

¹ Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 139.

² The three last, however, are not obligatory.

³ Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 142.

under six heads :—The natural obligations of Parents and Children, of Pupils and Teachers, of Husbands and Wives, of Friends and Companions, of Masters and Servants, of Laymen and the Religious. The insistence on the duties of the husband is noteworthy.

“The husband should cherish his wife—
By treating her with respect.
By treating her with kindness.
By being faithful to her.
By causing her to be honoured by others,
By giving her suitable ornaments and clothes.”¹

Still more the injunctions on masters.

“The master should provide for the welfare of his dependants—
By apportioning work to them according to their strength.
By supplying suitable food and wages.
By tending them in sickness.
By sharing with them unusual delicacies.
By now and then granting them holidays.”²

The Manual concludes that liberality, courtesy, kindness and unselfishness—“these are to the world what the linchpin is to the rolling chariot.”

6. The character of the true Buddhist is summarized in the short paragraphs on conduct.

“He abstains from destroying life . . . and full of modesty and pity, he is compassionate and kind to all creatures that have life. . . . He abstains from taking anything not given. . . . He lives a life of chastity and purity, averse to the low habit of sexual intercourse. . . . He abstains from speaking falsehood. He abstains from calumny. What he hears here, he repeats not elsewhere to raise a quarrel against the people here. Thus he lives as a binder together of those who are divided, a peace-maker, a lover of peace, impassioned for peace, a speaker of words that make for peace. . . . He abstains from harsh language. Whatever word is humane, pleasant to the ear, lovely, reaching to the heart, urbane, pleasing to the people, beloved of the people—such are the words he speaks. . . . He abstains from vain conversation. He refrains from injuring any herb or any creature. He takes but one meal a day. . . . He

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

² *Ib.*, p. 146.

abstains from dancing, singing, music, and theatrical shows. . . . He abstains from the getting of silver or gold. He abstains from the getting of grain uncooked. He abstains from the getting of flesh that is raw. He abstains from the getting of any woman or girl. He abstains from the getting of bondmen or bondwomen. He abstains from the getting of sheep or goats. . . . He refrains from carrying out those commissions on which messengers can be sent. He refrains from buying and selling. He abstains from tricks with false weights, alloyed metals, or false measures. He abstains from bribery, cheating, fraud, and crooked ways. He refrains from maiming, killing, imprisoning, highway robbery, plundering villages, or obtaining money by threats of violence.”¹

These precepts are expanded in the “middle” and “long” paragraphs, which further reprehend combats between animals, games of many kinds “detrimental to progress in virtue,” mean talk, such as “tales of kings, of robbers, or of ministers of state: tales of arms, of war, of terror, conversation respecting women, warriors, demi-gods, ghosts stories, empty tales.” They deprecate wrangling about orthodoxy; reproach those who perform “the servile duties of a go-between,” that is, between kings, ministers of state, Brahmans, etc.; denounce hypocrisy, divination, magic; reprobate those who make their living by predicting eclipses, or a rainfall, “or by drawing up deeds, making up accounts, giving pills, making verses, or arguing points of casuistry”; by giving advice about marriage, imparting magical formulæ, and so forth. If some of these prohibitions appear to us oddly assorted, the general purport is clear enough. The follower of Buddha is to hold aloof, on the one hand, from the frivolities and sensualities of the life of pleasure; on the other, from the quackery and professions² mixed up with quackery into which the lower forms of religion so easily slide. But underlying all this is the ideal goodness as consisting in universal love.

“And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of love, and so the second, and so the third, and so the

¹ *Suttas*, p. 189.

² In the *Vinaya Texts*, vol. iii., p. 152, sacrifices to the gods are included among the “low arts” which a Bhikkhu is not to teach. On the other hand, in vol. ii., p. 103, the prudent man, wherever he takes up his abode, is recommended “to make offerings” to all such deities as may be there.

fourth. And thus the whole wide world, above, below, around, and everywhere, does he continue to pervade with heart of Love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure. Just, Vasettha, as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard—and that without difficulty—in all the four directions; even so of all things that have shape or life, there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free, and deep-felt love.”¹

With this we may compare the character of the great King of Glory, the ideal Buddhist ruler, realized in some measure in the great King Asoka of Magadha. The King of Glory’s greatness depends on three qualities, those of forgiving, of self-conquest, and self-control. And in this rule of love the doctrine of Laotse is fully observed.

“For never in this world does hatred cease by hatred;
Hatred ceases by love; this is always its nature.”

“Whatever an enemy may do to an enemy,
Or an angry man to an angry man,
A mind intent on what is wrong
Works evil worse.”

“One may conquer a thousand thousand men in battle,
But he who conquers himself alone is the greatest victor.”

“Let a man overcome anger by kindness, evil by good;
Let him conquer the stingy by a gift, the liar by truth.”²

The Gospel precepts of humility and self-knowledge naturally find a place here. “Not the perversities of others, not their sins of commission and omission, but his own misdeeds and negligences should a sage take notice of”; and again, “One’s own self conquered is better than all other people.”³ Spiritual perfection is the supreme object and higher than all sacrifice. “If a man for a hundred years sacrifice month by month with a thousand, and if he, but for one moment, pay homage to a man whose soul is grounded (in true knowledge), better is that

¹ *Buddhist Suttas*, p. 201.

² Rhys Davids, p. 128. Compare the story of King Dighli in the *Vinaya Texts*, vol. ii., p. 298 ff.

³ *Dhammapada*, ch. iv., 50. *Ib.*, viii., 104. Compare the rule, “No Bhikkhu who has not given leave may be reproved for an offence—I prescribe, O Bhikkhus, that you reprove Bhikkhus for an offence only after having first asked leave by saying, Give me leave, reverend brother, I wish to speak to you.” (*Vinaya Texts*, vol. i., p. 264.)

For the mildness of penalties in the early Buddhist order, cf. vol. iii., p. 119, and the translator’s remarks.

homage than a sacrifice for a hundred years.”¹ The “Arahat” is as far above earthly things as the Stoical wise man. “As a solid rock is not shaken by the wind, wise people falter not amidst blame and praise.”² But by the same consequence responsibility and purification are individual. “By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one suffers, by oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified. . . . No one can purify another.”³ And the essence of purification is the ethical change of heart. Buddha accepts the confession and petition for forgiveness of Vaddha the Tikkhavi. “For this, O friend Vaddha, is the advantage of the discipline of the noble one, that he who looks upon his sin as sin and makes amends for it as is meet, he becomes able in future to restrain himself therefrom.”⁴ The saint must not look for success in this world. He finds his happiness in disregarding its hate. “We live happily indeed, not hating those who hate us.”⁵ Again, “Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy.”⁶ Again, “Not to blame, not to strike . . . to be moderate in eating, to sleep and sit alone and to dwell on the highest thoughts, this is the teaching of the Awakened.”⁷ Hence the duty of non-resistance: “No one should attack a Brahmana, but no Brahmana (if attacked) should let himself fly at his aggressor. Woe to him who strikes a Brahmana, more woe to him who flies at his aggressor.”⁸ The distinctions of caste are overcome—

“I do not call a man a Brahmana because of his origin, or of his mother, but the poor who is free from all attachments, him I call a Brahmana.”⁹ “Him I call indeed a Brahmana who, though he has

¹ *Dhammapada*, viii. 106.

² *Ib.*, vi. 81.

³ *Ib.*, xii. 165.

⁴ *Vinaya Texts*, vol. iii., p. 123.

⁵ *Dhammapada*, xv. 197.

⁶ *Ib.*, xv. 201.

⁷ *Ib.*, xiv. 185.

⁸ *Ib.*, xxvi. 389.

⁹ Ordination, however, was forbidden, not only to criminals and debtors, but to slaves, eunuchs, dwarfs, hunchbacks, one-eyed people, the blind, dumb and deaf; to a person that gave offence (by depravity) to those who saw him, etc. (*Vinaya Texts*, vol. i., pp. 199, 224-5. Cf. p. 215.) A quaint rule prohibits the ordination of an animal on the strength of a story of a serpent taking human shape and becoming ordained (*ib.*, pp. 217-19), and one of the questions asked of candidates was, “Are you a human being?” (Vol. iii., p. 349.)

Women were admitted to ordination, but according to the account in the *Vinaya Texts* with much reluctance and in an inferior position. The Buddha at first declines altogether to institute a female order, but is over-

committed no offence, endures reproach, stripes, and bonds, who has endurance for his force, and strength for his army. Him I call indeed a Brahmana who is tolerant with the intolerant, mild with the violent, and free from greed among the greedy. Him I call indeed a Brahmana from whom anger and hatred, pride and hypocrisy have dropt like a mustard-seed from the point of a needle." ¹

This morality does not rest on a theological basis; though Buddha does not deny the gods, they play no important part in his scheme. It is rather the inherent character and inevitable consequences of conduct with which he is concerned. The ideas of reward and punishment are not indeed wholly absent, for not only is there reward in a temporary heaven and punishment in a temporary hell for those in the lower stages of the path,² but those who reach the highest are rewarded by the final cessation of the circle of existences. But this after all is a very negative reward. The noblest prize that Buddha offers to man is to attain in this life and now to inward perfection. Such perfection has its essence in the absence of passion and desire, and its manifestation in universal love, in forgiveness of sin, in forbearance with the wrong-doer, in humility and self-respect. It is an inward state obtainable by all men, and also by all women, independently of caste, nationality, or sex. Love is for all and salvation is open to all.

7. The selflessness of spiritual religion is carried to the point of self-emptying, the negation of action along with desire, in some forms of Mysticism. Of such Quietism probably the earliest extant expression is to be found in *The Path of Virtue*,

persuaded by the faithful Ananda. Yet he foresees disaster as a consequence, wholly refuses to put Bhikkhunis and Bhikkhus on an equality, forbids any censure of Bhikkhus by Bhikkhunis, and ordains that a Bhikkhuni even if a hundred years old, shall make obeisance to a Bhikkhu even if newly initiated. On the other hand, all confessions of women are to be made to women, and all disciplinary proceedings to be carried out in the same way. (*Vinaya Texts*, vol. iii., pp. 320-332.) It is hardly necessary to remark that the ascription of these details to Buddha himself is of no historical authority.

¹ *Dhammapada*, p. 92, secs. 396, 399, 406, 407.

² Strictly speaking, this part of the doctrine would have to be qualified by what has been said above as to Karma.

by Lao Tszé, an older contemporary of Confucius. Lao Tszé is no theologian, but his system is historically connected with the Chinese conception of magical influences interpenetrating the whole physical world. The Tao, which is variously rendered by Way, Path, Truth, Reason,¹ is the course or process of the universe,² or perhaps, we may say, it is the one principle on which all the processes making up the life of the universe depend, or in which they are expressed. It is a magical conception refined into a metaphysical principle and made the basis of a system of mystical ethics. For the leading idea of the Tao would appear to be that man should surrender himself, his individuality, his self-assertion, his efforts to be positive, to rule others for their good, to be virtuous and benevolent—that he should abandon this vain self-assertion, and merge himself in the main stream of being which, flowing on its own course, sets all wrongs right, brings the proud to the ground, and exalts the humble and meek. “The sage governs by ridding the heart of its desires.”³ Going back to one’s origin is called Peace: it is the giving oneself over to the inevitable.⁴ The mystical paradox is that this excellent passivity is in reality the most effective of all modes of action. The sage “acts through non-action and by this he governs all.”⁵ The soft and the weak overcome the hard and strong.⁶ To teach without words and to be useful without action—few among men attain to this.⁷ Even from the personal point of view it is selflessness and restraint that yield happiness. “The more he (the wise man) gives to others, the more he has for his own.”⁸ “(The woman) conquers the man by continual quietness.”⁹ This wisdom practised by each would make virtue prevail in the community.¹⁰ For coercion is no remedy for social ills. “When the actions of the people are controlled by prohibited laws, the country becomes more and more impoverished. The wise man says, ‘I will design nothing, and the people shall shape themselves. I will keep quiet, and the people will find their rest. I will not assert myself, and the people will come forth. I will discountenance ambition, and the people will

¹ Old, *The Simple Way*, p. 20.

² De Groot, *Religious System of China*, iv., p. 67.

⁴ *Ib.*, ch. xvi.

⁷ *Ib.*, ch. xliiii.

¹⁰ *Ib.*, ch. lix.

⁵ *Ib.*, ch. iii.

⁸ *Ib.*, ch. lxxxi.

³ Old, ch. iii.

⁶ *Ib.*, ch. xxxvi.

⁹ *Ib.*, ch. lxi.

revert to their natural simplicity.'"¹ But not only is the government of the clever politician a "scourge." The ordinary virtues are really stumbling-blocks and rocks of offence. "By giving up their self-righteousness and abandoning their wisdom the people would be immensely improved. Forsaking Charity and Duty to the neighbour, they might revert to their natural relations."² That is to say, each should cultivate inward perfection and entire restraint—outward active virtues are a poor substitute for these. When Tao is lost it gives place to virtue, similarly in a descending scale virtue yields to benevolence, benevolence to justice, justice to expediency.³ In this excellent passivity certain virtues are inculcated in their most ideal form—humility, universal charity, love of enemies: "The wise man knows no distinctions; he beholds all men as things made for holy uses."⁴ "By governing the people with love it is possible to remain unknown."⁵ "To joy in conquest is to joy in the loss of human life,"⁶ and "whosoever humbleth himself shall be exalted, and whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased."⁷ The doctrine of forgiveness is pushed to its furthest point: "I would return good for good. I would also return good for evil. . . . I would likewise meet suspicion with confidence."⁸ And though wisdom prescribes passivity this is not from selfishness, for "the wise man lives . . . with modest restraint, and his heart goes out in sympathy to all men."⁹ He is inactive because this is the method of true happiness. For "the wise man is a constant and good helper of his fellows,"¹⁰ and the virtuous man acts "without hope of reward."¹¹

Such is the first recorded expression of the full doctrine of non-resistance—a doctrine which, however one-sided and inapplicable to the affairs of men, enshrines the profound truth that moral influence is distinct from and superior to physical compulsion; that force, however necessary in immediate exigencies, settles nothing in the end, but is a menace to the moral balance of the society and of the individual that employ it; that men are capable of being influenced, not only by retaliation, but also,

¹ *Ibid.*, ch. lvii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. v.

⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. xxii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ch. xxvii.

² *Ibid.*, ch. xix.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. x.

⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. xlix.

³ *Ibid.*, ch. xxxviii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. xxxi.

⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. xlix.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, ch. x.

and more profoundly, by the deliberate refusal to retaliate. The system of Quietism gave an extreme expression to these truths. The world will always reject its ideas, and will always be haunted by them until the time comes when, disregarding the extravagances of form in which they are uttered, it begins to ask itself in sober earnestness what truth they contain.

Putting aside the idiosyncrasies of different doctrines and considering only the ethical teaching of the spiritual religions—what advances and what limitations do we find? To begin with—a certain ideal of character is preached as the goal of man's endeavours. To cultivate the best within himself and to aid others in the same work is the means to salvation. Human character which in the lowest stages of moral thought is scarcely ever appreciated as a condition and cause of actions, is now a distinct object of activity, an end and aim of endeavour. Next, this ideal of character is conceived negatively as the destruction of selfishness, positively as the exercise of universal love. Here, again, elements which exist in all ethics from the lowest stage upwards are separated out and made into principles ruling conduct. For in the most primitive sense of duty to fellow-clansmen there is something of love and something of unselfishness, and something of the surrender of one's own desires and ways of thinking and personal pride. But these social centripetal qualities that tend to bind men together are inextricably intertwined with the fierce resentments, the pride of family or race, the antagonisms which break up human fellowship and keep men apart. Hence the group-morality of early times that we have described. Now in this higher stage of religion and ethics we see the socially-constructive qualities distinguished and idealized and recognized as the source of human salvation. And yet so roundabout is the path of human advance, in the very act and fact of being so idealized, their character as social qualities, their usefulness in organizing society, are in large measure annulled. They are conceived as being best cultivated apart from ordinary human ties, and as the foundation of a monastic brotherhood rather than of a living human society. Their negative side is emphasized. Self-negation is made more prominent than active kindness and love. Universal benevolence is held incompatible with the passionate personal love of woman and of child. The practice

of ideal virtues seems too hard for the householder and the man of affairs. Those very qualities which should refine the world are thought to be soiled by the world. Self-surrender and universal love—the two pillars of the higher ethics—are set up, but they are left standing in a void.

CHAPTER IV

MONOTHEISM

1. To the western world spiritual religion is familiar mainly in the form of the worship of one God, the creator and sustainer of all that is. If we conceive this form of belief as developing out of polytheism we may find approximations to it by several distinct paths. There is, first, the exaltation of one God as king over the rest, which will only lead to monotheism if the lesser deities become degraded to some lower plane of being. There is, secondly, the identification of all the gods with some one, an example of which has been seen in the Vedas. This is a natural effect of the feeling of worship, but it is checked in its development by the tendency to apply it to each god in turn, the result of which is that no single god obtains a definite and permanent supremacy. There is another and more subtle variant of this process wherein the several gods of mythology come to be regarded as manifestations of an underlying force, principle, or spirit, which is the sole reality—a line of development which leads rather towards Pantheism than towards Monotheism in the strict sense of the term. There is, lastly, the line of development which lies through the exclusive worship of one national god. This is the path through Monolatry to Monotheism, which was trodden in particular by the Jews. The Yahveh of early Judaism was not the one God, as we understand the term, but was the only God whom it was lawful for the Jews to worship. Yahveh was the God of Israel, just as Chemosh was the God of Moab. To each people, in Jephthah's view, their god has given their land, and this gift is

their title thereto.¹ The worship of Yahveh is properly confined to the soil of Canaan. To be driven thence is to be compelled to serve other gods.² Even in Deuteronomy, the First Commandment does not deny the existence of other gods, but forbids their being worshipped "before Me" or "beside Me."³ Indeed the Hosts of Heaven were in reality gods appointed by Yahveh Himself for the protection of the nations of the world. They were Gods, but God Himself sat supreme in the congregation of gods, and while He had divided the lower gods among all the peoples under heaven, He had reserved the direct worship of Himself alone for the children of Israel.⁴ Even when God controls the whole upper earth, His writ does not at first run in the under world; "Shall the pit give thanks unto Thee, or shall it declare Thy truth?" It is a late Psalm which says: "If I climb up into heaven Thou art there, if I go down into hell Thou art there also."⁵ The oneness of God and His supremacy over the whole earth are ideas which arose comparatively late in Hebrew thought, and are consequences rather than causes of a changed conception of His character. If Monotheism is taught—though indeed the teaching is implied rather than distinctly avowed—in the prophets before the exile, it is because with them the spirituality of Yahveh, His indifference to sacrifice and His love of righteousness are always first and foremost. It is His unique character which makes Him the one and only God. God is not the Ideal Being because He is One, but is One because He is the Ideal Being, the impersonation of the moral

¹ Judges xi. 24. "Wilt thou not possess that which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our God hath dispossessed from before us, them will we possess." The power of Chemosh seems implicitly recognized in 2 Kings iii. 27. Cf. Montefiore, Hibbert Lectures, p. 35.

² Montefiore, *ib.* 1 Samuel xxvi. 19. Apparently this is the reason why Naaman begs two mules' burdens of earth of Elisha, "for thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice unto other gods, but unto the Lord." (2 Kings v. 17.) These must be offered on Canaanitish soil.

³ R.V. marginal rendering, Deut. v. 7.

⁴ Deut. iv. 19. Cf. Driver, *Deut.*, pp. 70, 71. Here monolatry fuses with the conception of a chief god. Yet in the very same chapter we find a different thought, the thought achieved with difficulty by the prophets. The gods of the nations are idols, "the work of men's hands, wood and stone, which neither see, nor hear, nor eat, nor smell." (Deut. iv. 28.) Parallel passages are given by Driver, p. 73.

⁵ The same idea, however, as Dr. Carpenter points out to me, is expressed by as early a writer as Amos (ix. 2).

law. This is widely removed from the primitive conception. The earlier Yahveh had a well-defined human personality. He walks in the garden of Eden in the cool of the evening. He smells the sweet savour of Noah's sacrifice and declares that He will never again curse the ground for man's sake. He is not wholly without fear of the men that He has made. They may obtain too much power. Adam "is become one of Us." When men have all one language they attempt, like the giants who piled Pelion on Ossa, to build a tower that will reach to heaven, "and now nothing will be withholden from them which they purpose to do." "So the Lord," having confounded their language, "scattered them abroad upon the face of all the earth."¹ He has not always a human shape. He can appear in a thick darkness or in a burning bush. Sometimes He seems to dwell among the cherubims of the ark. Sometimes He almost seems identical with the ark itself.² He is in magic fashion dangerous to His worshippers. To touch the ark, or "to break through unto the Lord to gaze"³ was fatal. In other accounts He lives on Mount Seir and comes forth thence to battle. Afterwards He chooses Mount Sion for His habitation, and from Sion the prophet Amos declares that He would roar and utter His voice from Jerusalem.⁴

As a human personality He is half a barbaric chief, half an Oriental despot, superhuman like the gods of Polytheism, because greater and more powerful than man, but no ideal as to His moral attributes; a jealous God, as He describes Himself, capable of punishing the children for the fathers, according to the barbaric principle of collective responsibility; frequently on the point of doing rash things, from which Moses, His Grand Vizier, with difficulty restrains Him—asking Him to consider what people will say, and representing that if He destroys His nation, others will ascribe it not to His want of will, but to His want of power to preserve them.⁵ He is certainly from the first

¹ Genesis xi. 6-8.

² See Montefiore, p. 42.

³ Exodus xix. 21. Cf. Montefiore, p. 39.

⁴ Amos i. 2.

⁵ See the dialogue between God and Moses, Numbers xiv. 11-25. God having declared that He will smite the people, Moses replies, "Then the Egyptians shall hear it" . . . and "the nations which have heard the fame of Thee will speak, saying, Because the Lord was not able to bring this people into the land which He swore unto them, therefore He hath slain them in the wilderness."

the God of Righteousness in the sense that He is the source and upholder of the law. But it is the law of a barbaric people, and a warlike race—a law with all the features of early group-morality, and with some of them unpleasingly exaggerated. Yahveh is a man of war. He allows and even insists on the total destruction of the Canaanites. Agag is put to death before Him. His favoured David smites every male in Edom, and puts the men of Rabbah under saws and harrows of iron.¹ His code recognizes the blood feud, vengeance for unintentional homicide, and vicarious responsibility. But if barbaric, the code has, as we have seen in detail, many of the best features of early morality. A strong sense of social solidarity is shown in the care taken for the cause of the poor, the fatherless and the widow, in the prohibition of usury, in the protection of the Hebrew slave and concubine, in the cities of refuge to shelter from the fury of the avenger of blood. The ethics of early Yahvism, in fact, exhibit group-morality in its typical form with its best as well as some of its worst features standing out in strong relief.

✓ 2. Such was the religion which was transformed by the labours of the prophets from the eighth century onwards into a spiritual worship of one God, the creator and ruler of all things, the God of social justice, of mercy, and finally of love. It is not necessary for our purpose to follow the steps by which the new religious ideal was slowly and painfully acquired, with many backslidings and reversions to lower types of thought. It will be sufficient to point out the leading ideas which indicate the spirituality of the new religion. The first of these both in point of time and perhaps in ethical significance, was the protest against the belief that sacrifice could atone for sin. This is the ever-recurring theme of the older prophets. "I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies. Yea, though ye offer Me your burnt offerings and meal offerings, I will not accept them: neither will I regard the peace offerings of your fat beasts. . . . But let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream."² So

¹ 2 Samuel xii. 31. On Yahvism as exemplified in the story of David, see Kuensen, *Religion of Israel*, vol. i., p. 326 ff.

² Amos v. 21.

writes the first of the prophetic line. Isaiah takes up the word—"To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto Me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats."¹ "And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide Mine eyes from you: yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before Mine eyes; cease to do evil: learn to do well: seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."² This is the first lesson of spiritual religion which finally culminates in the doctrine that God is a Spirit, and they who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth. In the lowest stage of ethical thought men washed away their sins with magic purges or swore them off with incantation formulas. In the next stage they bargained with the gods and offered a bull or ram, or in extremity their own children to make up for their iniquity. The ethical stage proper begins when these childish things are put aside, and men conceive God as caring neither for gifts nor for ceremonial adulation, but for repentance and change of heart.

A spiritual religion must be a religion of the inner man. The ceremonies lose their magical effect. The true religious mystery is found in what passes within man's mind. "Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart," say the prophets and the prophetic code.³ Yet in the older prophets it is rather social righteousness and social salvation than the justification of the individual that occupy the first place. While nearly all later religions have appealed in the first instance to the individual to come to God and save his soul, leaving social righteousness to a secondary place, the prophets, innocent as yet of any doctrine of resurrection, believing in temporal rewards and concerned above all for the fate of Israel, put matters in a different order. Their righteousness is emphatically a social righteousness. We can trace in it the protest of a just and wise conservatism against the so-called progress of a material civilization with its tendency to break down the position of the

¹ Isaiah i. 11.

² *Loc. cit.*, 15-17. Cf. Jer. vii. 5, etc.

³ Deut. x. 16.

poorer free men and enslave them to the masters of wealth. The prophets' teaching was hardly yet humanitarian. It was rather an intensified form of group-morality. But it was for justice and equality, forbearance and consideration, as between all members of the group constituted as such by God's choice. It is God's people who are being oppressed. "What mean ye that ye crush My people and grind the face of the poor? saith the Lord, the Lord of Hosts."¹ The tyranny of the monopolist is already felt and denounced with a power that has never been surpassed. "Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field, till there be no room, and ye be made to dwell alone in the midst of the land."² "The Lord will enter into judgment with the elders of His people and the princes thereof: it is ye that have eaten up the vineyard: the spoil of the poor is in your houses."³ All the vices of material civilization, wine-bibbing and luxury, feminine vanity and ostentation, are denounced in the same strain,⁴ and the women are threatened with branding instead of beauty, and instead of a stomacher a girding of sackcloth.

These were not empty denunciations. The emancipation of slaves in the sabbatical year⁵ with provision to enable them to start as free men, the prohibition of usury in dealing with fellow Hebrews, the wiping out of debts in the sabbatical year, the abolition of vicarious punishment, the limitation of blood revenge, the provision for the fatherless and widows, the inculcation of humanity to slaves male and female, are embodied in the prophetic code and represent perhaps the earliest conscious effort towards systematic social reform, marred only by the exclusive religious spirit, which still (notwithstanding the concern for the stranger that is within the gates) draws a deep line between Jew and Gentile, emphasizes the necessity of exterminating the heathen, and proscribes the heretic. The heads of the code are summed up in the chapter in which Ezekiel repudiates the doctrine of vicarious responsibility.

¹ Isaiah iii. 15.

² Isaiah v. 8.

³ Isaiah iii. 14.

⁴ *Ib.* 16-26; v. 8-12.

⁵ I have referred above (Vol. I., Chap vii.) to Jeremiah's account of the attempts to enforce this rule (Jeremiah xxxiv. 8 ff.). The writer of Isaiah lviii. 6, insists on letting the oppressed go free, presumably meaning the emancipation of slaves.

“But if a man be just, and do that which is lawful and right, and hath not eaten upon the mountains, neither hath lifted up his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel, neither hath defiled his neighbour’s wife, neither hath come near to a woman in her separation; and hath not wronged any, but hath restored to the debtor his pledge, hath spoiled none by violence, hath given his bread to the hungry, and hath covered the naked with a garment; he that hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, that hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, hath executed true judgment between man and man, hath walked in My statutes, and hath kept My judgments, to deal truly; he is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord God.”¹

For a reformed and renovated Israel the prophets at first foresaw a reward of inner peace and prosperity. But as troubles thickened around them they began to feel that suffering might have a necessity and a value of its own. God’s servant is “despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief: and as one from whom men hide their face he was despised, and we esteemed him not.” It is the destiny of the teacher to bear the burden of the world’s folly and sin and to bear it with nothing but contempt for his reward. “Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed.”² His methods are those of gentleness and peace. “He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench: he shall bring forth judgment in truth.”³ He bears his sufferings in silence and humility. “He was oppressed, yet he humbled himself and opened not his mouth; as a lamb that is led to the slaughter, and as a sheep that before her shearers is dumb; yea, he opened not his mouth.”⁴ Thus by a very different road and with much difference of implied meaning, we are reaching the Buddhist doctrine of renunciation and humility—those cardinal points of spiritualized religion.

¹ Ezekiel xviii. 5-9.

³ Isaiah xlii. 2, 3.

² Isaiah liii. 4, 5.

⁴ Isaiah liii. 7.

Further, in proportion as Yahveh became the God of the whole earth the old group-morality was compelled to yield in a measure to Universalism. The warrior's song is changed to a prophecy of peace. "And He shall judge between the nations, and shall reprove many peoples: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."¹ In its cruder form the idea was that other nations should take their teaching from Jerusalem.² Vengeance moreover is still freely denounced on public enemies. "The Assyrian . . . shall flee from the sword and his young men shall become tributary."³ The exilic writers declare that the children of Babylon shall be dashed against the stones.⁴ But though national redemption and glory are still prominent we reach a higher phase in the conception of a redeemed Israel which is to evangelize the world.⁵ Unfortunately the experiences of the Exile and return were not favourable to the further development of thought along these lines, and there is a certain reaction towards exclusive particularism in the Priestly Code.⁶ Judaism feared to lose itself in the great world from which it was separated by no political barrier, and it sought safety in drawing its skirts closely round it, and even avoiding all contact with the unclean. One of the noblest traits of Monotheism was thus corrupted. Universalism survived only in kindness to the stranger and in the effort to proselytize, and even this was a matter of controversy.⁷ Nor was the question finally determined within the limits of Judaism itself, nor until the age of Paul.

Yet the unity and omnipresence and goodness of God are by this time established. The early prophets do not hesitate to attribute vengeance and even deceit to Yahveh. "Shall evil befall a city, and the Lord hath not done it?" Amos asks.⁸ In

¹ Isaiah ii. 4. Dr. Carpenter informs me that the passage is now generally regarded as post-exilic.

² Zech. viii. 20-23.

³ Isaiah xxxi. 8.

⁴ Isaiah xiii. 16. Cf. Psalm cxxxvii. 9.

⁵ Montefiore, pp. 273-277. Yet Cyrus is also God's instrument.

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 340.

⁷ That is to say, so far as the official religion is concerned. The universalist tendency is maintained in some of the Psalms and in the Wisdom literature.

⁸ Amos iii. 6.

the second Isaiah God declares that it is He who makes peace and creates evil.¹ This belongs, no doubt, to the conception of divine punishment for transgression. It is going a step further, however, when Ezekiel maintains that in punishment for the idolatry of the people God gave them statutes which were not good and judgments wherein they should not live. At a later stage, on the contrary, we find the authorship of evil imputed to Satan. In the Chronicles it is he, not Yahveh, who incites David to the numbering of the people. If in this we trace the influence of Zoroastrian ideas we may recognize also an attempt to keep pure the notion of God's goodness and to separate Him from all responsibility for sin and suffering. God's unity and omnipresent power are no less distinct than His righteousness. Jeremiah already puts the question, "Am I a God at hand and not a God afar off?"—a question to which more primitive worshippers would have returned a very doubtful answer. "Do I not fill heaven and earth?"² After the exile, though God still in some sense, symbolical or other, dwells in Sion and is certainly in a peculiar sense the God of Israel, yet there is no more talk of separation from Him, whether by exile or by death. "If I climb up into heaven, Thou art there; if I go down into hell, Thou art there also." God was the creator and father of all, though all men were not yet brothers.

Such was the adolescence of Monotheism. We have now to deal with its full development and endeavour to measure its main contributions to ethical thought, that is to say, to the guidance of life.

3. The central idea of Ethical Monotheism admits of a short and simple statement. There is one God only, the Maker of heaven and earth. He is a Personal God, and in His personality there is a touch of kinship with our human nature. But He does not, like the gods of polytheism, differ from us merely in being greater, wiser, and more powerful. He is not—when the adolescence of Monotheism is past—a mere magnified man.

¹ Isaiah xlv. 7.

² Jeremiah xxiii. 23-24. Yet in Ezekiel's time, people remaining in Canaan still taunt the exiles with being "far from Yahveh," and boast "unto us is Yahveh's land given." (Montefiore, p. 207, citing Ezekiel xi. 15.)

For man is finite and He is infinite, eternal, without beginning or end of days, the source and sustaining cause of all that is. Again, man is of composite nature and therefore corrupt. God is pure Spirit, and the spiritual is now the comprehensive expression for the highest and best that is known to man. It is defined negatively by opposition to the earthly, positively by the exaltation of morality into perfect purity of heart. God is a Spirit, and His communion with men is spiritual. They that worship Him must worship Him in spirit, and forms and ceremonies are naught without the inward and spiritual grace given unto us in them. As the Eternal Spirit God is the founder and sustainer of the Ethical order, He punishes the wicked and rewards the good, and yet—again except in the crassest apprehension—goodness cannot be assumed for the sake of the reward, for so it would not, spiritually considered, be goodness. What must win God is the genuine turning of the heart to Him, a faith in Him, which is also in the highest monotheism a love for Him from whom flows love to man, and in this love is the beginning and the end of human virtue. Finally, though man's corruption separates him by a great gulf from the infinite perfection of God, yet with a mercy that equals His justice God has Himself appointed means whereby the gulf may be spanned and forgiveness of sins obtained.

This comparatively simple conception in which the ethical and the religious fuse, which provides at once for the government of the universe and the entire direction of human life, expresses what religion has in essence meant to great numbers of devout souls. But the conception could not maintain itself in so simple a form. At every point it bristles with theoretical difficulties, to meet which great structures of dogma have been erected, modified, and replaced by others, as the needs of controversy have determined. Nor was the shape taken by dogma determined by the pure monotheistic idea alone, but in large measure by the particular contents of the historical documents in which the monotheistic system was revealed. We have to note the fundamental points in which the building up of dogma affected ethics.

First as to the nature of God and His relation to the world,

monotheism in all its forms appears to be agreed that He is the uncreated, unconditioned creator and sustainer of all things.

“He is God alone !
God the Eternal !
He begets not and is not begotten !
Nor is there like unto Him any one !”¹

But for one clause this Mohammedan hymn of unity might be sung with equal fervour by the Christian. So again another passage :—

“God, there is no God but He, the living, the self-subsistent. Slumber takes Him not, nor sleep. He is what is in the heavens and what is in the earth. Who is it that intercedes with Him, save by His permission ? He knows what is before them and what behind them, and they comprehend not aught of His knowledge but of what He pleases. His throne extends over the heavens and the earth, and it tires Him not to guard them both, for He is high and grand.”²

God is the creator and sustainer of things. But according as emphasis is laid on the one or the other of these descriptions, divergent views of His relation to the world come into being. As creator He makes the world out of nothing, and He makes man in His image. He endows His creatures with existence and they become in a manner separate from Him. If pressed hard this conception militates against God’s infinitude. Man and the world are separate from Him, and in so far as they have independent existences must be held to limit Him. He is no longer all that is. Upon this line of thought He becomes a Ruler, all-powerful no doubt, but still an outside power acting upon this earthy existence. On the other hand, as Sustainer of all that is His relation to the world becomes more intimate. It is only in Him that things have existence. His will alone is the cause of all that happens. He alone has independent

¹ The Chapter of Unity. *The Koran*, vol. ii., ch. 112 (Palmer’s Trans.).

² *Koran*, ch. ii. (Palmer’s Trans., vol. i., p. 40). These passages express God’s power rather than His love and other moral qualities. But these appear in their place. Palmer finds ninety-nine epithets of God in the *Koran*, including The Merciful, Ruler, Holy, Peace, Faithful, Protector, Mighty, Creator, Forgiver, Provider, Knowing, Honourer, Destroyer, Hearer, Seer, Judge, Justice, Subtle, Aware, Forgiving, Exalted, Generous, Answerer of Prayer, Comprehensive, Wise, Loving, Glorious, Truth, Subsisting, Eternal, the First, the Last, Righteousness, the Relenting, Kind, Lord of Majesty and Liberality, Equitable, Patient.

existence and the things of the world exist only by participation in Him.¹ This line of thought, it is clear, is bringing us close to Pantheism, and though thinkers as orthodox as Thomas Aquinas have made no small advances in that direction, the centre of gravity of monotheistic dogma lies nearer to the creationist conception. God made the world, but He is not the world: He made man, but is not man. In so far His Being is limited. He is transcendent, not immanent.

4. So far the interest is speculative rather than ethical. Whichever view is taken the unconditional omnipotence of God at the outset is assumed. But with this assumption the problem of evil at once becomes urgent, and we touch the very heart of all ethico-religious theory. The Platonic doctrine that God is good, and as good can be the author of no evil, may be regarded as the corner-stone of all ethical religion. How was this to be fitted in with the dogma of omnipotence which monotheism had accepted? Broadly speaking, there were two possible methods. The first was to deny the reality of evil, the second was to insist on the absolute right of the Creator to do what He would with His own. Both explanations have held an important place in dogma. According to Augustine evil has no positive and substantial existence. It is only "a privation of good,"² or, by a swift change of thought, it is the dark colour that throws up the light. "For as a picture with dark colour, set in its proper place, is fair, so is the universe of things, if one can behold it, even with its sinners, though they, considered by themselves, are stained by their own ugliness."³ It is well to remark that these two views are in essence quite opposed. In the one, evil has no positive character. It is a void, where good might be, but is not. In the other, there are things or persons that are evil in themselves—evil is so far positive; but their badness when viewed in connection with the whole scheme of things is held to have a good effect—a function to perform whereby the picture as a whole is made more fair.

¹ "Participatione ejus, qui solum per se ipsum est." Thomas quoted in Harnack, *History of Dogma*, E. T., vol. vi., p. 184.

² *De Civitate Dei*, bk. xi., ch. 22. "Cum omnino natura nulla sit malum, nomenque hoc non sit nisi privationis boni."

³ *Ib.* ch. 23.

The optimistic doctrine that the evil of the world is merely the dark colour which serves to show up the bright would be tenable upon two hypotheses. If evil and good were so distributed that physical suffering, external calamities and moral wrong-doing played an essential part in the growth of each personality, and could be shown to tend ultimately to its greater perfection, the existence of evil would be reconcilable with a divine justice which should take every personality into account. Equally, if personality were left wholly out of account, it might be theoretically maintainable that the unequal distribution of evil in the world was a matter of no moment, provided that the whole scheme of things be allowed to be sound at the core. The second alternative was not possible for any system which took account of personality at all. In particular, so far as regards moral evil, it was not open to Christian apologists, who, on the one hand, maintained the infinite value of the individual soul, and, on the other, visited the reprobate with the prospect of eternal punishment. Evil which involves eternal suffering as its punishment, cannot be dismissed as something merely negative, nor yet accepted as a mere incident in the working out of a higher order—that is to say, it cannot be so accepted by those who maintain the inherent worth of personality. Hence theologians are driven back on a second line of defence. They admit the evil will to exist, but they seek to exonerate the Deity for responsibility for its existence. The simplest method of such exoneration is that of Pelagius, which makes the salvation of man depend upon his own choice, that choice not being conceived as predetermined by God. Free will, thus understood, however, is clearly a limitation of the divine omnipotence, and theology, Christian and Mohammedan alike, has often been driven to prefer the opposite alternative of limiting the responsibility of man rather than the knowledge and authority of God. Yet this alternative raises many problems, some of them of grave ethical import. In the first place, how does the evil will come into existence? Augustine is clear that a good God cannot create a bad nature.¹ The nature of the wicked angels therefore was intrinsically good,² and “we must believe the

¹ *De Civitate Dei*, bk. xi., ch. 22, 23; bk. xiii., ch. 1.

² *Op. cit.*, xii., chs. 1 and 3. “In quantum naturæ sunt, bonæ sunt.”

providence of the Creator rather than be so rash as to condemn any part of the world's fabric of any imperfection."¹ The nature of the wicked angels being good, their fall arose from their evil will. What then, we naturally ask, was the cause of this evil will, seeing that evil was not in their own nature? The answer is that the evil will has no cause.

"Seek the cause of this evil will and you shall find just none, for what can cause the will's evil, the will being sole cause of all evil—'Cum ipsa (voluntas) faciat opus malum'—The evil will, therefore, causes evil works, but nothing causes the evil will."²

But at this point we are at once brought to the free-will dilemma. Either the bad will must have an origin somewhere in that structure of things which God has created, or it must be a force arising *per impossibile* out of nothing, which the Creator does not control. It may be said that He does not control it, but only permits it. This does not offer escape from the dilemma, either that it is a force arising somehow independently of Him, or that His permission is a negative condition whereby alone this force can have any effect. No theory of responsibility can, from the ethical point of view, draw any serious distinction between a negative and a positive condition, and to permit evil, in the plenitude of power that might prevent it, is all one with the doing of evil. In point of fact, Augustine's own argument, when looked into, tends to restore the omnipotence of God along with His responsibility; for although he denies that the evil will has an origin, he is strenuous in maintaining that the good will is created, and here he refuses to make any distinction between the will and the being to whom the will belongs, for he argues,³ "Seeing that the angels themselves were created, how can their wills but be so also?" It might be retorted that if this argument applies to the good angels, it applies also to the bad ones. But, further, Augustine himself is in the end led to the admission that the difference between the bad and the good will rests upon

¹ *De Civitate Dei*, bk. xii., ch. 4. The free rendering of the old translator J. H. The Latin is:—"rectissime credenda præcipitur providentia Conditoris ne tanti artificis opus in aliquo reprehendere vanitate humana temeritatis audeamus."

² *Ib.*, bk. xii., ch. 6. J. H.'s Trans. In the Latin the last words are:—"malæ autem voluntatis efficiens est nihil."

³ *Ib.*, bk. xii., ch. 9.

the choice of good, and the choice of good upon the grace of God. Those angels "that were created good and yet became evil by their proper will either received less grace from the divine love than they that persisted therein, or if they had equal good at their creation, the one fell by the evil wills, and the other, having further help, attained that bliss from which they were sure never to fall."¹ At this point, then, the whole argument becomes consistent, but at the cost of deliberately accepting one horn of the dilemma. The good will is good because he who exercises it has a greater measure of grace; the bad will is bad because grace does not sufficiently abound. This is in essence to abandon the conception of the bad will arising uncaused, as a force external to the providence of God, and to maintain the superintendence of God throughout; but it is also, by a logical necessity, to constitute God the ultimate author of the moral depravity of the wicked angels, and, on the same argument, of wicked man.² In fact, the determination to hold by the omnipotence of God at all costs led inevitably to the doctrine of predestination, for if God knows all things from the first, how can He but know the fate of those whom He is about to create or whom He may create at any future time, and if He creates them, knowing their fate, what theory of responsibility can be invented which shall take the burden of their fate off Him? True, their reprobation may still be regarded as the consequence of their own wickedness. But wickedness also is foreknown by God, and though that wickedness issues from the will of each individual, yet precisely the same argument applies to the will itself; that also is foreknown and foreappointed. Thus, though by various dialectical compromises theologians may still endeavour to attribute foreknowledge of sin without responsibility for sin, the far more logical consequence is that drawn by Calvin when he declares that those "whom God passes by He

¹ *De Civitate Dei*, bk. xii., ch. 9. J. H.'s Trans.

² Augustine attempts to escape from the positive character of the evil will by treating it as a deficiency in goodness (xii. 7). The want of sufficiently good will does not touch the question of responsibility. If one person's will is adequate to maintain the goodness of his nature while another person's will fails in that respect, the difference must be due to one of two causes. The want of will in the man who becomes bad is either something that arises independently without the appointment of God, or it is something which God foresees and appoints, and we are back in precisely the old dilemma.

reprobates, and from no other cause than His determination to exclude them."¹ And again, "I inquire again, how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. . . . It is an awful decree, I confess; but no one can deny that God foreknew the future final fate of man before He created him, and that He did foreknow it because it was appointed by His own decree."² As to the distinction between will and permission Calvin admits that it is nugatory. "What reason shall we assign for His permitting it, but because it is His will?" Thus, the strict insistence upon the omnipotence of God led theologians, in proportion to their logical courage, to a doctrine which did not indeed abolish the human will, because the will was the instrument through which God worked, but which did place upon God the final responsibility for all that exists in this world and all that man does therein, and all that in consequence man shall enjoy or suffer hereafter. And this, in accordance with views held to be derived from the original revelation—though utterly repugnant to the true spirit of Christianity—involved among other things the eternal suffering in unspeakable torments of the vast majority of mankind, of that mankind for whose benefit in the main God was nevertheless held to have created the world.

If we would know the ethical principle by which this scheme of things can be justified, we can again turn to the logical Calvin, in whom we find the consequences most thoroughly pushed home. We merit punishment because we are corrupted by sin, and if it be replied that God has made us corrupt, the answer is that the potter has power over the vessel. And it is not a question of power alone. God is the supreme judge of the world, and the supreme judge, from whom issue all law and all right, can do no injustice. That is just, in short, which God wills, and if He determined at the outset upon the fall of man, it was because He foresaw it would tend to the justification and glory of His Name.³ With the admission that in order to

¹ Calvin, ii., p. 141.

² *Ib.*, p. 147.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 142-148.

At this point in theological development we come by a long round to the arbitrariness of the Mohammedan Deity. "God's is what is in Heaven and in the earth, and if ye show what is in your souls, or hide it, God will call

understand the justice of the scheme of God we must understand Him to constitute justice as suits Him, we have, in point of fact, passed outside the range of human ethics. We have admitted that ethical conceptions, as we understand them, no longer apply, and Calvin himself allows that the destruction of mankind is guided by an equity indubitable, yet unknown to us. The Deity lays down an ideal code for man, but the code which men ascribe to the Deity is not ideal and can only be excused as being unintelligible to the human mind.¹ At this stage the ethical and religious elements, the blending of which was the triumph of monotheism, definitely fall asunder once more; and those who will not face this schism find themselves compelled to make some room for human responsibility, and to conceive a will which is not a mere puppet of an overruling Providence.

5. While limiting by implication the omnipotence of God, the doctrine of Free Will is not without ethical difficulties of its own. Will either is or is not an expression of character. If it is an expression of character, it figures but as one link in the endless chain of causes and effects. We may trace this chain back in the first instance to the original nature of the individual, and whether we say that this is determined by heredity or was what God made it, we are equally throwing the responsibility back on to something anterior to the individual, and on the creationist principle this something must in the end be God Himself. If, on the other hand, we deny that will is an expression of character, we not only assert something which is in itself

you to account; and He forgives whom He will and punishes whom He will, for God is mighty over all." (*Koran*, vol. i., ch. 2, p. 45.) Compare page 62, where, however, the concluding words run:—"For God is forgiving and merciful." Forgiveness may be the portion of any but the idolaters, but they were created for Hell. "Had God pleased they would not have associated aught with Him" (*Koran*, i., ch. 6, p. 128), i. e. would not have worshipped false gods. But "we have created for hell many of the ginn and of mankind. They have hearts and they discern not therewith; they have eyes and they see not therewith; they have ears and they hear not therewith; they are like cattle, nay, they go more astray; these it is who care not." (Ch. 7, p. 160.) These men God predestines to the fire, and the believers are not to intercede for them. But as to whether He will save all believers who avoid sin, it does not seem so clear. He is forgiving and merciful, but He is also an oriental despot in whom there remains an incalculable element of caprice.

¹ Calvin, ii., p. 148.

unintelligible, but we in reality destroy the very responsibility which we are seeking to maintain. For responsibility ceases when identity of character ceases. A man is justly rewarded or punished for what he has done only so far as he can recognize himself as the doer. If the "I" who did the deed is the "I" which suffers for it, well and good. But this "I" is the permanent self with its abiding character, and punishment has full ethical justification only so far as it tends to purge and ennoble the character. Thus if the theory of Free Will means that it is not this self that does the deed, but a Will which springs out of no antecedent cause and has no fixed relation to what the "I" has been or will be, then it is not the "I"—the permanent self—that has sinned, and to punish it will be of no avail.¹ Punishment is reduced to a blind retaliation on the body which the Will possesses, and the Will itself is reduced to the condition of an animistic spirit which enters a man from without and works its will for a while with his limbs.

Furthermore, on either conception of Free Will the ultimate responsibility of the Creator for evil remains. Sorrow and suffering do not begin with the Fall, or if any theologian attributes them to the sin of Adam and Eve in the spirit of the curse in Genesis, he is merely bringing us back to the doctrine of vicarious guilt. Even if all evil resulted from the wicked will

¹ Thus the man who is punished must be essentially the same being as he who did the deed. That is to say, justice and responsibility ethically conceived imply the persistent identity of the personality. But this persistent identity is precisely that which the Free Will doctrine in the stage now under consideration attempts to deny. It is not the "I," the trend of continuous connection running through all my conscious life, the subject which thinks and feels and knows—it is not that "I" which acts. For this "I" has its definite character, modifiable no doubt by circumstances and developed by its own reaction upon circumstances, capable of being appealed to by an infinite variety of motives and often assimilating new purposes, but nevertheless always the same "I," the character of which at any given moment arises out of its previous state. It is not this "I," but a Will that acts, a Will that comes from nowhere and stands in no certain relation to me. This Will is not by the terms of the argument what "I" was before the act was done. Why, then, do "I" take the praise or bear the blame of the deed?

The doctrine of the Undetermined Will, in short, destroys the moral responsibility which it sets out to establish. Moral responsibility infers (1) continuous identity of character, and (2) the determination of action by motives adopted in accordance with the character of the agent. This implies "free will" in the sense that the agent must be unconstrained by any force outside himself, never in the sense that he is free from himself.

of man, yet it is God who made man and gave him freedom to act as He would. Thus, though omnipotence is limited, its responsibility is not abrogated.¹ The conception of Free Will alone could not solve the difficulty. But taken in conjunction with a more rational theory of the function of punishment it has suggested a different method of approach. It was above all the doctrine of eternal punishment which converted the difficulties arising from God's foreknowledge and unlimited power into ethical impossibilities. This doctrine is of course not essential to Monotheism; it conflicts with the moral teaching of the Gospels; and with the growth of a more refined ethics it has in fact fallen into the background. Apologetics have then to cope with the evils, moral and physical, of this world, and their tendency would seem to be towards an "educative" conception. Free Will is higher than instinct. He only can be a morally good man who is physically and psychologically capable of being morally bad, for "ought" implies "can," and it is only

"when a soul has seen
By dint of evil that good is best,"

that it can enter into spiritual rest. In no other way could a moral order come into being, or could man be made god-like. As with moral evil, so with the pain and suffering inherent in the order of nature. Sorrow exists that man may learn to bear

¹ The doctrine of the dependence of responsibility upon character has inherent consequences which are carefully to be marked off from those which follow from theories of creation or of the nature of causation with which it may be associated. Moral responsibility implies the dependence of action upon the self with its definite character, and since the self does not arise out of nothing its character, and therefore its conduct, must at the next remove be referable to the conditions out of which the self arose. Following this line of thought we are forced to conceive of Reality as a single system of which all the parts are interconnected. The argument does not imply that this interconnection is of a mechanical character. On the contrary—so far as it consists in psychical operations working intelligently towards clearly-conceived ends, as is the case at least in human actions—these are the opposite of mechanical. Nor, again, does the argument imply that any intelligent being foresaw and planned the whole. If either of these creeds are held, they are held on other grounds. What the argument goes to prove is that Reality is a single system of interdependent parts. What kind of system it is must be discovered from other sources. It is only when taken in conjunction with the belief in an all-knowing and all-powerful Creator that this doctrine gives rise to the ethical difficulties of Predestination, and only when combined with a materialistic view of the universe that it destroys responsibility and renders human purposes an illusion.

it. The happiness of childish innocence is sweet, but not so worthy as the peace won for itself by the strong soul resting upon God. To strive is the law of life, and its suffering is the pang of travail. God might create a happy paradise for children at play, but He could not, without implanting seeds of suffering, produce the nobler race of strong men to be conquerors of the earth. It seems indeed impossible to state this explanation except in terms which condition the creative power of God. It may be that to strive and fall, to endure suffering in ourselves and even the sight of it in those whom we love, is an unavoidable condition of moral growth, but if this is so, it is as much as to say that there are laws and conditions in the spiritual world which omnipotence itself cannot infringe. Unconditioned creation is thus in principle denied, and we are instead brought nearer to an evolutionary conception of a Spirit striving in the world of experience with the inherent conditions of its own growth and mastering them at the cost of all the blood that stains the pages of history, and all the unremembered tears that bedew the lone desert places of the heart.

6. Amid all metaphysical difficulties monotheism remains clear as to the basis of the ethical order. God's Will is the source of moral obligation, His Word the revelation of the practical rule of life. The fulfilment of His Will is the means of salvation, and salvation is propounded as the supreme end of life towards which every thought and act must be directed. The order of ethical ideas springing from this principle has its own definite features, which must now be considered.

God being on the one hand a perfect Being, on the other the all-powerful Lord of all, all wrong-doing takes upon itself the character of a sin against Him. Sin is an act of rebellion against a supreme authority, and it stamps the soul with a stain of guilt which makes it unworthy to appear in the Divine presence. Sin, in fact, borrows something of the infinitude of the Being against whom it offends and puts a measureless gulf between Him and the sinner. But, in the Christian conception, man inherited from Adam—whether through the Fall or by a primæval decree of which the Fall itself was but the first consequence—an original inherent sinfulness, whereby even those of the most spotless

virtue stood condemned in the sight of God. Nor could any merit of their own avail to wipe their guilt away, for judged by the infinite excellence of the divine no human virtue can be called positively good, and our best acts, far from yielding an overplus of merit which could, as it were, be set against our natural faults, are themselves but poor attempts to carry out that rule of sublime perfection which alone could deserve the divine approval.

In all this the religious consciousness is expressing in its own fashion an immeasurably heightened sense of the gulf between right and wrong. In so doing it sets for itself a problem which could not be solved altogether by ethical means. The Fathers of the Church, in fact, found the solution in the history of Christ, who, being at once God and perfect man, gives His own life for us. In its crudest forms this conception of Atonement implies the primitive doctrines of vicarious justice, and the transferability of guilt, both of which belong to a relatively low stage of ethical development.¹ But the conception was capable of a more refined expression, and in Anselm's hands the death of Christ appears rather as a voluntary act redounding to the glory of God, and thereby meriting a recompense which Christ, not needing it for Himself, transfers to men. He makes men the "heirs" of the "superabundance of His plenitude . . . that what they owe for their sin may be remitted to them, and what, by reason of their sin, they lack, may be given to them."² In this treatment it is a question rather of the transfer of merit than of guilt, and this merit is not passed on mechanically (as in the semi-magical transfer of sins to the scapegoat), but only by spiritual means—to those who follow Christ according to the rules which His church has prescribed. This reconstruction, however, refines, but does not eliminate, the vicarious principle, and leaves us with the conception of a divine retribution, not as a consequence which attaches itself by a moral necessity to the state of the sinner's soul, but as capable of being somewhat arbitrarily softened by a gracious consideration for the noble act of another.

¹ By the prevailing tradition down to Anselm's time it would even appear that the Atonement was held necessary as a means of satisfying the otherwise imperative claim of the Devil. See Harnack, vol. vi., p. 70 (E. T.).

² *Ib.*, pp. 66, 67.

The death of Christ, however, does not win salvation for all men at a stroke. There are further conditions to be fulfilled. The first and greatest of these is faith in Christ Himself.¹ Without faith no virtue can save, and, though they had no means of knowing the Gospel, the best of the heathen are irrevocably lost. This may be said to have been common ground to the churches down to the modern period.² But further than this, faith not merely in Christ, but in the church's own scheme of salvation is too often a necessity, and no virtue, no sanctity, not even the utmost plenitude of the true spirit of religion, could avail to make good this flaw. "For any man who does not hold the unity of the Catholic Church, neither baptism, nor alms however profuse, nor death met for the name of Christ, can be of benefit for his salvation."³ To die for Christ has become a

¹ Faith in God is similarly the first condition of salvation with Mohammed. So accursed are the infidels that they do not even deserve the prayers of the faithful. "It is not for the prophet and those who believe to ask forgiveness for the idolaters, even though they be their kindred, after it has been made manifest to them that they are the fellows of hell." (*Koran*, i. ch. ix., Palmer, p. 189.) Sometimes the prophet casts his net wide. "There is no compulsion in religion; the right way has been distinguished from the wrong, and whoso disbelieves in Tāghūt" (i. e. the idols and demons of the ancient Arabs) "and believes in God, he has got hold of the firm handle in which is no breaking off; but God both hears and knows." (*Koran*, i., ch. ii., Palmer, p. 40.) Elsewhere threats are denounced against the Christians.

² Calvin even detracts from the merits of the heathen:—The good works of the heathen are distinguished from bad and rewarded in this life, but Augustine is right in saying, "That all who are strangers to the religion of the one true God, however they may be esteemed worthy of admiration for their reputed virtue, not only merit no reward, but are rather deserving of punishment because they contaminate the pure gifts of God with the pollution of their own hearts." They are restrained from evil not by a sincere attachment to virtue, but by ambition, self-love, or some other irregular disposition. The end of what is right is always to serve God, and as they regard not this end any externally good act performed by them becomes sin.

Luther, though of more tolerant disposition, is equally clear that outside Christendom there is no forgiveness and can be no holiness. (*Primary Works*, ed. Wace and Buchheim, p. 104.) The Anglican Article XIII. denies that "works done before the grace of Christ" are pleasant to God—"yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin." This view is satisfactorily anathematized by the Council of Trent. (*Corpus Juris*, p. 14.)

³ Quoted from Fulgentius in the *Decr. Greg. Corpus Juris*, p. 778, where however it is attributed to Augustina. Augustine suggests that good works may mitigate damnation when they cannot procure salvation, and

small thing compared with acceptance of precisely the right formula to express his relations to the Deity. The ethical consequences are double. Conduct, and not only conduct, but the whole ethical attitude of a man, his character, his soul as expressing itself in his life and in his relations to other men, fall into the second place and are subordinated to the single consideration of his attitude to the doctrines of the church—even when that attitude can only be expressed by saying that he has never happened to hear of them. Secondly, the original universalism of the world religions disappears, and for the old circle of the fellow-citizens marked off rigidly from the rest of the world, is substituted the circle of the true believers marked off, too often by a deeper, redder line from the rest of humanity.

7. But faith is not necessarily the sole condition necessary for salvation. Faith admits to the church, membership whereof is signified by baptism. But what of the baptized Christian? Is he sanctified, "justified," once for all, or may he yet sin and fall from grace? Should he fall, what means are open to him of regaining salvation? On these questions deep cleavage came into being. The dominant view in the early church was that while baptism washed away all previous sins, after baptism grave sins could not, unless under some exceptional circumstances, obtain forgiveness.¹ The church itself was to be a community of saints, and down to the beginning of the third century expulsion was in fact the penalty for idolatry, adultery, fornication and murder.² But during the latter half of the second century the practice of allowing a single penance for sin began to grow up as a "second plank" of salvation for him who had made shipwreck, and from this beginning the great Catholic system of discipline was developed,³ and the vast

the case of schismatics who endure martyrdom is instanced. (*De Patientia*, c. 28, quoted with approval by Gratian, p. 1228.)

¹ Harnack, vol. i., p. 172 (E. T.).

² *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., 108-109. The impenitent were threatened with the refusal of divine forgiveness. While exclusion was the logical consequence of the conception of a community of Saints, it does not in fact seem to have been pressed home. Offenders were often dealt with in the light of a special revelation.

³ The new system received a great impetus from the numerous lapses in the Decian persecution. (*Ib.*, vol. ii., pp. 110-112.)

structure of the Canon Law. If the church was to "come down to earth" and embrace not only the saints, but the whole mass of sinful, struggling humanity, it was clearly necessary to find some means of dealing with sins after baptism, and means more elastic than that of a single penance. It was essential to recognize true contrition as shown in the steadfast purpose to lead a new life. But the church did more than recognize. It systematized it, enjoining confession as a proof of contrition, and penance not merely as an outpouring of the contrite heart, but as a means of satisfaction for the offence. The theory is somewhat crudely expressed at an early date by Cyprian, who held that no one could remain permanently without sin after baptism, that accordingly God's wrath must be appeased by sacrifices, or that sins must be expunged by exceptional works of merit, among which almsgiving takes a conspicuous place.¹ Though it is insisted that such works can only be efficacious in so far as God is pleased to accept them, it is clear that the practical working out of such a principle will bring us perilously near to a systematic money composition for sins, quite comparable to the secular composition for wrongs in early law. The theory itself, moreover, contains the suggestion that special merits may be weighed against sins; a consideration justly applicable by a divine judge summing up upon a man's whole career, but deadly to the man himself.²

The requisite, but perhaps not sufficient, correction to this mechanical doctrine of satisfaction was a strong insistence on the necessity of genuine contrition as evidenced by a change of heart. This is in fact put forcibly by the Fathers,³ and a full contrition remains the main essential down to the thirteenth century. Gratian is even uncertain whether confes-

¹ Harnack, vol. ii., pp. 133, 134.

² Harnack's comment is not too severe. "Eine Kirche, die sich bei diesen Sätzen auf die Dauer beruhigt hätte, hätte den letzten Rest ihrer Christlichkeit sehr bald eingebüsst." (*Ib.*, p. 135.)

³ Thus Ambrose, "Penitentia est et mala præterita plangere et plangenda iterum non committere." (Gratian, p. 1211.) Again, "Satisfactio pœnitentiæ est peccatorum causas excidere nec earum suggestionibus aditum indulgere" (attributed to Augustine, *De Dogm.*, p. 54, by Gratian, but wrongly so according to the editors). This is the change of heart, "Ubi dolor finitur, deficit et pœnitentia . . . Hinc semper doleat et de dolore gaudeat." (Augustine, *De Poenit.*, quoted *ib.*, p. 1212.) This is the doctrine of lasting remorse.

sion is strictly necessary for forgiveness,¹ and he has some difficulties as to repeated confession. For the "every-day lesser and lighter sins without which one's life is not led" satisfaction is made sufficiently by the prayers of the faithful.² As to graver sins, Gratian is clear that they cannot be committed over and over again and still be redeemed by alms. Yet the church allows that by penitence sins are remitted, not once, but *saepeissime*, and though perfect penitence would be final, yet there are degrees in penitence as there are in charity, and he who has repented once is cleared of his sins until he falls again.³ In all this we see clearly enough the conflict of a stricter and a laxer view.⁴ With the growth of the opinion that penance does not pre-suppose full contrition, but only an *attritio*, which the sacrament of penance itself perfects, an impetus was given to the less spiritual conception,⁵ and this attained its full development in the doctrine of indulgences whereby the treasures of merit stored up by the faithful for the church, and at her disposal, could be held to remit the penalties of guilt here and in purgatory for her obedient children.⁶ We have not here to deal with the abuse of indulgences. It is sufficient for us to note how great is the departure from an ethical theory of penitence, when the Council of Trent pronounce an anathema, not merely on those who deny that the function of the priest in absolution is judicial, but on those who assert that true repentance is shown in a new life rather than in performance of penance.⁷

¹ See the long discussion in Gratian, *Corpus Juris*, pp. 1159-1190, and compare Harnack, vol. vi., pp. 245, 246.

² Gratian, p. 1214.

³ *Corpus Juris*, pp. 1213-1215.

⁴ Or perhaps a formalistic as against an ethical view. The rules of confession became stricter—the decretals of Gregory IX. lay down definitely that every adult must confess at least once a year (*Corpus Juris*, p. 887)—while the spiritual meaning of penitence is watered down.

⁵ See Harnack, vol. vi., E. T., pp. 248 ff.

⁶ The doctrine of indulgence as laid down by Clement VI. is a very crude statement of the transfer of merit, and the consequent cancelling of sin. "Quem quidem thesaurum non in sudario repositum, non in agro abconditum, sed per beatum Petrum . . . ejusque successores suos in terris vicarios commisit (Dei filius) fidelibus salubriter dispensandum, et propriis et rationabilibus causis; nunc pro totali, nunc pro partiali remissione poenae temporalis pro peccatis debitae, tam generaliter quam specialiter . . . vere poenitentibus et confessis misericorditer applicandum" (quoted in Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 287). This is not much above the level of the sin-eater.

⁷ *Corpus Juris*, Council of Trent, p. 39.

The Indulgences led directly to the Reformation, and the abuse of "works" went far to determine the attitude of the Reformers to the whole question of Justification. The moralistic theory of nicely-graduated penalties for sin and of the cancelling out of sin against merit had ended in ethical disorder and even scandal. Luther went back to the alternative principle of salvation, and justification by faith alone is announced in statements that sometimes seem to sweep the whole ethical order aside.

"We see then how rich a Christian, or baptized man is, since, even if he would, he cannot lose his salvation by any sins, however great, unless he refuses to believe; for no sins whatever can condemn him but unbelief alone. All other sins, if faith in the Divine promise made to the baptized man, stands firm or is restored, are swallowed up in a moment through that same faith, yea, through the truth of God, because He cannot deny Himself, if thou confessest Him, and cleavest believingly to His promise; whereas contrition and confession of sins, and satisfaction for sins, and every effort that can be devised by man, will desert thee at thy need, and will make thee more miserable than ever, if thou forgettest this Divine truth, and puffest thyself up in such things as these. For whatever work is wrought apart from faith in the truth of God is vanity and vexation of spirit."¹

This might seem to open the door to Antinomianism. But Luther would maintain that instead of taking morals out of religion, he had given them their true place within religion. They are not a means of grace, but a consequence of grace. "Good works do not make a good man, but a good man does good works."² The servile theory of reward and punishment should be banished from ethics. The Christian virtues are a free service lovingly rendered to God. "Here is the truly Christian life, here is faith really working by love, when a man applies himself with joy and love to the works of that freest servitude in which he serves others voluntarily for nought, himself abundantly satisfied in the fulness and richness of his own faith."³ Similarly in Calvin, he who knows God "restrains himself from sin, not merely from a dread of vengeance, but because he loves and reveres God as his Father, honours and worships Him as his

¹ Luther, *Christian Liberty*, p. 343.

² *Ib.*, p. 275.

³ Luther, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

Lord, and, even though there were no hell, would shudder at the thought of offending Him."¹

Here the ethical consciousness has regained its freedom from the bondage of a system of rewards and punishments. Yet the union of the ethical and religious is even more completely undone. It is one thing to point out that virtue ceases to be virtue when it asks for a reward. It is quite another to relegate the whole question of character and conduct to the second place. From this criticism the Counter-Reformation escaped by attempting an elaborate and extremely subtle reconciliation of faith and works, divine grace and the responsibility of the human will. Justification, the Council lays down, is by Christ alone, but only for those to whom the merit of his passion is communicated. The first step in this communication begins "A Dei per Christum Jesum præveniente gratia," by which people are called by no previously existing merits of their own to their own justification. But they must assent and freely co-operate with the grace of God, so that man is not inactive and yet could not move towards justification without God's grace. Faith is the beginning of salvation, but faith without works is dead, and neither faith nor works merit justification, nor could they confer it but for the grace of God. Grace is lost by any mortal sin, but those who fall away may be restored by aid of the Sacrament of penance.

The Council proceeds to pronounce thirty-three anathemas on any one who falls away from this narrow plank of truth whether to the right or to the left. It curses—to confine ourselves to the most important points—any one who shall maintain :—

¹ Calvin, vol. i., p. 37 ; cf. vol. ii., p. 52, on Christian liberty. Calvin explicitly rejects the contention that the works excluded from the scheme of justification are merely the ceremonial works of the law. Moral works go with them (vol. i., p. 595). All our best actions judged by their intrinsic merit are already defiled and polluted (p. 603), we have therefore merely to humble ourselves and submit to the Divine mercy (p. 604), and our hope must be founded, not on our own regeneration, which is always imperfect, but on our being engrafted into the body of Christ and so gratuitously accounted righteous (pp. 610-11). Humility is here carried out consistently, but at the cost in the end of throwing an arbitrary choice on the Deity.

It is important that in Calvin, regeneration does not complete itself at a stroke. Its end is the restoration of the Divine image within us, which is not accomplished in a day, but by continual and sometimes tardy advances. A fraction of evil still remains within us which produces irregular desires alluring us to sin (vol. i., p. 479).

(Clauses 1, 2, 3) That man can be justified by works, or by any effort of his own will, without grace. (4) That human will cannot co-operate or decline co-operation with the Divine Spirit, "sed veluti inanime quoddam nihil agere." (5 and 6) That there is no free will, but that God produces evil as well as good, "non permissive solum sed etiam proprie." (7) That all works before justification are sins. (8) That the fear of hell which restrains from sins, is a sin. (9) That justification is by faith alone. (11) That it is by remission of sins without grace and charity. (12) That justifying faith is nothing but trust in the Divine mercy. (13) That personal belief in our own salvation is necessary. (17) That grace is for those predestined to life only while others are called but do not receive grace "ut pote divina potestate prædestinatos ad malum." (18) That God's commandments are impossible even for the justified. (19) That there is no gospel precept except faith. (20) That the justified is bound not to obedience to the commands of God and the Church but only to belief. (23) That man once justified cannot sin. (24) That works do not increase justification. (25 and 26) That the just earns no merit by good works. (27) That there is no mortal sin except unbelief. (28) That through sin faith is lost along with grace. (29) That the lapsed after baptism cannot recover grace without penance. (30) That the penitent sinner may escape temporal punishment. (31) That good works done in contemplation of an eternal reward are sins. (32) That the good works of one who is justified are gifts of God in such a sense that they are not also merits of the man himself.¹

Here there is at least a stout attempt to reconcile divine grace and human responsibility, and to make morality along with belief essential to salvation. On the other hand, will is still second to grace—the prime mover—and conduct to belief—the preliminary condition, nor is the fundamental ethical point of the Reformers met, that moral service must be a service of perfect freedom.

8. Christianity, like Buddhism, has an elaborate theory of the basis of morals, and has applied it to the moral and spiritual education of man. It can teach, encourage, admonish, punish, forgive, and raise again to repentance and amendment of life. But in applying its principles to life, it has moved between two

¹ *Council of Trent, Corpus Juris, 13, 14, 15.*

poles of difficulty, which are perhaps inherent in the nature of the subject. To elaborate a system of rewards and punishments is to run the risk of degrading morals into a form of spiritual calculation. The opposite alternative of declaring that conduct follows truly and naturally from the convinced faith of a Christian tends to degrade the ethical side of religion to a secondary place. On behalf of the Protestant theory it may be urged that rewards and punishments, except in so far as they are the inherent consequences of action, belong to the legal stage of ethical development. They are necessary for the maintenance of social order, but are out of place when brought into relation to moral obligation proper, and even tend to undermine the genuine ethical conception. Thus, it may be said, Protestantism, while seeming to give a less important place to ethics, was really restoring to the moral will the "freedom"—from the bondage of external sanctions—which it had lost, and so has paved the way for a distinctly ethical view. But the truth is that neither Protestantism nor the Roman Church advanced to the ethical position that it is the good man through his goodness who is nearest to God. Too intent on the doctrine of exclusive salvation, with all that it meant for the dignity and importance of their respective churches, they readily agreed upon one point, that God was with them alone, and could see no good outside their respective bodies. And they paid the penalty of spiritual pride by marring the conception of righteousness at its source, and breaking up that union of ethics and religion which it was the special function of Monotheism to achieve and maintain. In the theories underlying both the main forms of Western Christianity that union is impaired, if not destroyed, by conceptions from which theologians have not been able to escape of the nature of God and His relation to the world and to man. Not being willing to surrender the conception of the Deity as an omnipotent Creator standing outside His world, they have been compelled under whatever disguises to impute to Him its evil along with its goodness. To explain the history of Christ they have maintained, with whatever refinements, the doctrine of transferable merit, and in magnifying faith they have made true loveliness and beauty of character secondary in God's eyes. To this extent ethical monotheism has failed in its intention.

9. With regard to the standard, as opposed to the basis of morals, all forms of monotheism have something in common. God is the Father of all. Therefore, all men are brothers, and, should be members of one Church. This potential universalism is common to Islam and Christianity, and the logic of it is so strong that it even half broke down the barriers of Jewish national exclusiveness. But in its fundamental teaching Christianity has really more affinity to Buddhism. In becoming Christian, as in becoming Buddhist, the whole moral nature of a man undergoes a change. The point of view is, as it were, reversed. The "eye of the soul" is turned in a new direction. The morals of the "natural" man, as we have seen them in development, concern the maintenance of his family, his clan, his community, his class. They are not selfish. They may impose upon him the extreme of self-denial. But they are in their most typical development the morals of the warrior—brave, loyal, proud, generous, upright, of the Greek or Roman patriot, of the modern man of honour. Sometimes they are called the morals of self-assertion. But the term is hardly just. Self-assertion was not the note of Regulus, or of the two Spartans who surrendered themselves to the Great King that they might wipe out the curse incurred by their country through its treatment of the Persian herald. It is truer to say that they are the morals of men who assert themselves, and with or through themselves their family, their caste, their country, whose very self-denial is founded on the pride of life, the honour of a name, the glory of a tradition. As against this, the Buddhist, and still more the Christian, teaching insists on a far more thorough-going self-surrender. Pride is now the deadliest of the deadly sins. Through pride the angels fell. Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings God has ordained praise. He has brought down the mighty from their seat and exalted the humble and meek. He has made the foolish things of this world to confound the wise. His own Son is despised and rejected of men, and His followers rejoice, and are exceeding glad, when men persecute and revile them and say all manner of evil things against them for His sake. They give up the world, they put away the joy and pride of living. They lose their own life, and in losing they find it. They must

sacrifice, not merely, as the older ethics taught them, life and home and rank and fortune for their country's good, but the very pride of race or family on which that sacrifice was based, the very idea of worldly greatness to achieve which for their city seemed the noblest duty of man. The soul must not merely sacrifice, it must surrender itself, abandon its pride, break down its barriers, and, in meekness, learn its duty. But, here the moral paradox begins, in this weakness lies its strength. Lao Tze had already taught that as water wears away the rock, so the weakest things of this world overcome the strong. This total self-surrender to the eternal truth means a complete spiritual victory over the lords of time. The meek shall inherit the earth, not merely the heavens. Because they have humbled themselves beyond all others they are set above all others. They overcome hatred with love. They conquer by refusing to resist, and meet assault by turning the other cheek to the smiter. And beneath this yielding softness of exterior they reveal when the right season comes a firmness which is harder than adamant.

In the old moral order men could, with a clear conscience, be equally good haters and good lovers. It was said to them of old time, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy." But the code of self-surrender has no room for hate. Hatred is assertion, and its exercise manifests the fallacy of assertion, for its open expression is the blood feud which never ends, but remains an open wound in the vitals of society. Morally regarded, revenge is a matter of physical strength and a poor satisfaction at best. There is a nobler way of dealing with an enemy which conquers him far more effectually. "Hatred," Buddha taught, "does not cease by hatred but by love." If you are in the wrong, it is for you to make amends, If it were he, then pity him for that he is wandering in error and blind to the truth. No doubt wrong-doing must carry its punishment. But it is not for finite intelligence to measure the guilt and assign the due penalty upon another man. "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord." As for us, the best of us are sinners infinitely far from the Divine perfection and needing infinite mercy for ourselves. If we judge others, shall not we ourselves be judged? And if neither personal antagon-

isms nor moral differences are to interfere with love, still less can the barriers of class, and race, and sex be allowed to stand. We are all alike members one of another, sons of God, brothers and sisters upon earth and co-heirs of the kingdom of heaven. Among us there can be no difference of Jew or Gentile, bond or free, noble or lowly. He is most noble who the lowliest duties on himself doth lay. The fallen woman becomes a saint and the crucified thief is the first to sup with the Saviour in Paradise. The kingdom of God is not peopled by those who have proved themselves the strongest on this earth. To their Father the fate of the weakest and most despised is of no less moment than that of those who have many talents entrusted to them. The principle of Comprehensiveness—against the more exclusive view of earlier morals—is here pushed to its furthest point. Here, at least, Christian ethics at their best have been determined and consistent, and here in this resolute recognition of weakness has been their strength.¹

10. Love, universal benevolence, forgiveness, humility, meekness, combined with the extreme of resolute endurance for conscience' sake—such are the necessary outcome of that emptying of self which Buddhism and Christianity alike demanded. In them the spiritual order formed for itself a new sphere detached from the more elementary morals of the ordinary good citizen. In this detachment, however, were seeds of trouble. We have already seen that the Buddhist life could hardly be lived in its perfection by the ordinary householder. The spiritual and the

¹ Any one who will compare St. Paul's description of Charity, in which term the whole of the distinctively Christian ethics is summed up, with the Buddhist description of the true Brahmana, with the description of the Highminded or Great Souled man in the *Éthics* (bk. iv.), and of the Superior man in scattered passages of the *Confucian Analects* (see below, Ch. V.), will form an idea of the relation of Christianity to other ethical systems. I take the description of the Great Souled man as typical of ordinary Greek thought, of the pagan "pride of life." The Great Souled man "deems himself worthy of great things, being in reality worthy of them." There is an honesty in his attitude to himself which is by no means to be confused with arrogance—a "proper pride" which is the alternative to the Christian humility. But for passages typical of Greek philosophy as opposed to pre-philosophic thought we must look elsewhere, e. g. in Aristotle himself to the description of the philosophic life (bk. x), to Plato's description of the just man, and to that of the wise man in Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius.

human had already fallen apart. In Christianity the fissure is in some respects deeper. It is in monotheism that there first arises a clear distinction between the natural and the supernatural. In the earlier phases of religion the intervention of gods and spirits was a matter of course, a thing of every-day life. But in proportion as the one God absorbs all power into Himself, the course of the world comes to be thought of as running smoothly and continuously in the line which He has laid down for it, and His direct interference with its orderly movements becomes something marked and exceptional, reserved for great occasions or for the special prayers of the faithful. Thus a well-marked antithesis arises between "nature" conceived as the ordinary course of events, and the "supernatural" conceived as that which belongs directly to the sphere of God. This antithesis dominates Christian teaching from first to last, and has a profound influence upon ethics. For in proportion as nature is separated from God, that which pertains to nature is set in antithesis to that which belongs to God, and is apt accordingly to partake of the character of sin. The great institutions of humanity, marriage, fatherhood, citizenship, are things of this world. The Christian must make his account with them, but they are not of Christian origin. He is to honour the king, because he is not to concern himself with worldly revolutions. The powers that be are ordained of God, but merely to regulate the secondary and profane affairs of this life. Christ's true kingdom is not of this world. It may be necessary for the Church in the end to come out into the world and regulate the affairs of men, for the universal benevolence taught us by Christ forbids us to be indifferent to the happiness or misery of our brother-men, and, above all, we can in no way afford to neglect their spiritual interests, to which state-laws ought in future to accommodate themselves. But the emergence of the Church into affairs of this world is like the descent of Plato's philosopher into the cave. The true saint finds no joy in it. His life is not there, but hid with Christ in God. And if in the end the Church became too much a thing of this world and allowed itself to be by the world corrupted, that is but the other side of the same shield. The detachment of what was best in Christianity from the world's affairs made a Christian

body unfit to rule the world's affairs. Christianity has, in fact, no theory of society by which to guide itself. Its doctrine is personal. The common life that it contemplates is a life of brotherly love, a community of saints, where all things are in common and lawsuits are not, nor any other mode of maintaining order by the strong arm. Hence, amid all the wonderful descriptions of charity, of love, of self-surrender, we hear very little of justice. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? What need of justice when love readily yields up all? Why talk of a fair division to one who, if his cloak be taken, will make that a ground for giving up his garment? What need for equal rights among men who claim nothing for themselves and yield all they have to all who want?

11. The code of the Sermon on the Mount appears to contemplate what in modern phrase we should call a voluntarist or Anarchist community. Non-resistance is its central feature. There is to be no fighting, no revenge, no lawsuits, no oaths, no self-defence, no insistence on private property, no excessive provision for the future. If there is to be any marrying or giving in marriage at all, there is to be no divorcing of wives "save for the cause of fornication." There is to be unbounded charity without display. Altogether a life that might be lived for a while by a picked brotherhood of perfect men and women.¹ How were these rules to be made applicable to a world in which men and women are so far from perfect? In regard to the general principle that law and government are necessities of human existence, the Church was helped by those passages of the Scriptures prescribing obedience to constituted authority. These sufficed as long as Christianity was the religion of a persecuted sect, but when it became the official creed of the empire a further step was necessary, and means had to be found of justifying believers in acting as judges and in executing the law upon criminals. This was done by drawing a distinction between the man and his office.² Even the judicial act of

¹ In fact, the Christian life, far from being a scheme of permanent social regeneration, was originally conceived as preparatory to an imminent millennium. There is here an important point of difference between the primitive Christian commonwealth and the Buddhist order.

² Augustine, Epis. 154, adopted by Gratian, *Corpus Juris*, p. 932; cf. 924,

torture was but faintly reprobated or even justified by the Fathers.¹ The only serious doubt was as to capital punishment. This was so genuine that Augustine begs Count Marcellinus in punishing certain Donatists who had murdered a Catholic priest to avoid inflicting either death or mutilation.² For a long period Christian clerks refused to enter death sentences in so many words, and at certain periods, *e.g.* in England under the Conqueror, death sentences were wholly suspended for a time under the influence of the Church.³ In general, punishment was to be limited by charity, and not to be embittered by the spirit of vengeance. The reproof administered to the apostles for wishing to call fire down upon the Samaritans was a warning against vindictiveness. Injuries to self should not be punished, but only those against God or our neighbour. Punishment is like a medicine, and the precept that we should love our enemies does not mean that we should relax censure, or, if in the end it is required, punishment, but that we should so carry out punishments as to reform the criminal and console the penitent.⁴ These were excellent precepts, though they bore singularly little fruit, and for fifteen centuries the criminal codes of most Christian nations remained a standing reproach to civilization.

Recognizing the authority of the law and the courts, the church was also compelled to admit the oath. It should be taken not lightly, but when civil necessities so required.⁵

“Non imputatur fidelibus qui ex officio aut tormenta exercent aut capitalem sententiam ferunt”; and see letter of Pope Innocent there quoted. Cf. Jerome *super Hierem.*, vol. iv., p. 23 (Gratian, p. 939). “Homicidas et sacrilegos et venenarios punire non est effusio sanguinis sed legum ministerium.” Cf. Gratian, 896, quoting or paraphrasing (see note *ib.*) Augustine on Psalm cviii., to the effect that retaliation, though it is hardly the part of a good man to demand it, may rightly be inflicted by the judge. “Hic enim malum pro malo redderet, iudex vero non, sed delectatione justitiæ justum injusto quod est bonum pro malo,” an ingenious turning of the phrase, but surely a perversion of its original meaning.

¹ See preceding note, and *Corpus Juris*, p. 936. In Ep. 159, Augustine congratulates Marcellinus on getting at the truth without the use of any torture worse than flogging, “qui modus coercionis . . . ab ipsis parentibus adhibetur, ut sæpe etiam in judiciis ab episcopis solet haberi.” (Gratian, p. 929.)

² Ep. 159. Gratian, p. 928.

³ See Pollock and Maitland, i., 88; ii., 452.

⁴ Gratian, *Corpus Juris*, pp. 909-914. Cf. also Ambrose, Sermon viii., quoted p. 915. Mercy may be unjust. We should not give unrepentant robbers the opportunity of returning to their wickedness.

⁵ *Corpus Juris*, pp. 861-62.

It has been left to isolated sects, like the Society of Friends, to maintain the literal teaching of the Sermon on the Mount on this point. There remained the further question whether the law should be obeyed when in conflict with conscience or the dictates of religion. The powers that be are ordained of God, and that has led many devout Christians to a doctrine of passive obedience. The Canon Law, however, recognized that disobedience to secular authorities is often necessary, and if possibly it may be right "per obedientiam bonum deserere," yet it can never be lawful positively to do wrong.¹ The doctrine of non-resistance was destined to play its part as a moral support of absolutism, and it was even accepted by Calvin, though rejected with much practical effect by so many Calvinists.² It is manifestly appropriate only to a small community which desires to lead its own life in the midst of a great world that it can never hope to control. Hence its most practical exponent in the modern world has been the great writer, who, living under the shadow of a tyranny of overwhelming power, could defy all efforts to silence him, primarily because he deprecated violence and confined the efforts of himself and his school to moral protests. Yet this same teaching, effective while the tyranny was supreme, is out-of-date and mischievous from the first moment at which it is shaken.

The principle of resistance admitted in the case of resort to the machinery of law is extended to the more doubtful case of warfare. We have already traced the outline of Christian teaching on this point, and the somewhat dismal tale need not here be told again. On this side also the maintenance of the pure teaching of the Gospel has been left to small and isolated sects.

While the doctrine of non-resistance was frankly abandoned by the majority of the churches, the doctrine of communism had a somewhat different history. It is accepted in the Canons as a part of the divine law, but as abrogated by the positive

¹ Gratian, p. 671, ch. 99. Ch. 101 is more stringent, and see ch. 91 and 92. Even a bishop should not be obeyed if he should enjoin the singing of a mass for heretics (p. 669).

² *Institutes*, ii., pp. 62, 63. However, Calvin admits that God sometimes raises up a servant as an avenger. He is also of course quite clear that no behest of a magistrate that is contrary to Divine law must be obeyed. Cf. iv., ch. 20.

law of the empire.¹ Instead of communism the Church preached abundance in charity, and on this was founded the great system of poor relief which has played so large a part in the mediæval and modern world. On this side the Christian teaching, though in a modified form, was incorporated in established institutions. But still the pure teaching of the Gospel was left to a few condemned sectaries to preserve, and was put aside by respectability as being merely that which "certain Anabaptists do falsely boast." Yet the ideal has never wholly died out, and we owe to it in our own times all the zeal and energy which Christian Socialists have thrown into the movement for reforming the conditions of industrial life. Here as elsewhere it is the few who take the Gospel literally that leave their mark upon the world.

12. To attempt to trace the full influence of Christian ethics on social morality is far beyond the scope of this work. It is a question of countless actions and interactions, nor are there many questions of history in which a just verdict would be so difficult to come at. (Christianity, like other movements, in descending from the mount to the plain loses much of its purity, while in turn gaining something from the impulse of other movements and contact with a wider life. These actions and reactions make up a great part of the history of nineteen centuries, and to deal with them fairly would be a work for many volumes. We have, however, in the first part of this work, seen something of the workings of Christian teaching in various departments of law and morals, of its influence on marriage and the position of women, on criminal justice, on war, on slavery and class distinctions, on the practice of benevolence, on the idea of the State and its functions in social life. This influence is not one that can be summed up in a single word as good or bad, nor is it even always harmonious in itself. Naturally the different sects into which Christendom has been

¹ "Jure divino omnia sunt communia omnibus, jure vero constitutionis hoc meum illud alterius est." Gratian, p. 12. Cf. p. 2, where the principle is referred distinctly to "natural" law. Augustine ingeniously applies it to justify the confiscations of the property of the Donatists (p. 12, note) in favour of the Catholics. No one holds any property except by human law as interpreted by the emperor. The emperor gives and the emperor may take away. There is no trace here of that divine right of property of which modern orthodoxy sometimes speaks.

divided have at times worked in contrary directions in the ethical as in the theological sphere. If, for instance, we take the question of slavery, we should have to weigh the recognition of the institution by the early Church against the prohibition of the enslavement of Christian prisoners and the encouragement of manumission: we should have to put the sanction of negro slavery in the sixteenth century in the one scale, and all the work of the Quakers and the Evangelical churches for its abolition in the other. If we take criminal justice, we should have to allow for the spirit of clemency which arose from the sanctity attached by the early Church to human life, and equally to admit that the religious persecutions stand as instances of what human savagery, pushed to its extreme limit, can achieve. If our example were the position of women, we should have to weigh the loss of the independence and dignity enjoyed by the Roman matron and the degradation for a long period of the ideal of marriage, against a conception of the moral and religious capabilities of womanhood which paved the way, first for charity, and ultimately for justice. In these and so many other cases "Christianity" is hardly to be distinguished from the civilization of Christendom. What is done officially, whether for good or for evil, is generally done in its name, and that cause must, indeed, be desperate, which cannot find some Biblical text or patristic saying to twist to its support. It would manifestly be unscientific to attribute corruptions of this sort to Christianity as such. On the other hand, if what is bad finds support in some distortion of religious teaching, it is equally true that the churches claim credit for much that is good with which Christianity has no special connection, and the epithet Christian is freely applied to virtues and moral principles that are far older and more universal than Christianity. Lastly, when we are taking the work of special sects into account we must remember that their ideas, though they themselves might claim them as exclusively Christian, may be in greater or less degree inspired by the general culture of their age to which elements not distinctly Christian would contribute.

Probably we shall be safe in following the historian of the period during which Christianity superseded Paganism in attributing to Christian influence in the first place a heightened sense

of the sanctity of human life. We have seen this at work in the teaching of the Church as to penal law. Mr. Lecky¹ calls attention also to the prohibition of abortion and infanticide along with the growth of public provision for exposed children and for children of destitute parents.² In this relation the action of the Church was determined rather by the belief in the terrible fate awaiting unbaptized children than by humanitarian feeling in our sense of the term.³ The suppression of gladiatorial shows is a more decisive instance of the triumph of humanity, and with this we may associate the efforts, perhaps not very strenuous efforts, of the Church to suppress private fighting. For the rest, the historian lays stress on those efforts to mitigate slavery and warfare, and to extend and systematize works of charity, to which reference has been already made. Apart from these contributions to humanitarian progress the ideals of asceticism and celibacy and the establishment of indissoluble monogamous marriage (resting, however, on the free consent of both parties) were the most noteworthy contributions of organized Christianity to the ethics of the mediæval world.

If, however, we take the Christian teaching apart from all inadequacies of historical application as a statement of an ethical ideal, and seek to measure its value as an ideal, a more decisive judgment is possible. It carries one side of ethics to the highest possible pitch of perfection, but it leaves another side comparatively neglected. The conception of a brotherhood of love based on the negation of self is demonstrably inadequate to the problem of reorganizing society and intelligently directing human efforts. Even on the personal side it is deficient, for human progress depends on the growth and perfecting of faculty, and therefore requires that provision be made for a self-development which is not selfishness, but builds up a better personality on a basis of self-repression. Equally on the social side the ideal of loving self-surrender is beautiful, but not always right. Utter self-sacrifice is magnificent, but it is not justice, and justice and reciprocity are even more essential

¹ *European Morals*, vol. ii., p. 20.

² *Ib.*, p. 30. Constantine's law, however, provided for the enslavement of the exposed child to its protector. That was repealed for the Eastern empire by Justinian.

³ Hence in particular the condemnation of abortion. Lecky, vol. ii., p. 23.

elements in any commonwealth that can survive and include average humanity within it than the readiness to resign all for the sake of others—a willingness which can hardly be made a universal rule without bringing action to a standstill. Nor does true love mean brotherly kindness and a diffused benevolence alone, but legitimately includes the whole gamut of human passions—if the lust of the eye be excepted—and a working ethical system must not suppress but provide a place for these. Applying these considerations we can see that spiritual religion, though it recognizes personality, fails to give it full scope in all its legitimate developments. It exalts the common life, but pays little attention to the actual conditions of any social structure. It inculcates duties, but overlooks rights—a factor scarcely less essential to social progress. Finally, having found its ideal in the heavens, and invested it with supernatural authority, it leaves it to the priesthood to bring down to earth, by that method of exegesis which tends too often to practise men in the art of asserting principles without meaning them, and accepting ideals with readiness because they know how to escape the practical difficulties of their application. Self-suppression, universal brotherhood, the conquest of strength by silent endurance, these remain ideals of conduct for which every rational system of ethics must find a place, but they are not the whole of social morality, and some of them are even capable of being pressed to the point of danger. It is not merely that, humanity being what it is, the life of the Gospel could only be lived by a select community of saints. There is another side to the question. The opposition of the natural to the supernatural degrades the ordinary life of men. What is of this world belongs to the flesh, and what belongs to the flesh is of the nature of sin. In the pursuit of an ideal which few or none can realize, the element of the divine which lies in our ordinary human nature is overlooked, or rather it is denied. That the love of man and woman, of parent and child, may be a passion which can on occasion raise the most ordinary and least saint-like among us to heights of self-negation which no ascetic can surpass, is a truth to which common experience testifies. Yet supernaturalism which could paint the mystic love of the cloistered enthusiast could only conceive of sexual love as a bondage of

the flesh.¹ This utter misconception of one side of human nature is only an extreme case of a general tendency. Supernatural ethics fail in that they do not recognize the ideal element in the performance of natural duty. Love of country, loyalty to comrades, devotion to truth and justice, all serve earthly and temporal ends, but are in themselves to be reckoned among the spiritual forces that guide and inspire mankind. With this interpretation of the spiritual, supernaturalism is not contented. Its service must be consciously dedicated to the glory of God. It must eliminate the passions which retain in them anything of an earthly element. It must cut the ties that bind us to this world and extirpate at the root the deadly passions that drag us into mortal sin. Hence it demands a life separated from the world, which mixes with the world from benevolence alone, but for its own part is dead to this natural existence and lives only for Christ.

Fortunately for the Western world supernaturalism¹ was but one side of Christianity. Christ Himself was no anchorite, and His teaching, if exacting, was also tender. There have never been wanting individuals to show the world that it was possible to follow in his steps, and live externally the ordinary life of a commonplace citizen while their souls within them are filled with their Master's teaching and overflowed in charity to all mankind. It is here in the simple personal following of Christ that the strength of Christianity will always lie—not in the mazes of dogmatic theology, not in the spiritual machinery for drawing souls to God, not in the teaching of the churches, not in the pomp of ceremonial, not in the fervour of the preacher, not even in the enthusiasm of the mystic who dreams of his oneness with God—not in these does Christ live, but first in the few who live as he did, shedding the light of peace around them, and next in the wider circle of those who, dwelling on the borderland dim betwixt vice and virtue, or in the twilight of conventional ideas, are irradiated now and then by a gleam from the true meaning of words with which they have been all their lives familiar, and for a while see themselves as they are and respond with some effort, however faint and short, towards the truth of things.

¹ For the revolting conception of womanhood held by many of the Saints, see Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. ii., pp. 116, seq.

CHAPTER V

ETHICAL IDEALISM

1. THE preceding chapters have illustrated the close connection between ethical and religious ideas. We have in fact seen ethics upon the whole in a position of dependence and subordination. But we have now to deal with more independent forms of ethical thinking. In barbaric society, indeed, reflection of this kind occupies no very important place; it hardly goes beyond some of those proverbial maxims of conduct which form the simple, worldly wisdom of uncultivated peoples all the world over. In the early civilizations we find this proverbial philosophy acquiring a somewhat fuller development as exemplified in the seven sages of ancient Greece and the gnomic poetry which belongs to the same period. We have already mentioned certain regular treatises on practical morals which are a feature of ancient Egyptian literature. Writings of this kind are not without their value for the historical student, precisely because they do little more than formulate the current ideas of the age to which they belong. Indeed, the whole race of proverbial moralists through the four thousand years that separate Ptah Hotep and Martin Tupper are apt to degenerate into platitudinists. They utter irreproachable sentiments—sentiments at least irreproachable according to the standard of their own times—but we can hardly think that even in their own day men rose from the perusal of them with any deep feeling of gratitude for heightened insight into the laws of conduct or the relations of man to man. In them the ethical ideal is not yet born; they take the traditional morality and formulate it into neat and general statements.

It is far otherwise with the class of thinkers with whom we have now to deal. We have seen in the history of religion a stage at which the divine (which at first is lower, and for long ages is at least no higher, than the human) becomes idealized, and there arises a conception of a spiritual being which is an embodiment of all that man can dream of perfection. This is one way in which an ideal dawns upon humanity. The other way is through reflection upon life and man's place in it, upon human nature and its potentialities, upon human action and its ends. Following this road thought proceeds by the deliberate examination of human experience, and seeks thereby to determine where man's true purpose lies. By this method, with little or no reference to supernatural sanctions or even to divine commands, it may make for itself an ideal of conduct, to which it calls man to conform simply because such conduct is best for himself and for humanity. In such a method we have the beginning of an ethical system conceived as the basis of a conscious ordering of human life by the deliberate efforts of the best and wisest members of the human race; and we have now to trace briefly the development of this ideal, and to indicate the phases which it has assumed and the function which it has performed in different civilizations.

2. Between the sixth and the fourth centuries before Christ schools of thought following this method arose in two distant parts of the world—in China and in Greece. The Chinese thinkers founded a great system which from that day to this, in spite of the efforts of the reactionary dynasty which destroyed the classical books and prohibited their teaching, has guided the destiny of what was, down almost to our own times, by far the greatest empire of the world in point of population. It has supplied the rule of life for the governing classes and maintained the essence of Chinese culture intact through, and in spite of, successive irruptions of semi-barbarous conquerors; and may thus, so far as its practical influence is concerned, fairly claim respect as one of the greatest and most influential doctrines of ethical conduct which the world has known. What, then, were the leading doctrines of the founder of this influential school?

The first principle of an ethical idealism, which is to rise

above the common morality of custom and to depend on its own excellence rather than upon any religious sanction to recommend it to mankind, must from the nature of the case lay down that for the individual virtue is its own reward. It is this which distinguishes the ethical from the supernatural view of morals on the one hand and the materialistic or prudential on the other. This principle is constantly insisted upon by Confucius: "I have not seen a person who loved virtue or one who hated what is not virtuous. He who loved virtue would esteem nothing above it; he who hated what is not virtuous would practise virtue in such a way that he would not allow anything that was not virtuous to approach his person."¹ The sage whose conscience is clear and who knows that his dealings are upright can fear no punishment from the powers of this world. "Heaven has produced the virtue that is in me. Hwan-T'uy—what can he do to me?"² And again—"The determined scholar and the master of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue complete."³ Every man is master of himself, and thus, as the Western Stoic taught, has a sovereignty which no one but himself can take from him. "The commander of the forces of a large state may be carried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him."⁴ The sage is not made of adamant nor is he wholly unaffected by fortune and misfortune, but he shows his strength by rising superior to calamity. "With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow, I still have joy in the midst of these things."⁵ Even the desire of posthumous fame must be banished from the mind. It is true that by a very human weakness the superior man dislikes the thought of his name not being mentioned after his death,⁶ but this motive is rejected as unworthy. "To live in obscurity and yet practise wonders in order to be mentioned with honour in future ages, this is what I do not do."⁷ Nor is there any hint of a divine reward. The current doctrine of universal animism is not indeed explicitly rejected by Confucius, but he nowhere

¹ Legge, *Confucian Analects*, bk. iv., ch. 6, sec. 1. ² *Ib.* vii. 22.

³ *Ib.* xv., ch. 8. ⁴ *Ib.*, bk. ix., ch. 25. ⁵ *Ib.*, bk. vii., ch. 15.

⁶ *Ib.*, bk. xv., ch. 19. ⁷ *The Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 11.

appeals to the benefits to be gained from the cult of spiritual beings, but, on the contrary, warns his followers to have as little to do with them as possible, and devote themselves instead to their duty towards their neighbours. "To give oneself earnestly to the duties due to men and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom."¹ Nor does Confucius encourage thinking about the future life. Ke Loo asked about serving the spirits of the dead. The Master said, "While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?" Ke Loo added, "I venture to ask about death." He was answered, "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?"² Only the consciousness that the Supreme spiritual being who inhabits Heaven knows him through and through remains a consolation. "Alas! there is no one that knows me. . . . But there is Heaven;—that knows me."³ And the appointment of Heaven is frequently recognized and used as a ground for ignoring the littleness of men and the obstinacy of rulers. "If my principles are to advance, it is so ordered. If they are to fall to the ground, it is so ordered. What can the Kung-pih-Leaou do, where such ordering is concerned?"⁴ Fortified by the favour of Heaven, the superior man rises above all ordinary human weaknesses and is completely master of himself. "The way of the superior man is threefold . . . Virtuous, he is free from anxieties; wise, he is free from perplexities; bold, he is free from fear."⁵ Upon the whole, Stoicism itself has hardly drawn a bolder picture of the self-poised, self-mastering personality, lord of his own bosom and therefore of all things that affect him. But as with Stoicism, so with Confucius this self-mastery is founded upon nature, and manifests itself in conformity to the rules of social life, in the execution of justice and the practice of benevolence. "The doctrine of our master," said Tsang, "is to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others—this, and nothing more."⁶ Similarly, the Master said, "Man is born to uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness and yet live, his escape from death is the effect of mere good fortune."⁷ This nature is

¹ *Analects*, bk. vi., ch. 20.

³ *Ib.* xiv., ch. 37.

⁵ *Ib.*, bk. iv., ch. 15.

⁴ *Ib.* xiv., ch. 38.

² *Ib.*, bk. xi., ch. 11.

⁶ *Ib.* xiv., ch. 30.

⁷ *Ib.*, bk. vi., ch. 17.

conceived as common to all men, the differences that arise being due to their own conduct. "By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart."¹ Nor is virtue to be found in deserting the common life and going out into the wilderness to seek for occasions on which to manifest one's superiority. "The path is not far from man. When men try to pursue a course which is far from the common indications of conscience, this course cannot be considered The Path."² But instruction is often essential. Knowledge of duties may be inborn, acquired by study, or after a painful feeling of ignorance. They may come with natural ease, from a desire for their advantages, or by strenuous effort.³ The only distinctions which the teacher claims for himself are, first, that his efforts towards perfect virtue, though never successful, are constant and unceasing—the Master does not rank himself with the sage and the man of perfect virtue, but strives without satiety to become such⁴—secondly, that he passes his life in learning. "In a hamlet of ten families there may be found one honourable and sincere as I am, but not so fond of learning."⁵ That is to say, the fundamental moral qualities are widely diffused, but not the intellectual attainments which direct them. On the other hand, mere customary morality is sweepingly condemned, and here breathes the true spirit of ethical idealism. "Your good, careful people of the villages are the thieves of virtue"⁶—a text which is ably commented upon by the greatest of Confucians:—

"Wan Chang said, 'Their whole village styles those men good and careful. In all their conduct they are so. How was it that Confucius considered them the thieves of virtue?'

"Mencius replied, 'If you would blame them, you find nothing to allege. If you would criticize them, you have nothing to criticize. They agree with the current customs. They consent with an impure age. Their principles have a semblance of right-heartedness and truth. Their conduct has a semblance of disinterestedness and purity. All men are pleased with them, and they think themselves right, so that it is impossible to proceed with them to the principles

¹ *Analects*, bk. xvii., ch. 2.

² *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 13, sec. 1.

³ *Ib.*, ch. 20, sec. 9.

⁴ *Analects*, bk. vii., ch. 32 and 33.

⁵ *Ib.*, bk. v., ch. 27.

⁶ *Ib.*, bk. xvii., ch. 13.

of Yao and Shun. On this account they are called "The thieves of virtue."

"Confucius said, 'I hate a semblance which is not the reality. I hate the darnel, lest it be confounded with the corn. I hate glib-tonguedness, lest it be confounded with righteousness. I hate sharpness of tongue, lest it be confounded with sincerity. I hate the music of Ch'ing, lest it be confounded with the true music. I hate the reddish-blue, lest it be confounded with vermilion. I hate your good, careful men of the villages, lest they be confounded with the truly virtuous.'"¹

The basis of morals, then, is the intrinsic desirability of a great ideal which accords with the true principles of man's nature when brought to their due development by proper education. To such an ideal man must hold fast in spite of all that fortune or his fellow-men can do to him, and that will be best for him in that he so remains lord of himself. In so doing he keeps the appointment of Heaven, yet his reward is nothing external to the act itself, but consists merely in the high desirability of the life lived in accordance with the best principles that are in one.

3. In what outward conduct does this ideal show itself? Generally speaking, in the conduct of the good citizen, the dutiful son, the kindly neighbour and, in particular, the upright official who would resist to the death the corrupt tyrant. Uprightness and benevolence are the two master-words. Confucius accepted and re-constituted the traditional standard of Chinese ethics with its closely-linked family ties and its patriarchal relations of ruler and subject. He calls himself a transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the Ancients.² Hence he insists repeatedly upon a conception of filial devotion which to the Western mind appears exaggerated. He finds the standard of conduct frequently in those rules of propriety which belong to ancient tradition, and prescribe the requisite term of mourning for the cult of the dead, the due order of precedence among relations, a ceremonial etiquette as between the prince and his officers, and so forth. In the Book of Rites he is, generally speaking, moderate and reasonable in his interpretation of

¹ Mencius, bk. vii., pt. ii. ch. 37, secs. 10, 11, 12.

² *Analects*, vii., ch. i.

customary rules ;¹ but, considering the incubus which the cult of the dead has imposed upon industrial life in China, it is to be regretted that he did not apply himself more resolutely to inquiring into the grounds of custom, and teaching men that its authority rests only upon its value in the social life of mankind. He is very clear that the requirements of virtue are not satisfied by mere outward conformity. In mourning, for instance, the feeling of grief was a far more essential matter than the form in which it was expressed,² and again, outward conformity to law may be secured by punishment, but this is not a moral education of the people, but, on the contrary, a corrupt influence. "If the people be led by laws and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment but have no sense of shame ; if they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good."³

Confucius therefore held by tradition, and advanced no reasoned theory of the rules of conduct. Yet certain fundamentals appear. Virtue must come from the good will. While the "rules of propriety" generally supply the detail, the broad principles of conduct are those which follow from the conception of oneself as the servant of mankind, and of social happiness as the supreme end of endeavour for the individual. For example we are told that Tsze-ch'an had four of the characteristics of the superior man ; "in his conduct of himself he was humble, in serving his superiors he was respectful, in nourishing the people he was kind, in ordering the people he was just."⁴ Again, perfect virtue is "when you go abroad to behave to every one as if you were receiving a great guest ; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice ; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself ; to have no murmuring against you in the country and none in the family."⁵ The virtues of the sage are acquired for the happiness of the world at large. "Tsze-loo asked what constituted the superior man." The Master said, "The cultivation of himself in reverential carefulness." "And is this all ?" said Tsze-loo. "He cultivates

¹ De Groot, ii., 662, etc.

³ *Ib.*, ii., ch. 3.

⁶ *Ib.*, bk. xii., ch. 2.

² *Analects*, bk. iii., ch. 4.

⁴ *Ib.* v. ch. 15.

himself so as to give rest to others." . . . "Is this all?" asked Tsze-loo. The Master said, "He cultivates himself so as to give rest to all the people."¹ In the practice of benevolence the family relations come first. Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity and the great exercise of it is in loving relations. Righteousness is the acting in accordance with what is right and the great exercise of it is in honouring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives and the steps in the honour due to the worthy are produced by the principles of propriety.² Indeed, Confucius's simple and somewhat elementary political philosophy rests on his conception of the family as the type and exemplar of the State. "There is filial piety, therewith the sovereign should be served; there is fraternal submission, therewith the elders and superiors should be served; there is kindness, therewith the multitude should be treated."³ Thus, the Confucian rule of benevolence is not a mere abstract principle, but one regulated in its application by well-understood duties depending on a man's position in his family or in the State. It is moreover always conceived in close connection with justice. The "golden rule" to treat others as we would have them treat us, which Confucius was the first to formulate, is as much a matter of justice as of benevolence. It is a rule of impartiality as between self and others. Tsze-kung asked, "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" The Master said, "Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others."⁴ Benevolence, indeed, should be universal,⁵ but there must be a rule of justice in applying it. We should forgive injuries, but we should not push that principle to the point of treating the evil and the good alike. The philosopher Lao-tsze had urged that instead of returning evil for evil we should recompense evil with kindness. Being asked what he thought of this principle, the Master said, "With what, then, will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice and recompense kindness with kindness."⁶ But this is not to be

¹ *Analects*, bk. xiv., ch. 45.

² *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 20, sec. 5.

³ *The Great Learning*, ch. 9.

⁵ *Ib.*, bk. xii., ch. 22.

⁴ *Analects*, bk. xv., ch. 23.

⁶ *Ib.*, bk. xiv., ch. 36.

taken as justifying vengeance. "To show forbearance and gentleness in teaching others and not to revenge unreasonable conduct, this is the forcefulness of Southern regions and the good man makes it his study."¹

Such then, in brief, is the code of private life. To live in the service of mankind, to respect parents and superiors, to be kind and helpful to those in need, to have no enemies, to forbear with the offender and forgive him within the limits of justice, to be prepared to love all men, to hate only those who slander others and thrust themselves forward against all social tradition,² to serve a good ruler but withstand him to his face if he is bad, to undergo privation and, if necessary, death for a moral principle, to be grieved and feel pity for the criminal instead of triumphing over him,³ not to withdraw from the world, to realize that man's life is to be lived in the midst of humanity whatever the difficulties and drawbacks may be, and in all these things to recognize that the beginning and the end is sincerity—such is the ideal of personal conduct that Confucius taught to China.

The ideal of public conduct is like unto it. In fact, throughout Confucius is talking with officials, addressing men who hold office and who are concerned with the problems of conscience arising in connection with the tenure of office, with the duties of the King and the relation of King and officer. Throughout he insists upon the duty of prince to people. The relationship should be that of father to children. The first duty of the prince is to order his own conduct aright, and to show in his own household those principles of family life upon which the structure of Chinese society was held to depend; from his example outwards the influence would radiate. When Ke-K'ang asked about government Confucius replied, "To govern means to rectify. If you lead on the people with correctness who will dare not to be correct?"⁴ And when Ke-K'ang was distressed by the number of thieves, Confucius replied with much directness, "If you, Sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it they would not

¹ *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 10.

² *Ib.*, bk. xix., ch. 19.

³ *Analects*, bk. xii., ch. 17.

⁴ *Analects*, bk. xvii., ch. 24.

⁵ *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 25.

steal”¹ The people are by nature disposed to virtue; they break out into mutiny only in times of distress. The duty of the prince is to keep down taxation, avoid harsh punishments and excessive forced labour.² When the people are numerous what next is to be done for them? The answer is, “Enrich them.” “And when they have been enriched?” “Teach them.”³ The virtuous and wise prince is able to dispense with punishment. “Sir, in carrying on your government why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good and the people will be good. . . . The grass must bend when the wind blows over it.”⁴ A succession of good governors lasting over a century would be able to transform the violently bad and dispense with capital punishment.⁵ In accordance with the doctrine of universal benevolence the people are the first object in the State. The King is their servant, and that sovereign is most praised who takes upon himself the sins of the people and is responsible for them to Heaven.⁶ We have here, in short, a theory of conduct which is at the same time a theory of society, elementary no doubt, especially in its political aspect, yet the foundation of that cultivated class which has for two thousand years governed China and kept Chinese civilization erect through all its vicissitudes.

4. The teaching of Confucius was further developed by the greatest disciple of his school, the philosopher Mencius (B.C. 371-288). Mencius made no entirely new departure, but put the moral theory of Confucius in a more systematic form, stated many of the Master’s fundamental positions with a vigour and incisiveness that were entirely his own, and laid special stress on certain sides of political morality, such as the inherent wickedness of militarism, and the right of rebellion against a vicious sovereign. With him again virtue is the supreme end of life. Perfect uprightness alone casteth out fear. He attributes to “the Master” a saying, “If on self-examination I find that I am not upright, shall I not be in fear even of a poor man in his loose garments of hair-cloth? If on self-

¹ *Analects*, bk. xii., ch. 18.

² *Analects*, bk. xiii., ch. 9.

³ *Ib.*, bk. xiii., ch. 11.

⁴ Cf. *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. xx., 14.

⁵ *Ib.*, bk. xii., ch. 19.

⁶ *Ib.*, bk. xx., ch. 1, sec. 3.

examination I find that I am upright, I will go forward against thousands and tens of thousands."¹ He who knows his own nature, knows Heaven, and "to preserve one's mental constitution and nourish one's nature is the way to serve Heaven."² Heaven has its appointments which we should accept instinctively, but this is not to lead us into fatalism.

"He who has the true idea of what is Heaven's appointment will not stand beneath a precipitous wall.

"Death sustained in the discharge of one's duties may correctly be ascribed to the appointment of Heaven.

"Death under handcuffs and fetters cannot correctly be so ascribed."³

The other elements of happiness depend on virtue. Being asked by King Hwuy whether wise and good princes find pleasure in geese and deer, Mencius replied, "Being wise and good they have pleasure in these things. If they are not wise and good, though they have these things, they do not find pleasure."⁴

"To dwell in the wide house of the world, to stand in the correct seat of the world, and to walk in the great path of the world; when he obtains his desire for office, to practise his principles for the good of the people; and when that desire is disappointed, to practise them alone; to be above the power of riches and honours to make dissipated, of poverty and mean condition to make swerve from principle, and of power and force to make bend,"⁵ such in a few words are the life and character of the great man. His principles allow of no compromise. "Never has a man who has bent himself been able to make others straight."⁶

5. Man must be lord of himself. But in the pursuit of virtue he is doing no violence to himself. He is merely fulfilling, bringing to the perfection of development the seeds of good implanted in him by nature. Here the teaching of Mencius is more distinct than that of his master, and contains the germs of a scientific theory of moral psychology. The foundation of virtue is in the "passion-nature" which occupies a position in the soul some-

¹ Mencius, bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 2, sec. 7.

² *Ib.*, bk. vii., pt. i., ch. 1.

³ *Ib.*, bk. vii., pt. i., ch. 2.

⁴ *Ib.*, bk. i., pt. i., ch. 2, sec. 2.

⁵ *Ib.*, bk. iii., pt. ii., ch. 2, sec. 3.

⁶ *Ib.*, bk. iii., pt. ii., ch. 1, sec. 5.

what analogous to that of the *θυμοειδής* in Plato's scheme. The "passion-nature" needs guidance and its natural leader is the will,¹ directed as we collect from other passages by education and the "rules of propriety." But this will must lead and not force, just as the ruler should not subdue men by violence but win their hearts by virtue. Or, in a different metaphor, the "passion-nature" must be weeded, not pulled up.² For the feelings are the foundation of the virtues. "The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of propriety. The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of knowledge. Men have these four principles as they have their four limbs," and those who say they cannot develop them play the thief with themselves.³ "All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others."⁴ "Even nowadays," if we saw a child about to fall into a well, we should experience alarm and distress, not from any desire for the favour of its parents, nor from any love of praise, but because commiseration is essential to man.⁵ Only as we saw above⁶ in the story of King Seuen, it is the misery that we see that affects us, and our imaginations are not vivid enough to make us feel the pain that we do not see. What is needed is development of the good material that is in man. Let the four principles "have their complete development and they will suffice to love and protect all within the four seas. Let them be denied that development and they will not suffice for a man to serve his parents with."⁷ These principles are not infused into us from

¹ Mencius, bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 2.

² *Ib.*, bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 2, sec. 16.

³ *Ib.*, bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 6.

⁴ *Ib.*, bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 6.

⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁶ Pt. i., ch. 6.

⁷ Bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 2. Elsewhere (Bk. vi., pt. i., ch. 1) a dialogue occurs between Mencius and Kaou, which Kaou begins by suggesting that righteousness is to man's nature as a cup to willow wood. Mencius objects that this implies that violence must be done to humanity to convert it to righteousness. Kaou then compares human nature to water, which flows east or west according as a channel is opened for it. Mencius replies that "the tendency of man's nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards." Kaou then draws a distinction between Righteousness as external and Benevolence as internal. I honour an old man not because there is a principle of reverence in men, but just as when I see a white man I consider him white. Kaou is here taking up a position somewhat

without. "Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them."¹ But men differ much in the cultivation of them, and what is needed is to work on the basis of good which exists in all and extend it² so as to cover the whole of life and achieve that universal benevolence which is "the most honourable dignity conferred by Heaven."³

Benevolence and righteousness are the leading notes of the character that is fully developed. Not indeed that benevolence should be equally apportioned to all men. Natural ties have their place. The philosopher Mih taught that we should love

analogous to that of the "moral sense" school. Mencius's reply is to the effect that whiteness is a quality common to a man and a horse. We do not honour an aged horse; nor is there any righteousness in the age of a man, but in our honouring it (i. e. righteousness is not a perceptible quality of things, but lies in a relation of ourselves to other persons). Kaou then says that he loves his younger brother, but not the younger brother of a man of Tsin—the feeling is therefore determined by himself, internal (subjective). On the other hand, he honours an old man whether of his own people or of Ts'oo. Therefore this (a point of righteousness) is external. Mencius replies that we enjoy roast meat, whether roasted by ourselves or men of Tsin. Would Kaou say that our enjoyment of roast meat is external? The discussion is as interesting as the examples are quaint. Kaou is contending for the objectivity of the moral standard as contrasted with the subjective variations of good feeling; Mencius for the subjectivity of all morals, in the sense that they proceed from and rest on human nature. The solution is perhaps to be found in the Kantian distinction between subjective as—the necessary laws of a subject, i. e. of a rational being, and as—the individual variations which make up a man's idiosyncrasies.

¹ Mencius, bk. vi., pt. i., ch. 6, sec. 7.

² "All men have some things which they cannot bear; extend that feeling to what they can bear, and benevolence will be the result. All men have some things which they will not do; extend that feeling to the things which they do, and righteousness will be the result.

"If a man can give full development to the feeling which makes him shrink from injuring others, his benevolence will be more than can be called into practice. If he can give full development to the feeling which refuses to break through or jump over a wall, his righteousness will be more than can be called into practice.

"If he can give full development to the real feeling of dislike with which he receives the salutation, 'Thou,' 'Thou,' he will act righteously in all places and circumstances." (Bk. vii., pt. ii., ch. 31, secs. 1-3.)

In more modern phrase, one might say that every man "has his code." In that code lie concealed impulses which, adequately developed, would furnish a perfect character. By it are inferred principles which, consistently carried out, would suffice for a saint. Thieves' honour recognizes a principle which the thief applies only to his fellow-thieves. If he applies it without any such arbitrary restrictions, he must become an honest man.

³ Bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 7, sec. 2.

all equally, which is contrary to filial duty, but "To acknowledge neither king nor father is to be in the state of a beast."¹ Human excellence lies in the performance of the social duties. The life of the hermit is like that of an earth-worm.² The sage learns humbly from others. "When any one told Tsze-loo that he had a fault, he rejoiced," and Shun "regarded virtue as the common property of himself and others, giving up his own way to follow that of others, and delighting to learn from others to practise what was good."³ Though it is the duty of the sage to teach as well as learn, yet there is a pitfall here. "The evil of men is that they like to be teachers of others."⁴ As to the conventions, Mencius holds by the "rules of propriety," but sometimes not without symptoms of impatience. A stickler for strict rule would not touch a woman's hand even to save her from drowning. Such a man, says Mencius curtly, is a "wolf."⁵ The intrinsic importance of the rule must be taken into account, and also the urgency of the motive for casting it aside.⁶ Had this principle been developed, it would have broken the crust

¹ Mencius, bk. iii., pt. ii., ch. 9, sec. 9. Mih's expression of the doctrine of universal benevolence was of the most sweeping kind. "It is this principle of making distinctions between man and man which gives rise to all that is most injurious in the empire." (Legge, ii., Prolegomena, p. 111.) Mih seeks to turn the objection that the doctrine is contrary to filial piety by urging that by loving and serving others a man will obtain their love and benefits for his parents. (*Ib.* pp. 105-119.) Mih's practical polemic was directed against the excessive burden thrown on Chinese life by the laws of mourning, and the classical philosophy, as De Groot's account clearly shows, erred by adhering too closely to the traditional observance.

Mencius follows closely the typical Chinese view in the extension of the principle of filial piety to cover all forms of wrong-doing that might indirectly injure parents, and in exalting it to the disparagement of duties to wife and child. Thus he enumerates five common things which are unfilial. 1. Laziness. 2. Gambling, chess-playing and wine-bibbing. 3. Love of money and selfish attachment to wife and child—these three when followed to the point of neglect of parents. 4. Following the desire of eyes and ears so as to bring parents into disgrace. 5. Being fond of bravery, fighting and quarrelling so as to endanger parents. (Bk. iv., pt. ii, ch. 30.) He holds up for imitation the example of Chang, who, because his father was offended, sent away his wife and child, and all his life received no cherishing attention from them. (*Ib.*, sec. 5.) There is of course another point of view—that of Chang's wife and child and the attention that they might expect. The Western world puts them first, the Chinese second *longo intervallo*.

² Bk. iii., pt. ii., ch. 10.

³ Bk. ii., pt. i., ch. 8.

⁴ Bk. iv., pt. i., ch. 23.

⁵ *Ib.*, ch. 17. Cf. Douglas, *Society in China*, p. 189.

⁶ Bk. vi., pt. ii., ch. 1.

of Chinese formalism and opened the way for a richness of spiritual growth which, crusted over by tradition as it has been from the first, Confucianism has never brought forth.

6. But it is in its political applications that the ethical teaching of Mencius is most thoroughgoing. Here the principles of justice and benevolence require that the welfare of the people should be the first consideration of government. "The people are the most important element in a nation, the spirits of the land and grain are the next, the sovereign is the lightest."¹ The people's will practically expressed in unanimous support of, or aversion to, a ruler is of divine authority. "Heaven sees according as my people see: Heaven hears according as my people hear."² The king must care for their prosperity. He should refrain from interfering with husbandry, spare the growing trees and the young fish, plant mulberry-trees about the homesteads and inculcate filial and paternal duties in the schools. A ruler so governing his state would certainly become emperor. Instead of this he says severely to a prince—

"Your dogs and swine eat the food of men, and you do not know to make any restrictive arrangements. There are people dying from famine on the roads, and you do not know to issue the stores of your granaries for them. When people die, you say, 'It is not owing to me; it is owing to the year.' In what does this differ from stabbing a man and killing him, and then saying, 'It was not I; it was the weapon?' Let your Majesty cease to lay the blame on the year, and instantly from all the empire the people will come to you. . . .

"In your kitchen there is fat meat; in your stables there are fat horses. But your people have the look of hunger, and on the wilds there are those who have died of famine. This is leading on beasts to devour men."³

Lighter taxation, care for the poor and childless, the punishment of corrupt officials, moderation in punishments avoiding the principle of collective responsibility, attention to works of public necessity, and above all aversion to warfare, were the marks of the good ruler. In the good old days of King Wan—

¹ Mencius, bk. vii., pt. ii., ch. 14.

² Bk. v., pt. i., ch. 5, sec. 8.

³ Bk. i., pt. i., ch. 3, sec. 5; ch. 4, sec. 4.

"The husbandmen cultivated for the government one-ninth of the land; the descendants of officers were salaried; at the passes and in the markets strangers were inspected, but goods were not taxed; there were no prohibitions respecting the ponds and weirs; the wives and children of criminals were not involved in their guilt. There were the old and wifeless, or widowers; the old and husbandless, or widows; the old and childless, or solitaries; the young and fatherless, or orphans:—these four classes are the most destitute of the people, and have none to whom they can tell their wants, and King Wan, in the institution of his government with its benevolent action, made them the first objects of his regard."¹

¹ Mencius, bk. i., pt. ii., ch. 5, sec. 3. The whole theory of government is somewhat more fully stated in bk. vi., pt. ii., ch. 7:—"The five chiefs of the princes were sinners against the three kings. The princes of the present day are sinners against the five chiefs. The great officers of the present day are sinners against the princes."

"The emperor visited the princes, which was called 'A tour of inspection.' The princes attended at the court of the emperor, which was called 'Giving a report of office.' It was a custom in the spring to examine the ploughing, and supply any deficiency of seed, and in autumn to examine the reaping, and assist where there was a deficiency of the crop. When the emperor entered the boundaries of a State, if the new ground was being reclaimed, and the old fields well cultivated; if the old were nourished and the worthy honoured; and if men of distinguished talents were placed in office: then the prince was rewarded—rewarded with an addition to his territory. On the other hand, if, on entering a State, the ground was found left wild or overrun with weeds; if the old were neglected and the worthy unhonoured; and if the offices were filled with hard tax-gatherers: then the prince was reprimanded. If a prince once omitted his attendance at court, he was punished by degradation of rank; if he did so a second time, he was deprived of a portion of his territory; if he did so a third time, the imperial forces were set in motion, and he was removed from his government. Thus the emperor commanded the punishment, but did not himself inflict it, while the princes inflicted the punishment, but did not command it. The five chiefs, however, dragged the princes to punish other princes, and hence I say that they were sinners against the three kings.

"Of the five chiefs the most powerful was the duke Hwan. At the assembly of the princes in K'wei-K'ew, he bound the victim and placed the writing upon it, but did not slay it to smear their mouths with the blood. The first injunction in their agreement was—'Slay the unfilial; change not the son who has been appointed heir; exalt not a concubine to the rank of wife.' The second was—'Honour the worthy, and maintain the talented, to give distinction to the virtuous.' The third was—'Respect the old, and be kind to the young. Be not forgetful of strangers and travellers.' The fourth was—'Let not offices be hereditary, nor let officers be pluralists. In the selection of officers let the object be to get the proper men. Let not a ruler take it on himself to put to death a great officer.' The fifth was—'Follow no crooked policy in making embankments. Impose no restrictions on the sale of grain. Let there be no promotions without first announcing them to the emperor.' It was then said, 'All we who have united in this agreement shall hereafter maintain

It is on the conditions of life that the behaviour of the people depends. Human beings have a naturally good disposition, but not one strong enough to resist the trials of adverse conditions, especially when these are due to unjust laws. Bad governments goad the people to crime and then punish them. "This is to entrap the people."¹ If the king failed in his duty his chief ministers should remonstrate with him, and if repeated remonstrance proved fruitless, they should dethrone him. So Mencius told King Seuen to his face.² In the last resort the minister should put the king to death.³ For all this of the duties of the king is not to be mere exhortation as in most preaching of the kind. It was meant in earnest, and behind it lies the sanction of just rebellion.

In fact we feel throughout that Mencius's sayings are the very reverse of ordinary moral platitudes. They are truths applicable to all time, but not empty as such truths too often are. On the contrary, they have a sting which we can feel even at the present day, or ought to feel if we do not. The great Chinese classical writers in fact laid the foundation of a distinct ethical and social ideal, in many ways analogous to the best teaching of the founders of spiritual religions, but different in its setting. Chinese religion was at this time and has since remained, except in so far as influenced by Buddhism, a form of animism, distinguished first by its systematic character—a multitude of spirits dependent on those of Heaven and Earth respectively; and secondly, by the remarkable development of ancestor worship. This religion offered little scope for ethical idealism except at two points—the idealization of family continuity, and the supremacy of Heaven. Of both these points Chinese ethical writers took advantage; of the first to re-enforce

amicable relations.' The princes of the present day all violate these five prohibitions, and therefore I say that the princes of the present day are sinners against the five chiefs."

Note the relationship of the emperor to the princes, a feudal relationship to which Mencius seeks to give an ideal ethical form; the supervision by the state of family relationship; the insistence on the distinction of chief wife and concubine; and the idea of purity and merit in official life.

¹ Mencius, bk. i., pt. i., ch. 7. If this view sounds somewhat materialistic, we may set against it passages like bk. iii., pt. i., ch. 4. If men "are well fed, warmly clad, and comfortably lodged, without being taught at the same time, they become almost like the beasts."

² Bk. v., pt. ii., ch. 9.

³ Bk. i., pt. ii., ch. 8.

the doctrine of filial piety ; of the second to insist on the moral unity of the empire. But in the main their concern was social salvation, and they were deliberately working out an ethical theory to contribute to that end, and appealing to the nature and training of individuals to use the means by which the end was to be reached. Thus the psychological basis of conduct and the conception of its ultimate end are not those of Buddhism or of Monotheism. For example, man is not inherently bad and redeemed from evil only by divine grace. In himself he is potentially good, and the germs of goodness in him only need favourable circumstances, teaching, and effort to come to perfection. But they are developed, not to the greater glory of God, but to the maintenance of human life, that all along the rich valleys with their million homesteads the husbandman may reap the harvest he has sown in fields unstained by blood, that he may cherish wife and child and be nurtured by them in age, and pass duly honoured to the tomb ; that worthy officers be found to serve just and benevolent kings ; that wars may die away ; that crime may be repressed, not by punishment, but by the example of virtue ; in a word, that peaceful industry and happy family life undisturbed by civil jars, official corruption, royal avarice, and military ambition, may be the lot of one-third of the human race. Not the glory of God, but the peace of man is the aim ; not good fortune here nor salvation hereafter is the disciple's reward, but merely his own best self independent of all that comes—righteousness for its own sake, benevolence because it is itself the best gift of heaven. Not the chaining up of human nature, but its full and harmonious development is the object of ethical training. In other respects the ethical and the religious ideals of character are more remarkable for their correspondence than for their divergence. The modesty of the sage is not perhaps drawn in such bold lines as the humility of the saint. Forbearance and forgiveness are upheld as better than revenge, but the returning of good for evil is set aside in favour of a severer application of justice. Benevolence should be for mankind generally, but for our own families first.¹ In all this there is some infusion of

¹ Universalism indeed is not so prominent as in Mohammedan and Christian ethics. The Confucians were thinking and writing for a homo-

practical sense which may not unfairly be set against the loss of the romantic glow. Perhaps, if we may strike a balance, there was less to stir the brain's blood, and so set men thinking and working towards wider problems yet and deeper solutions. But there was a definite theory of conduct appealing to the best of man's nature and calling him to the service of his fellow-men, and this theory has for more than two thousand years formed the actual working basis of life for a great division of the human race.

geneous people among whom the divisions were those of a decaying feudal system. They speak of mankind in general terms, but they have no sharp distinctions of race to overcome. They refer occasionally to the outlying barbarous tribes which will be "attracted" by good government, or influenced by civilized teaching. But the fate of these peoples plays no important part in their minds. Nor were class divisions a serious problem for them. Confucius lays down that "there being instruction there will be no distinction of classes." (*Analects*, bk. xv., ch. 38.) Undoubtedly they stand for the Chinese community as one great whole, but—from the nature of their historical position—they can hardly be said to have conceived Humanity as has been done in Western thought.

CHAPTER VI

PHILOSOPHIC ETHICS

1. THE profound conception of the Ethical basis taught by the great Chinese thinkers was arrived at independently by a movement of thought arising at about the same period of time, but in a distant part of the world, and under deeply contrasted conditions of culture. The great Greek philosophers from the fifth century B.C. onwards, worked out a theory of life in which the inherent excellence of good conduct, the strength and self-dependence of the disciplined character, the order and harmony of the well-governed state, were held up as ends of human action sufficient in themselves to inspire effort and justify self-sacrifice, worthy to be followed by every man even if in doing so he "should escape the notice of gods and men." But in speaking of Greek thought and its distinctive message—and it is only what is distinctive and that only in the barest outline that can be touched on here—we must recognize at the outset that its method was no less important than its results. The Chinese masters inculcated some profound truths and arrived at results often closely similar to the best teaching of the Greeks. But they seem to have laid them down almost as dogmatically and with as little attempt at rational proof as though they had been dogmas of theology. Certainly there is but little trace of system in Confucius and not much more even in Mencius. They made little attempt, it would seem, to go back to first principles and ask the why and wherefore of all moral rules. Hence they were moral teachers rather than philosophers, and hence also in the practical result they accepted only too much of Chinese tradition, and left their country after all bound in the fetters of antiquity.

With the Greeks, on the contrary, moral philosophy begins its course. With the early thinkers, contemporaries or perhaps predecessors of Socrates, who propounded the question "What is the Good, the end of human life, the aim which a thinking being should set before him as the goal of his existence?" there begins a new epoch in moral development, the epoch in which the ethical consciousness, long dominated by the forces which shape its conceptions unawares, begins to re-act upon them, to turn round upon the conditions that have hitherto determined its growth and inquires into their why and wherefore. This is part of a movement which extends far beyond the sphere of ethics and attacks the very foundations of knowledge and belief.

Its own processes and methods, the principles and pre-suppositions of all its thinking, are the last things of which the mind becomes conscious. In the earliest stages of its development in humanity it forms ideas under the stimulus of experience by methods which have all the roughness and imperfection of hereditary or instinctive reactions unpolished by rational reflection. The ideas themselves are loose and slippery. They are linked one with another, not by any coherent logic, but as the vague impulses of casual association suggest, or as emotional conditions predispose the imagination to impute connections between events. It is out of this chance-medley of mental forces that the ideas of primitive fancy are evolved.

We have seen how the advance of intelligence brings some order into this chaos, how in the building up of thought casual suggestion is replaced by systematic meditation in which trained reasoning and methodical analysis play their part. We have seen how under these influences the naïve imagery of the childish mind yields to the profound conception of the sage, in which finally the structural categories underlying all experience are brought clearly before consciousness, and utilized in the construction of a philosophy of things.

In such a construction there is undoubtedly implied a certain criticism both of the conceptions formed and of the methods by which they are formed. Yet underlying it all are assumptions which are only brought to light by a still more fundamental criticism, the criticism wherein thought seeks to determine its

own value as a measure of reality. Consider, for example, the question of logical method. Criticism may have shown some reasoning to be fallacious, and other reasoning to be apparently sound. But what is this appearance? Is it, after all, only an impression made on us, which we accept as convincing because we cannot resist it? But if so, what is its worth? The fallacy also impressed us till some one pointed out the flaw, and perhaps it still impresses other minds and seems as sound to them as it appears absurd to us. Is there, then, any more objective or absolute standard of sound logic which once revealed would settle all doubts, and if so, how are we to know it? Again, suppose our logic is sound so that we may unerringly connect concept with concept, what precisely is the value of it all at the end? We may forge a perfect chain of logical links, but what does it hang from? Is it suspended in mid-air, or are there first principles fixed in the adamantine firmament, or possibly solid supports reared on earth, from which the chain may hang? Does thought form a world of its own, or does it relate to an independent reality, and if so, how is the relation established and its validity guaranteed? Questions such as these, never finally resolved, but constantly renewed with deeper meanings and more subtle suggestions, form the permanent content of the philosophic criticism of thought.

This criticism being directed throughout to the discovery of an "objective" standard which is to rescue truth from the fallibility of ordinary human weakness, must in the first place concern itself with method. It will evolve a logic to justify the distinction of the sound from the unsound in reasoning, and systematize valid argument on some connected and coherent principles. Secondly, it will inquire into the genesis of our conceptions and will test them by reference to the experience from which they are educed. Then applying these methods, it will seek to reconstruct its conception of Reality. The Socratic Elenchus (notwithstanding the limits which Socrates imposed on himself), the Platonic Dialectic, the Aristotelian Logic and Metaphysics, were successive attempts in this direction. The reconstruction of Reality on the basis of a criticism of first principles was in fact first seriously taken in hand by the Greeks. But in the progress of criticism a problem emerges affecting the

bare possibility of Reconstruction—a problem which can hardly be said to have come fully within the purview of Greek thought. The mind itself may be regarded as a product of the Reality which it seeks to understand. Or conversely the world of experience may be regarded as a product of the Mind. Its sensations, its conceptions, its methods, its principles, the very self-criticism by which it has been seeking to rectify its principles, may all be results of its own growth and dependent for their peculiar shape on its own development. If this is so, must not the ultimate result of the philosophical movement, however far it may push its criticism of knowledge, still lie within the circle of the mind's own making? Will not the truth that satisfies us still be a truth for ourselves alone, or if it is more, how can we be assured of it? Truth is truth, but does it give us Reality? To determine this question we must "know ourselves" in a new sense. We must ascertain the facts as to the constitution and growth of the mind. We must re-examine the very conceptions of Truth and Reality. We must determine the conditions under which knowledge is possible, we must ascertain the limitations under which thought arises and ask how far those limitations are overcome. To attempt this more thoroughgoing evaluation of the subjective factor in knowledge has been the special task of modern philosophy. To some aspects of the problem we shall return later, confining ourselves in the present chapter to the philosophy of the Greeks, and indeed to one branch of their philosophical development. Their reconstruction of knowledge and reformed conceptions of the world-order intimately affected their ethical thought, which was indeed merely a part of the general movement of critical reconstruction, but it is only the ethical side of the movement which can be outlined here.

Indeed, a philosophical reconstruction is by no means less necessary in the region of conduct than is that of knowledge. On the contrary, rules of conduct have, as a matter of history, grown up under conditions eminently unfavourable to a rational apprehension of the ethical order best suited to human needs. They have arisen under the conditions of group-morality, and are tarnished with the brutalities incident to the struggle for existence. They have been infected by gross conceptions of magical influence and spiritual resentments. They have been

distorted by the sophistications with which men hide their spiritual nakedness. They have been bent into weapons used for the justification of class or race supremacy, of arbitrary power, of sexual wrong. In no other department are the fundamental categories in such permanent need of criticism. Good and bad, right and wrong, virtue and vice—all the elementary conceptions forming the pigeon-holes wherein we arrange our ideas about conduct, what at bottom do they mean? What is their value and justification? What grounds have we in reason for the judgments which we pass on conduct when we use them? Are they anything more than expressions for our feelings, or have they a higher authority? Is the standard by which we apply them final, or, seeing that human standards vary, is there any higher standard to which a rational society would conform, and if so, how is it to be ascertained? Such are the questions of philosophic ethics, and they cut deeper than any simple ethical idealism. We have seen ideals of character arising under Buddhist, Christian, and Confucian influence, and the mere formation of such ideals involve an immense advance in reflection. But such ideals are formed by laying stress on certain elements of virtue and by seeking to choke up certain sources of vice without any systematic inquiry into the meaning and object of virtue, without any rational examination of the ultimate purpose and function of human conduct, and therefore without any scientific determination of the rules by which it should be guided. Such ideals accordingly, though they may carry us far beyond the common morality of the average man, are not necessarily well adapted to the actual conduct of life? and the furtherance of human progress. They may even lead us further away from the path. The ultimate hope of a rational reconstruction of ethics must be to bring us back from the rules and ideals that have grown up at random and without any thought-out method to the conditions of conduct which a critical theory of what is best for humanity may prove to be required. The first steps towards such a reconstruction are to be found in Greek Ethics, and the resulting movement of thought, maintained with many fluctuations of vigour throughout the period of classical antiquity, interrupted though not wholly arrested by the revival of the theological conception of ethics, and resumed

in a new shape in the modern period, engendered the principal forms of ethical theory which it remains for us to mention. To write the history of the movement would be incompatible with the scope of this work. At best, the most fundamental features which distinguish this order of ethical conceptions from others may be summarily mentioned.

2. So far as he had a theory at all, the early Greek, as we have seen, held to the magico-religious basis of law and morals. The Furies punished the parricide. The perjurer or the betrayer of his guest aroused the wrath of Zeus. The curse fell upon the offender, and would work itself out in the fate of his children, if not in his own life. A public offence, as in the celebrated case of the Alcmaeonidæ, might involve a city in disaster and render necessary a public ceremonial of purgation. The wrath of Talthybius fell upon the Spartans for their unceremonious treatment of the heralds of Darius, and could only be appeased by the devotion of two Spartans who voluntarily surrendered themselves to the Persian king to deal with as he pleased. But stronger perhaps than any explicit dread of divine punishment was the half mystical reverence for established law, the customs written and unwritten of each city, and the common traditions of all Hellas. With the absolute and unquestioned authority of established tradition was bound up, as the Greeks felt, inarticulately perhaps, but none the less vividly, all that made the free civic life of Greece possible. The Greek citizen was a free man because he was governed by law, and the culmination of the charges against the tyrant was that he overrode all laws written and unwritten. To render back to the Laws the service due to them was the pride of the free Hellene, who contrasted his freely-rendered service to a constitution supported by his own voluntary efforts with the slavish submission of the Oriental to the arbitrary will of his master. The attitude of the true freeman is nowhere more justly stated than in the words which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, the ex-king of Sparta and an exile at the Persian court, quoted in the first part of this work. But perhaps the most complete expression of the traditional Greek view is given in the well-known defence of Antigone. Creon has tyrannically forbidden the burial of

her brother. She tells him why she has disregarded his proclamation—

“It was not Zeus who laid this ordinance on me, nor Justice, housemate of the gods below, by whom these laws were laid down among men. Nor did I deem thy order of such might that thou, a mortal man, shouldst override the unwritten and unshaken laws of gods. For these are not things of to-day or yesterday, but live for ever, and none know whence they sprang. For them I was not minded—not in fear of any man’s pride—to pay the penalty among the gods. That I should die, I knew—how else?—even hadst thou made no order, and if before my time I die, I call it but a gain.”

Here the dominant note of truth and right for ever against the petty tyrant of a day, who holds mere life and death in his hands, blends now with a whisper of a judgment beyond death, and a justice that sits as assessor on the judgment-seat in Hades, now with a more decided mysticism which makes the traditional law supreme, not because it comes from the gods, but because it is eternal and its source is lost in the darkness out of which things come.

3. This uncritical acceptance of traditional morality was rudely shaken by the negative movement of thought in the fifth century. The dialectics of Zeno had shaken the first principles of ordinary knowledge. The metaphysics of Heraclitus had attacked the testimony of the senses. On the speculative side the negative movement culminated in the doctrine of Protagoras, that “man is the measure of all things, of those which are that they are, of those which are not that they are not.” The application to ethics does not appear to have been made by Protagoras himself, but it lay ready to hand and was freely used by some of the so-called Sophists, men like the Polus, Callicles and Thrasymachus of the Platonic dialogues. If there is no rational ground for our knowledge of nature, how can we expect to find any for our theories of the moral life? True there is law in every state, and he who breaks the law will be punished by law, but what is the source and authority of law itself? The law which the tyrant makes rests, as all men admit, on the strength of his own arm, wherewith he will punish those who break it. But in precisely the same way the Law which the ruling Few

impose on the subject Many rests on the power of Fear, whether due to superior valour or better organization, to enforce their will ; and by precisely the same argument in a democracy the law is simply what the majority who are here the stronger decide that it shall be. In every case the "ruler," whether an individual or a class, frames the law in his own interest and enforces it by his power. Justice is merely a name for the "interest of the stronger." Hence it was that the rule of justice differed, as the travelled Greeks were discovering from nation to nation. Herodotus told of tribes who were as scandalized at the Greek custom of burying the dead as the Greeks were at them for eating their dead. If right and wrong were founded in nature, this would not be. The same rules would be in force everywhere. But depending on convention, they vary from place to place as it suits the dominant power to conceive them. And so νόμος, the law written and unwritten, is identified with convention, or institution depending on the arbitrary and changeable will of men, and is opposed to φύσις, nature, as the temporary and variable to that which is permanent and rooted in the essential structure of things.

The extent to which this sceptical doctrine had sunk into the practical life of Greece may be measured by any one who will contrast with the passage quoted above, the arguments ascribed by Thucydides to the Athenian delegates in the famous Melian Dialogue.

"As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favour as you. . . . For of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. . . . As to the Lacedæmonians . . . of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honourable, and what is expedient with what is just,"¹ etc.

4. Thus, the breakdown of the traditional Greek theory of the moral sanctions, of the divine basis of virtue, and the authoritative supremacy of law, was not merely a matter of speculative interest. It represented a change which had sunk deep into the minds of the people, and was a cause of

¹ Thuc., v. 105. Tr. Jowett.

anxiety to all thinking men. Accordingly the efforts of the constructive thinkers of Greece during the latter part of the fifth century, and throughout the fourth, were devoted to the reconstruction of private morals and public law, to find arguments in admitted principles of thought or in the unimpeachable evidence of experience to replace the old supernatural basis of virtue, and to determine, in the phrase of the day, what was natural in state law as opposed to what was merely a matter of human agreement. In this effort the negative movement had already supplied a point of departure, for it had in essentials formulated a first principle of action; that every man aims at what is good for him, or at least at what appears good for him, was the principle tacitly or openly avowed to which negative criticism had been brought. This principle was taken up by Socrates and his followers and made the starting point of a moral reconstruction. No Greek thinker, whether constructive or negative, idealist or hedonist, Platonic or Aristotelian, called this axiom itself in question, but it was possible to show, as Socrates was the first to discover, that, however selfish in form, it was capable of an interpretation which would not only reconcile it with the highest claims of the moral consciousness, but even set these claims upon an apparently firm basis in reason. For though it may be true that all men aim at the apparent good, it does not follow that that good is the interest of self, or the satisfaction of the sensual nature as opposed to the fulfilment of a man's function as a citizen and the cultivation of his higher faculties. On the contrary, Socrates, whose philosophical method was that of conversation at the dinner-party or in the market-place, was easily able to appeal to the ordinary opinion of the average man, and to elicit from him that he held courage and justice, wisdom and temperance, the ordinary virtues of the good citizen, in higher esteem than the pleasures of the senses or the interest of money-getting. But if this were so, if it were in reality best for a man to restrain his lower nature and to practise the duties of a good father and a good citizen, if the higher good, however defined, lay in this direction, then the principle that each man chooses what appears to him to be good will inevitably lead a wise man, who has found out where the true good lies, in the path of virtue and

good citizenship; and if we find people who are cowards and unjust and unbridled in their licence, it is because they do not know where their true good lies. So the critics who held themselves superior to the ordinary moral tradition found their own weapon turned against them. Their principle that every one must aim at his own good is freely adopted, with the rider that he who knows his true good finds it essentially in adherence to those traditions which the sceptic scorns. The abandonment of virtue is a proof, not, as had been urged, of superior wisdom, but of ignorance of the real interests of human nature. Virtue, in fact, might be defined as a kind of art of measuring—the art of measuring values aright. He who knows what true pleasure is finds it in the pursuit of virtue; he who finds it elsewhere has made a mistake in his fundamental principles.¹

5. But after all it was open to the critics to rejoin that the intrinsic value and goodness of the just and virtuous life was assumed rather than proved. By what argument, it might be asked, or by what appeal to experience can it actually be made clear to a doubter beyond any possibility of a cavil that the man who is sacrificing some direct interest, some money-profit, or perhaps his personal security, for the sake of justice, is not making a gross miscalculation of values? In what sense is it urged that justice is in itself superior to injustice? Do we not admit that in refraining from injustice we are giving up something that is useful to ourselves and seeking the gain of another, and is this not incompatible with our first principle that every reasonable man seeks his own good? It is true that his losses might be made up to the just man by human rulers or by a divine judge, but what are we to say of the position of the just man under a tyrant or a tyrannous democracy, and what are we to think of the problem of divine judgment when the whole framework of the supernatural is being called in question? Besides, if the just man is acting for the sake of a reward—indirect and remote it may be, postponed to a future life it may be—is he really acting from a principle of justice?

¹ This is the position attributed to Socrates in the *Protagoras*, and no doubt represents one side of the Master's teaching, though the hedonism of *Dialogue* probably represents one aspect only of the Socratic view.

Is he not after all seeking a reward for himself though he calculates on a different basis from the unjust man, and if he miscalculates, need we admire or pity him? In a word, had any one the ring of Gyges would he not, once rendered invisible and so invulnerable to his fellow-men, do as Gyges did, and practise against them all manner of villainy that might be necessary in the course of satisfying his own desires? These positions are stated with extreme force and clearness in the second book of the *Republic*, and the demand is made upon the Socrates of the Dialogue to give an account of justice which will sweep all this network of doubts aside. Socrates is to show that the just man is happier and better off than the unjust, even if he escapes the notice of gods and men, even if he is misjudged in this world and the next, even if he suffers the penalties of injustice and the unjust man gets the rewards of the innocent. The benefits of justice in itself are to prove such as to outweigh every possible consideration of external reward or penalty. Never before or since has the claim of the moral consciousness to override every other consideration been more uncompromisingly stated. The method by which Plato makes Socrates set out to answer the formidable difficulties propounded to him is that of inviting his hearers to a deeper analysis of the nature of the human being and of the state. He finds that human nature is in itself a commonwealth in miniature, in which there is a ruling portion represented by the reason. There is a spirited element whose natural function it is to assist the reason, as the military element of the state should assist the philosophical rulers. And lastly, there is within man a many-headed monster of desire like the many-headed mob of the Athenian democracy. There are certain natural and proper relations which these different portions of the soul should maintain towards one another. The reason should rule, the spirited element should assist it in so doing, the many-headed monster should be under control; and when these conditions are satisfied a certain harmony results; it is well with the man, his inner man is at peace. And in this peace and harmony the cardinal virtues which the ordinary Greek recognizes have their different parts to play. In the due

exercise of the reason there is wisdom. In the aid rendered to wisdom by the due cultivation of the emotional element which enables us to withstand alike the temptations of danger and the seductions of pleasure, there is courage. For though the weak man may have implanted in him the right opinion as to how he should guide his action, something more than opinion is necessary when it comes to the pinch; there must be that tenacity which enables us to maintain our opinion in the face of temptation, and to show that tenacity is to be brave. Again, there must be an agreement among all the three parts, a harmony stretching through the whole of the soul, that reason should rule, and this harmony is temperance. Given these three virtues we have the conditions necessary for the healthy functioning of each part of the soul. This active functioning, which consists in a perfect co-operation of all parts of the soul, each doing its own work without going outside, is Plato's definition of justice. Justice then is, in the first place, the harmonious healthy life of the soul itself. But it is this inner harmony which enables a man to do his duty in the world to which he belongs. He plays the part required of him in the larger life of the State, because each element in his own nature plays the part required of it within the miniature commonwealth that forms his soul. The outer harmony depends on the inner. A man behaves as a good citizen because his moral nature is in healthy working order, and conversely when he fails in that duty his own nature is out of harmony with itself and is corrupted and diseased. Thus, at the end of the argument, justice is above all things valuable to its possessor, in so far as the soul is more valuable to itself than all the rest of the world. Justice is to the soul what health is to the body, it is its active excellence and perfect life; without it, nothing that seems good can be really good, with it there is no evil that cannot be faced. If pleasure be alleged as a more rational end for man, it may be retorted that it is only the pleasure of the soul which is a real pleasure. The pleasures of the many are transitory and full of contradiction. We see them on their holidays, then as now, filling the unreal part of themselves with unreal joys. The philosopher alone knows what reality is, and is

proved, with a characteristic bit of Platonic humour, to have at least seven hundred and twenty-nine times as much real enjoyment as the devotee of the senses.

6. Thus justice, which is here in reality the name for virtue, is founded upon an explicit theory of the nature of man, and both the positions of the sceptic are met and turned against him. On the one hand, it is shown that if a man aims at what is good for himself, he must, if he is a reasonable and instructed being, endeavour to obtain that which is for his soul what health is for the body. On the other hand, if it is asked on what laws or conditions of nature is justice founded, the answer is that it is founded on the constitution of human nature itself and of the societies which human beings form. These positions are in essence retained by Aristotle, though with more of that compromising spirit which belongs to Aristotle's method. The good is that at which everything aims, and is to be found in the performance of that function which nature assigns to it in the scheme of things. In this scheme the function of every class of being lies especially in the active realization of its own specific character. The specific character of man is that he is a rational animal, capable of governing himself by reason in a social life and capable of exercising his reason in the great department of speculation as a philosopher. In the first direction his moral virtues are developed, in the second his speculative powers. And so the well-being of man consists in an active realization of the soul-life in accordance with what is excellent, and especially in accordance with the best and highest of excellences. This is the essence of well-being. But perhaps it would be extreme and paradoxical to maintain that external misfortune has no effect upon it. A man is not happy if the misfortunes of a Priam beset him. Yet even in such a case the nobility of his character will shine through. He will never be wretched as the caitiff and the sensualist might become; it will still be well for him in that he bears his misfortunes better than other people. But though fortune may help to make or mar, and though there is an element of chance in human life which is never wholly mastered and overcome by human reason, nevertheless, speaking generally—and Aristotle is clear that we can only speak gener-

ally and not universally in dealing with human affairs—the man who resolutely makes the best of his own powers and actively realizes them, is the happiest. He has no need of the ordinary pleasures as an appendage, so to say, to his life, for this realization of himself at his best has its own pleasure within itself; as his life is the best, so is it also the pleasantest. Bad fortune will hinder him, good fortune will aid him in making the most of himself and in showing all that he has in him to be. But this is at the utmost a not indispensable advantage, and the essence of his well-being is that he himself does well.

7. Thus upon the fundamental question of moral philosophy Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were essentially at one. That question is by most modern moralists defined as the question of the nature of moral obligation. Why should I do what is right, or why should I recognize the distinction between right and wrong, ought and ought not? Is it a matter of some external reward or punishment befalling me according to the character of my conduct, or is it a matter of some intrinsic quality in the conduct itself? To the Greek philosophers the question took the form—What is the character of that which is really good for man, or in what does human well-being consist? The answer which they gave to it was essentially that it consists in the practise of virtue as being that wherein human nature finds its best, happiest and most harmonious expression. This method of handling the problem leads at once to the converse question—Why do the majority of men at one time or another neglect virtue and do that which is evil? Nothing could be more characteristic of Greek modes of thought and of the gulf which separates them from Christian and post-Christian ethics than the method of handling this question. To the Christian theologian and to the moralist handling the subject with theological conceptions behind him, the difficulty is to see how men come to do good. To the Greek thinker the paradox is rather that so many men do wrong. From the axiom from which all Greek thinkers started, it was clear that men could only do wrong from some mistake in their conception of what was good. If, as the three great thinkers whom we have mentioned were agreed, the good for men lay essentially in the pursuit of virtue,

then in strict logic it could only be from some ignorance of its first principle that men went astray. Socrates in fact drew this deduction apparently without any hesitation or compromise. To him vice was ignorance, and if a man were found to be intemperate, cowardly or unjust, it was only because he did not know what true temperance, courage and justice were, or how to apply the rules based upon them to the circumstances of his own life. He was a bad craftsman in the art of life, a man who did not know how to use his tools, and capable of being improved by instruction and by instruction alone. It was easy to see that the position so uncompromisingly stated led to paradoxical results. It tended to make all conduct a matter of the intellect and not of the character, and so in a sense to destroy moral responsibility. Accordingly in Plato we have an attempt at a reconstruction of the Socratic view. At any rate, in the maturer Dialogues we find, as has already been remarked, that the emotional or spirited element in man is called upon to take its share in the work of governing the wild beast that is within human nature. The force of character which enables a man to maintain his opinion is recognized as something distinct from the purely rational element in him which enables him originally to gain his opinion. In the story of Leontios the son of Aglaion, the internal moral conflict, the division of the self into factions, and the wrath of the better part of human nature at the victory of the lower, are dramatically described. But for a complete theory of responsibility as far as Greek thought could take it, we must turn to Aristotle. Aristotle does not deny the major premiss from which the Socratic syllogism starts. Every intelligence, he admits, chooses what is best for itself, but in order that a right understanding of what is best may be attained, something more than intelligence is required. It is after all only moral men who can thoroughly understand the nature of a moral code, for in moral matters intellectual enlightenment depends upon character. Hence those are mistaken who urge that we cannot be responsible for wrong-doing because the wrong-doer acts in accordance with what appears to him to be good, and if he is mistaken, cannot be held responsible for his ignorance. The reply to this is that ignorance proceeds from and is a mark of bad character, and it is his own

slack method of living which has corrupted the bad man's views and made him at once remiss in his conduct and mistaken in his judgment. Virtue does not come purely by nature, nor can it be taught in the schools like an art, but along with teaching, or rather antecedent to teaching itself, the youth must undergo a training in practice. This practical training will produce the necessary character. The character being formed will give us the right aims, and then a trained intelligence is necessary in the form of Practical Wisdom to reason from those aims and apply the results to practical affairs. This, in brief, is the psychology of the good man. Contrasted with him stands, in the first place, the profligate who has what Plato called "the lie in the soul," who entertains, that is to say, the radically false principle of life that the proper thing for a man is always to pursue the pleasure of the moment. This character is again consistent. Bad training has given its possessor a bad principle, and he applies his principle resolutely in action. But between the good and the bad stands a third character whose essence is to be inconsistent. This is the incontinent man who has sufficient moral enlightenment to admit the goodness of virtue as a general principle, but who is so far overcome by passion and appetite as to find means of evading the application of the principle to the facts of conduct. He allows himself to be deluded by self-sophistication, and lets his desires represent the action which he is about in a light which prevents it from being seen to fall under the general rule which would forbid it. He does not deny that the courageous man is superior to the cowardly, but he is always sure that the present occasion is one which calls for discretion, and not for an imprudent display of valour. He does not uphold injustice, but while constantly overreaching his neighbour, is all the time convinced that he is only too modest in maintaining his own rights.¹ But all this

¹ These illustrations are not Aristotle's, who confines himself to the case of the actual obliteration of rational reflection by sensual appetite. But the principle is the same. The great mass of wrong-doing, particularly in public affairs, seems to have a measure of self-sophistication as its necessary condition. Few people will admit nakedly even to themselves that what they do is wrong. They must have some specious terms in which to cloak the deed. They must screen themselves from their own inner consciousness, and thus, though sophistication is not the originating cause, it is an essential condition of most conduct, public or private, that conflicts with admitted principle.

intellectual jugglery does not free him from responsibility. It is the consequence and the sign of an imperfectly disciplined character, and each man not only chooses his own actions, but, at least at the outset, he chooses his own character also, because the character is made by the actions. Human nature, upon this view, is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad. It needs no supernatural grace to lift it out of the slough of original sin, neither is it born in a state of innocence from which it falls away as life proceeds. It has originally a natural capacity to be influenced by training and teaching, and if favourably situated where the winds blow upon it from healthy and salubrious climes, it flourishes and grows up into wisdom and moral goodness. If it fails to receive the right nutrition, and if no effort is made to respond to the training of the spiritual pastor and master, then it falls away, possibly into the deliberate corruption of the principle of selfish pleasure, perhaps rather into that twilight of the average sensual man in which the rule of right is something seen and acknowledged from afar, but never allowed to shine unshaded upon the agent's own conduct.

8. From the question why we should concern ourselves to be virtuous and how we should go about to be virtuous, we pass next to the question in what virtue consists. If by this is meant—What in the modern sense is the moral standard? it must be admitted that none of the thinkers we are here considering have a perfectly definite answer to give. Even the famous Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean is not a doctrine laying down an objective measure to which the rules of conduct and the laws of the state should conform. Nevertheless the Socratic thinkers have an ideal of their own which in many respects is very clearly defined. It is by no means identical with the ideal of the more spiritual religions; we may say that it is both more and less than they are. It is essentially an ideal for this world, and it bids men make the best of their life in this world. It is an ideal made for human nature. It is not one which consists in overcoming human nature. It is an ideal for the active citizens of a free state, not for men who can only hope to practise virtue by retiring from state affairs. Though they put the philosopher's life above the statesman's, neither

Plato nor Aristotle could forget that they were members of a self-governing community, owing their freedom and their culture to the security which their citizenship gave them; nor could they leave out of their minds that a great part of the impulse which had turned men's minds to moral philosophy was the endeavour to save the city state from that loosening of the bonds of political obligation which they saw going on around them. Hence the first duty of man, whether in the Republic or in the Ethics, is to be a good citizen. Whether, indeed, he can always be a loyal citizen in a bad state, is a point which gives Aristotle some difficulty; but that the ideal arrangement is that he should find a state of society, in which to be a good man and a good citizen are one and the same thing, is a matter about which there is no doubt. The good citizen is one who can both rule and be ruled. He has the self-discipline which enables him to submit to others when their turn comes, and the wisdom which enables him to direct, not only his own affairs, but those of the state when his own turn comes. He must be ready to fight for his city in war and to count it the noblest of deaths to die for her. He must be moderate in his pleasures, capable of restraining appetite lest it should get the mastery of him, not given to anger, but capable of righteous indignation when circumstances require it, liberal without ostentation in money matters, and careful of the rights of others to the point of being willing always to take less than his own share rather than press his interests too keenly. He should have an adequate measure of self-respect, and a great-souled man, who is in a sense the perfect type of this kind of character, being worthy of great things, should deem himself worthy of great things. He should know himself for what he is, and do nothing to belittle or demean himself. In voice, in gait and in gesture his dignity should be reflected. He should feel a proper pride in himself, and trust to that pride to keep him from anything degrading. He is thus the direct antithesis of the holy and humble man of heart whom the Christian teaching holds up to esteem. The antithesis is inevitable; the Christian saint is conscious of a sinfulness from which the divine grace alone has raised him, and which nevertheless still tinges and stains all that he does when it is matched against the white radiance of infinite perfection.

The great-souled Greek has learnt to govern his own nature; he measures himself with his equals, and if he owes a debt it is to his country and her laws, which he repays in the capacity of faithful and upright magistrate and citizen. And thus the Greek ideal is cast rather in the mould of the hero or the statesman than in that of the saint. Justice is far more prominent than benevolence; in place of the mortification of the flesh we have a reasonable temperance, a self-restraint which prevents the lower nature from usurping the place of the higher.¹ We have the conception, perhaps not less illuminating, that justice being good can only have good as its result, and therefore the punishment that is just, far from doing harm to the criminal, is medicine that he should welcome for his own sake.² Finally with the patriotism bound up with the city state we get the inevitable limitation which a purely civic morality entails. The rights and duties which the Greek citizen recognized were obligations existing in the full sense only as between a limited circle of free men. Plato does not carry his humanitarianism beyond the point of urging that in making war with one another, the Greek states should treat the conquered as they do now in the civil contests of factions within each state, and that in making war upon the Barbarian, they should treat the conquered as they now treat conquered Greeks. Aristotle grades the rights of human beings according to the degree in which personality is developed. The man capable of full citizenship is the man fully capable of directing affairs, and he is the possessor of practical wisdom in its completeness. The woman, the child and the slave who are not so qualified have inferior rights, and we have seen how Aristotle found in this a justification for the inequality of the sexes and for slavery. Yet the slave is after

¹ In some of the Platonic Dialogues this is pushed to the point of asceticism, and this line of the Platonic teaching is carried further by the old Academy and revived in Neoplatonism. But the maturer mind of Plato himself, as seen, for example, in the *Republic*, does not push asceticism beyond the limit of healthy self-restraint in the interests of the character as a whole.

² That justice, being good, can never show itself in doing harm either to one's enemy or to a bad man, is the gist of the argument with Polemarchus in *Republic*, i. (see esp. p. 335). So in the *Laws* (bk. ix., 854) the object of punishment is never evil, but to make a man better, or at any rate less bad. Similarly in the *Ethics*, only the incurable are to be altogether "put beyond the boundaries."

all a man, and, in so far as he is a man, he is capable of friendship and of entering into and fulfilling obligations. Rights, as a modern might put it, depend on personality. But personality—the capacity for free, responsible self-direction—is not the attribute of all human beings.

Such, then, in brief, are the virtues and limitations of the civic ideal, but we must always remember that neither in Plato nor Aristotle is this the highest ideal of all. The idea of rising beyond human nature to something beyond it, the idea of becoming citizens of a better world than this, is to both the crown of their work; and we see in them the way paved, not only for the wise man of the Stoic philosophy who should reach perfection in a state of slavery or under a tyrannical rule, but even for the Christian saint who found his highest bliss in withdrawing from the affairs of this world altogether. The Platonic philosopher only remains a statesman from his sense of obligation to the city which has nourished and trained him. We shall not do him an injustice, says Plato, if we compel him to return into the cave where the blind men of this world dwell, watching the play of unreal things in a dim and uncertain light; but in his heart he will always desire to range abroad freely in the Elysian Fields, where by the purer light of reason he can contemplate the essential goodness of things. So in Aristotle's scheme, for the philosopher the ultimate value of practical wisdom is to so regulate the affairs of life and bring the lower elements of the mind into order as to set the speculative wisdom free to rise to those higher objects of contemplation in which the Sage finds his true delight. The philosopher remains a man, partaker of a corruptible nature, and, therefore, incapable of sustaining a permanent conversation with high and heavenly things. Yet he must, as far as possible, put off his mortality and put on the likeness of the divine intelligence, which is the centre of the universal order about which and towards which all things move.

If we find this ideal lacking in some of the graces of those ethical systems which are associated with the spiritual religions, we must admit some counterbalancing merits of no less importance to Ethical growth. Instead of the rule of self-repression we have the ideal of expansion, of harmonious self-

development, an ideal which may on occasion involve in it the necessity of extreme self-sacrifice, even to the point of dying for friend or for country, but which in more fortunate circumstances blossoms into the full flower of human excellence conceived as the realization of many-sided capacities, physical, moral, intellectual, and spiritual. Secondly, we have the conception that this ideal is to be sought, in the first place, in patriotic devotion to the state regarded as a community of free citizens existing for the very purpose of glorifying common life and bringing forth from it the best it has in it to be, an association that comes into existence that men may live, but continues to exist that men may live well. Thirdly, the gifted man rises above, though never beyond, this civic ideal. He may never neglect the spiritual mother that has borne him, yet he has his own life apart, which is, in later phrase, hid with God, sharing with Him the spiritual joy of contemplating nature and seeing that it is good, bathed "in that content surpassing thought the Sage in meditation found, and walked with inward glory crowned."

9. While Plato and Aristotle may be said to have continued and developed the Socratic condition in its fulness, different sides of the Master's teaching, taken by themselves, became the sources of separate schools. The hedonistic tendency in Socrates was developed by Aristippus, and through him became the source of the Epicurean philosophy. The more ascetic tendency, which, sprung from the Socratic teaching of self-containment and the practical hardihood and moderation of his life, became the central feature in the teaching of Antisthenes. Here the doctrine that virtue is the essential condition of happiness is pushed to the point from which, as we have seen, Aristotle drew back. Man is made in a fuller sense the master of his fate. To live in accordance with virtue is laid down as the end of life, and it is the object of the wise man to render himself independent of all external conditions over which he himself cannot exercise control. Aristotle, in defining self-sufficiency, laid down that we cannot apply the term to any man considered by himself, but only by taking into account his family, his friends, and, indeed, his city, since man is by

nature a political animal. To the Cynic, virtue alone was self-sufficient for happiness, needing nothing further, unless it were a Socratic fortitude. He had overcome desire. He would enter into no hampering bond with other human beings. In particular, the city was one of the encumbrances from which the true philosopher was free. For a home, his tub sufficed for Diogenes, and if asked of what state he was a citizen, he replied that he was a citizen of the world—a cosmopolitan. Thus, a full-blown doctrine of self-reliance makes also for universalism. The particular and special ties by which men are grouped together fall away, and with the abstract assertion of the human personality as the supreme object of life and as ruler of its own destiny, there arises also the conception of universal humanity as the only community to which the individual owes an allegiance. The doctrines of self-mastery and world-citizenship thus originating with the Cynics were developed into the most influential system of antiquity by the founders of Stoicism. The wise man of the Stoics was to live, in accordance with the first formula of the school, consistently. In accordance with the second and better-known formula he was to live consistently with Nature. But what was Nature? It was the universal order and harmony of things where everything by a divine overruling providence had its place, where everything which fulfilled its nature served the whole, where the healthy life of every part was a contribution to the life of the whole organism. The wise man learnt, in the first place, to contain himself and to bow to the universal order of things; to will, as Epictetus said, that each thing should take place as it does take place, that is, "as the disposer of things has disposed them; and he has ordained that there should be summer and winter, plenty and scarcity, virtue and vice, and all these contraries for the sake of the harmony of the whole." In this universal scheme of Nature man must play his part in accordance with the natural capacity assigned to him. He is the child of God in a special sense, and he should realize, therefore, that he has no lowly or ignoble birth, and realizing that, he will have no lowly or ignoble thoughts about himself. A god is given to each man, a deity (in the shape of his own reason), to guard over him; one that is sleepless and incapable of being deceived, who, if you shut the

doors and make it all dark, is still there with you, and with him, God Himself. "For you are not alone, but God is with you and your deity." God, in disposing things, has put certain things within our power, or rather within the power of this controlling deity within us—our reason. Our part in life consists in ruling those things well, and in realizing that other things are such as we cannot rule. And since God is good He has put within our power all things essential to our own happiness to possess. It follows that external things which we cannot control are indifferent to us, and all that matters to us is to preserve our own souls untouched. Externals are merely the material, in the use of which our own character manifests itself. "Good things are the virtues, and what appertains to the virtues; evil are the opposite to these; indifferent are wealth, health, and reputation." He whom these things can disturb is not a wise or virtuous man, but if you ask who is the invincible, he is the man who has put the world beneath his feet, whom none of those things which are independent of his will can move from his course.

This self-centred conception of the wise man can at times be pushed to the point of harshness and coldness. For instance, in discussing suicide, Epictetus bids the philosopher remain in the bodily prison as long as reason tells him, just as Plato had already said, that he is placed there as a sentinel and must not desert his post. God has need of the world and its inhabitants, but if He sounds the signal as He did to Socrates, then the philosopher should obey the signaller as his general. But in the performance of duty, the feelings of his relations, even of his mother, are not to be taken into account. It is not your action that will grieve them, but just that which grieves you, namely, their own opinion. "Do you take away your own opinion, and if they do well they will take away theirs, and otherwise it will be on their own responsibility that they will lament." But Stoicism has a softer and more social side. Since God is the father of all, it follows that all men are brothers; the slave differs from the emperor only by accident of external position. If Epictetus is asked how one is to refrain from anger with a neglectful slave, he will answer, "Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother; he has Zeus as

his forefather, is a son of the same loins as yourself and the same descent . . . Do you not remember who you are and what men you are ruling, that they are kinsmen and brothers by nature, that they are descendants of Zeus?" Do you answer—I bought them? If so, you are looking "into the abyss, into the wretched laws of the dead and not to those of the gods." Thus the brotherhood of the Stoic transcends the gulf betwixt bond and free; equally it obliterates the distinction between the fellow-citizen and stranger,¹ and the great and supreme community is the society of man and gods from whom all things come. "The poet says, 'Dear city of Cecrops, will you not say, dear city of Zeus?'"

Though hard with himself, the Stoic could not be hard with the offender, for vice, says the mild Emperor following Socrates, is ignorance of the good, and I who have seen good could not be angry with the bad man who is my kin. Moreover, if your father does wrong, says Epictetus, he suffers already in character. Do not then wish him to lose anything else on that account. Even the false judge can do you no harm. The real evil of punishment falls always upon the offender, and what have you to do with the evil which belongs to another; if the judge's decision is unjust, that is his loss. Men are indifferent to the Stoic, however, only in the sense that their doings cannot affect his will, nor therefore what is essentially good or evil to him. But, says Marcus Aurelius, in so far as I ought to benefit and bear with them, they are the nearest of things to me. Virtue, though springing from the individual and resting on his personal wisdom and self-control, is eminently social in its manifestations. "Rejoice in one thing alone and rest in it, in passing from one social action to another social action with mindfulness of God." If the expressions of Stoicism are often hard and lend themselves at times to a certain appearance of heartlessness and isolation, in the gentler handling of a spirit like that of Marcus,

¹ Similarly in social intercourse, Epictetus, who represents the more rugged side of Stoicism, bids us prefer goodness to every other consideration. "I have nothing in common with my father but with the good man." "Are you so hard?" "Yes, for so I was made. . . . For this reason, if the good is anything different from the noble and the just, father and brother and country and all things are gone." (Epict., iii., 3. 5.)

the social side becomes the dominant feature, and we learn that if a man is to ask nothing for himself, yet he is gratefully to acknowledge every good gift that he receives from all around him, and to be willing to give his all to others.¹

10. But it was not so much the gentler social virtues as the fundamental obligations which bind man to his fellows that interested the Stoics. Deep as was the mark left on the world by their self-containment, it was not the greatest or most lasting effect of their teaching. It was at the point where moral philosophy touches the theory of law and government that their influence was widest and most abiding. For it is to them more than to any other school of thought that the world owes the conception of an ethical ideal standing above the wills of legislators, whether despotic or popular, as a standard to which they ought to conform. This ideal took shape in the conception of a Law of Nature which stood above all human conventions and held up a standard to which state law ought to conform. The conception of Nature was not introduced into Ethics by the Stoics. We have seen that at the outset the fundamental problem of conduct was raised in the form of the question, "Are justice and the other virtues natural or merely conventional? Are they founded on nature or the products of human agreement, which may be relegated at will to the lumber-room of disused ideas?" We have seen how Plato undertook to prove that they were founded on nature, and did so by showing that they rest on the constitution of man and of human society. So far "nature" appears as the basis of morals. In Aristotle it begins to serve as a standard of custom. At least in regard to justice, Aristotle recognized that there must be some more ideal and scientific standard than that embodied in the written and unwritten law and custom of the Greek states. Rules of justice as embodied in law were changeable and varied from place to place, while that which is natural is the same everywhere. But though natural laws change, says Aristotle, there must be one state, one constitution, which is

¹ In the above references to Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, I have freely used Mr. Long's translations, without, however, always adhering to his words.

everywhere natural, namely, that which is the best : and there must be one set of laws everywhere natural, namely, those which the best state would adopt. But the law of nature after all is an incident in Aristotle's treatment of justice ; with the Stoics it becomes the central principle. It appeared to supply, and in its degree it did supply, that systematic conception of a moral standard in which they found earlier theories lacking. For if the older thinkers had taught that man's true happiness lies in the practise of virtue, they had given little attention to the question why certain classes of action are considered virtuous. They took over in the main the current ideas which they found as to the particular virtues, idealizing and sometimes supplementing and correcting them, no doubt, but not upon the whole seeking for any first principle by which the value of these traditional rules might be tested. Now such a principle the Stoics conceived that they had found in the law prescribed by Nature itself to man. This could be discovered—such at least seems to be the implied process of thought—by considering how far the rules of conduct which we actually recognize are due to human institutions, and what would remain if we conceive them done away with. Proceeding on this line of thought, for instance, it is easily recognized that such an institution as slavery is not "natural." It is an institution of men, for without such institution who would enslave himself? So again with all other inequality of rights. By law one man may be given privileges over another, but take away the law and what privilege could remain? On the other hand, if we consider such a matter as the fulfilment of obligations, the obligation itself, we may say, is the result of a compact made by men, yet we feel in ourselves a "natural" impulse to fulfil it, even without legal compulsion, and so to keep our contracts is a part of "natural" law. Reasoning on such lines as these, from their conception of Nature as one Kosmos, animated by One God, the father of all mankind, the Stoics arrived at the idea of a Law of Nature prescribing the freedom, equality and brotherhood of mankind, overriding all distinctions of class, and race, and nation, prescribing good faith and mutual obligation, even when there was no law. This was no empty theory, but an active principle, influencing the practical legislation of the great

Roman lawyers.¹ The freedom, equality and brotherhood of man, the inherent justice involved in distinctions of class and of nationality, the original sanctity of contracts, and, as a consequence, the recognition of moral obligations to those to whom one is bound by no law—such ideas as these originate with the conception of a law which Nature lays down for man, and is, therefore, independent of convention and superior to the enactments of kings. We have already seen the influence which this conception had in mitigating the hardships of Roman slavery. We trace it in the successive extensions of the franchise, which broke down the barriers between conquering Rome and the subject provincials. We may trace it once more in the humane laws which broke up the barbaric supremacy of the *paterfamilias*. Indeed, "there were few departments into which the catholic and humane principles of Stoicism were not in some degree carried." In the mind of the best of the emperors, Stoical principle kept alive the ideal of a "constitution of equal laws ordered in accordance with equality and equal freedom of speech, and a kingship honouring above all things the freedom of those who are ruled." Such an ideal was unattainable in the second century after Christ, but that it should have been placed on record by the absolute master of the Roman world as his conception of the principle by which he would govern himself, is not the least remarkable testimony to the strength of the Stoical creed. The law of Nature was not, as we shall see more fully, in the end an adequate formula for the moral standard, but it was a step in that direction. It was an assertion that such a principle could be found, and it recognized that actual codes deviate from the principle in consequence of what is arbitrary and accidental in the laws of their growth.

Greek ethics thus bequeathed two great contributions to the solution of the ethical problem. In its earlier stage it founded moral obligation on the well-being of the individual. It taught that virtue was not an emptying but a fulfilment of the personality. It reconciled individual self-development with legal, law-abiding citizenship in a free city state. In its later stages, when the old civic life was breaking up and the problem taking new

¹ See quotations from the stoically trained jurists in Lecky, *History of European Morals*, i., pp. 295, 296.

shape, it laid the foundations of a universalist ethics by conceiving an ideal standard of conduct applicable to all mankind, not subordinate but superior to state law, an ideal to which social as well as individual custom should be made to conform. In neither of these directions, however, was its analysis final. How it was pushed further by modern thought, we have now to inquire.

CHAPTER VII

MODERN ETHICS

1. THE tradition of Greek ethics did not wholly disappear with the decay of the classical civilization. In part it was incorporated in Roman law, and if buried with it for a time, shared in its revival from the twelfth century onwards. In part it coalesced with the leading ideas of Christianity, and was made subservient to the exposition of Christian doctrine. Particularly, as we shall see more fully later, the idea of a Law of Nature has a continuous history from the "common reason" of Heraclitus and the "natural justice" of Aristotle, through the Roman jurisprudence and the Canon Law to Grotius and Hobbes, and from them to Locke and Rousseau. Modern Moral Philosophy starts with the wisdom of the Greeks as its working capital. But from the first it had to deal with a more complex situation, a more tangled conflict of claims upon the conscience, a wider apparent fissure between the individual life and the social order.

The rise of a world religion, with claims on the spiritual life which were by no means easy to reconcile with any political authority, resulted in mediæval Europe in a separation of the Spiritual and Temporal powers and the erection of distinct and frequently opposed authorities, each claiming the strict allegiance of the individual. The Reformation threw these two powers in many countries into prolonged and violent antagonism, and the problem of conflicting duties to king and country, on the one hand, and to Christ and the Church, or to God and conscience, on the other, was raised in its most acute form. Such a conflict could leave neither political nor spiritual

authority unimpaired, and where the Greek philosophers had something to appeal to which all men were in a measure ready to recognize in the State and the traditional laws and customs which the State maintained, the first problem of modern philosophy was to find a higher authority to which either State or Church might appeal. There could no longer in thinking minds be any question of accepting either of the rivals as ultimate and supreme arbiter of right and wrong. Thus deprived of an unquestioned external authority men were thrown back in the first instance on their interpretation of the revealed Word of God, but as the principal conflict had turned from the first on questions of interpretation, and as experience had shown how the plainest meaning could be wrested into an ambiguous sense or the most categorical mandate erected on the basis of a forced interpretation, it was plain that revelation alone could supply no single and unquestioned standard whereby doubts might be removed. Hence the logic of facts drove men to the admission of private judgment, and the decay of an universally recognized authority forced the thinker to fall back on the individual, and to find in his conscience, his instincts, his reason, possibly in his merely selfish necessities, but at any rate somewhere in his "nature" as a human being, a point of departure for theories of moral conduct and the social order.

This was in a sense to repeat what the Greek thinkers had done when they found a basis of political order and social justice in the moral nature common to all human beings. But the whole historical situation made it impossible for modern thought to offer so simple a solution as that which had satisfied the Greeks. The conflict between law and conscience, public authority and private judgment, had been raised in too acute a form. The Greeks might be satisfied with the proof that man being a social animal, his duties as a citizen were a necessary part of the life that was best for himself, and so conclude to a close identification of private and public welfare. But to the modern it was not merely self-interest, but conscience which often clashed with authority. While to the Greek there was one form of political association which was obviously best, to the modern, particularly at the period of the rise of modern ethics in the seventeenth century, it might be said with more truth

that there was no form of political association open at all, but only submission to some form of political despotism. The corporate life of the Middle Ages was everywhere in an advanced stage of decay. Political virtue meant for the many, not "the capacity to rule and be ruled with a view to the best life," but submission to the powers that were. The process of erecting a true commonwealth under modern conditions had not passed the experimental stage, nor had the experiments been wholly encouraging. At their best the large kingdoms of the modern world were not as close to the hearts of their subjects as the city-state of antiquity was to its citizen. The interests of state and citizen were not so manifestly intertwined. Private life had a larger, and public life on the whole a narrower, sphere. It would have been to assume too much to lay down that public and private well-being were two sides of the same thing. It had to be recognized that the individual might have a life of his own, and that both from interest and from conscience he might have motives bringing him into conflict with the interests of state as interpreted by the ruler.

Thus the antithesis of the individual and society was more deeply cut than in the Greek days, and required a more radical solution, while it was complicated by the relatively new antithesis between private judgment and authority. In a simpler society these might both be resolved into forms of the primary antithesis between duty and interest, and this in turn might be solved by an identification of true interest with duty. But this solution, again, was not so easy to the modern thinker. The claims made on the individual by the moral law in modern times were more exacting than in antiquity, and in some measure consisted in ideals to which the mass of men have never been brought to render much more than lip service. It was one thing to agree that true well-being for the individual lay in the exercise of qualities which all really admired, and outside the discussions of the sceptic's lecture-room treated in practice as the essential equipment of a gentleman. It was quite another thing to proffer the same justification for duties which few in their hearts regarded as more than formulas which might mean something to an anchorite, but had little living relation to the affairs of ordinary life. The modern moral code

is harder than the Greek, partly because it has incorporated a larger mass of ideal elements, some contributed by later Greek thinkers themselves, others by Christianity, others by modern Rationalism, and also because modern life is more complex and its ramifications more widespread. Political duty, to instance a single point, may impose on the citizen of a great kingdom, and still more on one of a world empire, consideration for those whom he never has seen or will see, and the kind of political virtue so called upon is far more difficult to evolve and sustain in active being than the public spirit of a compact community where every one knows his neighbours, and the consequence of a public wrong falls at once and manifestly, if not on the very men who have voted for it, then on neighbours whose sufferings they actually witness. Thus it is owing partly to an advance in thought, partly to a change in the ethical situation, that in modern philosophy the Greek antithesis between the real and the apparent good, the choice respectively of reason and desire, deepens into the opposition of duty and interest, and morality presents itself, not so much as a source of happiness which every enlightened man must eagerly choose for himself, but rather as a law imposed on human nature to the cheerful performance of which it may by an effort attain, but which compels by authority, rather than appeals by inherent attractiveness. Duty and self-sacrifice become central conceptions of ethical theory. At the same time, since conduct cannot have moral worth unless it is unconstrained, the sanction of this law had to be found within human nature itself, and even in a sense within the nature of each individual, who must at least adopt of his own choice the law by which he is compelled uniformly to consider other interests than his own and may be constrained to sacrifice all that is dear to him. Thus the modern world has the ancient paradox before it in a yet sharper form. For though it may be said that true well-being lies for us, as for the ancients, in well-doing, and though this solution is occasionally brought up afresh, yet it fails to the modern mind to be more than a re-statement of the problem to be solved, since that well-being which was an undivided conception for the Greeks has been analyzed for us into the Happiness which a man experiences within his own consciousness, and the excellence which

another may praise and admire in him, but which may have brought him a heavy balance of sorrow. For similar reasons the Greek axiom that every man seeks the good, though useful in its place, can hardly avail to solve an antithesis which derives its whole point from the frequent conflict of moral goodness with the good things for which our nature craves.

2. Thus modern systems have moved between the poles of an authoritative moral law and an unconstrained self-direction of human nature, and the attempt to suppress either term of the antithesis brings about its Nemesis in the movement of thought. The ball is set rolling by Hobbes, in whose system the element of law, identified here with state law, becomes merely derivative. By the "law of nature," as we find it at this stage, each man seeks his own preservation, but since in the correlative "state of nature" where every man's hand is against every man, the life of all is or would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," men agree together tacitly or expressly to confer the plenitude of their natural rights upon a king who shall rule over them and keep them from mutual wrongs. This is the social contract which men make and maintain, each for the sake of his own preservation, since its persistent breach would reduce society to primeval chaos. Thus in the name of the Law of Nature Hobbes reduced morality to egoism as its ultimate basis. But in so doing he provoked the retort that his account of our nature does not correspond with the facts, and a succession of writers lay stress on the several social elements in human nature, till Butler, the form of whose theory is still determined by the questions set by Hobbes, elaborates a complete theory of the natural constitution of man in which conscience is, by the very law of the constitution and with the approval of self-love itself, established as the authoritative guide. Yet Butler in the ends fails doubly, not only because he has no provision for the actual variations in the deliverance of conscience, but also because, with a backwash of feeling from the currents of the time, he ends by admitting self-love to a supremacy which would be fatal to his whole argument if he had not future rewards and punishments to fall back on. But to fall back on the supernatural was in effect to

abandon the position and leave the way open for other lines of thought.

The most vigorous of these in England was the attempt to conciliate the egoistic and social sentiments on the lines of what was later known as Utilitarianism. Partly through the analysis of moral judgments (as in Hume's *Enquiry*), partly by the analysis of desire (as in Hartley and the Mills), the position was reached that the good is universally the pleasurable. But on this at once arose the fundamental question—whose good and whose pleasure are to be considered? Mine by me and yours by you, or that of all men by both of us? In this statement of the question the antithesis of duty and interest was resolved into that between others and self, and assumed a particularly acute form. For the psychological proof that pleasure is the object of desire pointed to egoism. It was my pleasure which my desire was supposed to contemplate. But the thesis that the pleasurable is the good once granted was applied to society as a whole. The happiness of all men was laid down as the standard of action, and its promotion urged (as by the younger Mill) as a duty. The reconciliation between these somewhat contradictory positions was sought in the sympathy and social feelings of mankind whether natural (Adam Smith) or built up on a more egoistic basis by a process of association (Hartley and James Mill). Through these feelings a man might come to identify his pleasure and pain with those of others, and deliberately sacrifice all purely personal happiness for the pleasure of serving his fellow-men, or to avoid the pain of remorse consequent on a betrayal. Taken at its best, however, this explanation gives no adequate account of rational obligation. It may be said to show that self-sacrifice is possible, and to offer an account of how the feeling of duty arises in the individual; but it does not make clear in what precise sense we can tell the man whose sympathies are not sufficiently developed to make him prefer another's happiness to his own, that he "ought" to do so, that this is his "duty," to perform which is "right" and to neglect it "wrong." Do these terms simply mean that this is the course of conduct which we prefer and which, if he felt as we do, he would also prefer, or do they mean that the more social conduct is intrinsically preferable whether he or we happen to prefer it or not?

If with the last of the great Utilitarians we adopt the latter view, we impinge upon the line of thought which in the form at one time of Intuitionism, in another of Rationalism, has run its course throughout modern philosophy from the Cambridge Platonists to our own day. We need not here refer to earlier phases of this form of thought, for rationalism took upon itself a new being in the Kantian theory. To the conception of morality as a law Kant gave the strongest expression that it has ever received. For him the very assertion of a moral judgment implies the existence of a law binding on all men as such, irrespective of persons and of consequences, and duty is duty only when done for the fulfilment of this law and for no extraneous motive. But again, since in morality man must be free, it is only man himself who can impose this law upon himself. He is at once sovereign and subject, sovereign as a rational being, a member of the spiritual world, which underlies phenomena; subject as a phenomenon existing in time and space, conditioned by those categories of substance and causation by which alone a phenomenon can exist. As rational he prescribes to himself a law which, as a being in the world of sense, he may obey or disobey. If he were pure reason, he would conform to law without effort and be perfect. If he were pure sense, he could know no law. Partaking of both natures, he is a responsible being, the subject, but not always the obedient subject, of a moral law.

In defining morality as law and in making it a law set by man to himself, Kant is in the centre of modern ethical thought. But the peculiar setting of his doctrine was in part determined by the transitional character of the Kantian metaphysics, and in part by certain exaggerations natural at the outset in the statement of all that a law implies. Kant's critics have pointed out, for example, that a rational law cannot disregard circumstances or consequences, as Kant would have it do. On the contrary, if the practical reason in man meant anything, it meant a capacity to be guided by ends and direct action thereto, and ends could not be served without taking changes of circumstances and all manner of consequences into account. Hence if there was to be a rational law binding on all human beings as such without regard to any extraneous considerations, it must be a

law binding them to permanent regard for some universal end. Again, those who stand nearest to the direct line of descent from Kant in modern Ethics admit that Reason was misconceived when it was placed in fundamental opposition to every emotional impulse. Reason on its practical as on its theoretic side is that which makes for coherence, connectedness, harmony. It forms experience into a connected whole, and it condemns as irrational only that idea which will not fit into the whole. On the ethical side it is that which makes for unity and coherence among the different and often jarring elements of our nature, and it is to be understood accordingly, not as an authority above and outside all feelings, emotions, sentiments and whatever else may impel us to action, but as a principle working within them towards harmony. If under the name of feeling we include all the interest we take in action and the ends and outcome of action, then reason undoubtedly rests on a basis of feeling; but while as irrational beings we feel things imperfectly, confusedly and inconsistently, so as to be led hither and thither by the stress of impulse, the work of reason is to gather up all feelings into one steady movement of will-power, to give them unity or at least consistency of direction, and so achieve for us a life that is at one with itself. Such an order is a rational order, because its component parts, instead of conflicting, support and further one another.

If the work of reason could be so completed that every impulse within us fitted in of itself as part of such an order, we should have what Kant called the perfect will and the sense of duty would cease. But because the work of reason is never complete our nature is never wholly at one with itself, there is strife within us. In part our impulses are harmonized and set in one definite direction, and it is here that we feel that our true self lies. In part they still rebel and chafe against their limits, and then arises the feeling of constraint and of moral obligation. Thus our nature in a sense lays a law upon itself, and this law is a rational law, and yet its foundation is in feeling and its purpose is the satisfaction of the permanent bent of our nature. These and similar criticisms urged by the line of Idealist thinkers who claim descent from Kant fall into line with the metaphysical criticisms by which they sought to overcome the dualism of the

Critical philosophy and to depict the entire process of things as a working out or realization of Spirit. In this way of thinking the familiar ethical antitheses tend to be regarded as apparent rather than real. The opposition between duty and interest or reason and desire is resolved into that between the real and permanent self and the illusory or temporary impulse. The very distinction between self and others disappears in the conception of a Universal Self which is the underlying reality of each, and whose movement towards realization constitutes the World process.

Apart from metaphysical controversies, the ethical rock lying always in the track of this movement of thought is the idea of Personality. Idealism sets out to overcome the separateness of individuals, but often seems to be only too successful, and to destroy what it ought to explain. Philosophy then has still to find a satisfactory method of stating the theory of moral obligation in terms which do full justice at once to individual personality and to the spiritual unity which binds men to the service of the common good. I will endeavour to state as briefly as possible the conclusion to which, in my own view, the course of thought, as shown in the considerations here briefly touched upon, seems to point.

3. As to the general conditions of the problem, any theory which recognizes an obligation in ethics must admit that there are actions which, if a man does not perform them with his whole heart, he yet feels constrained to perform. So far we have obligation as a psychological fact, explain it how we may. But further, a rationalist theory of ethics maintains that this constraint to be of a "moral" nature must be quite distinct from any pressure of external sanction, *i. e.* it must proceed from human nature, and so, as Kant showed, be imposed by each man upon himself. But none the less, thirdly, if it is to be something more than a psychological fact—a mere expression for the ultimate preference for one course of conduct over another—it must also be "objective," *i. e.* it must hold good for you and for me whether you or I ultimately acquiesce in it or not. It is the *prima facie* opposition of these two last points which constitutes the apparent paradox and the real difficulty of moral obligation.

The moral law which I recognize must be something which I adopt as a law binding on myself, and in that sense subjective. Yet it must be a law which binds me, even though I do not adopt it, and in that sense objective.

The Greeks formulated this problem in the shape of the contrast between my own good and that of others (the *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν*), and solved it (Ethics, ix., 8) by the thesis that my real good was the good of my real self, that this was the reason that is in me, and that reason might tell me to sacrifice the apparent good which lay in the satisfaction of my lower desires and satisfy my real self by serving others. In sum, in morals as in all conduct, I seek my own good, but as a moral man I judge truly that my good is to secure the good of others. The Kantian solution starts from a similar antithesis of reason and desire, but rests on a profounder analysis of the moral judgment and of the whole distinction between the objective and the subjective. To Kant, morality is subjective in that it is a law which I freely adopt as my own, which proceeds therefore from my own nature. It is objective in that it expresses a rational order which I apprehend as a rational being, and which I disobey only when and in so far as I am also an irrational being. The principle underlying the solution is the peculiarly Kantian thesis that the objective is the rational, and if this principle be admitted, the antithesis between subjective and objective disappears, or rather ceases to be an antithesis between something that proceeds from within and something that proceeds from without. The deeper contrast which the terms henceforward express, lies between that which rests on the caprice, the inclination, the erroneous or partial judgment of the individual, and that which must commend itself to all men in so far as they are guided by the rational element within them.

The problem then being re-stated, the question whether morality can be regarded as a matter of obligation resolves itself into the question of finding rational grounds for the moral judgment. Now if we seek for such ground outside the moral order we are at once convicted of the attempt to find a non-moral justification for morality. The rationalist then who stands by a moral obligation must seek it in the content or character of the moral order itself. He must ask himself whether the moral

order is a rational order, and he must determine the question by applying the same tests of rationality which he would use in any other intellectual problem. It is indeed objected to this test that the moral judgment does not, like the judgment which relates to the physical order, state a matter of fact, but rather imposes a command. We might accept the objection without fundamentally altering the test to be used. For orders issued may be intelligible or unintelligible, consistent or inconsistent. We can compare them one with another and see how they stand when regarded as a totality, and as we shall clearly see when the tests of rationality are passed in review, we can apply these tests to them as readily as to any other body of thought. But further, the rationalist will not wholly admit that the moral judgment merely issues an order and does not state a truth. On the contrary, it either asserts or implies that one course is "right," or "good" or "better" than another, and in so doing it appears to be founded on real relations of things, and as such subject to the test applicable to all judgments which claim to be valid and to deal with reality.¹

Now the validity of any judgment can only be tested or

¹ Though the moral judgment may be thus taken as asserting something, the attitude of the man who forms it with sincerity is not purely intellectual, *i. e.* not identical with that of one who without emotion notes some physical occurrence. On the contrary, any *bona fide* judgment of the form, "This is good, right, desirable," must be taken as expressing some practical sympathy or impulse of the person judging. Conversely, any desire or emotion that can be rendered definite at all may be regarded as translatable into such a proposition as—"This is good, or bad," as the case may be. This will be true not only of moral, but of non-moral or immoral feelings and impulses. The judgment uttered is (ultimately) a judgment of the relation between something under contemplation and the bent of our own nature, and this relation if expressible in intellectual terms is of an emotional or practical character. The judgment, then, when sincerely uttered conveys our own attitude to the subject of the proposition.

Now so far as we are swayed by a single impulse the relation in question will be judged from one side only (*e. g.* as satisfying a sensual craving). The function of reason is to enforce the judgment of the total relation of the object desired to our whole nature, and in so far as it has its way, reason (in accordance with the relation of reason and desire described above) re-moulds impulse until the different tendencies of the whole nature fall into line with one another. This is the practical harmony of the rational life, and it is translatable into a theoretical harmony in the form of a coherent conception of the good.

Of course this implies the Aristotelian view that the "practical reason" has its basis as much in the moral character as in any logical reasoning.

measured by another judgment independently formed but bearing on the same point. If the first judgment is corroborated by the second, we, so far, consider it valid. Now the second judgment in turn may demand corroboration. No final test of validity can be attained until we have exhausted all the points of view from which a given order of reality can be approached. At this point, the system of connected judgments so formed is valid, not in view of any further judgment founded on some outside source, for *ex hypothesi* no such outside judgment remains to be formed, but in virtue of its internal coherence. Thus the validity of a single judgment depends on its place within a system of judgments. The validity of the system on its internal coherence, the fact that it is built up of judgments which not only do not conflict, but maintain and necessitate one another. Final truth in such a system could only be claimed with perfect assurance, if we knew that we had exhausted all the points of viewing the order of reality with which we are dealing, and this is why final truth is not attainable by man. But the most complete truth which man can reach lies in the most comprehensive system of coherent thought which he can construct, and the way of reason lies always in the effort towards such a system, and of unreason in the adoption of beliefs which conflict with one another and cannot be reduced to a harmonious order.

To prove morality rational, then, we must be able to exhibit the moral order as a coherent whole. Its manifold judgments must not merely tolerate, but must actively support one another, and must similarly agree with any deduction from our knowledge of the physical or social order which may bear upon them. Now, in the actual morality recognized by any given society we cannot expect to find such coherence in perfection. We have seen the rough and ready way in which *de facto* morality grows up, how it is based on human character with all its imperfections, and influenced by accidents of historical development and partial theories of religious or quasi-scientific origin. The moral consciousness has all the characters of mind in growth, not of mind that has attained. But in this growth, and amidst the mass of partial and often inconsistent truth, we may find a tendency, a movement, an unfolding of a single idea, which

gives the coherence which we require to all conduct. We may be able to trace it among the inconsistencies which mar it, and through the partial truths which half illustrate and half obscure it, this truth of man as by God first spoken which the actual generations garble. If there is such an idea, and if it is capable of coherent application to all the aspects of life and conduct, it would be possible to found upon it an order of moral truth in which our manifold impulses and the judgments founded on them would meet and be seen to support one another as equally necessary parts of the same whole. Such an order could then be justly called a rational expression of the truth as to what is best for human beings.

Now, the germ of such an idea the teachers of mankind have found with singular consistency in the golden rule of Confucius, which bids each man treat others as himself. They may differ as to the phrasing and as to the application, but as to the essence and the principle itself all thinkers are at one, and reviewing all morality from primitive custom upwards, it is easy to see that, in however limited and halting a manner, the same principle is implied in the very recognition of rules of conduct of general application. That the individual is member of a spiritual whole with a common life and a general interest, is the axiom which gives the needed coherence to the multitudinous sympathies, susceptibilities, reluctances, that guide the moral life of the unreflecting man. The problem before rationalism is to carry this principle into detail, and show how it effects the harmony which it promises. At this point the problem of obligation passes into that of the moral Standard, and to prove that the moral order is rational, we must find an intelligible expression for the object which the moral principle propounds to us. Of the efforts made by modern thought in this direction we must speak later on. But assuming that a standard is found whereby all the lines of conduct laid down by the moral order may be viewed as starting from the same basis and pointing to the same result, let us see exactly what would be gained. First we should have a conception of "right" or "good" which would be rational in the full sense of satisfying the tests of the rational which we laid down. Secondly, this conception would be objective; *i. e.* it would hold independently of the opinion of

any given individual or of his determination to ignore it in favour of some preference of his own.

4. But in what sense would it "bind" him? This is generally taken as resolvable into the more precise question, "What will befall him if he ignore it?" Accepting the question in this form, let us from the outset insist that this consequence is not essentially or universally a loss of personal happiness. Admitting all that can be said of the pangs of remorse and the blessedness of martyrdom, we should still be, to say the least, unwise to stake anything on the possibility of proving that a loss of conscious, realized happiness attends every fall from virtue or refusal of duty. We may, if we please, maintain that it is well with the man who does his duty to his worldly loss, and ill with him who rejects it, but in speaking confidently on the point, we can only be judging them from outside. We are measuring them by that standard of merit to which we think men should conform, to which we ourselves wish to conform. We are not judging by the conscious happiness or misery which the two men experience, for we have no means of deciding with certainty what that consciousness is. If, indeed, we assume both of them to be animated alike by this same desire to conform to the rule of human duty which our judgment on them postulates, then we may impute those feelings of inward peace on the one hand, and lasting remorse on the other, which we know to be in average humanity determining factors in the balance of happiness and misery. But suppose that we have to deal on the one side with a conscientious soul much tried and often sore bested in the race, and on the other with a consciousness which gradually, perhaps half deliberately, blunts its moral feelings and loses the sting of shame. We may say with confidence that the second is a lower type, but we cannot with equal confidence assume that it experiences more unhappiness. Indeed, the probability lies in the opposite direction, and if nevertheless we persist that if we had to choose, we would prefer for ourselves the former character, we do so on the ground that something other than our own happiness is the motive which does and should move us, and that it is better to be half a hero and miserable than a whole-hearted brute, satisfied with brutishness. Such a con-

clusion is in fact held in germ in the bare conception of a moral obligation that is not merely a superior and more exact calculation of the elements of personal happiness and misery. In our thinking on this subject we are too often tempted to get the best of both worlds, to claim superiority to all selfish considerations when insisting boldly on the supremacy of the moral law, and then by an elastic interpretation of happiness to make terms with prudence and insist that even from this point of view the faithful servant of duty is proved wise in his generation. We are aided in this double feeling by phrases and turns of thought which enable us to identify Happiness and the Good. These terms are indeed closely related. We find happiness in conscious realization of the good, but we may attain the good without knowing it, or we may strive towards a supreme good at the cost of pain and misery which in the actual measurement of conscious feeling would probably far outweigh such satisfaction as our poor onward efforts may bring. Once admit and resolutely adhere to the admission that happiness is a condition of our conscious life, and we bring clearly into relief the truth that the ethical conception of the good carries us beyond our own conscious being and forbids us to look for a reward there.

This deduction fairly faced, we come back to the conception of obligation as resting on the relation of self to others, or more broadly, on the position of each man as a member of the great whole, in which, insignificant part as he is, he has his function to perform. It is that in him which answers to this position, which realizes, however dimly, the nature of the whole to which he belongs, which drives him on and impels him even through the wreck of his own happiness and the ruin of his personal desires to play his part. In a perfect human being indeed, all such conflicting desires would be overcome. If we imagine the reason within a man finding a perfectly rational order of ideas to guide it, and responding by carrying its own work of remoulding impulse to completion, we should have a character in which every impulse would of itself fit into an ordered whole. For such a being no satisfaction could be found outside the performance of the duties falling to his lot, and thus for him the antithesis of happiness and duty would be overcome. We do not find this perfection in real life, but we find the mirror

of it, or rather a fragment of it, wherever there is love. For here, too, happiness rests in service, and there can be no joy in satisfaction gained at the expense of the loved object. Hence the few men gifted with the genius of love which enables them to feel for mankind what ordinary men feel for wife or child, have always stood forth as the teachers capable of inspiring the world with a new gospel. Where love fails, colder duty takes its place, for though there is not the direct heart-whole feeling instinctively and without let or hindrance prompting service, there is still the bent of the nature in the main, the incomplete, imperfect impulse of the half-formed character, warring with the residue that is untamed, tending with pain and grief thither where perfection lies. Obligation, then, rests on the altruism of which the love-relation is the perfect type, which presents itself as duty when our natures are imperfectly formed by it, and is justified by reason because its aims alone give harmonious and coherent meaning to our practical efforts and our conception of the good. To conform to it, is to rise above considerations of personal happiness and to come into relation to the whole.¹

Obligation, then, cannot be resolved away. It remains standing with its claims upon a nature which is often recalcitrant, demanding at times a sacrifice of things that a great part of our nature craves. To maintain its authority in such a position it needs a rational justification. Seeking the direction in which such justification could be found, we have brought the rational groundwork of morals into relation with that of belief. Thought is rational in so far as it is a system of coherent or consilient judgments, and this internal cohesion is itself the ground and

¹ In admitting that a relatively greater happiness may be found in perfect egoism than in imperfect morality we may seem to be admitting that there are two positive standards of rational action. It is, perhaps, possible to maintain that an internally consistent egoism might be thought out. But this would be done only by systematically ignoring the impartial point of view which maintains that the happiness of another is also a good. The egoist may deny that this proposition interests him, but in so doing he is shutting the door upon the rational reflection that until cause is shown to the contrary one personality is of the same value as another. If the egoist can rebut this proposition he might be taken to prove his case. But merely to ignore it—and this seems to be the practical attitude of egoism—is to purchase internal consistency by leaving out of account disturbing considerations. This is not rational in the meaning which we, or any one else, can give to the term.

meaning of its validity. For conduct there is a rational and objectively valid order in so far as there is a similarly coherent scheme of moral judgments. The postulate of rational ethics, then, is that such a coherent body of ethical thought is to be found. Further, the idea underlying all ethical thought has been taken to be expressible in the form of the doctrine that each man is member of a spiritual whole to which he owes service. So far at least the Idealist construction holds good. If obligation is rationally justified, man is bound by spiritual ties to a community with a life and purpose of its own. But the tie is not such as to destroy his separate personality, but rather such that like Love it maintains the distinctness of the persons whom it binds together, and hence, though the whole to which he belongs may be called a spiritual whole, it is only by metaphor a self or a person. More strictly it should be a Spiritual whole in the true conception of which Personality is a subordinate element.¹ If this conclusion is correct the problem of finding the principles of a rational moral order resolves itself into that of formulating the nature and supreme purposes of the whole to which man belongs. To the efforts made by modern thought in this direction we must now turn.

5. Here once again modern thought starts with the idea of "nature." The conception of a Law of Nature binding on man as man had been adopted by the Church, who extended the conception by adding to the principles implanted in human nature itself those revealed in Holy Writ. These two sources of law are set forth at the outset of the *Decretum Gratiani* as together distinguished from the positive law of States.

"Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet jure et moribus. Jus naturæ est, quod in lege et evangelio continetur, quo quisque jubetur alii facere, quod sibi vult fieri, et prohibetur alii inferre, quod sibi nolit fieri."²

This is an ethical rather than a juristic principle. What follows corresponds better both to the ancient and modern idea of "natural" laws.

¹ Here the term super-personal, employed by some idealists, points in the right direction.

² *Decr. Grat., C. J., 1.*

"Jus naturale est commune omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu naturæ, non constitutione aliqua habetur, ut viri et feminæ conjunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum quæ caelo, terra-marique capiuntur; item depositæ rei vel commendatæ pecuniæ restitutio, violentiæ per vim repulsio."¹

The just supremacy of natural over state law is asserted by Gratian, and the authority of Augustine² and other Fathers adduced in its favour. The same doctrine is maintained by St. Thomas, and the Law of Nature, which was destined to become the associate and leader of revolutionaries, entered upon the modern period with all the odour of sanctity.

But it was not till the decay of theological ethics had begun that it assumed any real importance. Monotheism had divided reality into the natural and the supernatural, and when the one began to lose authority men turned to the other as of course. The Law of Nature provided a basis for morals, a standard for law, and a rule of conduct where no law was. It was in the last capacity in particular that it emerged as a working factor in thought. The Reformation had torn Western Europe asunder, and so destroyed that spiritual headship of the Popes which had provided some sort of common authority for the rival powers which it contained. The belief grew up that in international matters men were bound by no obligations whatever, and the belief was practically exemplified in the amazing horrors of sixteenth and seventeenth century warfare. The thinkers who sought to remedy an evil which had almost destroyed civilization in Germany, turned to the old antithesis between nature and human convention. They appealed to the conception of a natural law which all parties recognized, and which, being prior to political sovereignty, could be recognized by warring States without prejudice to their independence. Confining ourselves to Grotius as the most influential of the school, it is interesting to see how he conceives the Law of Nature. Combating the assumption that every animal seeks

¹ Decr. Grat., *C. J.*, p. 2.

² In the passages cited Augustine seems to have "divine" rather than "natural" law in view, but they are treated as the same by Gratian (see pp. 13-16).

its own advantage, he lays down that there is in man (and even in some lower animals) an *appetitus societatis*, a desire for community, and that not of any kind but of a tranquil kind, ordered in a manner congruous to his intelligence. We find an impulse to benefit others among certain of the animals and in infants anterior to any education. This social tendency is the fountain of natural law to which belong the obligations of "abstaining from what is another's, restitution of deposits, fulfilling contracts, reparation for culpable injuries and administering due punishment."¹ Further, since fulfilment of contracts is a part of natural law, and since a compact is the foundation of society, natural law is indirectly the source from which state laws flow. Lastly, though natural law would have force even if there were no God, or if He were indifferent to human things, in fact all Christians believe that He will punish disobedience to His law, and natural law, though it proceeds *ex principiis homini internis*, is still ultimately ascribable to Him as the fashioner of human nature.² Natural law, then, was something based on the nature of man as such, independent therefore of the whims of kings, nobles, or majorities, no respecter of the natural boundaries, or of any other differences that part groups of men, binding even on sovereign powers.

In elevating human personality above social convention and making its essential attributes tacitly, if not expressedly, the groundwork of political obligation, the law of nature was one way of formulating the most vital tendency in modern ethical thought. Moreover, it appeared to provide the fixed standard which in the decay of the supernatural was required by the ethical thinkers. But in this respect its promises were in large measure delusive. What precisely was natural was, and always has been, hard to say. If it was open to Grotius to maintain that man was naturally social and the fundamental laws of society were deductions from the law of nature, it was also possible for Hobbes to assert that man was by nature selfish, and that no social law could be produced from human nature if it were not for the fear that men entertain of one another. The Canon law might lay down that by nature all things are in common, while Grotius and Locke would agree that respect for

¹ Grotius, *Prolegomena*, 5-9.

² *Ib.*, secs. 11, 12.

others' property was a natural law. In one sense everything that occurs is natural and everything that men do arises out of human nature, and if that view is pressed, the whole difference between the natural and conventional disappears. Government is natural, even the freaks of a fashion are natural. It is certainly in human nature to tyrannize and domineer quite as much as it is in human nature to respect the equal rights of another. In this sense clearly nature means too much to be of any value as a term in ethics, but if, on the other hand, the permanent and fundamental conditions of human nature are meant the question arises how the fundamental is to be distinguished from the accidental and temporary, and the use of the term natural itself provides no test. Lastly, if natural means the ideal, the term which is really wanted when we speak of a standard by which laws and customs are to be renovated, then the canon of what always has been is insufficient for our purposes in so far as the natural falls short of the possible, and we could only identify the natural and the ideal by making unhistorical assumptions as to a state of nature in the Golden Age, which can do nothing but mislead.

In regard to the "natural rights" of man, definiteness was given to the doctrine by the complementary theory of social compact. Certain primary rights belong to a man as a human creature, and not merely as a member of society. They are regarded rather as attributes in individuals than as elements in a social system. Society is founded upon a contract whereby individuals yield up a portion of these rights in order to secure mutual aid in enforcing those which they retain. Thus while political or legal rights flow from the constitution of society, natural rights are the unexhausted residue of the original stock with which men are endowed. So much is common ground to upholders of the social contract from Hobbes to Rousseau and Paine, though they differ as to the conditions under which the contract was formed, and to the extent to which and the form in which the barter of natural for civil rights was effected. The general theory is very clearly stated by Paine.

"Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. . . . Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for

its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.”¹

From this principle it follows that opposite deductions might be drawn, and in fact were drawn, as to the sphere and functions of government. It might be used, as with Hobbes, to support despotism; or, as by Locke, to prove that a king who does not keep an implied contract with his people may be dethroned; or, as by Rousseau, to prove the ultimate and indefeasible sovereignty of the people as a whole. This last conception underlies a good deal of modern political thought, and we must note what it implies. The conception of natural rights, then, leads in Rousseau’s argument to popular sovereignty, because in the compact upon which society rests each man surrenders his own rights only in return for equal consideration in the decisions taken by the whole community. On the other hand, while the absoluteness of popular sovereignty is thus deduced from the doctrine of natural rights, it is limited by the same doctrine, for it may be held that in the exchange of natural for civil rights men do not part with all their rights, but assign some only to society, retaining those which are necessary to the inherent safety and dignity of the human personality. This point of view, in fact, underlies the Declaration of Rights by the French National Assembly. The theory is very clearly expressed by Paine. It is—

“First—That every civil right grows out of a natural right; or, in other words, is a natural right exchanged.

“Secondly—That civil power, properly considered as such, is made up of the aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man, which becomes defective in the individual in point of power, and answers not his purpose, but when collected to a focus becomes competent to the purpose of every one.

“Thirdly—That the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and in which the power to execute is as perfect as the right itself.”²

¹ *Rights of Man*, p. 306.

² Paine, 307.

The first six clauses of the Declaration of the Rights of Man show how the leaders of the French Revolution endeavoured to give practical shape to these ideas.

"1. Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded only on public utility.

"2. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression.

"3. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it.

"4. Political Liberty consists in the power of doing whatever does not injure another. The exercise of the natural rights of every man has no other limits than those which are necessary to secure to every *other* man the free exercise of the same rights; and these limits are determinable only by the law.

"5. The law ought to prohibit only actions hurtful to society. . . .

"6. The law is an expression of the will of the community. All citizens have a right to concur either personally or by their representatives in its formation."¹ . . .

We may sum up in a single sentence this expression of the creed in which the doctrine of the law of nature had culminated. Freedom, equal rights and security of person and property, limited only by considerations of public utility as determined by a sovereign people, this is the only moral basis of government. These principles insist upon the claims of human personality more fully than any previous ethical system had done; in so doing, and also, it must be granted, in placing a limit on the function of the state, they expressed a tendency with which the modern mind was on the whole in sympathy.

The State is thus conceived as having a sphere carved out of the original totality of rights in accordance with the necessities of the social compact. It figures as a necessary derogation from the plenitude of individual freedom—a necessary evil which, whenever it passes these natural limits, becomes a positive evil. The good the state can do is negative. It is the free individual on whom progress depends. In this conclusion yet another

¹ From Paine's *Rights of Man*, pp. 351, 352.

element in the conception of "nature" co-operated—the tendency to identify what is natural with what is best—a tendency which we find alike in the Physiocrats and in Adam Smith, and which was bequeathed by them to the economists of the first half of the nineteenth century. Not only had men a natural right to freedom in industry and trade, but the natural course of industry and exchange produced the best economic results. The industrial and commercial mechanism became perfect in proportion as it was allowed to run without interference from the central government. Under "natural" conditions, *i. e.* in the absence of attempts at collective direction, rent, profits, interest, wages, find their level. Any attempt to disturb this level produces a recoil, involving friction, waste and misery. Under natural conditions production finds for itself the course of greatest profit and least waste. The need that men have of one another makes them insensibly find the line of least resistance in their mutual dealings, and what that line will be none can tell for each individual so well as he himself. He moves precisely where his interest draws him, and to deflect him from the line of movement is to inflict on him and on others whose interests are involved in free dealings with him a net loss.

Thus in various forms—now as a Universal Law, now as a Primitive State, now as the source of indestructible right, and again as a beneficent tendency of things—the idea of nature formed a setting for men's thoughts on social ethics. It lent itself with an elasticity that was all its own to the varying needs of successive thinkers. But so far as it had a fixed meaning in social philosophy, it expressed the antithesis to the deliberate action of governments, and thus it was well fitted to serve as a rallying point for the modern political movement, the object of which, put in the most general terms, was to substitute the State based upon consent for the *régime* of governmental authority based on force. The conception of nature was a useful lever in the demolition of the old structure of monarchical absolutism and feudal privilege, wherein government very readily appeared as something imposed on the mass of the community from outside instead of springing from their own "nature" within. For the most part it was only too true that the less such governments meddled with affairs, the better it

was for the people concerned. It was true that the social structure which they preserved was not natural as resting either on the fitness of things or on permanent and insuperable necessities of human nature. Nor was it only the destructive side of the movement that the idea of nature expressed. In a dim and somewhat inarticulate fashion the term stood for fundamental conditions of human welfare, and in particular for the claims of human personality as independent of and superior to all legal and political obligations. Round the central conception range, as shown above (Part I., Summary), all the rights claimed by the modern man and woman, and those rights are one pole of modern ethics and of the modern state.

6. But when the question of the more precise definition of these rights arises, the limitations of the doctrine become apparent and the other pole of ethics comes into view. No right can be made absolute without threatening the destruction of society, and it is impossible to discuss the adjustment of any claims of the individual for many sentences without admitting a reference to the common welfare or some such principle. This is the point of departure for Bentham's criticism. The so-called Rights of man were, according to him, so many "anarchical fallacies." A man had a right to so much as was consistent with the general happiness, and no more. About the cause of happiness and misery one can inquire and debate, and finally prove an opinion or disprove it. But as to rights men can debate endlessly and prove nothing.

"To any such word as right, no other conception can ever be attached but through the medium of a law, or something to which the force of law is given; from a real law comes a real right; from an imagined law nothing more substantial can come than a correspondently imagined right. Lay out of the question the idea of law, and all that you get by the use of the word right is a sound to dispute about. I say I have a right; I say you have no such right: men may keep talking on at that rate till they are exhausted in vociferation and rage; and, when they have done, be no nearer to the coming to a mutual conception and agreement than they were before."¹

The argument could only be settled by reference to the

¹ Bentham, *Securities against Misrule adapted to a Mohammedan State*, 1822-23, chap. i, Works, vol. viii., 557.

higher principle of the general welfare, which both disputants could accept. If there is no *common* good which both admit, definable in terms which both can recognize, there is nothing to limit the possible claims of each. But the common good is after all a vague phrase. Could any means be found of so defining it as to make it an objective test of the right and wrong of action? Such means the Utilitarians (if the name may be applied retrospectively) conceived themselves to have discovered in the calculus of pleasures and of pains. The general happiness was the supreme end of creation. Happiness consisted positively in the consciousness of pleasure, negatively in the avoidance of pain. The goodness of a form of government, a social or political institution, a Law, or a moral rule, might thus be submitted to a positive and objective test. Did it on the whole produce more happiness than misery? If so, it was good. Did it produce a balance of pain? If so, it was bad. Here was an objective test which a perfected sociological science (here the word must be allowed prospectively) might carry out into detail. In point of fact Bentham set himself to work out a theory of law and government upon that basis. But the first condition of any such undertaking was that rights should be reduced from their proud position. They were not fundamental and inviolable principles, but were means to an end. If freedom in any given direction promotes the general happiness—well and good. Men have a right to that kind of freedom. Let it be shown, however, that such freedom tends to produce a balance of pain, and the right disappears. Rights then are related to the happiness of mankind. On the other hand, the two most important "rights of man" are in point of fact incorporated in Bentham's scheme. Equality in fact may be said to be its corner-stone—"Everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one."

"The happiness of the most helpless pauper constitutes as large a portion of the universal happiness, as does that of the most powerful, the most opulent member of the community. Therefore the happiness of the most helpless and indigent has as much title to regard at the hands of the legislator, as that of the most powerful and opulent"¹

¹ *Const. Code*, Bk. I., chap. xv., sec. 7, Works, vol. ix., p. 107. Cf. Mill's *Utilitarianism*, chap. v., p. 92.

The thought here appears to be that happiness is the sole end of value, and that any person's happiness is of equal value with any other person's. As in Kant, impartiality between persons is the foundation of morality. Individual liberty was also well provided for. The close relation of private and general happiness was an essential part of the scheme. Whether by enlightened self-interest or by the cultivation of the social feelings men could come to identify their good with that of other people's, and it was to this free choice rather than to any form of compulsion that the Utilitarians as a whole mainly trusted. On the other hand, since power in the hands of one man or of a few might be used selfishly, it was necessary that each man should have a share in determining the government of the country, and so the third of the great "ideas of '89" is reached by another path. There must be democratic government, not because popular sovereignty is a matter of absolute right deducible from the imagined character of a fictitious social compact, but because it is the only way to check the selfishness of rulers and so ensure the general happiness.

In this statement government is still tacitly conceived as essentially an infringement on the sphere of the individual, a necessary evil, the encroachments of which must be carefully watched. This attitude to government is not indeed essential to the Utilitarian principles, but it is characteristic of the phase of thought to which Utilitarianism historically belongs. In the Utilitarian method, society is still thought of in terms of "numbers" of people whose feelings of happiness and misery can be added and subtracted, rather than as a whole, in which the injury of any one part is apt to spread its bad influence through the body. With the same tendency, an even more vital defect is connected. To make general happiness the standard of law and morals was an immense advance in the direction of defining the moral idea upon the old conception of nature, and in Bentham's hands it could initiate a valuable and far-reaching series of reforms. Yet to make happiness the sole criterion, as though the kind of objective life in which men find happiness were unimportant, was a mistake which hampered Utilitarianism from the outset in accounting for moral obligation. Even if happiness were in theory the ultimate end, it

was not sufficiently recognized—unless perhaps by the younger Mill—that the kind of life in which happiness is found is all-important. The happiness of one section, or of one generation, might be purchased at the expense of misery in the future, and if this was to be avoided and an intelligent view of the permanent conditions of happiness for mankind at large was to be obtained, it was necessary to make the laws of healthy social development the object of study and the direct standard of conduct. The direct application of the Greatest Happiness principle might be applied with success to the flagrant abuses with which the men of Bentham's day had to contend, but as more controversial questions arise and greater scientific precision is needed, the calculus of pleasures and pains becomes inapplicable. We cannot think out the value of action in terms of the indefinitely large number of persons affected. We do not know where to stop in taking consequences into account, and the thread of causation is lost as we endeavour mentally to follow it into the dim distance. If we are to trace social cause and effect with any hope of securing tangible and well-grounded results, we must therefore start from the other end. We must think of the corporate life of society and inquire whether it exhibits any laws of health, of growth or decay, and so far as we can ascertain such laws we may judge of the broad effects of conduct.

7. Thus on several sides the Utilitarian method needed to be supplemented by a conception of the collective social life of humanity emerging and maturing under conditions which it is the supreme object of practical wisdom to ascertain and understand. Such a conception had already entered into modern thought with the work of writers like Vico and Montesquieu, and formed the basis of a historical treatment of sociology. From these it passed through Condorcet and the St. Simonians to Comte and his disciples. In another incarnation it inspired the Hegelian philosophy of history. Amid great variations, not merely in detail but in the whole handling of the subject, historical sociology leads to certain fairly well marked views on questions of ethical principle. First of all, it lays down that neither duties nor rights can be studied without a knowledge

of social conditions, for without society there is neither duty nor right. But further, social conditions are not the same everywhere or at every time. The relations on which the preacher of absolute right and wrong would rest his moral laws are themselves moving relations. Humanity is a growing organism, and the problem of the thinker is to understand the laws of its growth and adjust the code of conduct which his disciples are to preach to the needs of the present phase. For though there are "laws" of social growth, we are not to suppose that the result is so determined as to be wholly beyond the power of human intelligence to modify. There are "laws" of health, yet there is a use for doctors. It is so far as we understand the laws of social life that we can hope to affect it intelligently, and in point of fact it is of the essence of its growth that humanity becomes conscious of itself; that is to say, more and more aware of the conditions upon which its happiness and progress depend, and so capable of self-direction. In this conception of a self-directing humanity lies the basis of scientific ethics.

As conceived by Comte, it was more than a basis of ethics. Collective humanity, as a being that never dies, but grows, learns and develops throughout the ages, was to be the object of a new religion, a religion dealing with realities and based on science, that should put behind it for ever the dreams of the theologians and the cobwebs of metaphysics. Whatever there was of spiritual good was to be found in the life of humanity, in the relations of human beings to one another, and nowhere else in the world. With regard to the ultimate origin and basis of things, men could imagine what they pleased, but no absolute truth was obtainable. Throughout history schemes of theology had arisen, flourished and decayed. They had come into being to meet some intellectual or moral need of mankind. They had flourished so long as they satisfied that want; they had perished when other wants arose, when deeper questions were asked, when they no longer fitted the more developed character of the race. Their strength lay not in their truth, but always in their practical value. And while such systems rose and fell, what was permanent was the onward movement of the human spirit passing from one stage to another in its ascent towards a rational consciousness of the needs and the purposes

of its own life, ascending from fetishism to polytheism, from polytheism to monotheism, from monotheism to metaphysical theories of the origin of things, and finally from the metaphysical stage to the scientific conception of human development as the supreme and crowning object of human effort. True religion was a matter essentially concerned with human life, the co-ordination of human purpose, the regulation of human conduct. It was not a theory of the origin of things or the ultimate end of the world. Rational truth is only obtainable when men put aside the very effort to frame such a theory as one of the dreams of humanity's youth. We know nothing of the causes of things. We know only the laws by which phenomena succeed one another, and the value of this knowledge is practical, and its genuineness is measurable by the practical use which we can make of it. Knowledge which enables us so to act, so to modify the sequence of events, as to meet the needs of mankind, is true knowledge, positive knowledge. Everything beyond it is useless, and the attempt to cultivate such knowledge merely leads us off again to the dreamland of theology and metaphysics. To reach this conception of knowledge is itself the most important step in human development. Men began by explaining everything they did not understand as the action of a spirit. At first there was a special spirit for the action of every special object; this was the stage of fetishism. Then there was a greater spirit, a God presiding over great classes of objects; this was the stage of polytheism. Finally there was one spirit ruling the whole universe, which was the stage of monotheism. The whole theological scheme, however, fell before metaphysical criticism, which showed the regression of causes to be infinite, and the ultimate nature of reality to be unknowable, and yet in the hands of most metaphysicians endeavoured most inconsistently to form theories of causation which in essence merely replaced the spirit of the theological stage by a less concrete, less palpable entity conceived as underlying phenomena. Abandon these entities and deal with the phenomena alone. Study the laws of their co-existence and sequence in such wise that you may regulate them for the good of your kind, and you reach the final stage of intellectual development, the positive method, the

method of science, which gives you fact without any hypothesis, and a purpose realizable in this world, capable of being tested by human experience, bringing down religion from the heights of a theological and metaphysical dream to the practical realities of daily life. In this conception all that was best in the religious and ethical systems of the past was to be incorporated without the errors of the past. For humanity had worked out empirically as it were, in a blind, groping, unconscious manner, both the fundamental institutions necessary to its existence, such as marriage, property and government, and also the ethical and religious systems which were suited to each stage of its development. But in all cases there was a large admixture of error, and it was the problem for a scientific religion to maintain the truth, letting the shell of error drop off. The Gods taken at their best were incarnations of essentially human relations, human feelings, human duties. Could not these human relations, these human duties be made objects of reverence apart from the shell in which they had hitherto lived, and would they not be purer so conceived? For the very process of incarnation had robbed the spiritual of half its character. By transferring it to a supernatural world, it had given ground for the suggestion that it had no application to this world, and based it on dogmas which proved a treacherous support, instead of allowing it to stand by its own inherent strength. The problem of positive religion was to restore virtue and righteousness, charity and justice, to their true dignity, to recognize in them a positive value as integral elements in the noblest life of humanity, requiring no sanction, theological or metaphysical, to back them up, but relying on their own inherent beauty and strength. But theological religion at its best, as seen in the mediæval Church, had provided a rule for all life. It had presided over every occasion; it had been present at birth, marriage and death, in sickness and in health, in good and evil fortune, encouraging saintship, heroism and devotion, comforting misery and cheering the penitent. In all these directions the conception of humanity was to fulfil the same function; it was the focus and meeting-point of all good and resolute effort; the humblest devotee of science no less than the greatest philosophic intelligence was contributing to its progress. The statesman, the

man of affairs, the captain of industry, had their function, did their service in forwarding the progressive organization of life. The poet, the musician, the artist inspired or expressed the onward movement of the human spirit. All past history was lit up by the conception of this great movement to which all previous efforts of humanity pointed. A positive religion would provide for a renovated worship of saints and heroes in the persons of all who had contributed to the march of the human mind. The light thus reflected on the past shone even more brightly upon the present. Every social effort, every endeavour to the furtherance of knowledge, art or industry received a new dignity when considered as contributing, each in its degree, to one great all-embracing cause. Nor were the minor interests of life swamped by the supreme conception. Religion and humanity preached no vague diffused benevolence which should override the more direct and personal ties that bind us to our family, our neighbour and our country. On the contrary, all these had their place. Each was recognized as intrinsically a worthy object of devotion, only it must be a devotion limited by the broad requirements of the human religion—that is to say, it must be a devotion purged of the elements of collective pride and selfishness. We must love our country, but not so as to wish it to dominate all others. Our chief pride in it must lie in our sense of the service that it renders to humanity, just as the only legitimate pride that we can feel in our own achievements or in the career of those near and dear to us should depend on the extent to which those achievements or that career has been of service to the world at large. Humanity was not to override those fundamental attachments which make up the larger part of practical life for all of us. It was to purify and co-ordinate them, to infuse into them a spirit of wider sympathy, to elevate them by a deeper sense of their meaning and value.

The peculiar form given to humanitarianism by Comte has been criticized from many points of view. Fundamentally it is objected that it propounds to us the worship either of a vague impalpable abstraction, or, if we reduce humanity to concrete terms, of ourselves—weak, imperfect beings as we are. To this, one of Comte's ablest disciples replies that the conception

of humanity as the goal and basis of human effort is misunderstood.

“No one thinks that when he mentions the word England or France or Germany, he is talking of a ghost or a phantom. Nor does he mean a vast collection of so many millions of men in the abstract; so many million ghosts. Man in the abstract is of all abstractions the most unreal. By England we mean the prejudices, customs, traditions, history, peculiar to Englishmen, summed up in the present generation, in the living representatives of the past history. So with Humanity. . . . Is such a religion self-worship? . . . What explains the error is the belief that by Humanity we mean the same thing as the human race. We mean something widely different. Of each man’s life, one part has been personal, the other social: one part consists in actions for the common good, the other part in actions of pure self-indulgence, and even of active hostility to the common welfare. Such actions retard the progress of Humanity, though they cannot arrest it: they disappear, perish, and are finally forgotten. There are lives wholly made up of actions such as these. They form no part of Humanity. Humanity consists only of such lives, and only of those parts of each man’s life, which are impersonal, which are social, which have converged to the common good.”¹

It would seem from this that the conception of Humanity is not so much what logicians call a collective concept including all men and women. It is rather that of a Spirit pervading human beings and their life, not indeed a Being outside and over above men and women, but a Being that is the best of them—the good that is in each working together—the spiritual whole so constituted.²

¹ J. H. Bridges, *Discourses on Positive Religion*, p. 105.

² If it be said that such a unity of individual distinct minds can only have a mystical meaning, it may be replied that it is precisely the kind of unity towards which the passage quoted above from Dr. Bridges points. If, further, it is alleged that only the individual minds are real and that a totality constituted by them is not a real being, the reply is that this is a form of the nominalist fallacy. The totality is not another individual similar to those which compose it, but is none the less the real being which together they make up. All the vital processes of the human body proceed in separate cells. The body itself is not another cell, but neither is it a mystic creation. It is the totality of the cells, and its life the totality of the cellular processes. So in all probability conscious life depends, not on a process in any one cell of the brain, but in multitudinous processes carried on simultaneously in cells that lie far apart in the cerebral mass. Yet consciousness is one. So the Mind of Humanity is the unity in process of

When stated in these terms the conception of Humanity comes into close relation with a conception towards which the metaphysical method which Comte rejected had made independent advances. The Hegelian philosophy, for example, conceived history as a process wherein the Spirit, continually seeking realization, arrives finally at self-consciousness. Allowing for difference of terminology and for the more essential point of divergence that Positivism is a theory of practice, Hegelianism a theory of the ultimate nature of reality, this is after all something very close to the idea of humanity as a name for all that makes for good in men winning through the long struggles of historical development to consciousness of itself and the deliberate guidance of its own life. In either case it is at bottom the idea of the development of the divine in man that is used as a solution of ethical and religious problems. From such opposite poles do we approach an idea which would seem to be at the heart of modern thought. The God of Monotheism, as the ideally perfect Being, became, as we saw, separated from the world as its Creator and Ruler. From this separation arose ethical problems which might be concealed under a mass of optimistic verbiage, but were incapable of any genuine solution on the basis of an unconditional creation of things by a Being Who is perfect in Himself. We have seen the partial recognition of this *impasse*, pointing religious thinkers through the theory of Free Will to an educative conception of the dealings of God with man. Idealism, carrying this further, has sought to overcome the cleavage involved in Monotheism, to bring back the Divine Creator into the undivine created world. They have thus been led by a very roundabout road to a transfigured version of that indwelling Spirit with which religion starts, a Spirit which dwells in things instead of controlling them without. When the attributes of this Spirit are frankly criticized they are found to imply that it is not the whole of nature, but is conditioned by nature even while shaping it, and strives with things, though they are its own flesh; and only through the evolutionary process which science, as well as philosophy, recognizes, presses on to that final

formation of multitudinous minds of men. To call it "mind" may be metaphorical and inadequate. But to call it a real agency is, I think, literal prose.

and complete domination of the conditions of existence which the earlier theory attributed to it at its point of departure as the starting point and origin of Creation.

The conception of Development has been applied and extended by physical science. Biology has carried it far beyond the limits of human history and applied it to all forms of life. Contemporary physics and chemistry are using it to explain the constitution of inanimate matter. However little thinkers may agree about its philosophic interpretation, the idea of Development is the central conception of modern thought, and the idea of Humanity in development holds that place in modern ethics.¹

If we consider carefully the differences of interpretation which distinguish different schools of thought, we shall find that they turn largely on the value of this conception—or indeed of any conception derived from human experience as an expression of the ultimate nature of reality. The self-conscious Spirit of Hegel, and the self-directing Humanity of Comte, for example, differ primarily on this point. The Hegelian would hold that Absolute Self-Consciousness can be proved by a metaphysical demonstration to express the true character of the Absolute. Those who at all lean to Positivism would deny that such reality is in any way knowable, and would claim for their principle merely that it formulated the results of experience and would prove a trustworthy guide of life. But the doctrine that the ultimate nature of reality is unknowable is itself a metaphysical

¹ It is one of the ironies incidental to the development of thought that the biological theory of evolution, which was precisely the contribution required from Physical Science to round off and amplify the humanitarian conception of progress, should, for half-a-century, have been the most potent intellectual weapon against humanitarianism. This unfortunate result appears attributable to a confusion between different planes of thought. When evolutionists set themselves in earnest to find a meaning for such terms as "higher and lower," "fit and unfit," which come so readily to the lips, they cannot well avoid the appeal to a rational standard of ethics. With the introduction of such a standard there arises the possibility of distinguishing the processes which make for the evolution of a higher type from those which tend only to differentiation. The upward process, the "orthogenic line," as it has elsewhere been called, being thus distinguished, it became possible to define its tendency as that which makes for the advance of mind towards self-mastery. But this is again the self-conscious Spirit of Hegel, the self-directing Humanity of Comte.

It is very noteworthy that Mr. Kidd, starting from the biological point of view, has in his later work (*Principles of Western Civilization*) laid great stress on self-conscious development as the turning point in Evolution.

proposition which is open to question. It is equally possible to hold that all knowledge is, so far as it goes, knowledge of reality. On this view reality shows its character in experience, though in our limited experience it shows it only in part. If, then, the whole course of history, or say rather of physical, biological, or social evolution, is to be summed up in this—that it is a process wherein mind grows from the humblest of beginnings to an adult vigour, in which it can—as in the creed of humanity it does—conceive the idea of directing its own course, mastering the conditions external and internal of its exercise, if this is a true account of evolution—and it is the account to which positive science points—then we cannot say that this is a mean and unimportant feature of reality that is disclosed to us. We can hardly suppose such a process accidental or quite peculiar to the conditions of this earth. At any rate, as far as the widest synthesis of our experience goes, it shows us Reality neither as a providentially ruled order, nor as a process of fortuitous combinations and dissolutions, but as the movement towards self-realization of a mind appearing under rigidly limited conditions of physical organization in countless organisms, and arriving for the first time at a partial unity in the consciousness of a common humanity with a common aim.

8. To enter more fully into the questions of historical fact and philosophic interpretation raised by the humanitarian theory would be beyond our present scope. But on the ethical question which it suggests a word should be said. To begin with, we may remark that as a standard of action the conception of human development requires some further definition. A Utilitarian in particular might ask whether it is any and every sort of development that we seek, or only such development as leads to happiness. If the former, he will contend that our standard is bad; if the latter, he will maintain that we are after all Utilitarians, taking Pleasure as an ultimate end, though we may call a scientific view of the collective life of Humanity our means to that end. By introducing the idea of historical growth we have not after all evaded the philosophic problem. How moral ideas have arisen and grown is one question, how and by what principle we, as conscious and reflective beings, ought to shape

them, is another. We must therefore revert to the question raised by the Utilitarians, and ask how the standard they propose looks in the light of the further developments of thought which have been traced.

The Utilitarian theory, we saw, rested principally on an analysis of Desire. Now in the controversies to which this analysis has given rise, two opposite fallacies have been revealed. On the one hand, pleasure has been taken as the direct and universal end of action. On the other, those who have refused to identify pleasure and the good, have denied all relation between them, or have reduced pleasure to the position of a result supervening on the attainment of desire. Now inasmuch as pleasure is distinct from happiness, this latter position has a justification of its own, but this has hardly been the point of the controversy.¹ When we have distinguished Will and Happiness as having to do with the permanent elements of well-

¹ To resolve happiness into pleasure was the initial mistake of the Utilitarians. In part it proceeded from the influence of the Humian metaphysics, which denied permanent "substantiality" to the ego and resolved it into a series of states. Such an ego could only have a series of feelings, and to such temporary feelings the name of pleasure and pain are appropriate. But at bottom, I think, it proceeded from a laudable desire to define a man's happiness as something strictly pertaining to his own conscious existence. Without such a strict definition the fundamental question of modern ethics is not fairly faced. For the man who sacrifices happiness to duty admittedly "does well," and from this it is easy to proceed to the proposition that "it is well with him," and that he is accordingly a "happy" man. In that way of putting the argument (which has nothing to do with the empirical fact that by abandoning apparent happiness a man may obtain real inward peace, which is conscious happiness in another form) the old ambiguity between happiness as something felt and happiness as the possession of admirable qualities is revived, and the question whether the one should be given up for the other is blurred. The Utilitarians deserve more credit than they have received for forcing a clear statement of the question by resolutely defining happiness in terms of feeling. On the other hand, if the self is more than a series of fleeting states, happiness is more than a succession of pleasurable feelings. If the self is the permanent constitution or psychical fabric which is the subject of experience, happiness is the relatively stable condition of the structure—the quality which tinges ordinary life and lends it a roseate hue, which makes pleasure joy and pain bearable. I say relatively stable, because though in a measure dependent on our own personality—so that some have a happy, others an unhappy temperament—it is capable of being temporarily or even permanently destroyed by the really great events of life—some one's death, or the ruin of a cherished hope. It is *οικειόν τι* in that it belongs to our personality, and *δυσσάφαιρόν* in that no light thing robs us of it. But under the misfortunes of a Priam the most that can be said is "*διαλάμνει τὸ καλόν.*"

being from desire and pleasure as concerned with the temporary, the same question arises in a new form. Is personal Happiness the direct object of Will, or do we choose a certain mode of life from merits of its own, and merely find happiness in the fact that we are able to realize the results of efforts?

There is a third alternative which seems to accord best with the analysis of effort and to be supported by comparative psychology. In speaking of pleasure we are apt to forget in English the Greek distinction between τὸ ἡδύ and ἡ ἡδονή, the pleasant object or action, and the pleasure which we feel in relation to the object or in performing the action. The normally constituted animal on the whole desires things that are pleasant. Were it otherwise, pleasure and pain would have no function. For they come into existence by serving the function of regulating impulse, encouraging one impulse, and modifying or inhibiting another. The impulse to eat nasty food is checked by its nastiness, the preference for pleasant food is encouraged by its pleasantness. Indeed, in the life of the lower animals all that we know by direct observation is the encouragement and the inhibition, and the permanent effects thereof. The pleasure and the pain we impute to the animal on the analogy of our own consciousness. The value of this machinery for the regulation of impulse is that it enables the hereditary structure to become more elastic. The animal which can learn by pleasure and pain may have impulses which would lead to its destruction if not checked by the painful results, but for this very reason it is not compelled to come into being with all its modes of behaviour preordained, but may safely possess a richer inheritance, enabling it to deal with wider variations of circumstances. The implication here is that the pleasurable on the whole coincides with the life-giving, and the unpleasant with the harmful.

Impulse then is on the whole regulated by pleasure, and pleasure is on the whole subservient to the needs of life. But (1) impulse is the primary fact. It is directed to outer objects—to seizing prey or avoiding an enemy—and when transformed by the experience of pleasure into desire, it still retains this character. The desired object is attractive, and the attraction is not essentially a faint anticipatory realization of the pleasure to

be derived from it.¹ (2) The adaptation of desire to pleasure, and of pleasure to life-giving, or as we may call them developmental ends, is never perfect. Human, and even animal, nature is many-sided, and a function which on the whole tends to preserve the stock, may have many harmful developments which natural selection fails to lop off. Thus the pleasure of eating and drinking, which on the whole is necessary, may stimulate over-eating and over-drinking, which are *pro tanto* harmful. Further, different impulses and different pleasures may conflict with another, and those which are on the whole most necessary to the life of the species may be thwarted by others felt with greater immediate intensity.

Here is an opportunity for a conflict which is already apparent at times in the behaviour of the higher animals, but acquires far greater importance in the life of man. The developmental, "orthogenic" line of humanity lies in the direction of social growth, and accordingly man finds his principal source of abiding satisfaction in social relations. But the fulfilment of the social functions conflicts often enough with the animal impulses, and the social relations themselves being from the first complex, the claims of a wider may be thwarted by those of a narrower group—*e. g.* a civic duty by parental love. The larger life of humanity could not have come into existence but for the psychological development whereby men became capable of rising above desire for this or that pleasurable object to broad conceptions of modes of life in which abiding satisfaction could be found. The permanent bent of the character towards these wider ends—which we may call generically the good as conceived by men—we distinguish from Desire and call Will, while the satisfaction found in them, which is a permanent character of feeling rather than feeling itself, is Happiness. We may thus conceive Will and Happiness to be related on a higher plane, as Desire and Pleasure on a lower, and what has been said of these last will apply *mutatis mutandis* at this further remove. It results that the Will must be in the main directed not towards Happiness but towards the objects—possessions, activities, modes of life,

¹ This appears most clearly in the negative instance where impulse retains a partial ascendancy over experience, and we are impelled towards a thing though experience has shown a heavy balance of pain in the fruition thereof.

human relationships—in which Happiness is found; that the mean point of its aims will lie upon the developmental line, but that the aims of individuals will deflect from this line in all directions in greater or less degree, in accordance with the imperfect harmony between the individual nature and the requirements of social development.

9. It follows further, that if moral obligation depends on a rational coherence in our conception of what is good, its standard must be one in which this conflict is overcome. At the same time it is to rest on human nature, and find its support and practical efficacy in expressing the mean direction of human endeavour. We have then to find the element of harmony in actual conceptions of the good. Now looking back on the genesis of Impulse, Desire, Pleasure, Will and Happiness, we find them related at every point to developmental needs. The things which support the life of the individual and of the race are the objects which at successive stages impel, excite desire, cause pleasure, or are sources of permanent happiness. This is true of the springs of action, from hunger to romantic love, and from fear to a patriotic devotion. But we have also seen how the susceptibility which is based on a vital need may either have a morbid growth or may conflict with some other need, it may be of the same individual, it may be of another, it may be of the higher development which would render possible a fuller life. Thus the line of harmony is indicated along with the causes of deviation. Unless there is some inherent discrepancy among the vital needs of the race, actions will harmonize as long as they accord with those needs and not otherwise.

Now the absence of any inherent discrepancy among vital needs is not to be lightly assumed. The life of one individual may be the death of another, and it is only the establishment of social peace, involving much repression of impulse, which makes possible a harmony of effort as between many individuals. Thus the function of the social order—and its psychological counterpart, the ethical order—is from the first to form a kind of synthesis wherein the “goods” of each become the good of all. But since the “goods” of each lie in realizing the objects to which their natural bent leads them, that system will provide

the most complete harmony which admits of the fullest development to all its members, and thus we rise beyond the conception of vital needs to that of developmental possibilities.¹ But the development which is finally judged good can only be a social development—a development of which the manifold sides on the whole do not thwart, but subserve one another, which makes the most therefore of all the foundation instincts of humanity, the impulse to love, to help, to right the wrong, the thirst to know, and to create. In this movement of the human spirit towards the full realization of its powers and to the mastery of itself and of the world, every side of human nature can find its scope, and at the same time its discipline. In such development lies for each man the only happiness that does not ultimately result in the pain of another. I emphasize both terms, for the end is not happiness—not even the general and permanent happiness of the human race—abstracted from its spiritual growth, nor its growth abstracted from its happiness. The end is the spiritual growth in which happiness is found.²

The analysis of Desire and Will, Pleasure and Happiness, has thus led us by another road to that conception of a synthesis or harmony of Action, which we saw above to be the postulate of a rational theory of moral obligation. And this synthesis we have now found in the ordering of conduct by the needs of human development. But if this is so, it is, so far as ethics are concerned, a justification of the idea of a spiritual evolution in humanity as providing a possible basis for a consistent moral order, and therewith a rational ground of moral obligation.

¹ Since every development is a "good," except in so far as it hinders other development, it is clear that any moral system, even though it may establish a harmony of its own, is inadequate which curtails any form of development unnecessarily. Hence the *fullest*, as well as the most harmonious, development is the ideal.

² Another way of putting the question as between pleasure and desire, will and happiness, is to ask, *e.g.* whether the value of a given object consists in the pleasure derivable from it, so that if we imagine the pleasure removed the value would disappear also. If the answer is affirmative, the conclusion may be drawn that the thing itself is indifferent—merely a means to pleasure. If negative, that the pleasure is, as it were, adventitious and irrelevant. The true answer rather is that the pleasure we take in a thing is merely another expression for the value we attach to it. But the value is attached to the thing. Or if we prefer the phrase, the pleasure is in the thing, related to the thing, not a subsequent effect which the thing opens to produce and which might as well be produced by anything else.

10. Further, this conception of a moral order is designated as the appropriate outcome of ethical development by the character of that development itself. For if we are right in regarding the "practical reason" as the harmony of feeling and impulse, we may conceive all ethical development as a progressive realization of this harmony, the turning point in which is the recognition of the truth that harmony is the end to be obtained. For such harmony does not come of itself. We grow up with instincts and desires determined by the conditions of our life and that of our ancestors. This life is social, but imperfectly social. Hence love, affection, generosity, candour, honesty, truthfulness, modesty, courage, are as much a matter of "natural" instinct, reacting on early surroundings, as the desires for personal gain and esteem. These qualities arise under the conditions of existence which determine the character of a social animal, a character without which man cannot exist. In the same way the conditions of existence determine the growth of the tiger's claws or the bird's wings. But for the same reason, since human life is not social through and through but is strife as well as co-operation—strife of individuals within each social group and of group with group—the fighting qualities, the self-regarding centrifugal characters develop in the same measure, and envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness are as "natural" as their opposites. But if the rational in man is the impulse towards harmony, and if this harmony is a social harmony, it follows that the "practical reason" has its roots in the first class of qualities, and its main object is to bring the other class under discipline, reducing them to the legitimate measure of natural fire and pride and self-respect, by which personal rights and individual freedom may be maintained, and thus ultimately serving a social end. The first part of this principle was, as we have seen, apprehended by the great religious teachers, who sought to banish the principle of self-assertion from the world, and to erect an ideal of character on the basis of universal benevolence and pure self-negation. This attempt is indeed the starting point of true rationalism, but its principle is too narrow. Self-development is as much a duty as self-negation; the love for individuals is as necessary to the healthy working of life as general benevolence; the quiet,

resolute maintenance of rights as useful to society as the performance of duties. A social philosophy which admits these elements into ethics, takes a more comprehensive view of human nature, and renders possible a wider and more complete harmony, and therefore a more rational moral order.

11. Shifting our point of view from internal character to codes of external conduct, we trace the working of the same influence. We start with custom growing up unconsciously in rough accordance with the conditions of life in a rude society, and modified without regard to any social ideal or any deliberate calculation of values as the pressure of social forces intensifies in one direction or relaxes in another. The craving for some kind of reason for the rules which tradition prescribes is satisfied by a reference to the unseen world, to the working of magical forces, or the will of spiritual beings. At first the will of the spirits merely coincides with that of average humanity, and serves only to reinforce the code of retaliation, to sanction group morality, and intensify the blood feud. But as the movement of reflection begins, and the forces which make for peace and harmony are ranged together in contrast with those which tend to disunite and destroy, the divine becomes also the ideal, and God appears as the author of a higher law than the tradition of the ancestors. But this crystallization of the moral code, however valuable in itself, is an obstacle to further development, and leads to a war, not merely between the spirit and the flesh, but between those spiritual elements which the divine code sanctifies and those which it reprobates and leaves out of account. Moreover, the foundation which appears so secure, the existence and attributes of the Deity, the authenticity of revelation, the title of the divine word to obedience are themselves called in question, and reason, acquiring more confidence in herself, demands a basis for conduct in some principle by which assent will be compelled as it is compelled by science. She returns from the supernatural to nature, and declares that moral truths must have their foundation there if anywhere. Nature herself provides a code for man anterior to all legislation, superior to social conventions, independent of the accidents of political or social development, the idiosyncrasies

of race or class, a standard to which further legislation should seek to conform. But the work of scepticism is only beginning. The authority, indeed the very meaning of Nature itself, must stand an examination which shows that its apparent definiteness and authority are illusions. Virtue is natural, but so also is vice. Truth is founded on nature, but it is also in human nature to err. Life is the scene of a seeming conflict between Ormuzd and Abriman, and how are we to recognize the banner of Ormuzd? We need a standard of value which must prove its genuineness by the same test which we apply to speculative principles. It must give harmony, order, coherence to our efforts and our judgments, while its negation must leave them disordered and discordant. This function the humanitarian would claim as fulfilled by his principle, which makes the furtherance of the collective life of humanity the supreme object of endeavour, and the standard by which all secondary moral rules and all institutions of society are to be valued and determined. This object, he would say, includes all the partial aims of man, all his loves and joys, hopes, ambitions, tastes, his love of family and fatherland, his thirst for knowledge and for beauty—all so far as they do not antagonize one another, but are capable of entering into a higher synthesis. For this capacity for harmonization is his test of Truth. The ultimate principle, which is to guide the collective mind on this view, is nothing more nor less than self-knowledge—comprehension of the Purpose of its existence and growth, and of the conditions upon which its growth depends. These conditions underlie all earlier conceptions of ethical and religious truths, and moral progress is the gradual "conversion" of the mind whereby their nature and meaning becomes apparent.

12. In this development we may be asked how much may fairly be attributed to modern thought with its peculiar contribution. May it not be said that the same point of view was in essence reached by Greek philosophy? It may be said that the Greeks from Socrates and Plato onwards raised the fundamental issues, and in one system or another offered solutions which do not differ in principle from any propounded in the modern world. There is, however, a difference between a principle in

germ and the same principle in its full development and explicit application, and much of the Hellenic anticipation of modern thought is of this order. But further, the Greeks, as already hinted, had a simpler problem before them. Their analysis was masterly, but it was the analysis of a less developed ethical consciousness, and an experience neither so long nor so many-sided as that of the modern world, which has absorbed Asiatic along with Hellenic ideas and those of the fresh barbarism of the West. Hence when even the same solution is given in the same words by a modern thinker the meaning is really different. The problem is deeper, the synthesis required of wider reach.

It was the achievement of the Greek thinkers in the classical period to establish a harmony between the just requirements of individual self-development and the life of the city state. These were the terms which they had to bring into relation. But at every point these terms were altered by social and mental evolution. The requirements of the self were heightened and deepened as the antithesis between the spiritual life and the bodily was more keenly felt. The notion of the social order was fundamentally changed by the decay of the city state and the rise of world empires and world religions, and the required harmony could no longer be sought by a simple and direct identification of interests. Modern thought in its search for a solution has been driven, and is constantly being driven, deeper in its analysis of conceptions, which are at first used as primary starting points, into the experiences and modes of thinking from which they are derived. Thus it has sought to analyze personality and find a meaning for it in conscious experiences and the mode of their interconnection. Similarly it reduces happiness to terms of conscious experience, and therefore distinguishes it from the "well-doing" with which "well-being" might easily be identified. Again, it takes to pieces the idea of the natural, and seeks to reconstruct it in terms of the elements of order or connectedness in experience. Thus on the side of the individual we are brought down to the sequences and correlations of concrete experience, and the order and growth that we can find therein. On the side of the social order there is a parallel analysis and reconstruction. The *de facto* laws, customs, institutions and beliefs of society are seen as growths arising from

mental and social conditions in which the essential and the accidental, the rational and the arbitrary or the false, have to be separated out by getting back to the fundamental underlying conditions of social life and building up therefrom. Such a reconstruction was already postulated in the idea of the law of Nature, but it could only begin to be effective with the genesis of the principle that Nature is itself a growth, the products of which are appropriate each to its own stage, while the true meaning of the whole is only to be seized by overcoming the relative standpoint and viewing results in relation to the conditions from which they issue. The function of modern thought, then, appears to be to reduce ethical and social conceptions to the ultimate elements and conditions from which they have grown up, and working from this basis to build up a conception of a world order, conformity to which is conceived as matter of rational obligation. Permeated throughout by the idea of growth and the dependence of belief and custom on the phase which growth has reached, it carries the conceptions of Greek thought back further towards the elements from which they were derived, and conceives a larger synthesis—a movement throughout the vast variety of things that are good towards the realization of a comprehensive purpose—a synthesis resting on the totality of experience and utilizing it for the working out of a purpose comprehending the totality of human effort. In this synthesis it is not the idea of humanity as such that is the most distinctive element. This idea was possible, as we have seen, to ancient ethics, which culminates in the conception of man as a member of the world state—"dear city of Zeus"—ruled under the providence of God in accordance with the code of Nature. The difference is that in modern thought the principle of human development under whatever name becomes in a new sense the pivot upon which ethical conceptions turn. The idea of relativity and development are the distinctively modern contributions to thought, and in ethics they play an important part. Humanity is not merely a community existing as part of a Kosmos. It is something—a spirit or an organism according to whatever inadequate metaphor we choose for its designation—which has come into being, has grown and is growing before the eyes of us who are part of it. It is not merely that duties are

owing to it, but its needs prescribe what our duties are. Hence though our argument has gone to show that our ethics are founded on deep-lying instincts, and though the humanitarian idea is held to be only the explicit recognition of a principle that was all along implied in the conscious moral judgments of mankind, yet the effect of this principle once recognized is a Copernican change of attitude. Hitherto human conduct has been conceived as bound by law—first by divine law, then by natural law. But if the humanitarian principle is correct, man is not made for the law, but the law for humanity. Instead of religion being the basis of ethics, ethics becomes the test to which religion must submit. The relative value of the creeds is measured by their ethical efficacy, and the ethical consciousness is seen to be the only firm point of departure for any attempt at a spiritual interpretation of nature. As with religions, so with social institutions. Property, contract, marriage, the position of women, class distinctions, political obligations, the right of warfare and of conquest—all these in olden days were founded on custom and supported by divine authority. Whoso would seek the good of society must work within the limits thus rigidly laid down by the moral or the religious tradition. When revolts against these limitations occurred, they took the form of appeals to expediency, and perhaps of a sweeping denial of moral obligation, or again of the assertion of some counter principle of no greater claims than that which was called in question. In a rationalistic system of morals the whole point of view is changed. These institutions have grown up in rough accordance with the circumstance of social life, but they have no value or validity except in so far as they subserve human needs. On the other hand, they are not to be set aside on particular occasions when they happen to be inconvenient, as the doctrine of expediency suggests, not only because in the long run nothing is so inexpedient as the practice of unsettling society, but also because the rights and duties recognized by the ordinary consciousness when viewed genetically are seen to have arisen in response to social needs, and to contain elements, however roughly put, of ethical truth. They are like the empirical generalizations of common sense which contain truth, though not accurately true as they are, and historically speaking they are seen to develop, to

expand, define themselves, deepen and purify their meaning as ethical thought has developed. Thus they lie ready to hand as a basis for a scientific sociology. Sociology, therefore, is not compelled to start from an empty slate, and consider what in each case would promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It has rather to take the institutions it finds, and aim at a scientific determination of the function which they fill in the life of humanity.¹ Take the case of private property, for example. Here is an institution which from one point of view may be regarded as the only method of securing to the workman the fruits of his toil. Under suitable conditions it may in reality have that effect. Under other conditions it may as easily become the means of excluding the great mass of the people from the means of earning an independent livelihood. When the right of property is made absolute, whether as right natural or right divine, there is no ethical means of discriminating between the two cases. All the wealth of the country might fall into a single hand, as in Mr. Wells's romance, yet if it were in the bond society could do nothing but submit. Rights pushed to this point are answered by rebellion, and are therefore justly stigmatized by Bentham as anarchical fallacies. They provoke the doctrine of pure expediency, which denies that there is any right but the welfare of society. But though this is true in a sense, it omits the important consideration that one of the chief factors in the welfare of society is that its members should know what they are entitled to expect, and they should be entitled to all the freedom necessary for the development of those faculties which makes them useful members of society; and this is only saying in a more roundabout manner that they should have the fullest rights compatible with the conditions of social life, and should be carefully secured in their enjoyment.

¹ The great historical example of this method is, of course, the work of Bentham. For an estimate of the reforms achieved under his influence see Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England*, pp. 183-209. Professor Dicey, in whom after many years Bentham at length finds a fair judge, does not ignore the limitations of the Utilitarian basis. These, in fact, were such as to render sure going possible only so far as the means to the general happiness were matter of obvious common sense. For the more complex problems, economical, social, religious, political, of the modern world a scientific sociology is needed, and the need is even more urgent than in Bentham's time.

In other words, though it is true that all rights are conditioned by the public welfare, the public welfare on its side depends on the maintenance of rights. The rationalist criticism of property would have to meet all these points. It would have to discuss the functions which the institution of property performs, and so define it as to secure that it should perform those functions and obstruct no other useful organ of the social structure. It could not be satisfied with upsetting generally recognized rights wherever they happen to be inconvenient, nor with the permanent maintenance of rights which can be shown to entail a balance of evil consequences. It would have to take the institution of property and examine it in all its developments and ramifications, to consider inheritance and bequest, the nature of exchange and the resulting distribution of wealth under the conditions of modern industry, the effects of monopoly and the growth of values arising from the increase of population, the morality of acquiring wealth from occupations injurious to the people at large—these and countless other details have to come up for judgment in a scientific reconstruction of the nature and measure of the rights of property which a rational scheme of ethics would recognize as suitable to be maintained in the permanent interests of society.

13. Such a reconstruction is not the work of a day—and in social development, be it remembered, a hundred years are but as yesterday. If we would know the fruits which ethical rationalism has borne we must seek them, not in the work of any one school which has apprehended the principle in all its fulness—for no such finality is as yet, if it is ever, possible—but scattered in the work of different and often opposing schools, in which the principle has been apprehended partially or under different aspects. Indeed the influence of the humanitarian spirit in the modern world has been far wider than that of all the schools which could be called distinctively humanitarian.¹ For where there are few who will agree that

¹ Still more obviously is it wider than any school or schools of Philosophy. The distinctive ideas of the modern mind have expressed themselves in a thousand ways, in lyric poetry and in music, in fiction and the drama, as well as in avowed political and sociological or religious discussion. In

human ethics form the root from which all true knowledge of religion springs, there are many who will admit that the relation between religion and ethics has been in a manner reversed in the modern world, so that whereas ethics was formerly based on religion, religion is now deemed to have its firmest root in ethics. Many again who would doubt or reject the conclusions reached above as to the ultimate basis of obligation, would yet admit that humanitarian ethics, whether acting directly or through a revived religious consciousness, has had a large share in the distinctive changes that have made the modern state and the civilization of the modern world. In this broader sense humanitarianism has in fact touched every department of practical morals—class and racial divisions, the position of women, the law of marriage, the criminal law, the law of war, the rights and duties of states, the claims of nationality, the right of property, the law of contract, the rights of association and of citizenship, the equality of religions. We find the humanitarian spirit in that recasting of values which makes the infliction of misery on mankind a sin not to be erased by any access of national glory. We find it in the heightened sympathies which begin to make cruelty a crime, and in the calmer insight into human nature which banishes the use of cruelty in the repression of crime. We find it in the heightened belief in the power of reason which suggests that in the end rational suasion and just treatment are better methods of leading men to see what is good for them than the shorter and sharper expedients of the drill sergeant, that freedom to advocate error is the best social safeguard for truth, and to rule by the consent of the governed the surest road to social stability. Humanitarianism indeed has justified the Christian ethics on its positive side. As against those who maintained that the Sermon on the Mount had only

particular, the contrast between the realities of human nature and the conventional assumption of traditional ethics has been handled with more boldness and far more wealth of detail by the novelist and the dramatist than by the professed philosopher. If in the text I have confined myself to philosophy, it is because here the movement of thought receives, not indeed its fullest expression, but its most exact analysis, and is therefore presented in the form most easily comparable with the thought of earlier stages.

an ideal meaning applicable to a better world, it has vindicated the practical application of the Beatitudes to this world of ours. It has shown that when we look at matters from the point of view of common humanity it is true that there is none so lowly but he must be considered equally with the noblest, that the spirit of mild equity is better even in the interests of order than that of harshness, that it is a hard fact that hatred does not cease by hatred but by love, that the fundamental remedy for evil and for error is not physical force but spiritual regeneration. In a similar spirit it has been able to show that in industry it is not the hard master but the liberal employer who practises the best economy, that from the mere point of view of the output free labour is better than slavery, and highly organized labour than that of the sweater's den; that in politics self-government is a better preservative of union than a centralized despotism, and that order is best maintained when those who have to obey share in the framing of the rules. In a word, it has not only reconstructed ethics, but it has shown that the ethical is valid—that it works as a force to be reckoned with in human affairs. But with no less emphasis ethical rationalism has insisted on that active development of human qualities which supernatural religions have too often ignored. It has justified individuals, classes, creeds, nationalities, that have stood resolutely by their rights and fought for their liberties. It has fostered the newer education of the faculties and ridiculed the sentimentalism which regarded all independent initiative in one half of the race as a kind of indecency. In short, it has conceived the permanent elevation of both sexes and all classes to a life in which they could enjoy that free and full cultivation of their powers, which the best of the older civilizations only imagined to be possible for a narrow class.

Of the future of rationalism it is not our business to speak. We are not concerned with prophecy, but with the analysis of past and present tendencies. But one common misconception may be guarded against. There is a tendency to think of any "rational" system as claiming a certain finality, as forming as it were a closed circle from which the world of imagination is quite shut out. Nothing could be further from the true spirit of reason, which insists as a first principle on the relativity of all

human conceptions, on the narrowness of the area reclaimed by knowledge as compared with the ocean of reality, and on the unlimited power of human capacity to expand and explore. Nothing is more certain, if the rationalist doctrine is true, than that doctrine itself will grow, and, as growth implies, will change. But precisely because such changes are to be expected any attempt to define their outcome must be valueless. The rational ideal must be an ideal of growth that can accept change, and as it were assimilate it. We may hold the expansion of human faculty, the perfecting of social unity, the ascendancy of mind over the conditions of nature and its own existence, for formulas which in different words express imperfectly, but in the best way at present attainable, the supreme end in which all human interests are summed up. But whither this expansion, this growing sovereignty will lead us, is a question to which we can return no certain answer. We stand on the edge of illimitable, unexplored regions, into which our vision penetrates but a little way. But at least we can dismiss as foolish the fear that science will exhaust the interest of reality, or peace destroy the excitement of life, or the reign of reason cramp imagination. The conquests of mind have a very different effect. The more territory that it brings under its sway, the vaster the unconquered world looms beyond.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LINE OF ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

1. ETHICS as treated in the present work is the study of the regulation of life. This regulation, as we saw in Chapter I, begins in the animal world. We find it indeed in the lowest grades of life. For while at this level intelligence in the sense of the purposeful use of the animals' own experience plays a small, perhaps at the bottom of all, a vanishing part of the matter, action is determined in almost every detail by methods of response to stimulus (internal or external) which are fixed by the structure inherited by each individual from its ancestors. There is every probability that these methods, which display a general, though by no means perfect, adjustment to the requirements of the organism are in an indirect sense actually determined by those requirements. In every generation individuals which gave the responses best suited to preserve themselves and bring offspring into the world would probably survive in the largest numbers, and by the constant repetition of this process structures, fixedly determining the most suitable response to each kind of stimulus, would arise and be handed on. In this exceedingly slow, cumbrous and roundabout method, some of the experiences of the past generation (those, namely, which directly affect life, death, and reproduction) determine the behaviour of the present generation, and so determine it as to aid in assuring the future maintenance of the race. Thus from the lowest organic grades upwards we have a rough correlation of the past, present, and future experience of the species.

The simplest organic responses are, as we saw, of the Reflex

type. These proceed with an almost unvarying mechanical sameness, with little, if any, adaptability to varying needs. But at a slightly higher stage they pass into Instincts which, though they are generically inherited modes of response with essentially the same history and function, are more elastic in their operation and admit, as they expand, of correction by experience and modification according to varying requirements. Such instincts, as has been remarked, are not confined in their function to the service of the individual. They are directed to the production of the young as well as to the maintenance of the life of the parent. At a fairly low level they are directed, further, to the preservation of the young when produced. At first very rudimentary, this parental instinct assumes more and more importance as we ascend the scale and as intelligence arises to assist it, but there is no reason to doubt that its basis is throughout instinctive. That instincts of this kind should arise in the animal world might indeed be expected from the operation of those conditions under which instinct has grown up. What we have supposed is that certain stocks have survived in preponderating proportion in so far as the behaviour of their members was well adapted for the maintenance of the stock, and the production and care for the young by each individual or each pair would be as important an element in this process as the preservation of each individual itself. Thus biology does not lead us to assume an original egoism or self-regard out of which altruism is evolved as a secondary result. Egoism is something at once too deliberate and too limited to be primitive. What we infer alike from biological principles and from observed facts is rather an unreflective, possibly a quite unconscious, impulse growing by heredity into a determinate instinct producing responses adapted to the maintenance of the stock by means of the maintenance of the life of the agent and its young.

In the lowest stages there is no reason to think that instinctive actions are accompanied by any sense even of the proximate end which they are adapted to secure. Not only so, but there are definite reasons for thinking the contrary. Such blind action we call generically Impulse. But far down in the animal scale we found cases in which impulses are arrested by pain or

encouraged by pleasure. These introduced us to a new feature in the conditions affecting behaviour. The act of the individual is now no longer fixed by the inherited structure, but, in these cases, modified by the effect of the individual's own past experience. The inherited structure is affected by experience, and the reactions which it will give are re-modelled accordingly, with the result that they are better adapted to securing an immediate consequence to the animal in the shape of a satisfaction obtained or a pain avoided.

It would be premature to call this modification of behaviour intelligent. But, still within the animal world and on the plans of instinct, we get a higher adaptation. We find actions which are modified, not because they are felt as pleasurable or painful, but because they produce pleasure or pain in the sequel. That is, the act and its consequences are distinct for the animal; and the relation between them seems to be intelligently rather than mechanically established in its mind, since *e. g.* an animal which has been punished for some darling sin will restrain himself under circumstances which might lead to detection, and enjoy himself when he feels secure. Here, as we find that action is successfully varied according as it does or does not produce a given effect, we may say that the relation of the act to the effect, that is the purpose, is the determining factor. Impulse so modified becomes Desire and Aversion. On the other hand, though we should say that it is desire for things that are pleasant (*τὰ ἡδέα*) rather than for pleasure (*ἡδονή*), it is still pleasure (and pain) that are the moderators of desire.

But the same intelligence which transforms impulse into desire renders possible the concrete apprehension of other individuals. To the higher animal, its master, its young, its friends, and its enemies are known apparently with some measure of individual recognition, and moreover their behaviour, what they do, what they express, and what is done to them, are often matters of lively concern. Hence, though we can no more see inside a dog's mind than inside that of another human creature, we attribute sympathy to the one as to the other, and if we allow the dog intelligent purpose in securing his own pleasure and avoiding his own pain we must by the same reasoning treat as purposeful what he does for another

creature, human or animal. So we may attribute, not merely the gregarious instinct, but also the rudiments of a social intercourse to the higher animals, and hold that their actions are adapted, not only by instinct, but also in some measure by conscious intelligence to the protection, relief, or satisfaction of those for whom they feel affection. Thus we now find a considerable enlargement of the sphere of intelligence. We find it aiding in the adaptation of actions not only to the immediate, but to the somewhat more remote satisfaction of the agent, and also to the satisfaction of others whom the agent loves. But in all this it must be remembered that the inherited psychophysical structure is the underlying condition. It is that which makes experience pleasant or painful, and it is this, for the most part, which renders possible and also limits the circle of affection.¹ The main lines of behaviour, social as well as self-regarding, are laid down by inherited structure in accordance with the conditions of race maintenance. Only variations within these lines are left to the play of intelligence. Nevertheless this play increases the adaptability of the individual, enlarges the part which it plays in the world, and enables it to maintain the stock with a smaller number of descendants and with less waste of life.

2. While animal purposes, in the strict sense of the term, appear to be limited to the concrete results of each particular action, and, so far as directed to the good of another, to be swayed wholly by feeling, in man we saw that the rise of general conceptions—a process which may be regarded as at once the effect and the cause of the growth of language—enlarges the scope of purpose and renders possible the laying down of fixed rules by which action is judged and the handing on of these rules by tradition. Forming a concept of himself as a permanent being with varied interests, of his wife or children, his social group, etc., in the same manner, man re-acts to these

¹ I mean *e.g.* that though a mother cat may tend a kitten intelligently at times, yet the basis of mother love is instinctive. At this stage "natural selection" would even combat a wider love, since it would interfere with the predominance of any given stock which indulged it. So the conditions of race maintenance appear both as positive and negative determinants of social feeling.

larger interests just as the animal does to the immediate stimulus of desire. This re-action to larger purpose we have called Will; distinguishing it from Desire, because in it the whole personality tends to be involved rather than a single sense or a single emotion, and because its object is not that which gives pleasure, but those deeper conditions of life in which the more stable conditions of happiness are found. But the will does not set to work to construct its ends in a kind of vacuum of the pure reason. It finds itself guided and limited from the first by rules containing the traditions of society, and forming a standard by which the conduct of each man will be judged. These rules embody a tradition, the origin of which is for primitive man himself lost in myths. We do not, and probably never shall know in detail the actual stages by which the earliest customs originated. On the other hand, we do know something of the conditions by which custom in general is maintained and of the forces by which it is modified. We know, for instance, how customs change and grow and disappear unconsciously as an individual stretches a point here or makes a new application of a precedent there. We can see how the interaction of multitudinous forces transmutes custom and produces a new tradition before any one has been aware of the change, and we have no difficulty in conceiving the original growth of custom out of the inherited impulses of gregarious man as proceeding along the same general lines. It needs but that these impulses should be formulated and generalized, and there is already custom in germ, and the growth of custom will be of the highest value to nascent society as enabling men to understand each other, *i. e.* to know what in given circumstances each may expect from the other. The lines on which custom is formed will, however, be determined in each society by no reasoned principle, but by the pressures, the thousand interactions of those forces of individual character and solid relationship which never cease re-moulding what they have made—men's loves and hates, their hopes and fears for themselves and for their children, their dread of unseen agencies, their jealousies, their resentments, their antipathies, their sociability and dim sense of mutual dependence—all their qualities, good and bad, selfish and sympathetic, social and anti-

social. We were able, however, on general grounds to lay down two limits within which from the first custom must move. First, it must bear some relation to the character of primitive man. That is to say, although custom doubtless imposes upon him many restraints, nevertheless those restraints in the main fall into line with his own fears, reluctances, sympathies, and antipathies, and do not deviate from them to the snapping point. For if this point is frequently reached, not merely in exceptional individuals, but in the average member of the tribe, there must either be a change of custom or anarchy. This limitation will cut both ways, will equally prevent the level of social tradition from rising above or from falling below the level which in this rough manner corresponds to primitive character. The rule of conduct must in effect be so far adapted to the nature of primitive man as to embody much of what is bad in him along with much of what is good—his limited sociability, his hatred and dread of strangers, his craven fear of the unknown. Evil and anti-social impulses, in fact, contribute to the first formation of the moral consciousness, along with affections and sympathies and the dimly-felt need of co-operation.

In the second place, the body of custom must upon the whole be suited to the conditions which make for the maintenance of society, since otherwise they will tend to its dissolution. But once again, the beneficent efficacy of these conditions must not be exaggerated. In the first place, particular customs may be injurious provided they are not fatal. They may be the consequences of some idea which upon the whole makes for good order. Thus the taboo may be useful for the preservation of property. It may, however, have many useless or harmful applications. Further, when we speak of customs suited to the maintenance of society, we really mean the maintenance of a given social type. A custom which is quite necessary at one stage may block the advance to a higher stage, and if conditions are arising which make that advance possible, society will gain by its removal. The fact that custom rests on the requirements of social life does not render it inviolable in cases where those requirements have altered. However, when all these limitations are allowed for, it remains that without any reasoned conception of social welfare the broad conditions of stock

preservation indirectly determine the main lines of conduct just as they do in the animal world, only those conditions no longer operate merely by fashioning the physical structure of the organism. They operate also through social tradition, and thereby once again are rendered more elastic, and are able to shape action over a wider sphere. The starting point, then, for the development of human ethics is custom arising and maintaining itself, not through any reflective thought as to what is best, but by the play of human impulses within the limits of a life lived in social groups.

3. From primitive custom as our starting point, we can conceive ethical development as proceeding along three different lines. We may conceive it as an evolution in ethical conceptions, in the character of human beings, or in the established relations of society. To consider first the movements of ethical conceptions, we have found it closely bound up with the development of thought in general, of ideas as to the nature and origin of things and the destinies of man. Now the evolution of thought, stated in general terms, consists on the one hand in growing precision or accuracy of analysis, on the other hand in the ever extending reach or grasp of experience, the result being a more and more articulate understanding of an ever larger segment of reality. In this development we may distinguish certain phases, though we should regard them rather as milestones that mark the advance in a single journey than as gaps parting distinct stages from one another. Bearing this caution in mind, we may briefly recapitulate what the previous chapters have shown. In the lowest stages of human thought, then, we have seen reason to think that the difficulty of forming any conceptions at all is such that the familiar categories of common experience are blurred and intermingled in a manner which makes the result to our minds an almost bewildering mass of confusions. Attributes and relations become substances, while distinct individuals melt away into one another and preserve no clear-cut identity. There is no sound basis of generalization, no methodical interconnection of ideas, and no adequate distinction between the imaginary and the real, or between make-believe and earnest. Inferences are

formed by unconscious assimilation, by fusion or confusion of ideas, and by the influence of emotional prepossessions. Distinctions that are most elementary in the structure of knowledge are quite insufficiently grasped, and the result is seen in magic, witchcraft, and the primitive doctrine of the quasi-material spirit. It is a great step forwards when the world of ideas begins to be purged of these confusions, and thought no longer blurs and obliterates the primary lines of distinction, the common categories into which experience falls. Persons now are persons, functions are functions, relations are relations. Concrete experience is reflected with sufficient distinctness in mental pictures or images, and the thought-world, instead of being a distorted and confused rendering of the world of sense, is rather its counterpart and duplicate. The gods at this stage form a second human community in another sphere. Pure fancy, or fancy guided by crude ideas of physical causation, plays freely round them and gives them a living personality, often a really concrete character, with family, social and political relationships, loves, hates, joys and sorrows, and complete life histories. Progress from the inarticulate to the concrete idea is thus reflected in the transition from spirits (and occult forces) to gods.

Now the gods are already not only human, but in varying degrees superhuman. They preside over great departments of nature or of human life, thus embodying a wider and more discriminating colligation of experience. But, further, they often show traces of idealization, and in this we get a hint that the world of ideas is destined to be something more than a mere reduplication of sense experience. This brings us to the next step in advance wherein image-making develops into thinking. The "picture" ideas, loosely defined and uncritically connected, are transformed into definite or "abstract" conceptions; the "general" notion vaguely applied into the Universal, which wherever used has one constant meaning. Such concepts, of which those of number and quantity, Spatial and Temporal order are probably the first to arise, are connected, developed and tested by systematic methods of analysis and synthesis—the concept once rendered exact being capable of methodical comparison with other concepts.

But beside the minor "departmental" conceptions which give

rise to special sciences or to methodical arts, the fundamental all-embracing categories of experience also enter at length into clear consciousness. The mind had learnt in its image-making to represent Persons and Attributes, Relations and Functions, and to keep them distinct. It now learns to recognize what it is that distinguishes them, and so to form conceptions of Personality, Attribute, Relation, Function. In so doing, it has grasped and set before itself as distinct objects of thought the structural principles of its world. It is now in a position to attempt a theory of reality as a whole, to deal with the problems of permanence and change, of reality and appearance, of the finite and the infinite, and all the other antinomies which present themselves as soon as a serious effort is made to conceive a totality of things. Its theory of the world-process, its God, if it finds the solution in a God, is an embodiment, so to say, of the categories which it finds most satisfactory. God is infinite, absolute, unconditioned, the First Cause, perhaps the true substantial reality of things. He is also—since a foundation is required for practice as well as for theory—an incarnation of the moral ideal.

Here, then, we have reached the level of the philosophical, or, as we have called them, the spiritual religions, systems which seek to concentrate all experience in one focus and to illuminate all reality from one centre,—thought, as ever, becoming more comprehensive as it becomes more explicit. But such syntheses, however formed, contain in themselves the germ of contradictions,¹ the cause of which is not fully understood till thought

¹ Speaking generally, these arise, as appears further on, from the mental attitude which takes the categories as vehicles of ultimate truth, rather than as modes of rendering experience and interconnecting experiences. The more the "metaphysical stage" develops, i. e. the more the mind disengages itself from imagery, and insists on exactitude of conception and reasoning, the more clearly the inherent difficulties of this point of view emerge. The contrast between the hard insufficiency, the narrow finiteness of the categories and the subtle plasticity, the boundlessness, the variability of experience becomes almost disruptive of thought. At times it forces the mind by a confusion of planes to find reality in the categories themselves, and not in metaphysics alone, but in many departments of ethics, politics and law, the lines of distinction and definition which conceptual thought draws become stones of stumbling when gradations of meaning and the actual continuity of nature are to be dealt with. The world of thought tends to fall apart from the world of experience. But thought is meaningless unless it illuminates experience. This, as already indicated in principle by

has taken a fresh turn in which the genesis and function of conception in general is made the subject of inquiry. This in its simplest form is a return from the ideal to the actual, and as such is carried out in miniature in every special science. But the criticism of method has a deeper implication. It involves, when pushed through, an inquiry into the ultimate basis of knowledge, and the paradox of the inquiry is that since to inquire and examine is still to think, the very processes that are being examined have to be used in examining them. Nor can we who criticize place ourselves outside that which we are criticizing. The human mind is a structure which has grown up under conditions, and the thoughts which it forms and the criticisms which it passes on its thoughts depend upon that structure. Not only the thoughts, but the experience which they are to interpret is, again, conditioned by the structure of the sense organs. We are therefore compelled to regard the highest conceptions which the mind can reach as conditioned by the nature and limits of the mind itself, and to recognize that even though we could frame a theory which might commend itself to us as an adequate interpretation of our experience, it does not necessarily follow that it would express the final truth about reality. But further, when our conceptions are analyzed to the bottom they are found not to give an adequate interpretation of experience as a whole. On the contrary, it is when we endeavour to grasp our world as a totality that we fall into contradictions. Criticism, therefore, compels us to realize the limitations of our own thought, and to desist from the endeavour to force the universe into the narrow moulds which our experience has so far enabled us to frame, when what is needed is rather to enlarge our conceptions by taking in fresh experience. For it does not follow that because we find limits, these must be limits fixed for ever. On the contrary, the study of evolution indicates the possibility of indefinite growth. It helps us to understand how our mental structure has arisen from very humble beginnings, and how its methods, its logic and its philosophy have grown up in the continuous endeavour to grasp and organize its experience, and so direct and under-

Aristotle, is the starting point of criticism, alike of the special criticism of a particular science, and of the general criticism of philosophical analysis.

stand its own life. We measure a sufficiently great advance from the first dawn of consciousness in an animal which can just learn through pain, to the synthesis of the sciences and the analysis of philosophy, and we can in some degree judge thereby of the possibilities of further development. We can understand that what is readily intelligible to the highest human intelligence should be wholly inconceivable to a savage, and we must learn to understand that our own thought is no more final than that of the savage, but at best represents mental growth advanced by one stage.

It does not follow that we are landed in mere scepticism. The thought which gives harmonious, coherent interpretation to experience is true so far as it goes. It is only as a final interpretation of Reality that it is never the whole truth. In this relation truth means for philosophy a necessary phase in the development of the final synthesis. Each new interpretation, provided it is honest and intelligent, carries us a stage forward. The error is only in taking the completion of the stage for the end of the journey. Truth is no empty dream. She is a phantom only when we think that we grasp her. She is real when, recognizing that she is a being enthroned above us, we are content to touch the hem of her robe.

The tendency of the critical movement which constitutes philosophy is therefore to trace the conceptions, methods, and principles of thought to their elementary conditions in the nature of mind and its relation to reality. Starting from these conditions it re-models the whole idea of knowledge and of the nature and test of truth. Reality is conceived as something more than experience, and the truth attainable by man is seen to be only a partial approximation to the final truth of things. As a consequence thought is recognized as a growth, and its conceptions as the products of a given phase, having their genesis in earlier phases, and the test and measure of their validity in their power to contribute to that coherent, systematic interpretation of reality towards which growth aspires.

Thus in dragging to light the conditions of the cognitive process and the factors at work in the building up of thought, the philosophic movement renders the mind conscious of its own nature and history. Here it impinges on the results of the

physical and social sciences which have been building up the conception of evolution, and the effect, according to the view of contemporary thought here taken, is to establish the conception of mind in growth as the central fact of experience and the basis from which we must start in the further interpretation, alike of knowledge and of conduct.

4. Turning from the movement of Thought in general to the special sphere of Ethics, we have now to summarize the evolution described in the previous chapters. The resulting picture of the phases of Ethical development will show a rough parallelism with that of Thought in general. This could hardly be otherwise, since the two movements are in constant interaction. At the same time, since other influences affect ethics the parallelism is not exact and must not be exaggerated, and this caution must be taken as qualifying the general descriptions which a summary statement can hardly avoid. We have to consider the evolution of the ethical idea, as it were, in its depth and breadth; that is to say, in the degree of clearness and intensity with which its distinctively ethical character is realized, and in the extent to which it succeeds in directing conduct and organizing life. In this evolution we have found several phases. Now the general features of the ethical idea according to our analysis in the last chapter are that every man as a responsible agent stands under certain obligations, whether to himself, to others, or to society as a whole, defined by the requirements of the common good; or, in other words, that men are deemed good or bad in accordance as they do or do not recognize certain rights and duties important to the welfare of society as a whole. Obligation is the general expression for the relations in which men accordingly stand, and it is (a) in the way in which obligation is conceived—and (b) in the conduct which it covers, that ethical evolution is principally seen.

Now in the lowest stage of customary ethics obligations of a social character are undoubtedly recognized in a certain sense, but (1) they are almost entirely limited to the relations of men and women in small groups, and (2) though they tend to secure certain fundamental rights, yet the protection that they give is in large measure indirect. For example, human life is

protected by the blood feud, but the custom of the blood feud is not based upon the principle that human life is itself sacred, but on the principle that I must avenge a wrong done to a member of my kindred. Property is protected by the law of restitution or, within limits, of blood vengeance, yet when we look into the matter more closely we find that it is not because the thief ought to be punished, but rather because a man who has suffered theft may reasonably demand restitution or avenge himself. Similarly, the marriage tie is maintained in the sense that any husband may reasonably be expected to kill a man who violates it. The idea of justice is not separated from that of retaliation. Thus, the elementary rights and duties on which social life is founded can hardly as yet be said to be recognized as rights or duties, that is to say as matter of direct moral obligation, even in relation to fellow-members of the same society.¹ Nor again, is character as yet, strictly speaking, the subject of a moral judgment. So little is this the case that primitive justice draws a very insufficient distinction between the intentional and the unintentional or between the agent and his relatives, and even personal identity is not clearly conceived when the actions of a man may freely be attributed to a spirit which possesses him temporarily.

¹ It may be said (1) that after all there are from the first certain laws directly enforced by society, (2) that within the innermost group the general obligations of mutual aid and mutual forbearance are often, if not always, true "categorical imperatives." Both objections are valid so far as they go. But (as shown in Part I. ch. iii.) they only cover a section of the sphere of conduct. The principal obligations to the majority of the community are only recognized in the indirect sense explained.

It may be urged that it is all a question of group-morality, that within the innermost group obligation is directly enforced, and that the tribe or community is merely to be regarded as a wider group not yet fully brought within the area of obligation. But this account would not comprehend all the facts, viz. (1) that the "wider group" here spoken of is normally a true society, the different members of which meet and mix freely. The later group-morality leaves out the stranger or the slave, but this earlier rule of custom does not properly include the associate and the equal. (2) That the "subjective" side of morality as shown in the text is undeveloped. (3) That the magico-animistic basis of obligation is distinctly non-moral. We may conclude that while there are from the first some direct social obligations which form a beginning of morality proper, considered as a whole obligation in its lower stages is not merely limited in its application, but undeveloped in its character. We can hardly yet speak of a morality which decides impartially between the claims of different persons, but rather of the half-instinctive recognition of the restraints rendered necessary by the solidarity of the group.

This view of customary morality is supported by what we know of primitive ideas as to the basis of custom, for in the lowest grades of ethical thought the sanction of conduct is found in taboos and other magical terrors or in the fear of vindictive and resentful spirits. But the powers of magic have no moral purpose, and the spirits of animism are neither essentially moral nor immoral. In general they are guided, like men, by the law of retaliation. But the mere dread of vengeance from a spirit has no more morality in it than the corresponding dread of a man. On the whole, then, social rules in this stage, though doubtless supported by ethical feeling, are not yet clearly conceived as moral obligations.

A step onwards is taken when certain rights and duties are attached to members of a society as such, when, *e. g.* it becomes a duty to protect life instead of merely aiding the avenger, to guard property instead of only countenancing retaliation upon the thief, to redress wrongs and yet in so doing to entertain questions of responsibility. This stage appears distinctly in the earlier civilizations, though remnants of cruder barbarism of course survive. The essential features of group-morality are still retained. Obligations do not in principle exist in relation to those outside the group, and the moral consciousness is still drenched through with the old spirit of self-assertion, the passions appropriate to the struggle for existence among small and ill-organized groups of mankind. On the other hand, certain social duties are now matters of direct obligation. The basis of this obligation is still in the supernatural, but with the development of religious ideas it tends to take a more ethical character. The deities, heroes and ancestors of the anthropomorphic religions, which on the whole are dominant in the higher barbarism and the earlier civilizations, are morally superior in the main to the animistic spirit, and would be still more so but for the persistence of myths dating from the animistic period. They are generally—though with some terrible exceptions when magical ideas persist—at least as just as a fairly good man, they are opposed to demons and to witchcraft, and in some instances they have an element of the ideal. Moreover, some gods or perhaps some specially-developed spirits often undertake the special protection of the moral law or branches thereof, and one or more

of them are often judges of the dead. Thus at this stage it is not uncommon to find that there are some gods who stand in an essential relation to ethics, and, though the fear of punishment is not a high motive, yet a god who punishes acts because they are wrong is very different from a god who merely avenges an injury. His existence is a recognition of the moral idea. But the spiritual needs imposed by the conception of judgment are insufficiently met at this stage by sacrifice or magical rites instead of repentance and forgiveness, and even if the gods prefer justice they are hardly as yet incorruptible judges. Considering morality as a whole at this stage we may say that certain social duties are recognized as obligations, and obligation is based on human and divine sanctions. But just as the social code is a confusion of "love and hate," so the divine world is a blur of the just and the unjust, the righteous and the tyrannically wicked. There is as yet no thoroughly worked-out ethical ideal, human or superhuman.

It is the emergence of such an ideal which gradually transforms the primitive code of blended love and hate. In close connection with the spiritualized ideal of religion, an ideal of character is set up in which there is no room for the virtues of enmity; forgiveness replaces the duty of revenge, self-sacrifice the exaction of one's due; the humility of self-suppression supplants the pride of self-assertion. This implies a profound modification of the original moral consciousness, which arising under the influence of division into groups has the anti-social or disuniting blended with its social or binding tendencies. The principal change that moral history records is the subjection of this side of morality to the purely social element in the moral consciousness. It is paralleled by a no less revolutionary change in religious thought. The materialistic deity disappears. God is spiritual, and the non-spiritual elements of His worship are gradually eliminated. True, the judgment of the dead (or as an alternative certain automatic consequences of good and bad actions) hold a prominent place in the spiritual religions, but for the best minds the notion of retribution as a basis for morality is already transcended. God rules by love, and not by fear. On the other hand, in so far as the omnipotence of the Creator and the necessity of faith in Him as the basis of all goodness are

hard pressed, the ethical falls into the second place and may even be opposed to the religious view. And the actual content of ethical teaching is affected by the position which it holds. Though the social qualities are emphasized, their social function is often misunderstood, and self-suppression rather than the service of others is the central point of the ethical ideal. And thus, though the teaching of the world religions laid the foundations of humanitarianism, it has often tended paradoxically enough to paralyze humanitarian energy, and by holding up an unrealizable ideal to remove virtue from the world and make it possible only in the monastery.

At this stage, then, moral rules have reference to a distinct ideal of life and character. This ideal still rests on some supernatural mode of being, but the supernatural is itself the incarnation and expression of moral perfection. Idealism, however, is not necessarily critical and a further step is taken, according to the view put forward in the previous chapters, when the attempt is made to set out systematically the full implications, personal and social, of the moral judgment.

The attempt to construct or reconstruct the ethical order upon the basis of a reasoned theory of life was initiated by the philosophic movement of antiquity, which, though it appealed less strongly to feeling and missed at the outset some grace and tenderness of the religious ideal, left the individual personality standing, and made the development of its faculties rather than their repression the end of conduct, recognizing that individuality has its claims, that even original self-assertion contained a kernel of truth, and that what humanity claims is self-devotion rather than self-effacement. But in proportion as the idea of personality becomes the centre of ethical teaching, it must follow that rights and duties are regarded as belonging to every human being as a responsible agent, and human character, the development of faculty and the living happiness of men and women become the ends of life. A direct consequence of this view is that the duties and rights formerly dependent on membership of a group are now universalized. But with this universalism all of primitive custom that belongs to the law of enmity drops away, and the law of love is reached by another road and under another name. Humanity becomes a single com-

munity, and the Law of Nature—an ideal by which all positive law should be judged—prescribes our duties as members thereof.

But we are still only in the first phase of rationalism. When modern thought returns from the supernatural to Nature, it learns from physical and moral science alike that "nature" is not fixed but changing. It has, then, still to decide where in the series of changes lies the true upward path. We have to recognize that the ideals and principles by which we have judged things are themselves of relative value, the product of an evolution which has reached a certain phase and is destined to grow beyond it. Hence the problem for modern thought is immeasurably more complex than that of the ancient world. It is to be solved, if the view taken in the last chapter is correct, by tracing moral ideas to the conditions of racial life from which they spring, and maintaining as valid those which correspond to the permanent conditions of human progress.

The ethical order being thus interpreted, the claims of duty are urged on the ground that when we thoroughly understand its nature and all its bearings on our own life and that of humanity, we are compelled as rational beings to recognize its validity, and admit that the ends to which it points are wider and greater than any private good of our own that may conflict with it. Thus for rationalism the moral basis lies in the unfolding of the full meaning of the moral order, as that through which the human spirit grows.

To summarize the whole evolution in the fewest possible words, it would appear that at the outset customary rules have not acquired the distinctive character of moral laws. Next, moral obligations are recognized, but are not yet founded on any general ethical principle. Up to this point the morality of primitive social tradition persists, wherein "love and hate," the social and anti-social impulses are blended. In a third stage, moral principles and ideals of character and conduct are formed. The anti-social elements of morality are in principle suppressed. On the other hand, neither the origin nor the function of morality is as yet understood. It remains for philosophical criticism, beginning in classical antiquity and revived in the modern world, to trace ethical conceptions to their sources in human nature, and re-model them in accordance with the

principle that every rule of conduct must be based upon the demonstrable needs of human life. We may describe the whole process as one in which, by successive steps, the full meaning of the ethical principle becomes clear. Obligation resting at first on occult forces or the resentment of vindictive spirits, and then on the wrath of a not unjust god, comes to be based on the nobler desire to be at one with God or to realize a higher spiritual life, and, finally, extrinsic consequences being dispensed with, on the inherent goodness of the life which it renders possible. The social bearings of morality emerge by a parallel process. Duties at first indirectly guaranteed become directly inculcated. Next they are so extended as to overlap the bounds of group-morality and destroy the claims of self-assertion. Finally, the reason of the thing is rendered clear in the exposition of the common good as the source and object of duties and rights alike. By successive stages obligation becomes first a distinct element in consciousness, and finally a principle, the whole meaning of which is gradually thought out.

5. With the deepening consciousness of ethical meanings goes a wider and more coherent synthesis of experience and purpose. Primitive morality (whether in the first or second stage) builds up bodies of custom, introducing a measure of order into life. These rules are in an indirect manner fashioned by racial experience, since they are handed on by tradition, and their effect upon the social welfare can seldom be without an influence in determining them. To this extent early morality may be said to direct conduct towards social welfare on the basis of past experience. On the other hand, the rules of conduct are not combined into a whole or harmonized by subordination to any clearly understood principle, whether an ideal of personal conduct or of social organization. On the contrary, they are in large measure such as to justify social disharmony.

In the ethics of the spiritual religions the correlation is more complete. There is an ideal of character, a principle of right-living, to which all rules of conduct are subordinated. This, being a rule of peace and love with all the world, possesses at least the potentiality of a complete synthesis of human purposes. On the other hand, there is little direct

actual experience of mankind into account, and in effect the tendency is to idealize one side of virtue—self-negation—and leave no room for the conception of self-development. On the social side also, though many of the best social virtues are exalted, there is a tendency to disregard the actual working of society as a merely mundane affair. Thus, though there is an express and deliberate correlation of the conceptions of good conduct, it is of a kind which leaves much that is most valuable outside its scope.

The philosophical movement by its criticism of the conceptions of good and bad aims at a fuller correlation. Greek philosophy harmonized self-development with the common good of the city state, but had behind it less of the spiritual experience which builds up the idea of self-negation and none of the social experience which could give life to the conception of a world polity. Modern thought bringing ethics into relation to the theory of development conceives a synthesis of which the total recorded experience of the race—an experience always operative, though in earlier stages less consciously—should be the basis, and the further development of mind in society the end—a correlation of past and future racial experience.

It helps us to understand the character of ethical as of all mental evolution—when we observe that at each stage the mind as it expands brings within its scope the conditions and influences which have previously acted upon it unawares, but that in so doing it rationalizes and therefore modifies them. Thus the custom of the blood feud is enforced because it is custom, or nominally because it so pleases the gods. But the real value of it is that it tends to secure life. This is the latent or unconscious factor which fosters the institution in early society as making on the whole for order. In the next stage this factor enters into consciousness, and protection to person becomes a right and to recognize it a duty or a virtue. But words such as “right,” or “virtue,” carry weight only because men make moral judgments, approve certain types of character, etc., and the implication is that a certain type of character, or of social or religious life, is the guide and norm of conduct. Accordingly the next step is that this ideal enters consciousness and is set before man as his end. But lastly, the influences which determine

him in his preference of one character over another are a complex mass of traditions, instincts, partial reasonings. What is coherent in these appears to be what makes for the growth of mind in man, and the final step is to bring this aim into consciousness as a rational principle and the base of what went before. In looking backward over the process which has led us to this point we realize that the same factors, though not in the same rational form, have been present all along. The conditions of maintaining a social life operate in the very formation of social instinct and tradition. Custom, that is to say, is fixed by certain psychological forces and inter-relations of man and man, which arise, and are maintained, and grow, because the society which they engender can support itself in its environment. These forces all along underlie the work of consciousness, until bit by bit consciousness encroaches on them and takes them into itself. In so doing it transmutes them with something from its own quality. It makes them rational ends, and as such into forces that make not merely for life, but for a good life, and a life of growth and development.

Though the phases of development here distinguished pass into one another by such gentle transitions that the very attempt made to distinguish them may appear artificial, the total change which they constitute is of no small importance. Taken as a whole it forms a distinct stage onward in the evolution of mind, not unfairly comparable to that which parts the mind of the lowest savage from that of the beast which he chases and adores. Just as mental evolution enters on a new phase—a change of kind so far as the phases of a continuous process are ever changes of kind—when the nascent human intelligence formulates for itself in general ideas experiences which were already operating to direct its inferences, though before it knew them not nor named them, so a gradual but not less fundamental revolution is effected as the “eye of the soul is turned” upon the methods by which these generalizations are built up—that is to say, from the objects of thought to the processes by which they are formed, the conditions on which they rest, in a word to the mind itself, its nature and potentialities.¹ At the beginning of

¹ For we are dealing here with an order of reality—the ultimate conditions of knowing and being—which underlies the simple general truths of common sense just as these underlie the concrete and practical relations

this revolution the thought-world is occupied by the fragmentary and confused ideas of the primitive mind, moulded without criticism in accordance with mental predispositions out of the mass of unsifted experience and tradition. At its end, as the result of a movement which extends from the first attempt to observe a fact or define an idea to the profoundest analysis of the conditions of the cognitive process, is the synthesis of racial experience in which the mind grasps the conditions and possibilities of its own development, conscious for the first time in the full sense of its own nature and growth. This movement has its close parallel in ethics. At the beginning is custom with its blend of the ethical and unethical, accepted without criticism and guiding life without system or general plan. At the end is the rational order of conduct founded on the conditions of human development, and directed to the furtherance of that development as its supreme end. If finally we put together the results of the intellectual movement which reveal the conditions of development and of the ethical which make its furtherance the purpose of life, we recognize that the evolution of mind in man from being a blind, unconscious, fitful process has become a purposive, self-directed movement. This is the fundamental change effected in the course of human history.

6. So far we have traced ethical evolution as an evolution of thought. But in questions of morals it is easy, fatally easy, for thought to outstrip action. How far, then, does this development of conceptions correspond either to an actual improvement in social relations, or in the character of human beings? As to the first question we may say that in the social evolution from the community based on kinship to that which rests on Authority, and from this again to the State which rests upon consent, there is a very rough and irregular correspondence with the ethical and religious evolution here sketched out. The primitive society of the kindred is the natural home for the morality of custom, while at the other end of the scale the modern state embodies many elements of humanitarian morality. In the intervening

recognized by the animal mind, and to do so implies a new turn to mental activity—the bringing into consciousness of methods and processes—which is quite as profound a change as that involved in the first attempt to draw out the “universal” that lies in the particular.

stages we can recognize that social peace under a strong authority made a suitable arena for the work of the spiritual religions, while the city state correlates itself with the beginnings of ethical philosophy. On the other hand, we have been compelled to admit that social and ethical development do not always advance together. Social changes are in large measure unconscious, uncontrolled by any intelligent direction, and the more completely so the further we go back into the beginnings of history. Hence they do not run precisely parallel with the growth of mind, but at times impede, at other times again forward it. But as the higher phases are reached the two processes fuse into one. For the State rests on a measure of Right in the relations of men, and is so constituted as to be modifiable by the deliberate act of the community. In the method in which changes are effected indeed we find a definite evolution from the unconscious and unnoted changes of custom, through the deliberate changes introduced on occasion by the fiat of authority to the organic legislation of the modern world in which at its best there is an effort to determine social progress in accordance with a rational ideal. When this stage is reached social and ethical evolution become one. This union becomes realized in proportion as the mind attains that control over its own growth which it already possesses over the processes of nature. Here, as Comte first made plain, lies the true significance of the history of science. Through science mind dominates nature; first physical nature, then organic nature, lastly the conditions—physical, psychological, social—of its own life and growth. This movement goes on at an ever accelerating rate, and as it proceeds the conditions of a rational guidance of social life are one by one being satisfied. At the basis of these stands the mastery of external natural conditions, in which regard the last hundred and fifty years have witnessed a complete revolution, and so far there is every indication that the changes of the coming century will be not less, but even more sweeping. Next come the laws of life, the conditions of health, the causes of disease, the factors of physical evolution. The scientific treatment of these subjects can scarcely be said to be more than seventy years old, and it may be maintained without exaggeration that little as we know even now, the sum of what we have learnt in that time as to the

true causation of disease, as to the nature of heredity and the modifiability of organisms, far outweighs all that had been learnt in the previous two thousand years. There follow the laws of mental growth, and here our own time has witnessed the emergence of psychology as a science, and education as a true art aiming at educing from the mind what is in it, aiding natural development, and stimulating or correcting it at need, as the physician follows the efforts of the body towards the restoration of the balance of health—the whole a conception still in merest infancy, but already promising a vigorous life. Here, then, we have the conditions forming for development of body and mind and their maintenance in health. To these have to be added the scientific adjustment of the relations of man to man—sociology. Here, again, we have a science in its infancy, but the mere attempt to deal with public questions in the spirit of science implies an advance ethical as well as intellectual. At any rate it is on the possibility of controlling social forces by the aid of social science as perfectly as natural forces are controlled at present by the aid of physical science, that the permanent progress of humanity must depend.

7. For progress is not something that goes on of itself by an automatic law or an inherent tendency of things. The struggle for existence is not as such a force that makes for betterment, and in fact in human history we find epochs of progress followed by long ages of stagnation or retrogression. If the evil of the world overthrew the doctrine of unconditioned creation, the disorders and reactions of history are no less fatal to a purely teleological doctrine of the world process. There remains the possibility, however difficult to conceive in concrete shape, of a spirit subject to conditions and achieving its full growth only by mastering them. If this view is correct, progress is made only in so far as the conditions of life come more and more under the dominion of Mind. There is nothing in the scheme of organic evolution to determine that the higher type should prevail except the inherent strength of the type itself.¹ On

¹ In so far as it bears on the ultimate question of the element of purpose in Reality as a whole (as distinguished from the scheme of organic evolution) this statement should be qualified by the considerations advanced in *Mind in Evolution*, pp. 402–406.

the other side of the account let us bear in mind that there is no evidence of any permanent force working against the higher type as such, or singling it out, as it were, for destruction. Evil is not a positive force. There is no real Ahriman that strives with Ormuzd. Evil is merely the automatic result of the inorganic. Physical evil results from the impact on the spiritual order of natural causes which intelligence has not been able to subordinate to its ends, moral evil from the clashing of purpose in minds which have not been brought into an organic unity. Hence the working of that retributive principle in history whereby whatever is evil, being inorganic, conflicts with itself and perishes "by its inherent badness," while the elements of goodness, of rational harmony, in the long run support and further one another, and this upon the whole at an accelerating rate in proportion as they have already acquired organic union. Here is that internal inherent strength on which the spiritual order depends for its ultimate victory.

Thus the principal method of spiritual progress lies in this—that what is achieved at one epoch is a starting point for fresh development. Hence progress is sure and continuous in proportion as it depends on the principle of tradition, i.e. in proportion as the gains of the past can be handed on and form a capital for advancing the operations of the future. This method is most readily applicable in the case of positive knowledge, wherein it is possible for every student to equip himself with all that Newton or Darwin have to teach. But when something more than mere learning is required, other factors enter in. Even in the realm of thought so far as the deeper principles are concerned, every man must in a measure go through for himself the processes which Hume or Kant thought out, if he would really understand what Hume and Kant mean. Still more is this true of moral thought. We must have some spiritual experience of our own to enable us to realize what the message of Christ or of Buddha means. There must at least be an inward mirror to reflect the spiritual light. Hence ethical truths have sometimes been lost, or at least have lain dormant till new prophets have arisen to inspire them with fresh life. Nevertheless tradition, the mere contact with great ideas, counts for much in the ethical field, and there

is on the whole a clear though not an uninterrupted advance of ethical teaching.¹ But when we come to the development of character, the third point of ethical growth, the case is altered. So far as ethical teaching affects character, tradition has its influence. But so far as the foundation of character is inherited by each of us from his parents wholly different conditions apply, and the question whether the innate characteristics of men tend to improve, stands on a wholly different footing from the question whether their collective achievements in the realm of thought and of conduct exhibit growth and development. The data for deciding this question do not appear as yet to be sufficient. The laws of heredity are in large measure unknown. So far as natural selection is concerned, its operation is known to be extremely slow, nor could it be favourable to character unless the conditions of life in society were through many generations such as to eliminate the more selfish, less honest, less generous type, and preserve in greater degree those who are more worthy. How far this has been the case I must not here attempt to determine. We can easily imagine that some virtues, such as parental love, have been fostered by the better chances of survival enjoyed by the children of loving parents. Of other virtues it is less easy to speak with any certainty. At many periods social institutions have directly

¹ The bearing of tradition on progress may be measured by comparing knowledge, morals and art. Knowledge—the whole collective achievement of thought—takes the lead in progress because each generation can acquire the whole possessions of the past unimpaired and add to them its own. In ethical theory this is less easy in proportion as what is required is the deeper thinking-out of principles rather than the addition of past experiences. Nevertheless the road once trodden is always easier to traverse anew. In ethical practice we have not only to learn, but to come to be, and thus in large measure each must accomplish for himself, yet tradition still operates in that it is incorporated in law and custom and the spirit of a people. In art there seems to be epochs of progress in which some new vein is struck out by pioneers. This is worked by one artist after another, each learning from the last, till the best that can be done along that line is reached. The vein is then exhausted, and subsequent work along that line produces less and less ore and more and more dross. Tradition at this stage becomes a real barrier to progress. Meanwhile other pioneers are striking out in a fresh direction, and art revives in a new place. The cause of this brokenness of its history seems to be that the function of art is to give perfect expression—that is, expression in which the feeling-tone of the sense-symbols used precisely fits the thought expressed—to whatever facet of experience the artist seeks to approach. When this is once done adequately it cannot be done again.

tended to eliminate the stock of those best fitted to serve society. I think, for instance, of religious persecutions, or again of the ideal of celibacy which over great tracts of the world operated for centuries to deter many of the best men and women from perpetuating their stock. Nor is the question whether, morally considered, the human breed has in fact improved, by any means easy to settle empirically. Considering the improvement of ethical conceptions, is the actual improvement in our conduct as compared with that of our ancestors greater than we might expect, or even as much as we might expect? He would be a bold man who would found an argument for the improvement of the human breed by heredity on a dogmatic affirmation in reply to this question. Upon the whole we must be content for the present to leave this factor in evolution an uncertain quantity. Ethical progress is essentially a progress in ethical conceptions, acting through tradition.

These conceptions, as they advance, are, as we have seen, in a manner realized in law and custom. Here the element of tradition plays its part. But in so far as the old vices of character remain, the work is always liable to be undone and needs constantly to be done over again. The very growth of society sets up new problems needing a re-thinking of old ethical ideas, so that here again the ethical advance is fitful and uncertain. As society becomes larger and more complex many of its obligations become more remote and impersonal. Losing their direct application to our neighbour whom we see, our charity and our sense of justice are diluted and lose their strength. Our sympathies cease where our imagination fails to reach, and the great fabric of government is apt to become an inhuman machine advancing blindly over the living flesh and blood that happens to come in its way. Yet the vaster the social organism the greater is the triumph when justice, kindled to new life, has again sent a purified blood through its arteries. Its successes are achieved for larger portions of mankind, and their basis is wider and more secure.

But if our general conception of evolution is correct, the further development of society will follow a very different course from its past history, in that it is destined to fall within the

scope of an organizing intelligence, and thereby to be removed from the play of blind force to the sphere of rational order. Such a change must be gradual and attended with many setbacks. The very ideas which are to direct it are yet in their infancy. Yet the social self-consciousness which gives them birth, arrived at as it is by a blending of the moral, the scientific and the religious spirit, is for us the culminating fact of ethical evolution. But such an end can only be a beginning. Mind grasps the conditions of its development that it may master and make use of them in its further growth. Of the nature of that growth, whither it tends and what new shapes it will evolve, we as yet know little. It is enough for the moment to reach the idea of a self-conscious evolution of humanity, and to find therein a meaning and an element of purpose for the historical process which has led up to it. It is at any rate something to learn—as, if our present conclusion is sound, we do learn—that this slowly wrought out dominance of mind in things is the central fact of evolution. For if this is true it is the germ of a religion and an ethics which are as far removed from materialism as from the optimistic teleology of the metaphysician, or the half naïve creeds of the churches. It gives a meaning to human effort, as neither the pawn of an overruling Providence, nor the sport of blind force. It is a message of hope to the world, of suffering lessened and strife assuaged, not by fleeing from reason to the bosom of faith, but by the increasing rational control of things by that collective wisdom, the *εἰς ξυνὸς λόγος*, which is all that we directly know of the Divine.

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
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


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